

Indo Gr
h/2

THE LIBRARY
OF THE
University of Toronto,
FROM
THOMAS HODGINS, M.A.
1890.

Thomas Hodgkins.

RECEIVED

GREEK PARTICLES



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007

HOOGVEEN'S

GREEK PARTICLES.

HOOGRAVEN

Price 7s. 6d. Boards.

GRAND PASTOR

HOOGEVEEN'S GREEK PARTICLES,

ABRIDGED

AND

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

By THE REV. JOHN SEAGER, B.A.

RECTOR OF WELCH BICKNOR, MONMOUTHSHIRE,

AUTHOR OF CLASSICAL CRITICISMS IN VARIOUS NOS. OF THE
'CLASSICAL JOURNAL.'

T

LONDON:

PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

SOLD BY LONGMAN AND CO.; BALDWIN AND CRADOCK;

SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL; WHITTAKER AND CO.;

PARKER AND VINCENT, OXFORD; DEIGHTONS

AND NEWBY, CAMBRIDGE; AND ALL

OTHER BOOKSELLERS.

PUBLISHED BY THE SAME.

VIGER ON THE IDIOMS OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE; Translated into English, and abridged for the Use of Schools. By the Rev. J. SEAGER, Author of 'Critical Observations on Classical Authors,' and several Greek Criticisms in the Classical Journal. 8vo. Pr. 9s. 6d. boards.

'The publication before us is well fitted to carry students still farther into the recondite parts of that majestic language, and to display to them much of that interesting mechanism which escapes the un instructed eye. We, therefore, gladly lend our assistance in so rational an attempt as that which is here undertaken, and observe with pleasure that, in conformity with the improved spirit of the age, Mr. Valpy's list of New School Books contains several others on the same plan.'—*Lond. Mag.* Nov. 1828.

'This Volume is compiled with much industry and judgment; and altogether a more valuable service could not well have been rendered to the inquiring student of the classics. We have great satisfaction in announcing that the same able editor is about to favour us with the critical works of Bos and Hermann executed on a similar plan.'—*Oxford Literary Gazette*, No. 3.

'But when they have made real advances in Greek prose, read over with them the whole of Vigerus. Mr. Berry, what I now recommend, is really one of the most useful parts of education. You should make them read Vigerus in this way twice every year for five or six or seven years.'—*Dr. Parr.* See *Johnstone's Life of Parr*, Vol. 8.

BOS AND HERMANN are under abridgment on the same plan, and will soon be published. [Hermann in November, 1829.]

* * The four Works will form about 200 pages each, and may be purchased separately, or together in one vol. 8vo.

2095

21/10/1890

8

PREFACE.

ONE of the principal difficulties of languages arises from their *particles*. That difficulty is perhaps greater in the Greek language than in any other. The intellectual people, who formed that language, attended with greater nicety than others to numerous modifications, transitions, and connexions, of thought, and expressed them by a variety of particles, to which none can be found equivalent in languages constructed with less acuteness and refinement. The meaning and use of many of the Greek particles being thus incapable of a short explanation by literal translation, they have been the subjects of multiplied and voluminous discussion. One of the most renowned Professors¹ of the present age has written a treatise in four books,² occupying sixty-six folio columns very closely printed with very small types, on the little particle *αὐ* alone; which thus makes perhaps as great a figure as its little rival word *ὅν* in the *Parmenides* of Plato. Of those who have been unable to assign any certain and distinct meaning to particles, some have had recourse to a device almost as ingenious as the *Lusus Naturæ* of natural

¹ Professor Hermann.

² Published in the last Number of the new edition of H. Stephens' *Thesaurus*, printed by Mr. Valpy.

philosophers, and have declared them to be mere expletives, altogether void of signification; while others have attributed to them meanings which are wholly gratuitous and imaginary.¹ To overthrow the doctrine of redundant or expletive Greek particles; to show that they were all originally formed from words separately significant; to teach the various ways in which they affect other words, and to ascertain the proper meaning and use of each in particular; was the design of Hooegeveens's celebrated "*Doctrina Particularum Linguae Græcæ*." To those who may be prevented by the size and price of that standard work, or by ignorance of the Latin language, from studying it in the original, the author of this Abridgment has endeavored to supply a useful substitute. He has given in it the substance of Hooegeveen's doctrine; which however he has not servilely followed, but in many parts has taken the liberty of making alterations which cannot here be particularly specified. The *method* of Hooegeveen he has strictly followed, except where the brevity necessary in this work, or the advantage of a more clear and orderly arrangement, required a different division of the heads or paragraphs; the numerals of which in such parts do not, of course, exactly correspond with those of the original. For the sake of brevity he has proceeded also with regard to quotation of passages, and translation, on the plan mentioned in his preface to the Abridgment of Viger;² and has substituted numerals instead of the names of the Muses prefixed

¹ See note *m*, p. 148. of the Abridgment of Viger, octavo, 1828.

² See pp. v. and vi.

to the books of Herodotus, and by which Hoogeveen very pedantically quotes those books.

With Hoogeveen's original materials he has incorporated those added by Schütz in his Epitome, and also the Appendix to that Epitome; and has here and there made a few additions of his own.¹

For information as to the Editions of books from which the quotations are made, or which are referred to, see below;***.

J. S.

Welch Bicknor,

July, 1829.

¹ These are either included in brackets [], or are in notes at the bottoms of the pages.

N. B. It is intended to publish similar abridgments of Bos on the Ellipses, and Hermann on the Metres, of the Greek language.

*** With respect to the references, as passages may be readily found in any books divided always into verses or other small portions, the editions of such books need not be specified. Of books not so divided (as indeed of most books) the editions referred to may generally be understood to be the best, when there is no specification of any particular edition. The following, however, have sometimes been cited without such specification: *Æschines, Orat. Aurel. Allobr.* 1607. *Aristides, interpr. Canter.* 1604. *Clemens Alexandr. Colon.* 1688. *Demosthenes, Aurel. Allobr.* 1607. *Dinarchus, appended to the edition of Demosth.* *Hippocrates, Gener.* 1657. *Isocrates, interpr. Wolf.* 1604. *Lysias, Marburg.* 1683. *Pausanias, Xylandr. Hanov.* 1603. *Philo Judæus, Colon.* 1613. *Plutarch, Francof.* 1599. *Proclus, appended to the Basil edition of Plato,* (but *Plato* himself is usually quoted from the edition of *Serranus*.)

**NEW SCHOOL BOOKS JUST PUBLISHED,
and may be had of all Booksellers.**

**SCHOOL AND COLLEGE GREEK CLASSICS,
WITH ENGLISH NOTES, QUESTIONS, &c.**

At the express desire of many eminent Schoolmasters, Mr. VALPY has commenced the publication of a SERIES of such of the GREEK AUTHORS as are chiefly read in the upper Classes of Schools and in Colleges. The best Texts are adopted, and the CRITICAL and EXPLANATORY NOTES are presented, it is presumed, in a more inviting and accessible form than those of Latin Commentators, by avoiding that profuseness of annotation which frequently anticipates the ingenuity, supersedes the industry, and consequently retards rather than promotes the improvement, of the pupil. EXAMINATION QUESTIONS, adapted to the points discussed in the Notes, and INDEXES, are also added; and the Series, it is hoped, will constitute a convenient introduction to the niceties and elegancies of Greek Literature, and to the perusal of that portion of the relics of antiquity which is best calculated to interest a youthful mind.

Each volume will be sold separately; and it is intended that all shall be published in a cheap duodecimo form.

The following are already published:

HECUBA OF EURIPIDES. By the Rev. J. R. MAJOR, Trin. Col. Camb., and Master of Wisbech School. 5s.

'This is, beyond all comparison, the best student's edition of a Greek Play, which has ever been given to the public. The original edition of Porson, which forms the ground-work of the present, is, after all, a book more adapted to the finished scholar and classical critic, than to those who are only pursuing the studies which are to render them worthy of a station within the envied pale.'—*Literary Chronicle*, Jan. 1827.

MEDEA. By the Same. 5s.

PHENISSÆ. By the Same. 5s.

ŒDIPUS TYRANNUS OF SOPHOCLES. By the Rev. J. BRASSE, D. D. late Fellow of Trin. Col. Camb. 5s.

'The very useful illustrations given of all the difficult passages are well adapted to remove many of the obstacles, which usually stand in the way of a young Greek Scholar.'—*Monthly Rev.* May, 1829.

ŒDIPUS COLONEUS. By the Same. 5s.

THUCYDIDES, HERODOTUS, XENOPHON, DEMOSTHENES, &c. will be published in succession during the year 1829.

ROBINSON'S ANTIQUITIES OF GREECE; being an Account of the Manners and Customs of the Greeks, designed to illustrate the GREEK CLASSICS, by explaining Words and Phrases according to the Rites and Customs to which they refer. To which are prefixed, a brief History of the Grecian States, and Biographical Sketches of the principal Greek Writers. Archbishop POTTER, LAKEMACHER, and BOS, contain nothing which is not in this Edition, which has also much useful matter not to be found in those works. The *Second Edition*, considerably enlarged and improved, and illustrated with Plates. 8vo. Price 17s. bds.

* * * This work has been intirely re-written, and has been so much enlarged by extracts from Potter, Lakemacher, and others who have treated on Grecian antiquities, as to be rendered more valuable to the student than in the state in which it first appeared.

The classical authorities, which, in the former edition, were incorporated with the text, are placed at the foot of each page. This, it is expected, will be found an improvement, inasmuch as it will render the book more uniform, as well as more easy to the student, by obviating the difficulties which a frequent recurrence to the authorities must necessarily occasion, and by preventing his attention from being drawn to them rather than directed to the subject-matter itself.

GREEK GRADUS; or, Greek, Latin, and English Prosodial Lexicon; containing the Interpretation, in Latin and English, of all words which occur in the Greek Poets, from the earliest period to the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and also the Quantities of each Syllable; thus combining the advantages of a Lexicon of the Greek Poets and a Greek Gradus. For the Use of Schools and Colleges. By the Rev. J. BRASSE, D. D. late Fellow of Trin. Coll. Camb. One thick vol. 8vo. Pr. 24s. bds.

GREEK PARTICLES.

I.—OF THE DISTINCTIVE AND THE ADVERSATIVE USE OF THE PARTICLE ΑΛΛΑ.

I. 'Αλλὰ, *but*, notes—1. *diversity*;—2. *opposition*. *Diversity*, as in ἀνέγνως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔγνως.—*Opposition*, (when it is *adversative*,) as in οὐχ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ἐκόντες: Plat. Phædr. See also Aristoph. Ach. 47.

It is put for ἤ, *than*: οὐ τὸ κερδαίνειν μάλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι: Thucyd. ii, 44. v. Demosth. in Mid. p. 554. [l. 15.] ed. Reisk.

II. Sometimes it signifies a concession of something previous with a denial of something consequent; as in Aristoph. Ach. 470. ἀλλ' οὐκέτ'· ἀλλ' ἄπειμι· q. d. *I confess I have been so far troublesome to you; but I will be so no longer; I will be gone.*

Sometimes to a preceding proposition depending on ἐπειδὴ or the like, it opposes a contrary proposition, forming at the same time the apodosis; as in Hom. Od. ξ', 151.

III. 'Αλλὰ is sometimes adversative without any negation of what precedes; as in Hom. Od. α', 48.

IV. Both in its discreitive or distinctive use, and in its adversative, ἀλλὰ is put after μέν. a. *distinctively*: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐμοί γε δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλάγια λυπεῖ με: Xenoph. Cyrop. vii, 1, 16. So Hom. Il. π', 240. b. *adversatively*; as, Ἐνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ,—ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἦνδανε θυμῷ: Hom. Il. α', 24. v. et Il. ο', 690. sqq.

V. From its distinctive power is derived its use in *exceptions* and *objections*. An example of its exceptive sense is in Iliad α', 286. It is used in exception after a negation also, and is interpreted by εἰ μὴ, *except*: as, ἄλλος δ' οὔτις μοι τόσον αἴτιος, οὐρανίωνων, ἀλλὰ φίλη μήτηρ: Hom. Il. φ, 276.

VI. It *objects* in Hom. Il. α', 165. and in 1 Corinth. xv, 35. ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, &c.

It is used in syllogism or enthymema, to introduce an affirmative assumption after a proposition universally negative; as, οὐ γὰρ τοὶ πω οὗτοι ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν ἀγωνισταί, οἳ ἂν τοξεύωσιν, ἢ ἀκοντίζωσιν, ἢ ἱππεύωσιν ἐπιστημόνως, ἦν δέ που πονῆσαι δέη, τούτῳ λείπωνται. 'Αλλ' οὗτοι
Hoog. Λ

(now these our enemies) *ιδιωταί εἰσι, κατὰ τοὺς πόνοους* : Xenoph. Cyrop. 1, 5, 11.

VII. It has a similar use not only in anticipating objections, but in reply to anticipated pleas or objections : as, *Εἰ σύ γε κάρτερος ἔσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ, Ἄλλ' (yet, still) ὅγε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεονέεσσιν ἀνάσσει* : Hom. Il. α', 281. [See Abridgement of Viger, p. 172. R. i.]

VIII. It serves for correction or qualification of something already said ; as, *μελαγχολῆς, ἀλλ', ἄτε μουσικὸς ὢν, πρῶτον* : Plat. Phædr. p. 268. x. 367. ed. Bip.

IX. It is not inelegantly reiterated in an alternation of injunctions or commands, and objections ; as in Aristoph. Ach. 402. seqq. where it is used elliptically. Dicæop. *ἐκκάλεσον αὐτόν*. Cephisoph. *ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον*. Dicæop. *ἀλλ' ὅμως*. Then, when Dicæopolis has himself called Euripides, the latter answers, *ἀλλ' οὐ σχολή*. Dicæop. *ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθητ'*. Eurip. *ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον*. Dicæop. *ἀλλ' ὅμως*. Eurip. *ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήσομαι, well then, I will be wheeled forth*. [Abr. Vig. p. 173. R. ii.]

X. It retains its discreitive or adversative force also when it is used as a hortatory particle : as, *ἀλλὰ πείθεσθ', be persuaded then* : Hom. Il. α', 258. having reference to something different or opposite which has preceded. *ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα σπεῦδε*, Aristoph. Ach. 1093. *ἀλλὰ θαρρόντες ὁρμώμεθα*, Xenoph. Cyrop. 1, 5, 13. In this sense it is often put before *ἄγε* or *ἄγετε*, as in Il. α', 410. So *ἀλλὰ δὴ, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἀλλ' εἴτα*, and the like.

XI. Ἄλλὰ, from its employment in abrupt speech, and from its nature, is usually placed first in a sentence ; but not always ; as, *σὺ δ' ἀλλὰ μοι σταλαγμὸν εἰρήνης ἕνα εἰς τὸν καλαμίσκον ἐνστάλαξον τουτονί*, Aristoph. Ach. 1032. [It here signifies, *at least* : see Abr. of Vig. p. 173. iii.]

Without losing its adversative sense, it adds energy to the expression of indignation ; as, *ἀλλ' ἔκ τοι ἐρέω,—ἧς ὑπεροπλήσι τάχ' ἂν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέσση* : Iliad α', 204. (where at the same time it enforces the asseveration.) See also Il. α', 32. and Aristoph. Ach. 110.—and to supplications, prayers, or wishes, as in [Iliad α', 508.] and Il. ζ', 464.

In questions, such imperatives as *ἄγε*, or *εἰπὲ*, are often omitted after *ἀλλὰ* through haste, and eagerness for information ; as, *ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ—* : Plat. Phædr. p. 242. *ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιεῖ* ; Xenoph. Cyrop. i, 3, 11. So *ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ* ; *ἀλλὰ τί μήν* ; and the like.

XI. In a reply to what is conceded or approved of in the main, *ἀλλὰ* is abruptly used in despatching an objection to some part, before a general approbation is expressed ; as, *ἀλλ' ὅπως μὲν—ἐγὼ ἄχθομαι τρέφειν ὑμᾶς, μηδ' ὑπονοεῖτε· τόγε μὲν τοι ἰέναι εἰς τὴν πολέμιαν, ἥδη καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον εἶναι δοκεῖ πρὸς πάντα* : Xenoph. Cyrop. iii, 3, 20.

XII. It signifies, *and rather* : *παῦ', ἀλλὰ δευρὶ κατακλινεῖς προσμάνθανε* : Aristoph. Vesp. 1203.

So with *μὴ*, *and not rather* ; when preference of something following is expressed, without absolute exclusion of something preceding ; as, *ἄσπον τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οἶεσθαι διορθοῦν (τὴν πόλιν), ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις*, Aristot. Rep. ii, 5.

II.—ON THE ELLIPTICAL AND THE SUPPOSED REDUNDANT EMPLOYMENT OF ΑΛΛΑ.

I. 'Αλλὰ is used elliptically to indicate confidence or readiness; as Phædrus says in reply to Socrates, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι ἔξει τοῦθ' οὕτως, &c. Plato Phædr. x. p. 314. ed. Bip. underst. οὐκ ὀκνήσει, or the like, before ἀλλά.

II. In objections, when no absolute opposition or contrariety is signified: as, to Ismenias, requesting an audience of the king of Persia, an officer answers, ἀλλ', ὃ ξεῖνε Θηβαῖε, νόμος ἐστὶν ἐπιχώριος Πέρσαις, &c. Ælian. V. H. i, 21.

In Xenoph. M. S. iii, 11, 18. it occurs in four different senses in the same passage: ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη (Socrates), οὐκ αὐτὸς ἔλκεσθαι πρὸς σε βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ σε πρὸς ἐμὲ πορεύεσθαι. 'Αλλὰ πορεύσομαι, ἔφη (Theodota), μόνον ὑποδέχου. 'Αλλ' ὑποδέχομαι σε, ἔφη· ἐὰν μὴ τις φιλωτέρα σου ἔνδον ᾖ. In the first place it is corrective of what Theodota had said; in the second, adversative; in the third it denotes readiness, but so that it is opposed, as it were, to the doubt of the other party, whether she would come; in the fourth it expresses consent qualified with an exception.

III. In alternate brief objections and answers, with an ellipsis of πότερον or ἄρα:—ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην; ἀλλ' ὑπῆρχεν ἅπασιν. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον; ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περὶ εἰρήνης ἐβουλεύεσθε: Demosth. pro Cor. p. 233. [l. 12.] ed. Reisk.

IV. In approbation: ἀλλὰ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, Plat. de Rep. iv. καὶ νῦν, ἔφασαν, λαβὼν τοὺς ἵππους, ποιεῖ, ὅπως ἄριστον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι. ἀλλὰ δέχομαι τε, ἔφη, καὶ ἀγαθὴ τύχη ἡμεῖς τε ἰππεῖς γενοίμεθα, καὶ ὑμεῖς διέλοιτε τὰ κοινὰ: Xenoph. Cyrop. iv, 5, 51.

V. For οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ, in superadding to what is not denied or rejected: καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι—πολεμεῖν φήθημεν δεῖν: even we ourselves too, and the Lacedæmonians, &c. Demosth. Phil. iii, p. 117. [l. 9.] ed. Reisk. See 2 Cor. vii, 2.

VI. It is used correctively, with an ellipsis of a negative, when something of less moment, which has preceded, is denied, and is opposed by something of greater moment following; as in 1 Corinth. x, 20. where it may be rendered, *nay*, or *nay but*.

VII. It is used elliptically in the beginning of books, chapters, or speeches, to excite attention to something remarkable; as, 'Αλλὰ θαυμασὰ μὲν ἴσως δόξω λέγειν commences a speech in Xenoph. Cyrop. ii, 1, 13. and ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν 'Ροδίων δόξαν, a chapter in Ælian. V. H. i. where it refers to something preceding; as in the beginning of Xenophon's Symposium it refers to the Memorabilia; and so in the beginning of the ἐρωτικὸς λ. of Demosth. In the beginning of Xenophon's book de Lacedæm. Rep. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐννοήσας ποτὲ, ὡς ἡ Σπάρτη, &c. it has a sense of asseveration.

VIII. In expressions made abrupt by rage; as, ἀλλὰ σέ γ' ὁ Ζεὺς ἐξολέσειεν, Aristoph. Plut. 592.

IX. It sometimes abruptly commences a dialogue, as in that of Menippus and Proteus in Lucian, [p. 193. ed. Salmur.] 'Ἄλλ' ὕδωρ μὲν σε γίνεσθαι, ᾧ Πρωτεῦ, οὐκ ἀπίθανον, &c. where if it refers to any thing, it must be to something imaginary, and which must be supposed to have preceded the author's commencement.

X. For ἀλλά γε, *at least*; as, εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλάς: Aristot. See Xenoph. Cyrop. v, 5, 33. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 173. iii.]

XI. Ἀλλὰ has been erroneously supposed redundant. In Iliad ψ', 319. e. g. it retains its adversative force. In Iliad ω', 771. it appears to be a mere repetition (on account of the preceding parenthesis) of ἀλλά in v. 768. and to have the same sense. In Demosth. c. Aristog. i. p. 771. [l. 11. ed. Reisk.] τῶν μὲν εἰς σωτηρίαν αὐτῷ φερόντων ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν πάρεστιν ἔχων, it serves for asseveration. The form is elliptical; q. d. οὐχ ὅτι μέγα τι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν: a stronger negation than οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν simply. So ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μικρὸν, Demosth. de fals. leg. p. 352. [l. 21.] ed. Reisk. and ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ μικρότατον, Proœm. p. 1455. [l. 18.] In Aristoph. Nub. 1367. 1372. ἀλλὰ urges or exhorts. In Xenoph. Anab. i, 3, 3. it adds emphasis to asseveration.

ΑΛΛΑ ΓΑΡ.—I. In this combination γὰρ introduces a reason for the opposition, diversity, or objection to something preceding, which is signified by ἀλλά; sometimes explicitly, as, Ἀλλὰ γὰρ Κρέοντα λεύσω,—παύσω τοὺς παρεστῶτας λόγους: Eurip. Phœniss. 1318. the construction being, ἀλλὰ παύσω τοὺς λόγους, λεύσω γὰρ Κρέοντα. So in Plato Phædr. p. 228. (t. x. p. 282. ed. Bip.) ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα, &c. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 173. v.] and the causal proposition sometimes follows explicitly with a repetition of γὰρ; as, ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὅτι μὲν παλαιότατοι οὗτοι οἱ νόμοι εἰσὶ, σαφές· ὁ γὰρ Λυκούργος κατὰ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας λέγεται γενέσθαι: Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. 10.

II. But the force of each particle in this combination is sometimes more latent; and that in a threefold manner. First, when the opposition or objection itself involves a cause, of which γὰρ is the indication; as in ἀλλὰ γὰρ νόστου πρόφασις γλυκεροῦ κώλυε μείναι, Pind. Pyth. iv, 56. where γὰρ performs the office of διὰ; the sense being, ἀλλὰ ἐκωλύοντο μείναι διὰ νόστου γλυκεροῦ πρόφασιν. So *sed enim*, Ov. Met. vi, 152. Virg. Æn. vi, 28. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὅτι μὲν ἐν Σπάρτῃ μάλιστα πείθονται ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἴσμεν ἅπαντες: Xenoph. de Lac. Rep. c. viii. q. d. ἀλλὰ ὅτι μὲν ἐν Σπ.—σαφές, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσμεν ἅπαντες.

III. Secondly, when recourse must be had to a repetition of something preceding; as, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ᾧδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, Plato de Rep. ii, p. 366. where between ἀλλὰ and γὰρ we must understand οὐκ ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. Or when the reason indicated by γὰρ is elicited from what follows; as in Xen. Mem. ii, 1, 17. where the sense is the same as if the words had run thus, ἀλλ' οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι—οὐκ εἰσιν εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων. τί γὰρ διαφέρουσι, &c.

IV. Thirdly, when the deficiency is to be supplied by something extraneous; as, καὶ χρήσιμον μὲν ἐδόκει εἶναι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τρέ-

φειν οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει καλὸς κῆραθὸς κάμηλον, ὥστ' ἐποχεῖσθαι, οὔτε, &c. Xen. Cyrop. vii, 1. where we must understand, *but that use of camels was abolished, for, &c.* and in Aristoph. Ach. 738. after ἀλλὰ, οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν is to be understood; in Hom. Il. φ, 581. ἀντέστη.

V. Other words are sometimes inserted between ἀλλὰ and γὰρ both in verse and in prose; as, θαυμαστὰ μὲν, ἔφη, ἴσως δόξω λέγειν, — ἀλλὰ γινώσκω γὰρ ὅτι—λόγοι, οὔτοι καὶ μάλιστα ἐνδύονται ταῖς ψυχαῖς, &c. Xenoph. Cyrop. ii, 1, 13. After ἀλλὰ understand οὐκ ἔστι θαυμαστά. Lamachus: ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγὸν, πτωχὸς ὢν; Dicæop. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμι πτωχός; Lamachus: ἀλλὰ τίς γὰρ εἶ; Aristoph. Ach. 594. *why what are you then?* if not a beggar, then something else. The difference is noted by ἀλλὰ, the ratiocination by γὰρ; but the sentence takes an interrogative instead of an affirmative form, to elicit from Dicæop. a declaration of what else it is that he is.

VI. It is to be remarked that in the first of the cases, when the opposition and the reason are explicit, if the former, introduced by ἀλλὰ γὰρ precedes, and the latter follows, then the latter being deserted as it were by its particle γὰρ, is supported by δὲ instead; as, ἀλλὰ γὰρ περιέχονται τοῦ ὀνόματος μᾶλλον τι τῶν ἄλλων Ἴωνων ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ καθαρῶς γεγονότες Ἴωνες: *for these too are genuine Ionians*: Herodot. i, 146. [147.] ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῷμεν σὺ δ' εἰπὲ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν: Plato Phædr. p. 261. (t. x. p. 353. ed. Bip.) where the order of the sense is, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπὲ, τί δρῶσιν, &c. ἐῷμεν γὰρ τούτους."

ΑΛΛΑ ΓΕ.—I. When something more general is to be restricted to something more special, with emphasis and enforcement, γε is added to ἀλλὰ. οὔτοι καταγελῶν ἂν, says Phædrus, (Plato Phædr. p. 268.) Socrates concedes this general affirmation, but with an emphatical restriction: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, οἶμαι, λοιδορήσειαν: *but at least they would not revile us in a rude and coarse manner.* τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλεῖστα: Aristot. de Rep. i, p. 182.

In Aristoph. Nub. 400. [401. ed. Br.] ἀλλὰ opposes Jupiter's not destroying certain perjurers, to his striking his own temple; and γε introduces the stronger argument against his supremacy drawn from this last circumstance, with an indication that the argument drawn from his sparing the perjurers is no longer insisted on, as being less irrefragable and triumphant.

II. The proper sense therefore of each particle remaining, ἀλλὰ expresses some opposition to what precedes, and γε softens or qualifies that opposition: as in Luke xxiv, 21. where οὐ φαίνεται, or the like, is suppressed after ἀλλὰ.

III. But the sense of these particles is not so obvious, when it depends on words not expressed. In Ælian. V. H. i, 32. Sinæta, sud-

* Even according to Hoogveen's own explanation, the reason, in this passage of Plato, *precedes* instead of *following*; and perhaps it does so in that from Herodotus also; for the words ἔστωσαν δὲ, &c. seem rather to contain an admission or concession of Herodotus than an affirmation. J. S.

denly meeting Artaxerxes, is in great perplexity, because he has nothing to present to him according to custom: ἀλλ' οὗτος γε, continues Ælian, πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν πλησίον παραρρέοντα ἐλθὼν σὺν σπουδῇ, &c. where there seems to be an ellipsis, which may be thus supplied: ὅτι ἂν ἄλλος ὀκνήσειε μὴ ἔχων ἄξια δοῦναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος, καίπερ ἱκανὰ μὴ ἔχων, πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν γε τὸν πλησίον ἐλθὼν, καὶ ἀρυσάμενος τοῦ ὕδατος, &c. So ἀλλὰ will answer to ὀκνήσειε understood, οὗτος to ἄλλος, and ὕδατός γε to ἄξια. A similar ellipsis is in c. 34. ἀλλ' ἐκείνος γε συλλαβὼν τὸ παιδίον, &c.

'Αλλά γε are sometimes found with an omission of the enunciation of opposition before them; when the ellipsis is to be supplied from the context: e. g. εἰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι—ἐθελήσῃτε στρατεύεσθαι: Demosth. Ol. iii, p. 37. l. 18. ed. Reisk. i. e. εἴπερ οὐκ ἄλλως, ἀλλὰ νῦν γε. [Since not before, yet at least now. See Abr. of Vig. note o p. 173.]

IV. Thus in this combination neither of the particles is redundant. In Hom. Il. α, 83. ἀλλὰ is opposed to ἔχει, ὅφρα τελέσῃ το αὐτῆμαρ χόλον καταπέψῃ, and γε concedes in some measure what precedes, but presses more what follows. So far is either from being idle, that it is perhaps even to be understood when not expressed: e. g. one may suppose εἰ μὴ ὅλον, μέρος γε, in Demosth. to be said for ἀλλὰ μέρος γε, since ὅλον and μέρος are opposed. Thus ἀλλά γε is equivalent to *at certe, at saltem, yet at least*: v. c. in Cic. de Orat. ii, c. 16.

V. In Soph. Electr. 412. there is a transposition on account of the metre: ὦ θεοὶ πατρώοι, συγγένεσθέ γ' ἀλλὰ νῦν. underst. εἵποτε. 'Αλλά answers to εἰ, and νῦν, limited by γε, to ποτέ.

ΑΛΛΑ ΔΗ.—I. Here each particle retains its proper force; ἀλλὰ that of opposition, and δὴ that of urgency: so in transition, or change of subject: ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνῶμεν; Plato Phædr. p. 228. (t. x. p. 287. ed. Bip.) and Euthyphro, having inquired and heard who was the accuser of Socrates, dismisses that topic, and says, ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφὴν σε γέγραπται, Plat. in Euthyphr. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν, after an admission that men may be deceived: Plat. de Rep. ii, p. 365. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 174. l. 1.]

II. Sometimes these particles are separated by other words: ἀλλ' ὅδε γὰρ δὴ βασιλεὺς—χωρεῖ: Soph. Antig. 163. ἀλλὰ πῇ δὴ; Plat. Phædr.

ΑΛΛ' Η.—I. 'Αλλ' ἦ is literally, *but either*: Μὴ πῖν' οἶνον ὑπερβολάδην, ἀλλ' ἦ, πρὶν μεθύειν, ἐπανίστασο, ἦ παρεὼν μὴ πῖνε: Theogn. 485.

II. It is sometimes interpreted, *unless, except, except that*. [For an explanation of this sense see Abridgement of Viger, p. 174. R. x. and note p.] The following are additional examples: οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἦ ποιεῖν προθύμως, Plat. Phædr. p. 231. (t. x. p. 288. ed. Bip.) οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ'

ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, Plat. Phæd. τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἔχουσι, βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ, ἀλλ' ἢ ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 34.

III. When ἢ is repeated after ἀλλὰ, its ordinary disjunctive sense is obvious to every one; see 2 Cor. i, 13. [Abr. of Vig. p. 174. l. 42.]

IV. 'Απέθανον ἂν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὥς τύραννος μόνον, ἀλλ' ἔτι νομίζων ἔξειν ἔκδικον: Lucian. Tyrannic. [p. 801. E. ed. Salmur.] i. e. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ὥς τύραννος μόνον.

V. 'Αλλ' ἢ is to be distinguished from ἀλλ' ᾗ, which latter is sometimes *interrogative*, sometimes *affirmative*. ἀλλ' ἢ ὁδύνη σε εἴληφε; *what, are you seized with pain?* Xen. Symp. i, 15. ἀλλ' ἢ μέμηνas; *why, are you mad?* Soph. Electr. 879. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 175. l. 3.] The following is an example of its affirmative sense, (*in truth, in good truth, really,*) ἀλλ' ἢ πέπονθα δεῖν' ὑπὸ ξένων ἐμῶν, Eurip. Alcest. 819. Barn. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 174. l. 45. and note q.]

ΑΛΛ' ΗΤΟΙ.—I. Here ἀλλὰ introduces something different from what has preceded, and τοῖ, being confirmative, presses what follows, as preferable; ἢ prefixed to τοῖ denotes division or distribution, wherefore two members, with μὲν and δέ, commonly follow. So that by the whole phrase, something preceding being reprobated or disapproved, something different and preferable is proposed. Thus in Hom. Il. ι, 65. ἀλλὰ opposes banqueting to war, τοῖ presses the former, and ἢ followed by μὲν and δέ indicates distribution of employment, by which some are to prepare supper, and others to keep watch.

II. Sometimes the opposition or difference is not fully expressed, but what should have preceded is to be understood; as in Hom. Il. φ, 372. ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ἐγὼν ἀποπαύσομαι, &c. where cessation is opposed to the annoyance which Achilles has already suffered from Xanthus.

III. Sometimes the reprobation or correction of what precedes is lighter; as in Il. α, 211. where a lesser evil is allowed in preference to a greater.

IV. This use gives rise to, or rather is accompanied by, that in which ἀλλ' ἦτοι denotes transition; as, 'Αλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὖτις. Νῦν δ' ἄγε, &c. Il. α, 141. See also Il. ι, 697.

ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ.—I. Καὶ in its augmentative sense, *even*, is often added to ἀλλὰ, and often without οὐ μόνον preceding; as, πάντες δακρύοντες πλὴν τῶν νεογνῶν τούτων καὶ νηπίων· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πάνυ γεγηρακότες ὀδύρονται, Lucian. dial. mort. p. 443. for οὐ μόνον ἐκείνοι, ἀλλὰ καί.

II. 'Αλλὰ καὶ is used when what is more is added to what is less; as, καὶ ἵνα σοι μὴ τὰ ἐν Τύρῳ, μηδὲ τὰ ἐν Ἀρβύλοις διηγῶμαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρις Ἰνδῶν ἦλθον: *I advanced moreover even as far as to the Indi*: Lucian. dial. mort. xii.

III. St. Paul uses these particles with an ellipsis to be supplied from what precedes: Rom. vi, 5. ix, 10. 2 Cor. xi, 1.

ΑΛΛΑ ΜΗΝ, ΑΛΛΑ ΜΗΝ ΓΕ, ΑΛΛΑ ΜΗΝ ΓΕ ΚΑΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΜΗΝ ΚΑΙ.—I. Ἀλλὰ μὴν serves for affirmation or asseveration; as the Megarensian, in producing the pigs which he has brought for sale, says ἀλλὰ μὰν καλαὶ, Aristoph. Ach. 765.

II. Hence it is used in assumption, as in the minor proposition of a syllogism. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 174. ix.]

III. And in this use it is sometimes (with the interposition however of some other word) followed by γε, which by its limitative power strengthens a position either conceded by all, or legitimately deduced from premises; as, οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι, καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἀγαθοί· οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες, κακοί.—Παραπλησίως ἅρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί: Plat. Gorg. p. 498. (t. iv. p. 111. ed. Bip.) As if he had said, *if any thing must be granted, this certainly must be granted, that the wise are good, &c.*

IV. And without this syllogistical method ἀλλὰ μὴν γε has an illative force with limitation. Thus Cebes, being asked by Socrates whether the soul be visible, answers, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, *not at least by man*: to which Socrates rejoins, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν, *but when we spoke of things visible and invisible, we certainly meant such as were so to mankind*: Plat. Phæd. p. 79. (c. 26. ed. Fisch.)

V. Ἀλλὰ μὴν γε is put for ἀλλὰ μὴν γε καὶ, as in Plat. Phædr. p. 240. (t. x. p. 306. ed. Bip.) Socrates, after he has said that a lover wishes his beloved to be deprived of parents, friends, and relations, adds, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐσαν γε ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ, ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως, οὔτε ἐδάλωτον ὁμοίως, οὔτε ἄλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται, *but moreover certainly if he has property, &c.*

VI. Ἀλλὰ μὴν γε is used in answers conceding more than is asked; as in Plato, to the question whether to know and not to know be not possible to us, it is answered, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄλλό γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον, πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι, Theæt. p. 188. (t. ii. p. 147. ed. Bip.)

VII. The ellipsis of καὶ, but without the limiting γε, is supplied by Aristot. ii. de Rep. c. 9. where, certain defects in the Lacedæmonian republic having been noted by him, he adds, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως, *but moreover what regards the magistracy of the Ephori also, &c.* So Plato de Rep. v. p. 468. (t. vii. p. 42. ed. Bip.) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον, &c.

VIII. Sometimes γε follows καὶ, some other word however intervening; as, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖται γε πᾶν ζῶον, &c. Plat. de Rep. v. p. 467. (t. vii. p. 39. ed. Bip.)

IX. The asseveration of ἀλλὰ μὴν is softened by που: as, ἀλλὰ μὴν που τὰς γε τῶν δούλων ψυχὰς κεκτῆσθαι δεξαίμεθ' ἂν μᾶλλον τὰς ἐκουσίως, ἢ τὰς ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτανούσας, &c. *but truly there is no doubt I think that, &c.* Plat. Hipp. min. p. 375. (t. iii. p. 223. ed. Bip.)

X. Sometimes ἄλλα and μὴν are separated by οὐ which negatives

some other word following, and not *μήν*: as, *ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἄγε τις οἶδεν, οἴεται που, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι*: Plat. Theæt. p. 188. (t. ii. p. 147. ed. Bip.) where Plato might have said, *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ οἴεται που*.

ΑΛΛ' ΟΥ.—I. In *ἀλλ' οὐ*, *οὐ* does not affect *ἀλλὰ*, but connects with something following, which it negatives; as, *τί δέ; χρυσοχοήσοντας οἶε τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσομένους*; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 450. (t. vii. p. 4. ed. Bip.) and *not to hear*, &c.

II. So also when the form of the sentence is declarative, and not interrogative: *τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους, φιλοσόφους, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους, κλητέον, and not lovers of opinion*—: Plato ib.

III. For *ἀλλ' οὐ*, *ἀλλὰ μὴ* is used by Plato in the same sense: *διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, — ἀλλὰ μὴ πληθῇ καὶ διὰ τὸ πληθος; — ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει*; Phæd. c. 49.

ΑΛΛ' ΟΥΝ, ΑΛΛ' ΟΥΝ ΓΕ.—I. *'Αλλ' οὖν* is combined of *ἀλλὰ*, discretive, adversative, or in whatever sense taken, and *οὖν* collective; for it collects or concludes not only from what precedes, but from what is to be understood extrinsically: thus in those verses of Euripides, *Ἐμοὶ μὲν, εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλήνων χθόνα Τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ' οὖν ξυνετὰ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν*, (Phœniss. 501.) *οὖν* collects from what has preceded, that Polynices has spoken wisely, and *ἀλλὰ* opposes what is last, to *εἰ καὶ μὴ*: *yet however in my judgment you speak wisely*.

II. *'Αλλὰ* is discretive or disjunctive in this phrase in Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 509. (t. vi. p. 121. ed. Bip.) *νόησον δὺν αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν, τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξῃ σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα· ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὁρατὸν, νοητὸν*: *but however then, be that as it may, you have*, &c.

III. *'Αλλ' οὖν* is qualified by *γε*: *οἱ δ' (monarchs) ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιστατοῦντες, ἦν καὶ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ταῖς γε ἐμπειρίαις πολὺ ἄλλων προέχουσιν*: Isocr. Nicocl. p. 59. init. Here *ἀλλὰ* opposes *προέχουσιν τὸ τὴν φύσιν καταδεεστέραν ἔχουσιν*, *γε* limits their superiority to *experience or tact*, *ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις*, and *οὖν* collects their experience ἐκ τοῦ ἀεὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπιστατεῖν.

IV. *'Αλλ' οὖν γε* commonly follows negative hypothetical propositions; as, *εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐλπίσι γε σπουδαίαις ὑπερέχουσιν*: Isocr. ad Demon. p. 20. *εἴτ' οὖν δυνάμεθα, εἴτε μὴ· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι*: Plat. de Leg. ix. p. 859. (t. ix. p. 14. ed. Bip.) *ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὥς εἰκάζω, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνιν σνγχωρῶ, τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα, ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν, ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα*: Plat. Phæd. p. 100. (c. 39. ed. Fisch.) In this last passage, to understand the conclusion we must have recourse to an ellipsis: *q. d. εἴπερ [ἐπεὶ] ἄλλη οὐκ ἔξην, ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε*.

V. *'Αλλ' οὖν γε* is used in transition, as in Aristoph. Vesp. 1185. where through *οὖν* a transition is made from scenic spectacles to those of games, and *ἀλλὰ* marks difference, *εἰ μὴ βούλει τοῦτο λέγειν being understood*.

ΑΛΛΑ ΤΟΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΤΟΙ ΚΑΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙ.—I. In *ἀλλά τοι*, *τοι* confirms what *ἀλλά* affects either as a discriptive or an adversative particle; *καί* added intends its force. *εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν· ἀλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρή νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν*, &c. Plat. Sophist. p. 231. (t. ii. p. 229. ed. Bip.) where *ἀλλά καί* indicates an ellipsis of *οὐ μόνον σὺ ἀπορεῖς* before it. Neoptolemus to Ulysses threatening to draw his sword: *ἀλλὰ κἀμέ τοι ταῦτόν τόδ' ὄψει δρῶντα, κὺν μέλλοντ' ἔτι*: Soph. Philoct. 1248.

II. *Τοι* strengthens the force of *ἀλλά* in objections or exceptions: Megar. *διαπεινᾶμες αἰεὶ ποττὸ πῦρ*. Dicæop. *ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι, ἦν αὐλὸς παρῇ*, *why that is a pleasant thing enough, if*, &c. Aristoph. Ach. 752. See also Eurip. Phœn. 1653. Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 24. *ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τοι, ὦ Κύρε*, &c.

ΑΛΛΩΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ.—I. This combination is employed in connecting enunciations simply together. It is interpreted *especially*; being literally, *both otherwise, or in other respects or accounts, and*—.

II. It introduces, in various constructions, some heightening circumstance, or reason, or efficient cause of something: *ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἴ τις ἔλοιτο τοιαῦτα πράττειν*, &c. Plato Epist. ix. *πάντων ἀποστρεφίσθαι λυπηρόν ἐστι καὶ χαλεπὸν, ἄλλως τε κἄν ὑπ' ἐχθροῦ τῷ τοῦτο συμβαίνει*: Demosth. de Cor. [p. 227. l. 8. ed. Reisk.] *τολημτέον τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα*: Plat. Phædr. p. 247. l. 26. (t. x. p. 322. ed. Bip.) So Xen. Memor. ii, 8, 2. Thucyd. vii, 80. *ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κόφισιν. οὐδ' ὥς ῥάδια ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο· ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ σῆας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἷαν τελευτήν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῆκτο*: Thucyd. vii. c. 75. *ῥᾶστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἵεναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδὲς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας*: Plat. Phædr. p. 229. l. 6. (t. x. p. 284. ed. Bip.) *ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ὑποπτοὶ ὄντες*: Thucyd. iv. c. 104. h. e. *διὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοισι ὑπόπτους εἶναι*.

III. The nature of the phrase will appear from considering it in passages where other words intervene between *ἄλλως τε* and *καί*, which are then obviously referred to distinct parts of the sentence: [See Abr. of Vig. p. 127. l. 22. and foll.] *ἄλλως τε γὰρ ἄπιστον τὸ βουκόλων γένος, καὶ νῦν πλέον*—: Heliodor. Æthiop. c. 17. So iii, c. 4. viii, c. 13.

Sometimes when other words intervene, *ἄλλως τε* and *καί* are still in the same member of the sentence; as, *ἀλλά μοι τὰ χρήματα τὸν υἱὸν ἀποδοῦναι κέλευσον, ἂ' λαβεν, ἄλλως τε μέντοι καὶ κακῶς πεπραγότε*: Aristoph. Nub. 1270. ed. Kust.

IV. We see that *ἄλλως τε καί* is used as *ἄλλοτε καί*, or *ἄλλοι τε καί*, when words intervene, and after *καί* follows what is principally denoted: Heliodor. viii, 14. Thucyd. iv, 100. and the phrase is often found where *ἄλλός τε καί* would seem rather to be required; as, *ἴσασι γὰρ, ὅτι ἱππικὸν στράτευμα ἐν νυκτὶ παραχῶδές ἐστιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ βάρβαρον*: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 14. for *ἄλλο τε καί*.

V. The order of the words is sometimes changed, especially when expression of way or manner follows; as, *οἷα δὲ πρεσβυτικός τε ἄλλως καὶ πρὸς τῆς ὁδοιπορίας κεκοπιωμένος, ὕπνῳ κατείχετο*: Heliodor. vi, 14.

AMEΛΕΙ.—I. 'Αμέλει is properly a verb, and is primarily used to remove the fear or solicitude of another by its expression of our own confidence: *be of good heart; make yourself easy*, &c. See Aristoph. Ach. 367. Lysistr. 172.

II. When it assumed the nature of a particle, it remained still confirmative, signifying *certainly, in truth, in reality*, &c. See Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 3, 4. Theophr. Eth. Char. [c. xiii. p. 70. l. 1. ed. Simps. c. xvi. p. 79. l. 5. c. xxiii. p. 97. l. 3. c. xxv. p. 102. l. 6.] Lucian. Nigrin. t. i. p. 65. [p. 39. A. ed. Salmur.]

III. It came afterwards to be used on very light occasions in the sense of *nimirum, nempe*, where there is no appearance of endeavour to remove fear or solicitude; as, *καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδογμένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε*: *why as to that, said Thrasymachus*, &c. Plato de Rep. v. [See note k, p. 129. of Abr. of Vig.]

IV. 'Αμέλει δέ, *utique vero*; ἀμέλει δέ καί, *quin etiam*: ἀμέλει δέ καὶ πίθηκον θρέψαι δεινός, *moreover, but besides*: Theophr. Char. cap. v. 4.

V. For *τοιγαροῦν*, Suid. for *διὸ, ἀπλῶς, οὕτως, (ὄντως?) τοιγαροῦν*: Hesych.

AN, KE, KEN.—'Αν (κε or κεν in poetry), is a particle by which the force of affirmation is simply diminished.

I.—OF THE POWER OF AN, (TERMED ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ,) IN RENDERING THE SENSE OF OTHER WORDS LESS DEFINITE AND DETERMINATE.

I. The primary and predominant power of ἄν, and to which all its other powers must be referred, is that of rendering the meaning of other words less certain and definite; by *ὅς ἄν* and *ὅστις ἄν* no certain person is designated, by *ὅ τι ἄν* no certain thing, by *οὗ ἄν* and *ἐπου ἄν* no certain place, by *ὅπως ἄν* no certain manner, by *ὅταν* no certain time; by *γράφει ἄν* the certainty of an act, or actuality, is taken away. Thus also when a negative is added to verbs; in *οὐκ ἀπέθανε* the act is absolutely denied; but in *Κύριε, εἰ ἦς ὧδε, οὐκ ἄν ἀπέθανέ μου ὁ ἀδελφός*, (John ii, 32), the certainty of the act denied is taken away. The act then may be taken away in four different manners; for a person may be said *to be able* to do a thing, or *to be willing* to do it, or it may be said that *it behoves him* to do it, or that *he is about* to do it.

II. In this its first power, now treated of, ἄν is joined especially with the relative *ὅς*, with *ὅσος, ὅστις*, and with the adverbs *οὗ, ἐπου, ὅπως, ὅσάκις*, with nearly the same signification as the Latin *cunque*:

usually with a subjunctive mood, as, ἂν δέη συναρμοσθῆναι, Xen. Cyrop. ii. and Aristoph. Ach. 355. and most commonly with the subjunctive of the *aorists*; as, μεταμέλει, ἂν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν: Plat. Phædr. p. 264. (t. x. p. 358. ed. Bip.) and Hom. Il. α, 527. Act. Apost. vii, 3. ἀξιῶ ἰατρὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν, ᾧ ἂν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῶ: Plat. Phædr. p. 268. l. 15. (t. x. p. 366. ed. Bip.) and in p. 248. l. 22. (p. 324. ed. Bip.) Matth. xxii, 9. Sometimes with an indicative, as in Aristoph. Ach. 873. or an optative, Iliad. α, 550. [On the use of ἂν with these different moods see Abr. of Vig. p. 176. r. ii.] It is joined also with adverbs, as οὗ ἂν, ὅπου ἂν, *wheresoever*, Plat. Phædr. p. 251. l. 42. (t. x. p. 332. ed. Bip.) ὅπως ἂν, *howsoever, in whatsoever manner*; &c. ὅσάκις ἂν, *as often soever* as, 1 Cor. xi, 25. 26.

II.—ON THE POTENTIAL USE OF AN, TERMED ΔΥΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ.

I. *AN takes away the act of verbs in a fourfold way; with regard either to *power*, or *will*, or *duty*, or *future time*. Its most frequent use is the *potential*, or *δυνητικός*, [in which it properly signifies possibility without actuality,] usually with an optative mood, as in Aristoph. Ach. 313. Demosth. Olynth. i. [p. 13. l. 6. ed. Reisk.] In Latin a subjunctive mood is used in the same sense: see *On Metam.* ii, 12.

II. Sometimes with an infinitive: φήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ (πόλει) μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην, κατιδόντες δὲ κρίναι ἂν ὃ πάλοι ζητοῦμεν: Plat. de Rep. iv, p. 420. (t. vi, p. 327. ed. Bip.) where ἂν εὐρεῖν and κρίναι ἂν are for εὐρεῖν and κρίναι δύνασθαι. So ἂν παθεῖν for παθεῖν δύνασθαι, Plat. Phædr. p. 235. fin. (t. x. p. 297. ed. Bip.)

III. Not unfrequently with participles. [See the examples in the *Abr. of Vig.* p. 177. l. 9.]

IV. [On the construction of ἂν with an indicative mood, see *Abr. of Vig.* p. 176. iii. and note u.]

V. With the indicative of any tense it often signifies the doing or occurrence of something, not at any particular time, but *usually, frequently, every now and then, or as it may happen, upon occasion*: [see examples in the *Abr. of Vig.* p. 177. l. 15.]

It is also used for evading a direct confession or affirmation, to give some appearance of uncertainty to what is certain. [As an example of this use Hoogveen cites the passage of Aristoph. Plut. 983. differently interpreted in the *Abr. of Vig.* p. 177.]

It has also a conjectural sense, especially with τάχα or ἴσως as τάχ' ἂν βουβωνιῶ, Aristoph. Vesp. 277. and presently afterwards, τάχ' ἂν—ἴσως κείται πυρέττων.

VI. *AN changes the signification of the future indicative from certainty or necessity to possibility; as, Ἡ τεδὼν, ἢ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἢ Ὀδυσῆος Ἀἴω ἐδὼν, ὃ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται, ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι: Iliad. α, 138. where ἄξω as expressing somewhat depending on the will of Agamemnon, and therefore more certain, is put without κεν, but κεχολώσεται, as expressive of something not depending on his will,

and therefore more uncertain, is qualified by *κεν*. [See note *y* p. 178. Abr. of Vig.]

VII. When *ἂν* is joined with *δύναμαι*, some contingency, case, or condition is put, explicitly or implicitly, on which the power expressed by *δύναμαι* is represented as depending: thus Lucian says, *had Athens been the birthplace of Homer*, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐπ' ἱσῆς ἀξίως ἐφίκεσθαι δύναιτο τῷ λόγῳ ὁ Δημοσθένης, Dem. Encom. p. 891. τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἂν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι; Plato Phædr. p. 269. l. 31. (t. x. p. 369. ed. Bip.) underst. ἂν βούλοιο ἦτοι μέλλοι ῥητορικὸς γενέσθαι.

III.—ON THE PARTICLE AN IN ITS SIGNIFICATION OF WILL.

I. *Ἄν* sometimes indicates *volition* or *choice*, rather than power or possibility. With the optative: *tis δ' οὕτως ἄνους, ὃς ὑμέκα πρίαιτο φανεράν Ξαμίαν*; for *ὑμᾶς ἂν*, Megar. Aristoph. Ach. 737. he does not intimate that no one *could* or *ought* to buy them, but that no one *would choose* to. With the 2 aor. opt. Hom. Il. α. v. 60.

II. An indication of will is particularly observable, when an optative with *ἂν* is explained by an imperative; as, *λέγοις ἂν* for *θέλε λέγειν*, Plato Phædr. *προάγοις ἂν*, Plat. Phædr. p. 229. l. 12. By this form somewhat of civility is usually imparted to a command or injunction; but not always, for the order of Orestes to Ægisthus, e. g. in Soph. El. 1498. *χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω σὺν τάχει*, is imperious and peremptory. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 177. l. 25. and note *x*.]

III. In oblique or indirect phraseology it is joined with an infinitive also in its signification of will; as, *ἔφη ὁ Ἀρμένιος πολλοῦ ἂν τοῦτο πρίασθαι*: Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. p. 73.

IV. With verbs, which of themselves signify will, *ἂν* denotes—1. an inclination or willingness to wish; as, *βουλοίμην ἂν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρώδω, μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται*: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 3. l. 6. (c. 2. init. ed. Fisch.)—2. a propensity to be willing; as, *αἱ κ' ἐθέλωσι Παύσασθαι πολέμοιο*, Iliad. η, 374.—3. a softened or civil injunction; as, *βουλοίμην δ' ἂν ὑμᾶς καὶ τοῦτο διανοῆσαι*, Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 6, 6.—4. It qualifies a wish expressed with regard to something already past and irreversible; as, *ἀρχὴν κλέειν ἂν οὐδ' ἅπαξ ἐβουλόμην*, Soph. Phil. 1232.

IV.—ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF NECESSITY AND OF DUTY BY AN.

Ἄν is said to signify necessity; as in *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη*, Plat. Phædr. p. 246. and duty, as in *τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύοις*, Iliad. β, 250. but in the former passage *ἂν* only serves to soften an affirmation; and in the latter it has its signification of *will*. [See III. ii.]

V.—ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE FUTURE BY AN.

I. *Ἄν* gives a signification of the future by taking off the actuality in the sense of verbs:—1. obliquely, of what would have happened; with all moods except the imperative, and with the oblique tenses: with the imperfect; *ἄν*—καθεῖλκετε τριακοσίας ναῦς· ἦν δ' ἂν ἡ πόλις πλέα Θορύβον στρατιωτῶν—ταῦτ' οἷδ' ὅτι ἂν ἔδρατε, Aristoph. Ach. 552. seqq. He recounts not what the Athenians *could* or *ought* to have done, but what they *would* have done. So St. John viii, 42. With the plusquamperfectum: ἀνήρπαστο ἄν—εἰ μὴ δι' ἐμέ, Philo Jud. Legat. ad Cai. p. 774. l. 32.

With the Aor. 1. in the sense of the plusquamperfectum: ἐκείνος θανμαστός, ὃν ὁ Μαρσύας, εἰ τὰ δίκαια αἱ Μοῦσαι δικάσαι ἤθελον, ἀπέδερν ἄν; Lucian. t. i. p. 244. With the 2 aor. indic. in the sense of the imperf. subj. οὐποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός, Theogn. 436.—in the sense of the plusquamperfectum: καὶ νύ κ' ἔτι πλέονας Λυκίων κτάνε διὸς Ὀδυσσεύς, Εἰ μὴ, &c. Iliad. ε, 679. so φ, 544. add St. John xi, 32. With the optative: εἰ ἀπιστοίην, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἶην, Plat. Phædr. p. 229. l. 25. With an infinitive: τί ἂν οἶει ἀκούσαντας εἰπεῖν; Plat. Phædr. p. 268. l. 16. (t. x. p. 366. ed. Bip.)

II.—2. directly, of what will happen; helping to supply the place of the future indicative; as, εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι: *but if they will not give it, I will take it myself*: Iliad. α, 138. and immediately afterwards, ἦ τεόν, ἦ Αἴαντος ἰὼν γέρας, ἦ Ὀδυσῆος Ἄξω ἑλὼν, ὃ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται, ὅν κεν ἴκωμαι. See also ν, 206. and ι, 157.

VI.—ON THE ELLIPTICAL AND EXPLETIVE USES OF AN.

I. There is no ellipsis of *ἂν*, when the optative mood is used without it to express a wish; as, ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν—ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, &c. Hom. II. α, 18.

II. An ellipsis of it may with more reason be supposed, when a word put without *ἂν* must be taken in the same sense as if *ἂν* were expressed; as, τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἶη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν, μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων, for ὅσον ἂν, Plato Phædr. So ὅπως—ἐξετάσασαιμεν—τοὺς λόγους, οἱ τέχνη καὶ ἀνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο, for οἱ ἂν, Ibid. p. 277. l. 12. [but see Abr. of Vig. p. 179. r. iii.]

III. There is an ellipsis of it in its potential use in Iliad ε, 303. ὃ οὐ δύο γ' ἀνδρε φέροισιν. [See note v. on p. 177. of the Abr. of Vig.]

IV. When power, or want of power, is mentioned hypothetically, there is an ellipsis of *ἂν* before δύναμαι, as, εἰ μὴ ἦν οὗτος παρὰ Θεοῦ, οὐκ ἡδύνατο ποιεῖν οὐδέν, for οὐκ ἂν ἡδύνατο: St. John ix, 33.

V. There is an ellipsis of it in its signification of *will* also; as, μηδὲν ἄλλο φυτεύσης, &c. Alcæus. See Hor. Od. i, 18, 1.

VI. In its [supposed] signification of *duty*: ἔρδοι τις ἢν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην, Aristoph. Vesp. 1422.

VII. In its signification of the oblique future: εἰ μὲν οὖν οὗτος μὲν ἐν ἄστει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἤμεν, εἶχόν τίνα λόγον αὐτῷ αἱ συνθήκαι, for εἶχον ἂν, Lys. adv. Agorat. p. 227. and when an aorist of the optative or subjunctive is used for the indicative of the future; as with ἐμπέσοι, Eccles. xxxviii, 15. and with εἶπω, St. John xii, 27.

VIII. There is another elliptical use of ἂν, in which the ellipsis is not of that particle itself, but of some other word or words implied by the presence of ἂν, as, ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς ἂν ἤτησ' εἴκοσι Eis ἱμάτιόν γ' ὀκτὼ δ' ἂν εἰς ὑποδήματα: Aristoph. Plut. 984. where ἤτησε is to be understood again with the second ἂν. This ellipsis is very frequent in such responsory phrases as πῶς ἂν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν; καὶ πῶς ἂν; as, ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτο' ἂν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος; Answ. καὶ πῶς ἂν; underst. γένοιτο: Plat. Phileb. p. 43. l. 42. (t. iv. p. 275. ed. Bip.) and presently afterwards, πῶς γὰρ ἂν; viz. ὁρθῶς δοξάζοιτο καὶ λεχθεῖ;.

IX. Sometimes not only a preceding verb is to be repeated with ἂν, but a negative also is to be added; as, Socr. οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν; Protarch. πῶς γὰρ ἂν; viz. ταῦτὸν οὐκ εἴη; Plat. Ibid. p. 43. l. 34. (p. 274. t. iv. ed. Bip.)

X. Sometimes the ellipsis is of something not expressed before, but to be assumed extrinsically; an example may be seen in Budæus p. 496. and in the Abr. of Vig. p. 179. r. ii.

XI. Ἄν is said to be sometimes expletory or redundant; but this has not been sufficiently proved from the passages adduced for that purpose: e. g. in the passage cited by Budæus, p. 497. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν κοφύτερον συσκευαζώμεθα καὶ εὐτελέστερον, τοσούτῳ τὰς ἐπιούσας ἡμέρας ἤδιον ἂν ἀριστῆῖσσομεν τε, καὶ δειπνήσομεν, καὶ καθευδήσομεν; Xen. Cyrop. v, 3, 35. each ἂν takes off actuality in the sense of the verb with which it is joined. In ἀλλὰ κἄν εὖξαιτο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει, Plat. Alcib. ii. p. 142. (t. v. p. 85. ed. Bip.) the second ἂν affects γενέσθαι, [to which it imparts a future sense, which it would not otherwise have.] In the passage of Plato, de Legg. iv. p. 705. l. 13. (t. viii. p. 163. ed. Bip.) τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχουσα (πόλις) πολλὴν ἔξαγωγὴν ἂν παρεχομένη νομίματος ἀργύρου καὶ χρυσοῦ πάλιν ἀντεπίμπατ' ἂν, the participle παρεχομένη is put, by an idiom of the language, for a verb; and the sentence may therefore be no less considered as consisting of two members, to each of which one ἂν belongs, than if it had been constructed as follows, πολλὴν μὲν ἔξαγωγὴν ἂν παρείχε, νομίματος δ' ἀργύρου καὶ χρυσοῦ πάλιν ἀντεπίμπατ' ἂν. In πῶς δέ γ' ἂν καλῶς λέγοις ἄν; Aristoph. Ach. 306. the first ἂν affects πῶς: without it πῶς would have so qualified καλῶς λέγοις, as to make the sense, *in what manner*, &c. but now πῶς ἂν is equivalent to οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὅπως, so that by a figurative question it denies the possibility of the thing.

XII. But ἂν is sometimes really repeated with one and the same word, to assist the memory or attention after a parenthesis of considerable length, as, οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἐμῆς γε νεότητος (——) ὧδε φαύλως ἂν ὁ σπονδοφόρος—ἐξέφυγεν, Aristoph. Ach. 210. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ ἡμῶς—ἂν τις ἐψεγε, λέγων ὅτι— (——) μετρίως ἂν ἔδοκοῦμεν

πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, λέγοντες, &c. Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. l. 25. (t. vi. p. 327. ed. Bip.) also for the sake of more impressive inculcation, or of emphasis; as, ἀλκῇ δέ σ' οὐκ ἂν, ἥ σὺ δοξάζεις ἴσως, σώσαιμ' ἂν: Eurip. Orest. 710. See also Aristoph. Vesp. 506. seqq. [508. ed. Br.]

VII.—ON THE CONDITIONAL USE OF AN.

I. Besides the uses of ἂν already mentioned, there is another in which it is employed hypothetically for putting a case, or stating a supposition on which something else depends; as, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται, οὔτε κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς: Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (t. vi. p. 328. ed. Bip.) *if we are persuaded by you*, then so and so.

II. This use of ἂν is so nearly akin to that termed ἀοριστολογικὸς, that ὅστις ἂν and ἂν τις, ὅσοι ἂν and ἂν τινες, ὅπου ἂν and ἂν πον, and the like, may be interchanged without any difference of meaning; and so in Iliad. α, 527. for ὃ τι κεν or ἂν κατανέωσω, ἂν τι κατανέωσω may be substituted without alteration of the sense.

III. This agreement is very apparent too, when a case or supposition is expressed by a participle with ἂν, as, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν, οὔτε στρατηγίας: Plat. Alcib. ii. p. 142. (t. v. p. 85. ed. Bip.) for ἂν τυραννὶς δίδωται: and ἐπεὶ γενομένον γ' ἂν, οἷον λέγομεν, ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἂν, for ἂν γένηται: Plat. Politic. p. 301. l. 34. (t. vi. p. 97. ed. Bip.)

IV. Ἄν καὶ, or καὶ ἂν (always coalescing into κᾶν) signifies, *even though, even if*; as, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὦν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα: Plat. Sophist. p. 230. l. 38. (t. ii. p. 228. ed. Bip.) Sometimes καὶ is omitted, so that ἂν alone appears to have the same sense as ἂν καὶ or κᾶν; as, καὶ γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾗ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀμυδρὰν ποιεῖ τὴν μάθησιν ἄνευ παραδειγμάτων: Plut. de Anim. Procr. p. 1027. l. 41.

I.—OF THE PRIMARY POWER OF APA, AND ITS VARIOUS USES.

I. The primary power of ἄρα is that of deducing consequences from premises. It is therefore, like οὖν, collective or conclusive; but more syllogistical, being regularly employed in the conclusion of syllogisms, as ἀλλὰ μὲν is in the minor proposition: e. g. εἰ γὰρ εἰσι βωμοί, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοί· ἀλλὰ μὲν εἰσι βωμοί· εἰσὶν ἄρα καὶ θεοί· *therefore there are gods too*: Lucian. in Jov. Trag. [p. 229. c. ed. Salmur.] See also Lucian. in Vit. Auct. p. 565. [p. 379. B. and D. ed. Salmur.]

II. It concludes similarly in enthymemas, [syllogisms in which the major proposition is not expressed,] as, ἐγὼ σου πλουσιώτερός εἰμι· ἐγὼ σου ἄρα κρείσσων: Epictet. c. 66. where there are several other examples. τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει, κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐσθ' ἐκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ μάλιστα τοῦτο ἀνθρώπος,

οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος : Aristot. Ἠθικ. Νικομ. x, 7. "Αρα is frequently thus used by Homer : e. g. in Il. ε, 333. οὐτ' ἄρ' Ἀθηναίη οὐτ' Ἐννῶ : Diomed knew that Venus was feeble, and not of the number of warlike goddesses ; but Minerva and Bellona were warlike : *therefore* she could not be Minerva or Bellona.

III. So in dialogues, when an inference is made by one party from a preceding affirmation or denial of another party ; as, Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς ἐλέγομεν, ὁρατὸν εἶναι, ἢ οὐχ ὁρατόν ; οὐχ ὁρατόν. Ἀειδὲς ἄρα. Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ : Plato Phæd. p. 79. (c. 26. ed. Fisch.)

IV. So also in a sorites, ἄρα, through the accumulation of propositions, concludes or connects by the subject of the first proposition and the predicate of the last. An example is in the book of Wisdom, vi, 17—20. See also 1 Cor. xv, 14.

V. This illative force of ἄρα is more obscure, when it is employed on premises not immediately preceding it, but more remote, or on a diffuse train of argumentation ; as by οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, &c. St. Paul draws an inference in Rom. viii, 1. from all he has said from v. 16. of ch. i.

VI. The illative force is not obvious also when ἄρα is inserted in oblique phraseology, in a part where argumentation would not be expected, but where however a conclusion is legitimately drawn from premises : as, ὁ δὲ (one who is no longer loved) ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν (is under a necessity of following a person who has ceased to love him) ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων, ἡγνοηκὼς τὸ ἅπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι καὶ ἀνοήτῳ χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μὴ ἐρῶντι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι : Plato Phædr. p. 241. (t. x. p. 309. ed. Bip.) The collective force of ἄρα here will appear more plainly upon altering the construction in the following manner ; οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι—χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μὴ ἐρῶντι—ὁ ἐκεῖνος ἡγνοοίκει.

VII. Nor when ἄρα with its inference is put before that from which the inference is drawn ; as, Μῆτ' ἄρ' τις νῦν κτήματ' Ἀλεξάνδροιο δεχέσθω, Μῆθ' Ἐλένην· γνωτὸν δὲ, καὶ ὅς μάλ' ἀνίκητός ἐστιν, ὧς ἤδη Τρώεσσι δόλεθρον πείρατ' ἐφῆπται : Iliad. η, 394. Here from the certainty of destruction to the Trojans, it is concluded that their offers ought not to be accepted. In the same manner ἄρα with the conclusion is put first in Iliad. α, 93. *Apollo is incensed on account of his priest ; therefore not on account of vows or hecatombs.*

VIII. Nor in an inverted or preposterous method of reasoning ; in which the conclusion or consequence is placed first, and ἄρα, instead of accompanying that, accompanies one of the propositions placed last ; as, Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γενεὴν μεγάλου Διὸς εὐχομαι εἶναι· τίτρε μ' ἀνὴρ, πολλοῖσιν ἀνάσσειν Μυρμιδόνεσσι, Πηλεὺς Αἰακίδης· ὁ δ' ἄρ' Αἰακὸς ἐκ Διὸς ἦεν : Iliad. φ, 189. If what is first here be placed last with ἄρα, a regular sorites will appear ; *my father is Pelcus, Pelcus's was Æacus, Æacus's Jupiter ; therefore my descent is from the great Jupiter.*

IX. From this inverted mode of argumentation arises its significance of *nempe, nimirum, scilicet ; to wit, videlicet.* For, if a transposition be not admitted in the foregoing lines, ἄρ' may be translated

nempe. See *Iliad*. *o*, 306—310. where it so occurs twice; and in the sense of *sane, utique*, it is frequently put in the beginning of a sentence; as, ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, νῦν μὲν καιρὸς διαλυθῆναι: *Xen. Cyrop.* vii, 5, 40.

X. In the sense of *nimirum*, it is often placed between οὐδὲ and γε, as, οὐδ' ἄρα τῷ γε (Talthybius and Eurybates, who came to take away Briseis) ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς, *Iliad*. *a*, 330. So φ, 495. and 608.

XI. From the illative or conclusive power of this particle arises its employment in *epiphonemas*; because every epiphonema involves some conclusion or inference: [see Demetrius Phaler. § 106. seq.] To Phocion only, says Ælian, did Alexander use in his letters the salutation χαίρειν, and he adds, οὕτως ἄρα ἡρῆκει τὸν Μακεδόνα ὁ Φωκίων, *V. H.* i, 25. where ἄρα collects from what has preceded, the great estimation in which Phocion was held by the Macedonian.

XII. Nor is its sense different, when seasonableness of time is inferred from circumstances previously mentioned: τῆμος ἄρ' ὑλοτομεῖν μεμνήμενος ὦριον ἔργον, *Hesiod. "Erg.* 422. *timber felled in autumn is least subject to decay; at that season therefore, &c.*

Hence its use in referring actions or incidents to their times, with a repetition of words significant of time; as, ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ—, τότε ἄρ'—, ἤμος δ'—, τῆμος ἄρ': *Hom. Il.* *ω*, 786. 789.

II.—OF APA SIGNIFYING EFFECT.

I. When the consequence includes a fact or circumstance mentioned, then arises a power of ἄρα akin to the one before treated of, namely that of indicating effect.—1. When obedience follows an order: ὡς ἔφατ', says Homer, (*Jupiter gave this command*), and immediately adds, οὐδ' ἄρα πατρὸς ἀνηκούστησεν Ἀπόλλων, *Iliad*. *o*, 236.—2. When something is related as the consequence of a fact or circumstance mentioned; as, Ἦτοι ὁ μὲν δῶρ μακρὸν ἀνέσχετο διὸς Ἀχιλλεύς, Οὐτάμεναι μεμαῶς· ὁ δ' ὑπέδραμε, καὶ λάβε γούνων Κῦψας· ἐγχείη δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ νώτου ἐνὶ γαίῃ· Ἔσθη: *Iliad*. φ, 69. Here ἄρα indicates that the spear's entering the ground was the consequence of Lycaon's running under it, and embracing the knees of Achilles.

II. In this use there is sometimes an ellipsis which must be supplied from what precedes: in the *Cyrop.* of Xenoph. Tigranes asks Cyrus, πότῃ δ' ἡγῇ ἄμεινον εἶναι σὺν τῷ σῷ ἀγαθῷ τὰς τιμωρίας ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ σὺν τῇ σῇ ζημίᾳ; to which Cyrus answers, ἐμὰντὸν ἄρα οὕτω γ' ἂν τιμωροίην, iii, 1, 15. understand, *if I should inflict punishment so as to injure myself, ἐμὰντὸν ἄρα, &c. in that case it would be myself that I should punish.*

III. This force of ἄρα is sometimes rendered less obvious by a metathesis; as, τῶν νεοτῶν γενομένων, ὁ ἄρῃν ἐμπτύει αὐτοῖς, ἀπελαύνων αὐτῶν τὸν φθόνον, φασὶν, ἵνα μὴ βασκανθῶσιν, δι' ἄρα τοῦτο: Ælian. *V. H.* i. 15. for ἐμπτύει αὐτοῖς, ἀπελαύνων αὐτῶν τὸν φθόνον δι' ἄρα τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ βασκανθῶσιν.

IV. Akin to this transposition are the instances in which the effi-

cient cause with ἄρα is put last, and the effect first: as, "Ἐως ὃ τὸν πεδίοιο δῶκετο πυροφόροιο—Τυτθὸν ὑπεκπροθέοντα· δόλφ δ' ἄρ' ἔθελγεν Ἀπόλλων:" Iliad φ, 604. The deception practised by Apollo is the cause, and the pursuit the effect. Here, as in the case of inverted argumentation before mentioned, ἄρα takes the sense of *nimirum*, *nempe*, *scilicet*; and here, as there, its power may be considered as causal, for it may be rendered *nam*. This is why the examples above cited from Iliad. ο, 306. α, 330. and φ, 608. may be referred to this head.

III.—OF THE CONJECTURAL USE OF APA.

I. Ἄρα has been represented as having a conjectural sense, termed *στοχαστικός*; when an effect or event, having not yet taken place, remains doubtful; but since in all the examples of it ἄρα follows some hypothetical conjunction, as *εἰ*, *ἐάν*, *ἢν*, *εἴτε*, or a doubtful interrogation, the conjectural sense may perhaps with more propriety be attributed to the former, while ἄρα may be regarded as retaining its proper power of conclusion: *θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι· ὥστε ἐάν ἄρα [so that if therefore, because it is so—] πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος, προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου, γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσης:* Plat. Phædr. p. 238. (t. x. p. 303. ed. Bip.) So, *δεήθητι τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰ ἄρα ἀφεθήσεται σοι ἡ ἐπίνοια τῆς καρδίας σου*, Acts viii, 22. may perhaps be rendered, *supplicate God, that therefore*, i. e. *on account of thy supplication*, &c. And with *γε*: *ζητεῖν τὸν Κύριον, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὔροιεν*, *if perhaps by that means*, i. e. *by seeking him*, &c. Ib. xvii, 27. *Μὴ προσδεχόμενων μὲν ὑμῶν τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας, ἐάν μὲν ἀναρεθῶσι καὶ διοικισθῶσιν, ἰσχυροῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εὐθὺς ἔστιν εἶναι· ἐάν δὲ σωθῶσιν ἄρα,—βέβαιοι σύμμαχοι Θηβαίων δικαίως ἔσονται:* Demosth. pro Megalopol. Here is a dilemma; and if the first proposition be not established, the second must. Upon your rejecting the Megalopolitans, either such a thing must be the consequence, or such another: if not the former, then the latter. So that the meaning of *ἐάν δὲ σωθῶσιν ἄρα* is, *but if they should be preserved, which is the necessary consequence of the former supposition or case not being realised*—.

Εἴτ' ἄρ' ὄγ' εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται, εἴθ' ἐκατόμβης: Iliad. α, 65. There must be some cause for Apollo's anger: *whether therefore*, &c. *Καὶ νύ κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιτο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνεΐας, Εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη:* Hom. II. ε, 312. Æneas must have perished, if Venus had not perceived his danger: this cause therefore of his preservation is denoted by the insertion of ἄρα.

"Ὅστε ὁκνῶ, μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ, ἐάν ἄρα καὶ ἐβελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρεῖναι: Plat. Phædr. p. 257. l. 23. The meaning is this: *your speech, o Socrates, has much excelled the previous one of Lysias; if THEREFORE Lysias should choose to oppose another also to you, I doubt that too would be inferior, at least in my judgment.*

This illative force of ἄρα even after *εἰ* and the like particles is very evident in Plato, de Rep. v. p. 451. (t. vii. p. 8. ed. Bip.) *οἷόν τ' οὖν*

ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσθαι τινι ζῳῳ, ἂν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδιδῶς; This question having been answered in the negative, it follows, εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα χρῆσόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτα καὶ διδάκτεον αὐτάς; *if therefore, &c.*

Sometimes other words are inserted between εἰ and ἄρα, as, καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, &c. Thucyd. iv, 86.

II. The syllogistic power of ἄρα may be discerned in questions also expressive of doubt: ἴδε καὶ σὺ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡγρίον, ὥσπερ ἐμοί: Plat. Phædr. p. 268. (t. x. p. 366. ed. Bip. [*it appears so to me; therefore it may perhaps to you.*]) In Acts xii, 18. the guards of Peter, who had been liberated, wondering inquire, τί ἄρα ὁ Πέτρος ἐγένετο; From his having disappeared, although he had been most carefully guarded, they infer that something extraordinary must have taken place. So in Aristoph. Vesp. 266. τί χρῆμ' ἄρ' οὐ 'κ τῆς οἰκίας τῆσδε συνδικαστῆς πέπονθεν; ἄρα concludes (although from what immediately follows, not from any thing preceding) that something unusual must have happened to Philocles.

III. In direct questions not expressive of doubt, each particle has obviously its proper signification; the one of interrogation, the other of conclusion: εἰ ἄρα ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει; *are these things then so?* Acts vii, 1. εἰ ἄρα καθ' εἰς λανθάνει σε περιϋίων; Lucian. Solœcist. p. 577. So, τοῦτο οὖν βουλόμενος, μήτι ἄρα ἐλαφρία ἐχρησάμην; *did I therefore? does it follow that I did?* 2 Cor. i, 17.

IV.—OF THE USE OF APA IN TRANSITION.

I. Akin to its signification of *effect* is that of *due order* or *succession*: ἐπεὶ κατὰ μῆρ' ἐκάη, καὶ σπλάγχχ' ἐπάσαντο, Μίστυλλόν τ' ἄρα τέλλα, καὶ ἄμφ' ὀβελῶσιν ἐπειραν: Iliad. α, 465. ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ,—καὶ τότ' ἄρ', II. ω, 786. and presently afterwards, ἦμος δ'—, τῆμος ἄρ'—.

II. Hence in continued narration, where one thing follows after another, ἄρα, δέ, and ἔπειτα are used promiscuously and indifferently. See Hom. II. φ, 490—494. ι, 207.

III. From this signification of things duly following one another, arises its use in transitions, where it connects what follows with what precedes; and it is especially used when, after the recital of a speech, what followed is mentioned; ὡς ἔφατ' οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον νῆες Ἀχαιῶν: Iliad. η, 403. See also 398.

IV. And so it is put for μὲν οὖν or μὲν δὴ, either inchoative or continuative. See Hom. II. α, 8. Hesiod. [Op. i, 11.] Hom. II. φ, 39. and in v. 49. οὖν is used in the same sense as ἄρα.

V. Transition is made more apparent, when δέ, ἀλλὰ, αὐτὰρ, or some similar particle follows, as, Ὡς ἄρ' ἔφη ποταμὸς δέ χολώσατο κηρόθι μᾶλλον, Iliad φ, 136. So 502.

VI. Μὲν ἄρα is used in the same manner as μὲν οὖν, and is similarly followed by δέ or αὐτὰρ in the beginning of a fresh member. See Iliad. ο, 100. 149. 400. φ, 298. and in Iliad. φ, 427. μὲν ἄρα is in the first member, and δέ ἄρα in the second.

When the first syllable of the particle is long, it is marked with a circumflex, as above. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 179. § iv.] ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 10.

In oblique interrogation, in the sense of *whether*, it occurs but seldom: e. g. σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐναντίου; Plat. Phæd. p. 70.

APA ΓΕ.—I. Γε is added to ἄρα, when what may be controverted being waved, a question is limited to what is known to be allowed, and is put not for the sake of information, but merely to urge what cannot be denied: [*is it not so?* see note *d* p. 180. of Abr. of Vig.] ἄρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι; Xenoph. Mem. i, 5, 4.

II. Such questions involve or imply a vehement denial of what they ask; as, ἄρα γέ ὅμοια ἢ παραπλήσια τοῦτοις; Demosth. de fals. leg. p. 241. l. 48. The answer must be, *quite the contrary*. Γε denotes that the language of Æschines, after his arrival in Macedonia, was not only not the same as before, but not even like it. So, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὔρομεν αὐτοὶ, ἄρά γ' ἂν ἐθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων; Plat. Phædr. p. 274. (t. x. p. 379. ed. Bip.) The interrogation may be exchanged for simple negation; *we certainly should at least care no longer at all about human opinions*.

III. Another word intervenes between ἄρα and γε in Aristoph. Vesp. [4.] ἄρ' οἴσθ' αὖ γ', οἷον κνώδαλον φυλάττομεν; Without interrogation the sense would be, *you ought at least to know*, &c.

IV. When the phrase is used in anger, γε still retains its proper force: ἄρά γ' ἂν, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὑμεῖς ὑπαλλαχθεῖτέ μοι; Aristoph. Vesp. 482. *Will you at least be gone?* i. e. *be gone, lest I say something worse; lest you incur something worse*.

V. In ἄρα γε γινώσκεις, ἃ ἀναγινώσκεις; Acts viii, 30. γε softens and limits the doubt implied in the question.

VI. Sometimes ἄρα γε may be rendered *num forte*, the proper limitative force of γε being however still preserved: ἄρα γε διὰ τοῦτο; *is it perchance on this account?* Æschin. Dial. ii. So, ἄρα γε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐνδεέστεροί τι ἡμῶν διὰ τοῦτο φαίνονται εἶναι οἱ ἕτεροι, ὅτι οὐ πεπαιδευνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν; ἢ οὐδὲν ἄρα διοίσουσιν ἡμῶν οὔτε ἐν ταῖς συνοisiαις, οὔτε ὅταν ἀγωνίζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους δέη; Xenoph. Cyrop. ii, 2, 1.

APA ΜΗ, ΑΡ' ΟΥ.—I. Ἄρα μὴ, *num ideo*: ἐὰν δέ σου προσκατηγόρῃσω, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀγασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἄρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; *will you therefore, or on that account, think*, &c. Xenoph. Mem. ii, 6, 34. To the question of Socrates, τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι—σοὶ—λέγεις τὰ γράμματα, when Euthydemus hesitates for a reply, Socrates proceeds, ἄρα μὴ ἱατρός; *num ergo medicus?* Ibid. iv, 2, 10. *is it then a physician?* underst. *that you wish to be*, &c.

II. Ἄρα alone is used when a question is intended merely to elicit

an answer, whether affirmative or negative; *ἄρα οὐ*, when a negative answer is anticipated. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 180. l. 19. and notes *b* and *c*.]

III. *Ἄρα* alone is used in an interrogation consisting of two members: *ἄρα τὸ ὁσίον, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστι, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὁσίον ἐστι*; Plato Euthyphr. p. 10. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.)

IV. It is used alone also in questions implying a denial: *ἄρα καὶ μόνα ταῦτα*; Demosth. de fals. leg. p. 218. l. 36. He adds, *οὐ μὰ Δία· ἀλλ' ἔτι*, &c. So, *ἄρά γε ὁμοία ἢ παραπλήσια τούτοις*; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ: Ibid. p. 241. l. 48.

The question in Xenoph. Mem. iii, 10, 4. *ἄρ' οὖν*, ἔφη, γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶποτε τό τε φιλοφρόνως καὶ τὸ ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρὸς τινὰς; is no exception to this rule; for Socrates, as usual, dissembles his knowledge, and affects to seem ignorant.

V. On the contrary, *ἄρα οὐ*, as before observed, implies or demands affirmation: *ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο λουδορία ἐστίν*; Socr. *ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως*; Euthyphr. οὕτω. Plat. Euthyphr. p. 8. (c. 8. ed. Fisch.) See also Xen. Mem. i, 2, 44. i, 3, 11.

AP' OYN, AP' OYN OY.—I. *Οὖν* after *ἄρα* retains its proper power, *conclusive*, *inceptive*, or *transitive*.—1. *Conclusive*: in Plat. Euthyd. p. 280. to the question, *if ill, would you prefer a skilful or unskilful physician?* the answer is, *a skilful one*. The interrogator proceeds: *ἄρ' οὖν, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἶε πράττειν, μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων, ἢ μετ' ἀμαθοῦς*; (t. iii. p. 22. ed. Bip.) the conclusion denoted by *οὖν* taking the form of interrogation. So in p. 292. l. 22. (t. iii. p. 47. ed. Bip.) *ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλική*, &c.

II.—2. *Inceptive*. In Plat. Euthyd. p. 301. a disquisition on the ambiguity of the words *mine* and *thine* begins, *ἄρ' οὖν ταῦτα ἡγῆσθαι εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξης*, &c. (t. iii. p. 68. ed. Bip.)

III.—3. *Transitive*. Demosthenes, having shown that Æschines had made no decree when occasion demanded, passes on thus to another topic: *ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἔγραφεν, ἡνίκα ἐργάσασθαι τι δέοι κακὸν ὑμᾶς; οὐμνοῦν ἦν εἰπεῖν ἑτέρῳ*; pro Cor. p. 333. l. 23.

IV. It is used for conclusion and transition at the same time in Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 421. where after the answer *ἀλλὰ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν*, this further question is asked, *ἄρα οὖν καὶ τὸ τοῦτον ἀδελφὸν δόξω σοι μετρίως λέγειν*; (t. vi. p. 330. ed. Bip.)

V. *Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ* is *nonne igitur*. In Plat. Phædr. p. 263. Socrates, about to criticise a speech of Lysias, after reading the exordium, begins thus: *ἄρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τόγε τοιόνδε*, &c. *well then, is not this*, &c. (t. x. p. 356. ed. Bip.) So, *ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀριθμητικὴ*, &c. *is not then arithmetic*, &c. Plat. Politic. p. 258. l. 32. (t. vi. p. 7. ed. Bip.)

VI. It is to be observed that *ἄρα illative* is never placed first in a sentence; but *ἄρα interrogative* is; and that *οὖν* with *ἄρα* and *οὐ* is always placed between those words.

ATE.—I. "Ate composed of *â* and *τε*, *κατὰ* being understood, is

employed to restrict the universality of affirmation ; nearly equivalent to *utpote, quatenus* : as, *so far forth as, as being, since, &c.* ἄτε βασιλεὺς, ἄτε στρατηγός, is καθ' ἃ βασιλεὺς ἢ στρατηγός ἐστι.

II. It is generally construed with a participle ; as, *μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, ἄτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτοῦ, οὐποτε λήγει κινούμενον* : as *not deserting itself, since it does not desert itself* : Plat. Phædr. p. 245. l. 28. (t. x. p. 318. ed. Bip.) ἄτε σοφοὶ ὄντες, &c. de Rep. p. 568. (t. vii. p. 233. ed. Bip.) But the participle is wanting in the words immediately following, *ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα, ἄτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς.*

III. Sometimes it carries a signification of *cause* or *reason*, and is rendered *quippe, nam* ; as Aristotle says Thales took all the olive-yards in Chios and Miletus at a low rate, ἄτε οὐθενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος, *since, or because, no one outbid him* : De Rep. i. p. 185. l. 30. καὶ ἤδη περιφρονῶ τοῦ ἔλῃν, ἄτε εἰς ἀμείνω οἶκον μετασθησόμενος, as *being about to remove, &c.* Æschin. Dial. iii. 32. See also Plato Phædr. p. 275. l. 18. (t. x. p. 381. ed. Bip.) ἄτε οὐκ οὔσι σοφοῖς, &c.

IV. It is construed, like ὥς, with an accusative of a participle instead of a genitive absolute ; as Plato, speaking of a disadvantage arising from the invention of letters, says, τοῦτο τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἄτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους : Phædr. p. 275. (t. x. p. 381. ed. Bip.)

V. It signifies, *in the same manner as* : ξένοις ἄτ'—εὐεργέται δέϊπν' ἐπαγγέλλοντι, Pind. Pyth. Od. iv. So, ναῦς ἄθ', ἐκὰς διέχω : Theogn. 964.

VI. It is used for *quaque* (although), Anc. Lex. v. H. Steph. in v. οὐδέ μιν εἶπετο Πέτρος, ἄτε θρασὺς : Nonnus. [Perhaps it means, *nor did Peter, as a bold man, as might have been expected from so bold a man, inquire of him.* J. S.]

VII. Οὖν is sometimes added to ἄτε, each particle retaining its proper signification : also περ, as, ἄτε περ ἄζυξ, Aristot. de Rep. i. 2.

ATEXNΩΣ.—I. Ἀτεχνῶς, derived from τέχνη, in its sense of *fraud* or *artifice*, [see Abridg. of Vig. p. 131. l. 25.] signifies in its primary and genuine meaning, *frankly, openly, candidly, sincerely* : τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτεχνῶς, καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ : Plato Phædr. p. 100. l. 33. (c. 49. ed. Fisch.)

II. Hence, as what is said candidly and sincerely, is said *truly*, its signification is derived of, *in reality, indeed*, when it is used to augment the force of affirmation : as, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, παντοδαπὸς γίγνη : Plat. Ion. p. 541. σοφόν γε τοῦτ', καὶ γέροντι πρόσφορον ἐξεῦρες ἀτεχνῶς φάρμακον στραγγουρίας : Aristoph. Vesp. 806.

III. Its third sense, nearly allied to that last mentioned, is *absolutely, entirely, wholly, quite* : as, θεῖος εἶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὃ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος : Plat. Phædr. p. 242. l. 9. (t. x. p. 311. ed. Bip.) See also p. 230. l. 27. and Aristoph. Vesp. 721. [722. Br.]

ATTA.—I. Ἄττα is a particle added to words to render their

meaning less determinate and precise.—1. To adjectives: principally to ὀλίγα, ἅλλα, ἕτερα, ποῖα, πολλὰ, and some others: as, ὀλίγ' ἄτθ' ὑποειπών, *some few things*: Aristoph. Vesp. 55. λοιδορεῖσθαι δὲ ἅλλα ἅττα οὐδεὶς ἐκώλυνεν αὐτόν, Demosth. de fals. leg. p. 227. l. 31. ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα σώμασι προσφέρειν, *some such things*: Plato Phædr. p. 268. l. 10. (t. x. p. 366. ed. Bip.) ὅποι' ἄσσα εἴματα, *what sort of habiliments*: Hom. Odys. τ, 218. ἅλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα, *some other such things*, Plat. Phæd. p. 108. l. 15. (c. 57. ed. Fisch.) To adjectives of quality; as, οἰκτρὰ ἅττα λογοποιούντες, Xen. Cyrop. ii. p. 47. l. 33.

Sometimes other words intervene between the adjective and ἅττα, as, τοῖς δέκα ταλάντοις ἅλλα προσθήs ἅττα πεντήκοντα, Pherecrat. ap. Harpocrat. Sometimes the adjective is put last: ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε, Plat. Phæd. c. 4. ed. Fisch.

II.—2. It is sometimes added to substantives: as, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδα ἅττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον, *some slaves or other, no better than slaves*: Plat. Phædr. p. 259. l. 6. (t. x. p. 348. ed. Bip.) Sometimes it stands by itself for τινὰ, as, ἔλεγεν ἅττα προσκεκυφώς, Plat. de Rep. v. (t. vii. p. 2. ed. Bip.) [p. 413. l. 26. ed. Bas. 1.]

III.—3. It is found added to an adverb in Aristophanes only; πηνίκ' ἅττ' ἀπώλετο; Av. 1513. [On ἅττα see Abr. of Vig. p. 17. l. 14.]

ΑΥ.—I. Αῦ has a twofold power: *discretive* or *disjunctive*, and *adversative*. In its disjunctive use it signifies,—1. *repetition of the same thing; again*; as Xenophon says that Cyrus, when he arrived at the boundaries of the enemy's territory, sacrificed to the gods, and when he had passed them, ἐκεῖ αῦ καὶ γῆν ἱλάσκετο χοαῖς, καὶ θεοὺς θυσῖαις, *again, with repetition of sacrifices*: Cyrop. iii. p. 79. l. 38. See also Iliad α, 541. φ, 394. In this sense it is joined with the synonymous word πάλιν, either preceding or following; as, ἐγὼ αῦ πάλιν εἶπον, Plat. Euthyd. p. 279. l. 30. τοῦτο αὐτὸ πάλιν αῦ διαρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, Plat. Politic. p. 261. l. 4. See Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 26. ii, 2, 28.—2. *interchange or alternation; in turn*: as in Aristophanes, Xanthias, having related his own dream, desires Sosias to tell his in return; ἀτὰρ σὺ τὸ σὸν αῦ λέξον, Vesp. 27. See also v. 735. ed. Br. and Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 75. l. 38. [See note s on Abr. of Vig. p. 132.]

II. Things are sometimes so different as to be opposite or contrary to one another; whence αῦ, which is employed in divisions and subdivisions of things, takes the sense of, *on the contrary, on the other hand*: [note r on p. 132. of Abr. of Vig.] φήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ (πόλει εὐδαίμονι) μάλιστα ἂν εὐρεῖν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ αῦ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένην ἀδικίαν: Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (t. vi. p. 327. ed. Bip.) So *rursus* for *contra*; v. c. Curt. vii, 7, 4. and Plato joins αῦ with ἐναντία: ταύτης (δηγήσεως) αῦ ἐναντία γίγνεται, de Rep. iii. p. 394. (t. vi. p. 276. ed. Bip.)

III. Like ἄλλα, αῦ is put instead of δὲ after μὲν, for distinction of the members of a sentence: see Iliad. α, 19. So for *neque vero*, in contradistinction; *nor again*: Thucyd. iv, 87.

IV. Αὖ signifies also *backwards, back*: as, βόστρυχον αὖ ἐρύσαι, Suid. p. 378. and αὖ ἔρυσαν, Iliad. α, 459.

V. It is also put for δὴ in the sense of *especially, above all*; as, εἶπεν οὖν τις—δοκεῖν οἱ τὰ τε ἄλλα σοφώτατον γεγονέναι Σόλωνα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν αὖ τῶν ποιητῶν πάντων ἐλευθεριώτατον: Plat. Tim. p. 21. l. 21. (t. ix. p. 288. ed. Bip.)

ΑΥΘΙΣ, ΑΥΤΙΣ, ΑΥΤΕ.—1. Αἴθι, formed, according to Eustathius, by syncope from αὐτόθι, differs from αἴθις. Analogously to ἄλλοθι, ἐτέρωθι, &c. it signifies *rest in a place, there*; as in Iliad. ε, 296. but αἴθις, although it may signify motion from a place, as in Thucyd. iv, 12. usually denotes time, or repetition.

II. Αἴθις and αὐτίς are the same with regard to meaning, the latter being, according to Suidas, Homeric; according to Eustathius, Ionic: the former according to Suidas, Attic; according to Eustathius, common. See Hom. Il. α, 26. compared with Plato de Rep. iii. p. 393. near the end; (t. vi. p. 276. ed. Bip.)

III. Αἴθις signifies repetition: ἰδοὺ μάλ' αἴθις τοῦθ' ἔτερον see! *there again another blunder!* Aristoph. Nub. 670. In this phrase αἴθις is used with asseveration and emphasis, where repetition seems scarcely credible.

IV. With ἰέναι, ἔρχεσθαι, and the like verbs, it signifies sometimes *repetition*, as in Iliad. α, 26. sometimes *return*, as in Iliad. κ, 62.

V. And with other verbs it does not always denote a repetition of the acts of those verbs, but sometimes the performance of some act contrary to a former act; as, γέρας δέ μοι ὅσπερ ἔδωκε, Αὐτίς ἐφνυβρίζων ἔλετο κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων: Iliad. ι, 368. *he took it back again.* So Theogn. 357.

VI. From signifying repetition it assumes a designation of time; *hereafter, at a future time, another time*; μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὐτίς, Hom. σωφρονήσαντα πρόσθεν, αἴθις μὴ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δίκαια δυνηθέντα πράττειν, αἴθις ἀδυνατεῖν; Xen. Mem. i, 2, 23. Hence εἰσαῦθις or ἐσαῦθις, and separately ἐς αἴθις, *to another time*, Thucyd. iv, 63. With αὖ subjoined: οὐδ' αἴθις αὖ σε σκώψεται Παύσων, Aristoph. Ach. 854. and with πάλιν prefixed: πάλιν αἴθις, Hom. Il. β, 276.

VII. But sometimes αὖ is subjoined to αἴθις, when the latter signifies *again*, to express vehemence of emotion; without which one or other of the particles would be superfluous: as, ὦ, τί σ' εἶπω; ἀλλ' αἴθις αὖ τυπτήσομαι: Aristoph. Nub. 1382. [1379. Br.] Πάλιν in the sense of *retro, back*, is sometimes put before αἴθις, as in Iliad. ε, 257. Αὖ πάλιν αἴθις are conjoined in Aristoph. Nub. 971. εἴτ' αὖ πάλιν αἴθις ἀνισταμένους συμψῆσαι, where however αἴθις is perhaps to be taken with ἀνισταμένους, and πάλιν with συμψῆσαι. [On αἴθις and αὖ answering to μὲν, see Abr. of Vig. p. 133. l. 3, 4.]

VIII. Of αὐτε nearly the same may be said as of αὖ and αἴθις, except that αὐτε is more poetical; and it is scarcely joined with πάλιν, αὖ, or αἴθις. In the sense of *repetition* it occurs in Iliad. η, 377. and it is elegantly used when something preceding is repeated, as in Iliad. φ, 191. *and again; and—too.*

IX. Like αὖ, it signifies *alternation* ; whence its use in replies and rejoinders ; as, τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε, Iliad. α, 207. τ, 184. So νῦν αὖτε for νῦν δέ, ἀλλὰ νῦν : Il. α, 238. φ, 160.

X. It signifies *hereafter* in Hom. Il. ι, 135.

ΑΥΤΑΡ, ΑΤΑΡ.—I. Αὐτὰρ in poetry, ἀτὰρ in prose, and especially in Attic writers, have, like δέ and ἀλλὰ, both a discrete and adversative use. Discrete, as, ἀτὰρ σὺ λέξον πρότερος, *but tell you your dream first* : Aristoph. Vesp. 15. adversative, as in Iliad. η, 361. Hence it is conjoined with the adversative particle ὅμως : τὸ κατάβα τοῦτο πολλοὺς δὴ πάννυ ἐξηπάτηκεν· ἀτὰρ ὅμως καταβήσομαι : *but however, but nevertheless* : Aristoph. Vesp. 975.

II. From ἀρα, of which ἀτὰρ is compounded, the latter takes a *conclusive* or *collective* sense, which ἀλλὰ (for which ἀτὰρ is said to be put) cannot have alone, but which ἀλλ' οὖν has. Thus Strepsiades, having been reproved by Socrates for saying τὸν κάρδοπον in the masculine, replies, ἀτὰρ τολοιπὸν πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν ; *but how then must I call it in future?* Aristoph. Nub. 677. concluding from Socrates's reproof, that he had miscalled the thing, and must denominate it differently.

III. Ἀτὰρ is used in an involved mode of argumentation ; what ought to be the premises not being placed first : ἀτὰρ τί ταῦθ', ἅ πάντες ἴσμεν, μανθάνω ; Aristoph. Nub. 693. Αὐτὰρ (for which ἀτὰρ is put) being compounded of αὖτε and ἄρα, αὖτε here indicates a change of topic, and ἄρα concludes from what follows : q. d. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντες ἴσμεν, τί ἄρα μανθάνω ;

IV. The conclusive force of ἄρα in αὐτὰρ is perhaps discoverable in Iliad. α, also, v. 119. where γὰρ in the last member of the sentence assigns a reason upon which depends the conclusion indicated by αὐτὰρ in the first member.

V. The transitive force also of ἄρα, above mentioned, is preserved in αὐτὰρ : in Iliad. φ, 157. Pelegonus, having informed Achilles of his country, and the time of his arrival, proceeds, αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γενεὴ ἐξ Ἀξίου εὐρὺ ρέοντος, [*and as to my birth, &c.*] where αὐτὰρ merely denotes transition from one topic to another.

VI. Αὐτὰρ in its sense of transition denotes also that things are done duly and in proper order : as, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μῆρ' ἑκάη, &c. Hom. Il. α, 464. See also 467 and 469.

VII. Hence, like ἀρα, it indicates continued narration ; for ἔπειτα : see Iliad. η, 383. α, 598. ο, 113. and in this use, as in that last mentioned, ἐπεὶ is added to it ; as in Iliad. α, 458. 484. φ, 377. 383.

VIII. It is put for δέ, distinguishing one member of a sentence from another. It appears to be used for ἀλλὰ in abrupt speech, in Iliad. κ, 331.

IX. When ἀτὰρ is obviously put for ἀλλὰ, it is often followed by γε, but with some other words between : as, ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αἰὲ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδριμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάννυ γε ἦσθην : Plat. de Rep. ii. p. 367. Here ἀτὰρ, in its discrete or disjunctive use, opposes τότε to αἰὲ ; γε limits or restrains the time ; and οὖν infers from ἀκούσας the cause of Socrates's delight.

X. Ἄτὰρ has an *exceptive* force, like ἀλλά γε : as, μὰ δὲ οὐ τοῖνον γε (I have not indeed been at Sardis) ἀτὰρ δοκεῖ γέ μοι (but yet nevertheless it appears to me at least) εἰκέναι μάλιστα Μορύχου σάγματι : Aristoph. Vesp. 1136.

ΑΥΤΙΚΑ.—I. Αὐτίκα commonly signifies, *forthwith, immediately*. It is opposed to νῦν in Plato ; νῦν—πλάττομεν—αὐτίκα—σκεψόμεθα : de Rep. iv. p. 420. (t. vi. p. 327. ed. Bip.) It is construed with a future tense, when it signifies *without any delay, or with the least possible* ; as, αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται, Plat. Apol. Socr. [p. 7. l. 5. ed. Bas. 1.] To express the least possible delay, μάλα is sometimes added ; as in Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 72. αὐτίκα μάλα δείσει μάχεσθαι ; When what is spoken of is past, it is construed with a past tense, as in Iliad. α, 386.

II. Such being the nature of the particle, it is sometimes used to indicate an immediate commencement of the main topic of discourse, or a return to it, after discussion of what has little or no connexion with it. Thus Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus, having done with irrelevant matters, proceeds, αὐτίκα, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τί οἶει, &c. p. 235. in fin. (t. x. p. 297. ed. Bip.) *but to the purpose ; to come to the point*.

In this manner it may introduce a proof taken from a consequence or effect, and may be rendered *and* or *for*, as in Iliad. τ, 126.

III. Αὐτίκα is elegantly used to introduce an instance or example in proof of any thing said ; its true meaning in this use being, *not to look far, but to make use immediately of an example at hand* : [see note v on p. 133. of Abr. of Vig.] *for instance, for example* : αὐτίκα ἦν τινα ἔασι Ζῆν τῶν σε μηδὲν ἡδικηκότων, τίνα σοι τούτου χάριν οἶει αὐτὸν εἴσεσθαι ; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 29. [On αὐτίκα, and especially on the difference between τὸ νῦν—τὸ παρὸν—τὸ αὐτίκα, see Abr. of Vig. p. 133. and notes u, v, and w.]

ΑΧΡΙ, ΜΕΧΡΙ.—I. Ἀχρι and μέχρι, usually with a genitive, signify uninterrupted continuation as far as a certain term or boundary. That term is either of *time*, as μέχρις ἑως ἐγένετο, Plat. Symp. p. 220. l. 34. (t. x. p. 268. ed. Bip.) see Acts xx, 6. or of *place*, as, ἀχρι τῆς θαλάττης : or of *measure or degree*, as, μέχρι τινὸς ᾤετο δεῖν εἶναι, Aristot. Polit. ii, 7.

II. The term expressed by the genitive is either *included*, as, ἀχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν συμφερόντων, οὔτε τῶν δεόντων πράξει δυνάμεθα : Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 47. see 2 Cor. iii, 14. or *excluded*, as, μέχρι τοῦ βωμοῦ φίλος.

III. Sometimes it is not so much the term itself, as what is limited, space of time or of place, that is denoted : as, δεῖ τοὺς γινομένους, μέχρις ἂν ζῶσι, (for διὰ βίου,) πονεῖν. And metaphorically : τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα μέχρι χρείας τῆς ψυχῆς παραλαμβάνειν : Epict. c. 46.

IV. Sometimes the term is left uncertain and indefinite : as, ἀχρι πόρρω, Lucian. Amor. t. ii. p. 409. l. 53. *a great way, very far*. So μέχρι πολλοῦ, *a long time* ; ἀχρι καιροῦ, *for a time* : Acts xiii, 11. τὰς μασχάλας θηριώδεις καὶ δασείας ἔχειν ἀχρις ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν πλευρῶν,

to a great distance down his sides, for a great way down his sides: Theophrast. Eth. Char. c. xix. And when παντός is the genitive, (χρόνου, διαστήματος, χρήματος, or other such words, according to the occasion, being understood,) all term or limit is taken away. Παντός is sometimes suppressed; whence ἄχρις, for ἄχρι παντός, means *utterly, entirely*; as in Iliad. δ, 522. π, 325. Μέχρις or ἄχρις οὗ (*until*) is also said: μέχρις ἂν, μέχρις οὗ ἂν, μέχρι περ, μέχρι περ ἂν, μέχρις οὗ-περ ἂν, μέχρι τινός (for some time), μέχρι τίνος; (how long?) μέχρι ποῦ; μέχρι πρὸς, μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.

V. Ἄχρι and μέχρι are construed with verbs; in the indicative mood, when a certain, known, term or limit is spoken of; in the subjunctive or optative, when the term is not yet known: μέχρι μὲν ἐπίδοξος ἦν ὁ δῆμος ἕνα χειροτονήσῃν ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατηγόν, *as long as*: Plut. in Poplicol. μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς πίστεως, *until*: Ephes. iv, 13.

I.—ON THE SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE PARTICLE ΓΑΡ, CAUSAL, INCEPTIVE, AND RATIOCINATIVE.

I. Γὰρ (which may be thought to be compounded of γε and ἄρα) is in the first place *causal*,—*for*; being used in probation.

II. This force of γὰρ is sometimes obscure, when the particle is to be referred to words not immediately preceding it, but more remote: e. g. in St. Mark xvi, 4. where γὰρ assigns a reason, not for the stone's having been rolled away, but for the perplexity of the two women, which made them say, τίς ἀποκυλίσει ἡμῖν τὸν λίθον, &c.

III. And also when there is an ellipsis, to be supplied from something preceding, or from something extrinsical, and not expressed. Phædrus, about to enter on a discourse, says that he cannot avoid it, because he thinks that Socrates will not let him go until he has spoken; to which Socrates answers, πάντ' γὰρ σοὶ ἀληθῆ δοκῶ. Either καλῶς εἶπας must be understood before these words; or, assuming something preceding, they are to be thus taken: πάντ' σοὶ ἀληθῆ δοκῶ· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ σε ἀφήσω, πρὶν ἂν εἶπῃς ἀμωσγέπως. So in Sophocle. Philoct. 1273. [1281.] πάντα γὰρ φράσεις μάτην is to be explained either by understanding καλῶς ποιῶν πέπανσαι, or thus, πάντα φράσεις μάτην· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς καιρὸν λέγων κυρεῖς. Socrat. ἴσως τὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἷε νομίζοντα λέγειν ἃ ἔλεγεν. Phædr. ἐφαίνοτο γὰρ. Plat. Phædr. p. 257. underst. τὸν λοιδορούμενον οἷμαι νομίζοντα λέγειν· ἐφαίνοτο γὰρ. So Eurip. Orest. 444. 781. 792. 796. In Acts viii, 31. before πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην; underst. οὐ γινώσκω. In Æschyl. Pers. 232. with πᾶσα γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν Ἑλλάς βασιλέως ὑπὸ κῆρος, underst. *if Xerxes should take Athens*. Γὰρ assigns a reason why the desire of Xerxes to subjugate Athens was not at all strange.

IV. The causal force of γὰρ is still less obvious, when the ellipsis must be supplied from something extrinsical. In μετρίον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἐπέτυχες πώποτε, Aristoph. Plut. 245. the deficiency is to be supplied by understanding, *it is no wonder that all this has happened to you*, μετρίον γὰρ, &c. In St. John's Gospel, iv, 18. the expression

is complete. Ælian. V. H. xiii, 4. puts *ναὶ μὰ Δία* before *γὰρ* in an answer; and Aristoph. *τὴν τὸν Δι'*, Nub. 1382. [1379. Br.]

V. The ellipsis before spoken of is very common in answers, both affirmative, as, *ἔχει γὰρ*, *it has so*: Plat. Phædr. p. 268. l. 4. (t. x. p. 366. ed. Bip.) q. d. *you say well; for it has so*: and negative; as, *οὐ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ μαντεύμενον κατενόησας*. Ausw. *Μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, οὐ γὰρ ἔμαθον*: Lucian. Solœc. t. iii. p. 577.

VI. And also in interrogations: *εἰπέ μοι*, says Cyrus, *ποῦ δὴ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνὴρ, ὅς, &c.* to which Tigranes replies by another question, *οὐ γὰρ ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτὸν οὐτοσί ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ*; Xenoph. Cyrop. iii, 1, 38. where *οὐκ ἐστιν ἔτι* seems to be understood.

VII. *Γὰρ* causal is elegantly used as a close of sentences: thus *βίαιον γὰρ* closes a sentence in Aristot. de Rep. i. c. 3. at the end.

VIII. *Γὰρ* in its *inceptive* use occurs in the beginning of narrations, disquisitions, &c. that which it introduces appearing to be assigned as a reason of what has been premised. Thus Aristotle, after some previous discussion, begins thus to treat of the acquisition of property: *ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστίν, the use then of each possession*, &c. de Rep. i, 9. Prometheus in Æschylus begins an account of the wanderings of Io with, *ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἦλθες πρὸς Μολοσσὰ δάπεδα*, &c. See also St. Matth. i, 18. So *nam* in Latin; Cic. pro Arch. c. iii. [§ 4.] Ter. Andr. i, 1, 14.

IX. Sometimes *γὰρ* is introductory, even when the reason assigned is not in the same member with it, but in a following one, where *δὲ* is put to perform the office of *γὰρ*, as in Odyss. κ, 501. *ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γὰρ, &c.* *Γὰρ* should properly have come after *αἶδος*, and *δὲ* after *τίς*.

X. In such a case *δὲ* is not always put in the following member. See Il. α, 123. where the sense would be regularly expressed, if *γὰρ* were placed after *οὐδέ τι*.

XI. The *sylogistical* or *ratiocinative* use of *γὰρ* is evident in interrogation. In the *Ranæ* of Aristophanes, Bacchus asks if it is not a shame that he himself should go on foot while he makes his slave Xanthias ride on an ass to save him from fatigue and from carrying burdens. Xanthias, who feels that he is carrying, although he rides, answers, *οὐ γὰρ φέρω γώ*; with conclusion and interrogation at the same time: q. d. *do you think then that I carry nothing?* To this Bacchus rejoins, *πῶς φέρεις γὰρ, ὅς γ' ὀχεῖ*; [*you ride; therefore you do not carry*; but an interrogative form is given to the argumentation.] But the words may be understood also in a *causal* sense, *οὐ φέρεις* being understood; and so in v. 29. and in Acharn. 594. Dicæop. *ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι πτωχός*; Lam. *ἀλλὰ τίς γὰρ εἶ*; For by a Greek idiom, the remainder of what a person is saying is often, through impatience, partly anticipated and taken up by another, who being unable to proceed has recourse to interrogation; *γὰρ* or *ὅτι* being added, as a particle which would have introduced a reason for what the person, whose words are anticipated, had begun to say. So *τί γάρ*; *τίς γάρ*; *ὅτι τί*; and in Aristoph. Vesp. Philocl. *τηροῦμ' ὑπὸ τῶνδ', ἐπεὶ βούλομαι γε πάλαι—μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐλθὼν, &c.* Chor. *τίς γὰρ ἔσθ' ὁ ταῦτά σ' εἰργων, κἀποκλείων τὰς θύρας*; See Lucian. Dial. Mort.

t. i. p. 388. τίς γὰρ εἶ, ὃ βέλτιστε, &c. [p. 251. E. ed. Salmur.] Eurip. Orest. 483. Æschyl. Prometh. 519.

XII. Γὰρ therefore is never in itself interrogative. Τί γάρ; e. g. is not *what* or *why*, but *what then?* or *why then?* as in Aristoph. Nub. 57.

But its argumentative power is not so plain in τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ, without admitting an ellipsis and transposition, as in Lucian. Dial. Alexander: τί γελᾷς; Diogenes: τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνεμνήσθην οἷα ἐποίει ἡ Ἑλλάς. q. d. ἀνεμνήσθην οἷα ἐποίει ἡ Ἑλλάς, &c. ἐπὶ τούτῳ μόνῳ γελῶ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο γελῶμι; [p. 253. c. ed. Salmur.]

XIII. It has a similar force in other modes of interrogation: e. g. to Phædrus saying οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ παίζειν; Socrates replies, δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν—; *do I then appear to you to jest?* Plato Phædr. p. 234. l. 39. (t. x. p. 295. ed. Bip.) and in Xen. Mem. i, 4, 14. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον, ὅτι, &c. *for is it not evident to you, &c.* See Cyrop. iii, 1, 38. So when it expresses indignation, and is rendered *itane?* *nempe?* as, Χρυσίππον γὰρ μέμνησθε ὑμεῖς—; *and do you then dare to name Chrysippus?* Lucian. Conviv. p. 440.

XIV. It has been erroneously thought *adversative*, as in Aristoph. Pac. 320. where it rather signifies *enim*, *for*, as it does in Æschyl. Prometh. 1000.

II.—OF THE PARTICLES ΓΑΡ ΔΗ, ΓΑΡ ΔΗ ΠΟΥ, ΓΑΡ ΟΥΝ, ΓΑΡ ΟΥΝ ΔΗ, ΓΑΡ ΠΟΥ, ΓΑΡ ΡΑ, AND ΓΑΡ ΤΟΙ.

I. When δὴ signifies time, there is no combination of significations in γὰρ δὴ. δὴ γάρ· ἤδη γάρ· Hesych. (for poets put δὴ first.)

II. But when δὴ is *confirmative*, it strengthens and adds weight to the argumentative force of γάρ: ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ δὴ οἱ δευσιδαίμονες ἦττον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φοβοῦνται, Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 58. *for in truth; for it is certain that—*. Που added, lessens in a small degree the confirmative force of δὴ, and tends to elicit assent. [So that γὰρ δὴ που is *for doubtless; for you will allow, &c.*] ἀρμονία γὰρ δὴ που—ἀναρμοστίας οὐπορ' ἂν μετᾴχοι: Plato Phæd. p. 94.

III. In γὰρ οὖν, γὰρ is causal, and οὖν collective or conclusive: φημι γὰρ οὖν κατανεῦσαι ὑπερμενέα Κρονίωνα, &c. Iliad. β, 350. Here γὰρ assigns the reason why those of the Greeks, who wished to return home, could not do so before a certain time; which reason is the promise of Jupiter that they should first take Troy; and οὖν concludes from that promise, that if any attempted to return, they would either perish on the way, or, at least, not reach Argos before the destruction of Troy. See the preceding lines, to which γὰρ οὖν refers. Οὖν therefore is indicative of a latent conclusion: ἔχει δὲ ὤδε· πολυμήτειον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν: Plat. Phædr. p. 247. l. 25. (t. x. p. 322. ed. Bip.) He does not say ἔχει with affirmation, but ἔχει; and the reason for using the latter word rather than the former follows, πολυμήτειον γὰρ, &c. Οὖν concludes that ἔχει is rightly used in preference to ἔχει, since affirmation of the truth of the matter is not professed, but an attempt only.

IV. As every conclusion involves an affirmation or negation dependent on premises, οὖν sometimes appears to be merely affirmative in augmenting the causal signification of γάρ: προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, χάριν οὖ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζω γάρ οὖν [*for I do think; for I do really think,*] ἔλαττον ἁμάρτημα, ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ δικάων καὶ νομίμων: Plato de Rep. v. p. 451. l. 6. (t. vii. p. 6. ed. Bip.)

V. From the confirmative power of these particles combined, they are frequently employed in answers containing affirmation; as, λέγω γὰρ οὖν, [*yes I do say so,*] Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 22. Upon a nicer scrutiny however, the causal sense of γάρ, and the collective sense of οὖν, may be discerned here too: γ. d. ἀληθεύεις οὖν, τοῦτο λέγω γάρ. And so in ὁ δὲ γέρον (σφόδρα γάρ οὖν μέμνημαι) &c. which may be explained, διηγῆσομαι πάντα σάφως· σφόδρα γάρ μέμνημαι· διηγῆσομαι οὖν πάντα σάφως.

As in ἀλλὰ γάρ the former particle indicates an omission of something for which γάρ assigns a cause, [Abr. of Vig. 173. v.] so in γάρ οὖν the latter particle marks the suppression of a conclusion of which γάρ gives the reason.

VI. Δὲ, when added, urges the certainty of an affirmation; as in Plato de Legg. iii. p. 682. (t. viii. p. 116. ed. Bip.) where, after mention of the divine inspiration through which Homer had expressed something, this affirmation follows: θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὃν γένος, &c. *for undoubtedly, &c. for so it unquestionably is, that, &c.*

This phrase also, as well as γάρ οὖν, is employed in affirmative answers: ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτως: Plat. de Rep. v. p. 476. l. 17. (t. vii. p. 58. ed. Bip.)

VII. Sometimes however γάρ proves by an example, and οὖν applies a saying to a particular person; as, ἦπου σοφὸς ἦν, ὅστις ἔφασκε, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσης, οὐκ ἂν δικάσαις, σὺ γὰρ οὖν νῦν μοι νικᾶν πολλὰ δεδοῖσαι: Aristoph. Vesp. 725.

VIII. Που added to γάρ renders affirmation more cautious, and less positive, expressing some little degree of doubt, which the speaker wishes to have removed by the assent of others. Hence, in Plato, Socrates, who always affects ignorance, frequently uses the phrase γάρ που, as, δεινὸν γάρ που τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, Phædr. p. 275. l. 33. (t. x. p. 382. ed. Bip.) ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος, Phædr. p. 101. l. 17. These two particles are separated in Eurip. Heracl. 151.

IX. Γάρ ῥα, used only in poetry, is nearly equivalent to γάρ οὖν in reciprocal argumentation, (of which above;) but there is this difference, that ῥα, which is put for ἄρα, may, besides its collective or conclusive power, denote effect also. In Hom. Il. α, 237. Achilles swears by his sceptre, which could never vegetate again: the reason follows, περὶ γάρ ῥα ἐχαικὸς ἔλεψε Φύλλά τε καὶ φλοῖόν. The effect therefore, which is οὐκ ἀναθλήσει, is indicated by ῥα. So in Il. φ, 468. the reason of Apollo's turning back is reverence of his uncle, and again the effect of his reverence is his turning back.

X. Γάρ τοι scarcely differs from γάρ δή. It is used in asseveration, to vouch or assert a reason given; *trust me; take my word for it;*

depend upon it: ἐμπλησο λέγων· πάντως γάρ τοι παύσει ποτέ: Aristoph. Vesp. 601. very properly therefore subjoined to ἀμέλει in Aristoph. Ran. 535. [532. Br.] Sometimes it may be rendered *in truth, indeed, truly:* αἰσχιστα γάρ τοί μ' εἰργάσατο Λυσίστρατος, Aristoph. Ran. 783. προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή· ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβομεν,—ἐρωτικός: Plato Phædr. t. x. p. 281. ed. Bip. and it has other slighter significations, of which examples are every where to be found.

I.—ON THE PRIMARY FORCE OF THE PARTICLE ΓΕ, AND ITS ELLIPTICAL USE.

I. Of this particle, which is employed very frequently and elegantly by the most ancient authors, the primary force is that of restraining or confining what is more general to what is more special, a whole to a part, &c. as, εἰ μὴ ὅλον, μέρος γε: Demosth. pro Cor. εἰ μὴ πάντες, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρες γε, *at least.* αἰσχύνῃ, οὐδεμιᾷς ἐλάττων ζημίας τοῖς γε σῶφροσι: Demosth. Olynth. i. [p. 17. l. 7. ed. Reisk.] Cicero uses *quidem* in the same sense, pro Fonteio, c. v. [c. iv. § 8.] And as what is limited or restrained is urged with greater emphasis, this particle, conceding, or comparatively disregarding, what precedes, insists forcibly on somewhat following; and when subjoined to an affirmative proposition, has a negative before it, and vice versa: εἰ μὴ ἅπαντες, ἀλλὰ τινές γε, and εἰ τινες, ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι γε ἅπαντες.

II. Sometimes it urges emphatically what follows, without waving or giving up what precedes; as in Plato de Rep. iv. the guards of the city are said to be μισθωτοί, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι, καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες, (t. vi. p. 326. ed. Bip.) This power of the particle is called περιγραφικὴ or *circumscriptive*.

III. The primary meaning of this particle has often been overlooked on account of an ellipsis attending it: e. g. ὕστερον αὐτε μάχεσσόμεθ', εἰσόκε Δαίμων Ἄρμυε διακρίνῃ, δῶγ δ' ἑτέροισι γε νίκην, Iliad. η, 292. 378. and 396. where the ellipsis is to be supplied from what precedes, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ διακρίνῃ, δῶγ δ', &c.

IV. But the ellipsis is oftener to be supplied from something extrinsical: as in ἐσῆλθε δὲ καὶ ἐς τῶν Καβείρων τὸ ἱρὸν, ἐς τὸ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἐστὶν εἰσεναὶ ἄλλόν γε ἢ ἱερέα: Herodot. iii, 37. Before ἄλλόν underst. οὐδένα, and thus γε limits the preceding general negation, and is corrective.

V. In Iliad. ε, 303. μέγα ἔργον, ὃ οὐ δύο γ' ἄνδρε φέροισιν, underst. εἰ μὴ πλείους:—ὃ, εἰ μὴ πλείους, ἀλλὰ δύο γ' ἄνδρε οὐ φέροισιν, *which two men certainly, or at least, not to mention more, could not carry.* In Lucian. adv. Indoct. τὴν λύραν δὲ ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τὸ ἱερὸν, [καὶ] ἐπὶ πολὺ γε σώζεσθαι αὐτὴν, t. iii. p. 110. [p. 547. A. ed. Salmur.] underst. εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ νῦν. ἀσπασίως ἐσέχυντο ἐς πόλιν, ὄντινα τοῦ γε πόδες καὶ γούνα σώωσαν: Iliad. φ, 611. q. d. οὐ πάντες, ἀλλ' ὄντινα, &c.

And in this elliptical use it is often repeated many times: e. g. οὐ μὲν σφῶϊ γ' ὅτω πρὶν γ' ἀποπαῦσθαι, πρὶν γ' ἢ ἑτερόν γε πεσόντα,

αἵματος ἄσαι Ἀρηα : Iliad ε, 288. οὐ σφῶτί γε, *not you at least, if any one else* : πρὶν γ' ἀποπαύσεσθαι, *and if you desist, yet at least that you will not desist before, &c.* The third γε is perhaps repeated merely on account of the repetition of πρὶν : the last γε limits the certainty of falling to one or other of Pandarus and Æneas, waving the consideration of the probability of both falling : q. d. εἰ μὴ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἑτερόν γε. In a passage of Aristoph. Plut. beginning at v. 571. γε occurs four times ; and the ellipses may be supplied in a similar manner. This latter passage shows that γε is used in concessions made unwillingly, and with all possible repugnance.

VI. The meaning is rather obscure also, and liable to be overlooked, when γε is used interrogatively in expressing indignation ; as, Phidip. οὐκ Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινεῖς, σοφώτατον ; Streps. σοφώτατόν γ' ἐκείνον ; Aristoph. Nub. 1381. [1378. Br.] But if the interrogative form of the sentence be changed, and the ellipsis supplied, the force of γε appears : εἰ τινα ἄλλον, ἐκείνόν γε μὴ λέγῃς σοφώτατον. In a similar manner it is added in expression of admiration : σοφώτατά γε, ᾧ Πρῶδικε : Plat. Phædr. p. 267. l. 16. (t. x. p. 364. ed. Bip.) q. d. εἰ τινα ἄλλα, σοφώτατά γε ταῦτα.

VII. In Aristoph. Plut. 1169. καὶ πλῦνέ γε, &c. it is used in conceding Mercury's request of admission, but urging more what is to be done in consequence.

VIII. From its proper native force arises its *confirmative* use, which is also elliptical : γελοῖόν γ', ᾧ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις : Plato Phædr. p. 257. l. 28. (t. x. p. 344. ed. Bip.) underst. ὅ τι ἂν λέγοις, τοῦτό γε δόγμα γελοῖον λέγεις. So in affirmative answers very frequently ; as, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, μάλιστα γε, ἀληθῆ γε, &c. q. d. εἰ τι ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν, ἀληθέστατόν γε τοῦτο.

IX. The confirmative power of γε is very conspicuous when the particle is used in a proposition, which even our adversary we know will not gainsay ; as, σὺ δέ γε οὔτε κτῆσις εἶ, οὔτε λέξις : Epict. Enchir. c. 66. *but you, it is certain, as you will allow, &c.* It would be fully expressed thus : ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅ τι ἂν ἀντεῖποις, τοῦτό γ' ὁμολογήσεις, ὅτι οὐκ εἶ οὔτε κτῆσις, οὔτε λέξις. Cf. Plat. de Rep. v. p. 462. l. 34. And thus it appears synonymous with δήπον, as it not only affirms, but extorts assent. Xenophon certainly employs these two particles together, Cyrop. ii, 2, 26.

X. It is used for γε δὴ, when what is mentioned after other things is rested on with exultation and triumph, as of more moment than those other ; as, after an enumeration of advantages, ὃ δέ γ' ἥδιστον τούτων ἐστὶν πάντων, &c. Aristoph. Vesp. 603. [605. Br.]

XI. The force called περιγραφικὴ of this particle appears in emphatical negation ; as in Theocrit. Idyll. xxii, 74. and in Aristoph. Vesp. οὐδὲν μετέδωκεν, οὐδὲ τῷ κοινῷ γ' ἐμοὶ : *not even to me, although his associate* : v. 912.

XII. It has an exaggeratory force sometimes, and is equivalent to οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καί : as in Plato de Rep. iv. to the question, ἀργὸς καὶ ἀμελὴς γενήσεται μάλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ; the answer is πολὺ γε : p. 421. (t. vi. p. 330. ed. Bip.) *yes, and much more so* : q. d. οὐ μόνον ἀργὸς μάλλον καὶ ἀμελὴς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ ἀργότερος καὶ ἀμελέστερος.

See also Plat. Phædr. p. 263. l. 5. (t. x. p. 357. ed. Bip.) But perhaps it may be allowed that γε in these passages has its affirmative force.

XIII. It is put for *μάλιστα*, a use arising from its primary limitative one; as, *ἄλλου του ἢ τούτου γε ἔνεκα εἰρήνης νῦν ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ὅτι*, &c. Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 73. l. 32.

XIV. In proofs of an assertion which are founded on instances, γε is put for γοῦν, in which however the restrictive or limitative power of γε is preserved. The Persians, says Isocrates, treated their allies with slight and contempt, and made court to their enemies; which he proves by instances: *τὴν μὲν γε μετ' Ἀγησιλάου στρατιὰν ὀκτὼ μῆνας διέθρεψαν, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντας, ἑτέρου τοσούτου χρόνου τὸν μισθὸν ἀπεστέρησαν*: Panegy. p. 141. *for*, &c. Γε confines the general assertion to the instances specified: *at least they certainly maintained*, &c.

XV. Γε has been erroneously supposed redundant: as, e. g. in Odyss. v, 245. *οὐχ ἡμῖν συνθεύσεται ἡδε γε βουλή*: but its sense will appear on supplying the ellipsis: *εἰ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἡμῖν συνθεύσεται, ἡδε γε βουλή οὐ συνθεύσεται*: *whatever may be the success of other designs, this at least will not succeed*. In the Plutus of Aristophanes, Chremylus says that all things are subservient to riches; which Cario confirms by his own example, *ἔγω γέ τοι διὰ σμικρὸν ἀργυρίδιον δοῦλος γεγέννημαι*. [147. Br.] Here γε limits the proof or confirmation to the person of Cario, setting aside the consideration of others. And there is a similar limitation in those answers which occur so often in Plato; *ἔγω γε*, and *οἶμαι ἔγω γε*, *I at least certainly think so*. So, *οὐκ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται*, Aristoph. Acharn. 769. See also Lysias c. Agorat. p. 227. Plat. in Phædr. p. 230. l. 31. (t. x. p. 287. ed. Bip.) p. 266. l. 29. (p. 363. ed. Bip.) Lucian. Dial. Mort. p. 443.

II. OF THE PARTICLES ΓΕ ΔΗ AND ΓΕ ΔΗ ΠΟΥ.

I. The restriction or limitation signified by γε is enforced by the addition of δὴ: thus to the question of Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus, what power the art of rhetoric has, Phædrus replies, *a very great one*; adding, *ἐν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις, especially in assemblies of the multitude*: [*that is to say, in assemblies, &c.*] p. 268. (t. x. p. 266. ed. Bip.) *τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὐπορον εἶναι διέναι ἀνευ ἀγωγῶς, καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δὴ*: *and especially with an armed force*: Thucyd. iv, 78. In Latin this sense is expressed by *quidem certe*: see e. g. Cic. pro Archia c. xii. [§ 30.]

II. Hence the frequent use of γε δὴ in affirmative answers: *λέγεται γε δὴ*, Plat. Phædr. p. 242. l. 39. (t. x. p. 312. ed. Bip.) Δὴ affirms that men say so; the restriction or limitation will appear on considering the ellipsis: *ὅ τι ἂν εἴη περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐμοί, τοῦτό γε σαφές, ὅτι λέγεται*. So, *ἔδοξέ γε δὴ*, *ibid.* p. 277. l. 13.

III. But in *πλὴν γε δὴ*, γε has its circumscriptive force, which, without waving or remitting what precedes, merely urges or insists on what follows: thus, *πάντα γὰρ πάρεστι νῶν, ὅσων δεόμεθα, πλὴν γε δὴ τῆς κλεψύδρας, except only the clepsydra*: Aristoph. Vesp. 853.

τί ἄλλο ἢ γραμματικὸς ἀπετελέσθην ἀντὶ φιλοσόφου; πλὴν γε δὴ, (*except only*) ὅτι ἀντὶ Ὁμήρου Χρῦσιππον ἐξηγούμενος: Epict. Enchir. c. 73.

The sense of γε δὴ is more latent when those particles are subjoined to an interrogative word; as, οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφιστῇ κραιπαλῶντι, πόθεν γε δὴ Πλάτωνι τοιαύτην ἂν τις ἀναθείη—ταραχὴν καὶ ἀνωμαλίαν: Plutarch. de Anim. procr. p. 1016. but it will appear when the negation implied by the interrogation is substituted for the latter, i. e. μήτι γε δὴ for πόθεν γε δὴ, *much less to Plato*. Γε, whether with interrogation or negation, denies at all events that such confusion and inconsistency can be attributed to Plato, whatever may be conceded with respect to a drunken sophist, and δὴ enforces the limitation.

IV. When *που* is added, it throws a shade of doubt over assertion, and lays out for assent; as, οὐδέ γε δὴ *που* ψυχῇ, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχῇ, κακίας (οὐποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι,) Plato Phæd. p. 94. l. 4. *if I mistake not; as you will no doubt allow*, or the like: ἐκεῖνό γε δὴ *που* οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν, οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 8.

ΓΕ ΜΕΝΤΟΙ.—I. To γε in its restrictive sense the adversative μέντοι is sometimes added: οὐκ ἔχω φράσαι, ὅμως γε μέντοι σοι δι' αἰνιγμῶν ἐρῶ: Aristoph. Ran. 61. *I cannot tell you plainly; yet nevertheless I will inform you at least by inuendos or indirect intimations*.

II. Elliptically in Aristoph. Vesp. 1150. κατὰθον γε μέντοι καὶ κρεάγραν, *yet however at least*, &c. underst. εἰ μὴ ἄλλο τί μοι χαρίζεσθαι βούλει.

Between μέν and τοι, οὐ is placed by Homer, Il. ε, 516: μετᾱλλησάν γε μέν οὔτοι, *yet nevertheless*, (although they rejoiced when they saw him safe and sound) *they made no inquiries at least*, (whatever else they might say to him.)

ΓΕ ΜΗΝ.—I. In this combination γε retains its restrictive, and μὴν its adversative, sense: τυχὸν μὲν οὐδ' αὐτῶν τούτων τεύξη, πάντως γε μὴν (*but however at all events*) ἐκείνων ἀποτεύξη: Epict. Enchir. c. 4. q. d. εἰ καὶ μάλιστα τούτων τεύξη, ἐκείνων γ. μ. ἂ. So, after mentioning certain excellences of Protagoras as a rhetorician, Socrates adds, τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων—λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος: Plat. Phædr. p. 267. Μὴν opposes to the inventions of Protagoras the οἰκτρολογία of the Chalcædonian Rhetorician, which is limited by γε, elliptically: q. d. εἰ μὴ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γε τῶν οἰκτρογόνων λόγων τέχνη ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος κρατεῖ.

Λέγει Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν κύκνον καλλίπαιδα εἶναι καὶ πολὺπαιδα, ἔχειν γε μὴν καὶ θυμὸν: *but yet*: Ælian. V. H. i. 14. Γε limits the praise εὐτεκνίας, and μὴν signifies that something is set against that praise. So, καὶ μάχεσθαι τοὺς κύκνους τοῖς ἀετοῖς, ἀμύνασθαι γε μὴν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρχειν ἀδίκων, *ibid. but then that it is only in self-defence*, &c.

II. In this combination γε has sometimes the circumscriptive force

before mentioned : thus in Plato de Rep. v. Socrates, after setting forth the greatest of the advantages of his republic, proceeds : *τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν* : p. 465. (t. vii. p. 36. ed. Bip.) [*but as to the smallest of the evils, &c.*]

III. And *μὴν* sometimes supplies the place of *δὲ* after *μὲν*, *γε* retaining its restrictive force : as, *πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδὺν, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα* : *but nevertheless, to say nothing of any other inconvenience, &c.* Plato de Legg. iv. p. 705. (t. viii. p. 163. ed. Bip.) *οἱ μὲν δὴ Πέρσαι—ὁμόσε ἐφέροντο· οἳ γε μὴν πολέμοι οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο μένειν—*, Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. at the end. [*but the enemy on the other hand, &c.*]

ΓΟΥΝ.—I. Γοῦν is compounded of *γε* and *οὔν*, which are sometimes found together, without being united in one word, e. g. in Xen. Mem. i. p. 731. l. 10. and iii. p. 782. l. 5. or separated by another word, as, *μᾶλλον γ' ἂν οὔν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο*, Plato de Rep. v. p. 469. (t. vii. p. 44. ed. Bip.) It therefore limits or restricts by *γε*, and concludes by *οὔν*, and is used in arguments rather probable than irrefragable and certain. *ὦ Λύκε δέσποτα, γείτων ἦρως· σὺ γὰρ, οἷσπερ ἐγὼ, κεχάρησαι τοῖς δακρύοισι τῶν φευγόντων αἰεὶ καὶ τοῖς ὀλοφυρμοῖς· ᾤκησας γοῦν ἐπίτηδες ἰὼν ἐνταῦθ', ἵνα ταῦτ' ἀκροῖο* : Aristoph. Vesp. 390. [*from your having made your abode where you may hear such things, it may at least be fairly concluded that you delight in them.*] οἶει—*παρέντα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκωμιάζειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν ὄντα, εἴτ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἔξειν λέγειν* ; Plat. Phædr. p. 236. (t. x. p. 297. ed. Bip.) *may you not conclude from his passing over what at least is quite necessary to be spoken of, that he will not have any thing else to say?*

II. In some passages γοῦν is, *at least therefore* : *καὶ μοι, εἰ δοκεῖ, ἀπόκριναι· μᾶλλον δὲ, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό σοι ἀδύνατον, ἐπίνευσον γοῦν ἢ ἀνάνευσον πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτώμενα* : Lucian. Adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 103. ἦ, εἴπερ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνειν συμβαίνοι, πολέμου γοῦν ἔργον μαχομένους γενέσθαι : Heliodor. vi, 13. and in that sense it is used elliptically by Lucian. *ibid.* p. 120.

III. Γοῦν is used in arguments drawn—1. from signs or tokens ; as, *κοῦκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐχ ἡμερῶν τεττάρων τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὸν θεὸν ποιῆσαι· ἔπεισι γοῦν τοῖσιν λύχνοις οὐτοῖς μύκητες* : Aristoph. Vesp. 262.—2. from facts or examples ; as, *ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοί σε μὲν δίκαιον νομίζω, σοφὸν δ' οὐδὲ ὅπωςτιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γ' οὔν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πρᾶττη* : Xenoph. Mem. i, 6. [§ 11.] Aristotle says that a female hyæna is seldom taken, and adds as a proof, *ἐν ἑνδεκα γοῦν κνηγός τις μίαν ἔφη λαβεῖν*, Hist. An. vi. c. 32.

IV. In affirmative answers γοῦν is used in a threefold manner, *γε* preserving its power of limitation or restriction, and *οὔν* its power of conclusion :—1. when what is given as a sign or proof of the truth of what has been said, is added, or comes after ; as in Plato, one having determined the age most proper in man and woman for pro-

pagation, another answers, ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν αὕτη ἀκμή σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως: de Rep. v. p. 461. (t. vii. p. 26. ed. Bip.)—2. when the sign or proof has preceded; as, ἐκ τῶν νῦν γοῦν εἰρημένων, [*certainly that conclusion must be drawn from what has now been said:*] Plat. Politic. p. 295. l. 16. (t. vi. p. 84. ed. Bip.)—3. when that from which a conclusion is drawn is not expressed, but something extrinsical; as in those frequent answers, εἰκός γ' οὖν, δίκαιόν γ' οὖν. Thus in Xenoph. to the question, τὸ τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τὴν σωματικὴν ἀπομιμῆσθαι οὐ ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις; the answer is, εἰκός γ' οὖν. Mem. iii. c. 10. q. d. *from a great multitude of circumstances, which might be adduced in proof, it is at least probable that such is the case.*

ΓΕ ΠΟΥ.—I. Γε is prefixed to the conjectural particle πον, the former limiting, and the latter laying out for assent; thus in Plato de Rep. x. Socrates, after asking whether it were not just that the poets should come forth and defend their cause either in an ode or in some other kind of poetry, adds, δοῖμεν δὲ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοὶ, φιλοποιηταὶ δὲ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν: p. 607. (t. vii. p. 109. ed. Bip.) ἀγορᾶς τέλος ταύτην γέ που δώσεις ἔμοι, *you will give me this eel at least, I think, (or will you not? or to be sure,) instead of the market toll:* Aristoph. Acharn. 895. Γέ που is used whenever one suspends a limitation or restriction on the will or judgment of another; as, δεινόν γέ που 'στ' ἄνθρωπος ἀποβαλὼν ὄπλα, Aristoph. Vesp. 27. So in negation πον eliciting assent is added to γε circumscriptive: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἂν, Plat. de Legg. p. 712. l. 24. (t. iv. p. 177. ed. Bip.)

II. Sometimes however, since γε is confirmative, (see above,) the employment of γέ που is only a civil manner of requiring assent to what one knows to be undeniable; as, καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων γέρα δοτέον, Plato de Rep. v. p. 460. l. 10. (t. vii. p. 25. ed. Bip.) The answer is ὀρθῶς. So, καὶ ἄρχοντας γέ που—οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους αὐτοῖς (over the boys) ἐπιστήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἱκανοὺς ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς εἶναι, ibid. p. 467. l. 32. This could not be denied; *πρέπει γὰρ, therefore, is the answer.*

ΓΕ ΤΟΙ, ΓΕ ΤΟΙ ΔΗ, ΓΕ ΤΟΙ ΠΟΥ.—I. Τοι, like δὴ, enforces the limitation of γε, as in Aristoph. Vesp. 928. [934. Br.] So v. 1141. [1146. Br.] τοῖσι βαρβάροις ὑφαίνεται πολλαῖς δαπναῖς αὕτη (this garment) γέ τοι ἐρίων τάλαντον καταπέπωκε ῥαδίως. [On the difference between γε δὴ, and γέ τοι, see Abr. of Vig. p. 181. r. vi.]

In Aristoph. Plut. 424. Chremylus, seeing Poverty, asks her who she is; to which Blepsiadēs answers, ἴσως Ἐριννύς ἐστίν ἐκ τραγωδίας· βλέπει γέ τοι μανικόν τι καὶ τραγωδικόν: *however that may be, she at least certainly looks, &c.*

II. For still stronger enforcement or confirmation, δὴ is sometimes added; as, ἔστι γέ τοι δὴ τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται: Plat.

Phædr. p. 264. l. 10. (t. x. p. 358. ed. Bip.) an exclamation of Phædrus, convinced of what he had before denied.

III. On the contrary, to weaken the affirmation, *που* is added ; as, *εἰκός γέ τοι που σοφοὺς ἀνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν*, Plato de Legg. x. p. 888. (t. ix. p. 74. ed. Bip.)

ΔΕ.—I. Δὲ in its relation to *μὲν* will be treated of under the latter particle ; but here, as far as may be, separately. It is never the first word of a sentence, but usually the second ; sometimes the third, as in Gal. iii, 23. especially if *οὐ* or *μή*, or the article, is the first ; as, *οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κοινωνοὺς τῶν δαιμονίων γίνεσθαι*, 1 Cor. x, 20. *τὸν λόγον δέ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω*, Plato Phædr. p. 257. l. 20. (t. x. p. 344. ed. Bip.) A different arrangement in these last passages would not have kept *οὐ* δὲ and *οὐδὲ*, *τὸν* δὲ and *τόνδε*, sufficiently distinct. It is even the fourth, when a preposition with its case follows *οὐ*, as in Galat. iii, 23.

II. When δὲ occurs without *μὲν*, the latter particle is to be understood ; as in, *μῆνιν—ἡ μυρὶ Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε, πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς ἄϊδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων*, Il. α, 3. after *μυρία*. In this sort of construction, which is very common, it is often rendered *et* or *que*. The following is more unusual : *ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσιν ἡδοναί* ; Plat. Phileb. p. 36. l. 42. (t. iv. p. 261. ed. Bip.) for *τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐκ εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς* ;

III. Sometimes the insertion of some other particle in a preceding member causes δὲ in a following one to appear redundant, while yet it retains its signification of opposition or relation ; as, *ὅς σ' ἐπεὶ ἐς κλισίην ἄγαγον καὶ ξείνια δῶκα, αὖθις δὲ κτείναιμι* : Odyss. ξ, 319. Here δὲ is retained as a sign of opposition between *ἄγαγον ἐς κλ.* κ. ξ. δ. and *κτείναιμι*, although the substitution of *ἐπεὶ* for *πρότερον* gives an appearance of redundancy to δὲ, [or of anacoluthon to the construction.] So in Iliad ε, 38. *δαινὰ δὲ* is put, as if *τὸ τέταρτον μὲν ἐπέεσσυτο* had preceded. [It is to be observed that this use of δὲ in the apodosis is most frequent after particles signifying time in the protasis.]

IV. It appears to supply the place of *ἀλλὰ*, disjunctive or adversative ; as, *ἀκάρπων μὲν, χρησίμων δὲ* : Aristot. de Rep. i. p. 185. l. 9. *ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ ἐφρονεῖτε, ἡκαιρεῖσθε δὲ* : Epist. ad Philipp. iv, 10.

It is added to an adversative sentence in Aristoph. Vesp. 587. [589. Br.] and in Thucyd. iv. c. 86. *αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα*.

V. It elegantly closes a sentence either disjunctively or adversatively ; as, *ὃν Ὀμηρος μὲν οὐκ ᾔσθετο, Σησίχορος δὲ* : Plat. Phædr. p. 243. l. 5. (t. x. p. 313. ed. Bip.)

In this construction, if the negation in the first member be not expressed separately, as by *οὐ* or another particle, but be included in a noun or verb, then in the latter member an affirmative noun or verb must be understood ; as, *τῶν δὲ ξύλων τὰ σχιστὰ μὲν ὅλως ἀρβραγῇ, διὰ τὸ γυννωθεῖσαν τὴν μήτραν ξηραίνεσθαι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· τὰ δὲ πελεκητὰ καὶ τὰ στρογγύλα, διὰ τὸ ἐναπειλῆσθαι τὴν μήτραν* : Theo-

phrast. After τὰ δὲ, ῥήγνυται, or the like, is to be understood; and in the passage of Plato above, if ἡγνύει had been used instead of οὐκ ἦσθετο, ἔγνω, or the like, must have been understood after Στησίχορος δέ.

VI. Δέ is used also, especially in the end of sentences, to qualify or explain something preceding, and obviate error; as, γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν· οὐχ ὑπὸ ἐραστοῦ δέ: Plato Phædr. p. 227. l. 25. (t. x. p. 281. ed. Bip.) See also Epictet. c. 32. [p. 31. l. 12. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1739.] τάχιστον—τῶν ὄντων, λέγω δὲ τὸ πυρῶδες: Aristot. de Mund. c. 4. and Rom. ix, 30. But it is sometimes dispensed with, as in the Gospel of St. John xiv, 22. οὐχ ὁ Ἰσκαριώτης for οὐχ ὁ Ἰσκαριώτης δέ.

VII. Δέ in the second member sometimes adds an aggravating or heightening circumstance or consideration; as, ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου· θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ: Philipp. ii, 8. q. d. οὐ μόνον δὲ μέχρι θανάτου, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ μέχρι θανάτου σταυροῦ: [equivalent to καὶ ταῦτα θανάτου σταυροῦ, and that too the death of the cross; in our translation, even the death of the cross.]

VIII. Δέ frequently marks transition, imperfectly, without μὲν, as, καταβάντι δὲ αὐτῷ, &c. εἰσελθόντι δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ, &c. Matth. viii, 1, 5. —perfectly, with μὲν, as if it had been said, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἔλεξεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καταβάντι δὲ αὐτῷ, &c. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, εἰσελθόντι δὲ, &c.

IX. In introducing a fresh topic or point, it may be rendered further, moreover, &c. but it sometimes merely marks the continuation of discourse, as in Theogn. 1039.

X. It performs the office of μὲν δὴ, in concluding one topic and proceeding to another without δὲ in the succeeding member; as, ἐν πυρετοῖσι δὲ ταῦτα. ὁκόσοισι ἐλπίς, &c. Hippocr. Aphor. § iv. n. 73. for, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἐν πυρετοῖσιν· ὁκόσοισι δὲ, &c.

XI. It is found in the very beginning of speeches made abrupt and elliptical by the agitation and anger of the speaker; as, πῶς δὲ σὺ νῦν μέμονας, κύον ἀδδεῖς, ἀντὶ ἐμεῖο στήσασθαι; Iliad. φ, 481. So Il. α, 541.

XII. From its power of connecting what follows with what precedes, so that the former may not be considered without the latter, arises its use in inverted or preposterous argumentation, when the conclusion is placed first, as in Iliad. η, 395. μήτ' ἄρ', &c. cited under APA, I. vii. p. 17. where γνωτὸν δὲ, &c. ought to form the premises, although placed after the conclusion, marked by ἄρα.

XIII. In a causative member of a sentence, δέ sometimes supplies the place of γὰρ, which is transposed to a preceding member; as, Ζεὺς γὰρ πον τόγε οἶδε—αἴκε μιν ἀγγεῖλαιμι ἰδὼν, ἐπὶ πολλὰ δ' ἀλήθην: Odys. ξ, 120. See under ΓΑΡ, I. ix. p. 29. So with ἀλλὰ γὰρ in the preceding member; as, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ Μινύαισιν ἐπήνδανε πᾶσι νέεσθαι, δεῖμα δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεῶν—. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 173. l. 38.]

But γὰρ is not always found in the preceding member: see Iliad ε, 391. Theogn. 102. not even with ἀλλὰ: ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ'· ἄμφω δὲ νεωτέρω ἐστὸν ἐμεῖο: Iliad. α, 259.

XIV. This last mentioned employment of δέ has occasioned a

causal sense to be erroneously assigned to it; for in reality it only fills up the vacuity made by the transposition of γάρ, which, either expressed or understood in a preceding member, is the true causal particle. Thus, in *Ἰσα δέ μιν κεδνῇ ἀλόχῳ τίεν ἐν μεγάροισιν· εὐνῇ δ' οὔ ποτ' ἔμικτο, χόλον δ' ἄλεεине γυναῖκός*: *Odys. α*, [433.] the second δέ is put for ἀλλὰ, γάρ being understood: q. d. ἀλλὰ γάρ οὔ ποτ' ἔμικτο, χ. δ. α. γ.

XV. In the passages, in which δέ has been supposed to be put for δὴ, it will be found to have its proper distinctive or adversative use, or to be repeated or added on account of an unusually long protasis or parenthesis preceding. Thus in *Il. 2*, 479. *καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι, πατὴρ δ' ὄγε πολλὸν ἀμείνων*, it is distinctive, and answers to μὲν understood; for the sentence would be fully expressed as follows; *ὁ πατὴρ ἀγαθὸς μὲν, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἀμείνων πατρός*. [See *Abr. of Vig. p.* 201. r. xviii.]

XVI. Καὶ δέ, conjoined by epic writers, as *Hom. Il. η*, 374. *ι*, 680. 705. &c. [see *Abr. of Vig. p.* 201. r. xix.] but separated by others, who interpose some other word or words between, may be rendered *and moreover, and indeed*; but here too δέ retains its adversative sense: *νῦν γὰρ περὶ ψυχῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων ὁ ἄγων, καὶ περὶ γῆς, ἐν ᾗ ἔφυτε, καὶ περὶ οἰκῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐτράφητε, καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν δὲ καὶ τέκνων*: *Xenoph. Cyrop. iii*, 3, 43. *i. e.* οὐ περὶ τούτων μόνον, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων. See also *iii*, 2, 24. *iii*, 2, 7. In *Hebr. xi*, 36. *ἐτι δὲ δεσμῶν*, where *καὶ δεσμῶν δὲ* might have been said. [See note *j* on *p.* 201. of *Abr. of Vig.*]

XVII. Δέ καὶ differs from καὶ δέ. In the latter, καὶ connects the whole member following it with what precedes; in the former καὶ, being augmentative or exaggerative, influences only the word immediately construed with it, and δέ shows more evidently its relative sense without any ellipsis. Thus, *καὶ πυνθόμενος τὰς ἐκκλησίας ἀπαγγέλλειν· προσδιηγῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀριστοφῶντος ποτὲ γενομένην τοῦ ῥήτορος μάχην*: *Theophr. Char. c. 7*. [*p.* 41. ed. *Simps.*]

XVIII. Δέ is perhaps sometimes put for καὶ as a copulative; e. g. *αὔθις δὲ κτείναιμι, φίλον δ' ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἐλοίμην*: *Odys. ξ*, 319. but in *εἰ δὲ σὺ κάρτερός ἐσσι, θεῶ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ*, [*Iliad. α*, 280.] before *κάρτερος, μὲν* may be understood, to which δέ may be correlative.

It is sometimes put for καὶ in its signification of time: *νῦν ἦν Ἀδράστου δ' ἦλθον εἰς παραστάδας*: *Eurip. Phœn.* 418.

XIX. Δε, when enclitic, is not the conjunction, but a syllabic adjection; as, *ὅδε ἦδε τόδε, this*, (and the conjunction δέ sometimes accompanies ὅδε, as in *Iliad. ε*, 261. *φ*, 155. thus showing itself to be of a nature distinct from the adjection) *τοῖόςδε, τοσόςδε, τηλικόςδε, ἐνθάδε, ἐνθένδε, οἰκόνδε, ἀγορήνδε, ὅνδε δῶμόνδε, to his own house or home*, *Odys. α*, 83. and with *εἰς, eis ἅλαδε, to the sea*, *Odys. κ*, 351. *Θήβαζε, Ἀθήναζε*, for *Θήβασδε, Ἀθήνασδε*, by coalescence of *δσ* (by metathesis for *σδ*) into *ε*; a change which always takes place when the noun before the adjection ends in *as*. Δε is sometimes added in signification of the final cause, as in *μήτι φόβονδ' ἀγόμεν'*, *Il. ε*, 252.

ΔΑΙ.—I. Δαὶ has generally a discretive or distinctive, often an

adversative, power. Plainly in Aristoph. Ran. 1502. [1454. ed. Br.] *τί δαί λέγεις σὺ*; and you, on the other hand, or in turn, what say you? after another had first expressed his sentiments: for *τί δ' αὖ*; —*τί δαί δὴ*; *κακουργεῖν δεῖ*—; but again, or further, what do you say to this? &c. after conclusion of a preceding argument: Plat. Crit. c. 10. ed. Fisch.

II. It is in frequent use when upon denial of something by one person, another inquires in consequence, *what or how else then?* as, *πῶς δαί*; *how else then?* Eurip. Hel. 1262. *τί δαί*; *what else then?* Aristoph. Plut. 156. See also 905. and Eccles. 970. [978. ed. Br. where *τοῦ δέ σὺ*—.]—[See Abr. of Vig. p. 202.]

III. *Τί δαί*; may sometimes be rendered, *why so?* as in Xen. Cyrop. v. 1. 6. 7. *τί δαί*; *ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος*.

ΔΕ ΓΕ.—These particles are combined without alteration in the sense of either, as in Plato Phædr. p. 230. l. 26. (t. x. p. 287. ed. Bip.) *σὺ δέ γε*, &c. and in Xen. Cyrop. v, 1, 7. *οἱ αὐτοὶ δέ γε*, &c.

But when δέ is adversative, δέ γε is for ἀλλά γε: thus Plato, after speaking of sciences merely speculative or theoretical, proceeds, *αἱ δέ γε περὶ τεκτονικὴν αὐ καὶ σύμπασαν χειρουργίαν*, &c. *but those on the contrary, which are employed about*, &c. Politic. p. 258. l. 36. (t. vi. p. 7. ed. Bip.)

ΔΕ ΔΗ.—I. Δὴ is added to δέ, as a mark of transition to a point or circumstance of greater weight than any preceding; to which all before has been but prefatory or introductory, or beyond which amplification or exaggeration cannot be carried. Socrates, about to introduce to Protagoras, the Sophist, a youth who was desirous of becoming a pupil of the latter, elicits from him a confession of what he wishes to become through the instruction of Protagoras, by asking him first, what he would expect to become, if a pupil of Hippocrates the physician, next if of Polyclethus or Phidias the statuary, (*εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον—ἢ Φειδιαν*, &c. without δὴ); he then comes to the point by saying, *εἰεν*—*παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν*: *but now the case is that Protagoras is the person we are going to*, &c. Plato Protagor. p. 311. l. 30. (t. iii. p. 89. ed. Bip.) [p. 283. l. 52. ed. Basil. 1.] *Οἷς γάρ ἐστιν ἐν λόγοις ἡ πολιτεία, πῶς, ἂν οὗτοι μὴ ἀληθεῖς ᾧσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἐστί πολιτεύεσθαι*; *ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἃ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει, δῶρά τις λαβὼν λέγῃ, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσετε*; Demosth. de fals. legat. —See also Xenoph. Cyrop. iii, 1, 6. *ἦν δὲ δὴ ἡ πολέμῳ κρατηθεῖς*, &c.

II. On account of the fresh attention excited by this use, these particles occur when mention is made of something said after a long silence; as, *ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ*—*ὅψε δὲ δὴ Μενέλαος ἀνίστατο καὶ μετέειπε*: Iliad. η, 94. So ι, 31. 692. Elsewhere δὴ in δέ δὴ signifies time; *ἔκτον δὲ δὴ τὸδ' ἡμαρ*, *ἔξ ὅτου*, &c. Eurip. Orest. 39.

Δ' ΟΥΝ.—I. In this combination δέ commonly answers to μὲν either expressed or understood, and οὖν makes a conclusion—I.

from something preceding; as, ἡ Χαρίκλεια μικροῦ μὲν ἐξολόλυξε—μόγισ δ' οὖν—πάλιν ὑφείρπε τὸν σκοπὸν: Heliod. x, 19. Μὲν and δὲ distinguish their respective members, and οὖν concludes from μικροῦ ἐξολόλυξε the difficulty Chariclea had to summon firmness sufficient to do what she did.—2. from something following: λεγέτω δ' οὖν ὁμως, ἐπειδὴ βούλεται Σισιμίθρης: Id. x, 10. i. e. Σισιμίθρης βούλεται, λεγέτω οὖν.

II. Δ' οὖν, after μὲν δὴ, concludes recital; as, Φεραύλας μὲν δὴ οὕτως εἶπεν—ἔδοξε δ' οὖν, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 6. And without μὲν δὴ, or at least with an ellipsis of μὲν, as Ælian says, the vulpis marina, having bitten through the line with which it has been caught, νήχεται αὖθις. πολλάκις δ' οὖν καὶ δύο καὶ τρία κατέπιεν ἄγκιστρα: V. H. i, 5.

III. From the use last mentioned arises its *inceptive* use, δὲ connecting, and οὖν noting a commencement of the subject itself after something prefatory; as, after four introductory verses, πρῶτος δ' ὦν ποτὶ Δάφνιν ἰδὼν ἀγόρευε Μενάλκας: Theocr. Idyll. viii, 5.

IV. Δ' οὖν is used in proceeding with recital after a declared omission of unnecessary particulars; as in a summary of the history of Tantalus, Pelops, Atreus, and Thyestes, τί τ' ἄρρητ' ἀναμετρήσασθαί με δεῖ; ἔδαισε δ' οὖν νιν, τέκν' ἀποκτείνας, Ἀτρεὺς: Eurip. Orest. 15. *well then, Atreus, &c.*

ΔΕ ΤΟΙ.—Τοι added to δὲ is, as usual, confirmative; *truly, indeed, in truth*: γέρων ὦν καὶ πολλὸς, ἔχων δὲ τοι πλευρὴν βαρυτάτην, καὶ χέρας, &c. Aristoph. Vesp. 1187.

I.—OF THE PRIMARY POWER OF THE PARTICLE ΔΗ.

I. Δὴ is usually a subjunctive particle; in poetry, however, it often takes the lead; as, δὴ τότε, Iliad. ε, 114. and δὴ γάρ.

II. Its primary signification is that of time, *now*; as, ὧρα δὴ ἀπαντᾷν, Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 12. for ἤδη. οἱ δ' Ἀσσύριοι καὶ δὴ ἀριστηκότες ἐξῆσαν: *by this time*: ib. iii, 3, 20. Especially after adverbs of time; ἦμος δὴ, Hesiod. Ἔργ. 414. ὅτε δὴ, Iliad. φ, 148.

And the poets prefix ἀλλὰ before ὅτε δὴ, to mark the time of the principal incident of a recital, after narration of other circumstances; as, ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἐκίχανε, &c. *but when at last he found her*: Iliad. ε, 334. So 762. 769. φ, 1. 450. ω, 785.

III. After νῦν it signifies, *instantly, without the least delay*; as, νῦν δὴ μαχητέον, i. e. νῦν ἤδη, as Plato expresses it, in Phædr. p. 228. l. 25. νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐνθαδὲ μοι κακὸν ἔσσεται: Iliad. φ, 92.

With a past tense νῦν δὴ is a *little while ago, just now*; as, οὖς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, Plato de Rep. v. p. 476. l. 9. and so in ii. p. 314. init. (t. vi. p. 240. ed. Bip.) and in iv. init. [p. 403. l. 18. ed. Basil. 1.] and in Gorg. p. 455. (t. iv. p. 22. ed. Bip.)

IV. When δὴ precedes νῦν, it does not affect the latter, but the enunciation or proposition following; as, ὅς δὴ νῦν κρατεῖ, Iliad. φ, 315. where δὴ affects κρατεῖ: and in v. 458. Neptune, after remind-

ing Apollo of their ill-treatment by Laomedou, says, τοῦ δὴ νῦν λαοῖσι φέρεις χάριν; &c. where νῦν keeps its signification of time, but δὴ closes the recital with an indignant interrogation, equivalent to an exhortation against the Trojans. So, ἀτὰρ δὴ νῦν for ἀλλὰ δὴ νῦν, Theogn. 851. ἄκουε δὴ νῦν, Eurip. Orest. 237. 1181. Phœniss. 918. 1436.

II.—ON THE HORTATORY USE OF THE PARTICLE ΔΗ.

I. From its primary sense of time, including briefness and despatch, is derived the hortatory use of δὴ. This use is very apparent when δὴ is used with an imperative mood; as, λέγε δὴ καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν μαρτυρίαν, Demosth. de Fals. Legat. p. 221. l. 25. See Plato Phædr. p. 229. l. 8. (x. 284. Bip.) ἄκουε δὴ, ib. p. 230. (p. 287. Bip.) εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, ib. p. 268. l. 7. (p. 366. Bip.) So Acts xiii, 2.

Hence it is very frequently subjoined to the imperatives, ἄγε, φέρε, ἴθι, as, φέρε δὴ—εἶπω πρὸς ὑμᾶς: Demosth. de Fals. Legat. p. 222. l. 10. φέρε δὴ, ἴδωμεν, &c. Plato Gorg. p. 455. l. 9. (t. iv. p. 21. ed. Bip.) ἴθι δὴ, ἀκολούθησόν μοι τῇδε—ἄγε δὴ, ἔφη: Id. de Rep. v. p. 474. l. 23. (t. vii. p. 54. ed. Bip.)

II. It is joined with the first person plural of verbs, when the speaker exhorts both himself and others; as, διέλθωμεν δὴ εἰς Βεθλέεμ, Luke ii, 15. So Plato Phædr. p. 260. l. 9. (p. 350. ed. Bip.) cf. Acts xv, 36.

III. In νῦν δὴ, used hortatively, νῦν urges speed emphatically, without dropping its signification of time; as, νῦν δὴ γίνου γλίσχρος, προσαιτῶν, λιπαρῶν τ' Εὐριπίδην: Aristoph. Ach. 450. [451. Br.] *now then, now.*

III.—OF THE INTERROGATORY USE OF ΔΗ.

I. In interrogations δὴ denotes an eagerness for reply; so that it does not lose the signification of speed and despatch inherent in its primary sense: Σ. εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε. Π. τί δὴ; *quid ita tandem? why, I pray? or tell me*: Plato Gorg. p. 469. (p. 49. ed. Bip.) So in Cratyl. p. 401. l. 17. (266. Bip.) and in Phædr. p. 265. l. 33. (361. Bip.) Δὴ in such questions may be considered as hortatory also; for one eager for the answer of another, naturally urges and instigates him to make it. Thus, τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα; Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 421. (330. Bip.) is the same in effect as ἄγε δὴ, εἰπὲ, ποῖά ἐστι ταῦτα; and in this urgency for speed, and impatience of delay, the signification of ἡδη is apparent. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι,—ποῖον δὴ τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβές; Plato Euthyphr. p. 5. l. 29. and with adjuration in Sophocles also, Philoct. 1228. [1235.]

II. Ποῦ δὴ is in Plat. Phædr. p. 243. l. 41. (p. 315. Bip.) and in Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. p. 69. l. 28. and πῶς δὴ; in Plat. Cratyl. p. 408. l. 20. (p. 280. ed. Bip.) and Phædr. p. 242. l. 35. (p. 312. ed. Bip.)

and ποῖ δὴ; in Phædr. [p. 195. l. 28. ed. Bas. 1.] and, with the intervention of another word, τί γὰρ δὴ; τί οὖν δὴ; τί δὲ δὴ; occur.

III. The addition of ποτε augments the signification of wonder in an eager inquiry; as, τί δὴ ποτε τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ θεὸς μαινοῦσθαι μὲν ἐκέλευσεν ἑτέροις, αὐτὸν δὲ γεννᾶν ἀπεκώλυσεν; Plut. Quæst. Plat. init.—τί δὴ ποτε τούτων; and why about these things above all others? Demosth. de Fals. Legat. p. 201. l. 4. Add Plat. in Protag. p. 324. l. 33. (p. 115. ed. Bip.) Δὴ ποτε is put after words to render their meaning less definite, and resembles the Latin *cunque*, as ὅστις δὴ ποτε, ὅπου δὴ ποτε, and the like. And δὴ alone is sometimes used in the same manner, as in Plat. Theæt. p. 209. l. 40. (p. 193. ed. Bip.)

IV. Τί δὴ is in some places employed in increpation, as in Iliad. φ, 436.

V. Δὴ is occasionally put first, but with δὲ preceding; as, λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί; Plat. Phædr. p. 242. l. 33. (p. 312. ed. Bip.) see also p. 259. l. 12. τῶν δὲ δὴ χρόνων διατί; Demosth. l. c. where transition also is signified: *but wherefore of the times also?* underst. *should an account be exacted from the ambassadors.*

IV.—OF ΔΗ INCEPTIVE.

I. Because commencement of action or speech is attended with adhortation of one's self or others, δὴ is employed as an *inceptive* or *inchoative* particle: τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαί σε διδάξαι, Plato Sympos. p. 204. (p. 233. ed. Bip.) ὧδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτὸ, Id. Phædr. p. 260. (p. 350. ed. Bip.) and Nicocles, in Isocrates, after prefatory matter, enters on the delivery of his precepts thus: φημι δὴ πρᾶττειν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν, &c. *I say then*, &c. p. 71.

II. Hence it is used instead of μὲν δὴ in commencement of discussions; thus Aristotle enters on a subject, after introductory observations, with these words: εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέψειεν, *if then any one*, &c. de Rep. i, 2. and Plato, ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, &c. Phædr. p. 237. (p. 300. ed. Bip.) and also in the commencement of a recital of another's words, as, τοιούτους δὴ λόγους εἶπεν, "Οὔτε πόλεως, &c." Thucyd. iv, 58.

III. And in introducing something worthy of attention, and different from what has preceded, δὴ is used, with self-adhortation or incitation, as it were: ἐνθα δὴ εἰπεῖν λέγεται ὁ Κῦρος, *and then is Cyrus said to have spoken*, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 10. οὕτω δὴ ὁ Κῦρος, &c. *then, things being so, Cyrus*, &c. ii, 1, 14.

IV. And because transition involves a fresh commencement, therefore δὴ serves for transition also, and especially exhibits its hortatory force too when the transition is from recital of what has already been said, to an exhortation that the remainder may be despatched; as, σὺ—πολεμίους λέγεις—εἶναι—εἴκοσι μυριάδας· ἄγε δὴ, (*now then on the other hand tell me*) τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως τί πλῆθος φῆς εἶναι; Xen. Cyrop. ii, p. 39. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, &c. *but now I ask you*, &c. Plat. Protag. p. 358. (t. iii. p. 184. ed. Bip.)

V.—OF THE USE OF ΔΗ IN GRADATION.

I. Δὴ is used in gradation—1. when new force is added to discourse, or when a fresh topic is introduced; and this use is nearly allied to those before mentioned, as it has somewhat of exhortation, or of inception, or of transition, or of all together: as, αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι, γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω, ἔπονται, *but now as to the other souls* (two classes of spirits had been before mentioned): Plat. Phædr. p. 248. (p. 324. ed. Bip.) and in the middle of a subject, digressing to a collateral topic, εἰν αἰρεθῇ· ἀλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἰρεθεὶς τοιῷδε τρόπῳ, [q. d. *but by the by I will now explain to you, in what manner, &c.*] ib. p. 253. (p. 335. ed. Bip.)

II.—2. When discourse rises or increases in importance or emphasis:—The Athenians, says Herodotus, caring little about Pisis-tratus, as long as he remained at Marathon, yet when they know that he is advancing to the city, οὕτω δὴ (*then at length*) βοηθέουσιν ἐπ' αὐτόν, i, 62. So in Plato, This, says Phædrus, would be ridiculous: οὕτω γε, replies Socrates; ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι, &c. *not so yet; but when I should really and seriously set about persuading you, &c.* Phædr. p. 260. (p. 350. ed. Bip.) And when one arrives at the particularization of what is most excellent, after mention of what is less so: thus Socrates, about to bestow higher praises on Calliope and Urania than he had before given to the other Muses, says, αἱ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὔσαι,—ἱᾶσι καλλίστην φωνήν: Plat. Phædr. p. 259. l. 35. (p. 349. ed. Bip.)

III.—3. When discourse arrives at the proposed or main point, after introduction: as, ὁ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὄν, περί οὐ βουλευτέον, εἰρηταί τε καὶ ὤρισται· βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτό, τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν: Plat. Phædr. p. 238. (p. 303. ed. Bip.)

So, after a simile, or analogous case, the apodosis thus follows in Epictetus: τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον κἀνταῦθα· οὐ προσεκλήθης ἐφ' ἐστίασίν τινος; &c. Enchir. c. 32.

IV.—4. When in an enumeration of particulars, or in amplification, the highest point or pitch is attained, or where a climax can be carried no higher: thus, when in Xenophon's Cyrop. the Armenian has been led by a train of questions to self-condemnation, ἐνταῦθα δὲ, says the author, ὁ μὲν παῖς αὐτοῦ—περιεσπάσατο τὴν τιάραν, καὶ τοὺς πέπλους κατεβῆξεν, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἐδρύποντο, &c. [*then, when it was arrived at that, &c.*] iii, 1. 13. So Croesus, in enumerating the motives which had urged him on to wage war with Cyrus: ὑπὸ τε πλούτου,—καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν δεομένων μου προστάτην γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν δώρων,—καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, οἱ—ἔλεγον, ὡς, &c. ὑπὸ τοιούτων δὲ λόγων ἀναφυσώμενος ὑπεδεξάμην τὴν στρατηγίαν: *such representations as these then, I say, were what puffed me up, &c.* Xen. Cyrop. vii, 2, 23. In Latin *vero* is used, or *igitur*.

V. Hence it is very aptly joined with superlatives: as, φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δὴ, Thucyd. viii, 1. So in i, 1. and iv, 55. ὁ δὲ πάντων πεδίων κάλλιστον γενέσθαι λέγεται, Plat. Critia p. 113.

I. 25. (t. x. p. 48. ed. Bip.) and with words having the nature of superlatives ; as, ὅσα δὴ δέδηγμαι τὴν ἐμαντοῦ καρδίαν ! Aristoph. Ach. 1.

VI. Hence it signifies *chiefly, especially* ; as, ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς, καὶ δὴ ἐν τοῖς κάμνουσιν : Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 21.

VII. With τότε it specifies a precise point of time determined by something else ; as Hesiod says, when you hear the note of the crane, δὴ τότε χορτάζειν ἑλικας βοῦς, &c. *then is the time to fodder well*, &c. Op. 452. and a little afterwards, [Op. and D. ii, 77.] εὖτ' ἂν δὴ—, δὴ τότε, &c. So, ἡνίκα δέ—, τότε δὴ—, Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 24. and, ὡς ἀπὸ πόντων,—τότε δὴ—οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέσχοντο : *then, when it came to that* : Thucyd. iv, 127.

The emphasis is much augmented by repetition of τότε after δὴ ; thus Demosthenes, speaking of the fate of traitors, when he whom they have served by their treachery, has no longer any need of them, says, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν πραγμάτων ἐγκρατὴς ὁ ζῆτῶν ἄρχειν καταστῇ, καὶ τῶν ταῦτα ἀποδομένων δεσπότης ἐστὶ, τὴν δὲ πονηρίαν εἰδὼς, τότε δὴ, τότε (then, when it is come to that, then) καὶ μισεῖ, καὶ ἀπιστεῖ, καὶ προπηλακίζει : de Cor. p. 319. c. [p. 241. l. 21. ed. Reisk.] So Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 320. init. Eurip. Orest. 1483. [1490. ed. Pors.]

VI.—ON THE ASSERTORY OR CONFIRMATIVE USE OF ΔΗ.

I. Δὴ is used in assertion, and signifies *truly, without doubt, really, in truth*, &c. : as, διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνῃ πτεροῦνται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια, Plat. Phædr. p. 249. (p. 327. ed. Bip.) and, ὃ δὴ ὀλίγον πᾶσαι αἰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἰδοῦναι ἔχουσι, p. 258. (347. Bip.) οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι γε—δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν : Plat. Euthyphr. [p. 1. l. 4. ed. Bas. 1.] See also de Rep. v. p. 450. l. 23. (t. vii. p. 5. ed. Bip.)

II. Hence it is aptly used in affirmative answers, when one confirms by his suffrage what has been said by another : as, δηλον δὴ, Plat. Phædr. p. 258. l. 33. (346. ed. Bip.) whence the compound δηλαδὴ : οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ, &c. Answ. δηλαδὴ. Plat. Crito p. 47. l. 17. *evidently* ; and δηλαδὴ is used in assertion of one's own opinion, Plat. Phædr. p. 80. l. 7.

III. Δὴ retains something of this sense in interrogations prompted by wonder, or other mental emotions : as, ταῦτα δὴ τολμᾷς λέγειν ; *and do you really dare*, &c. Aristoph. Acharn. 310. [311. Br.]

IV. And to this sense it may be referred when used ironically, as in Lucian. adv. Indoct. of a rich man, who, although he had wooden legs, bestowed great care and expense upon his shoes, ὡς καλλίστοις ὑποδήμασι κεκοσμημένα εἶη αὐτῷ τὰ ξύλα, οἱ πόδες δὴ : *that is to say, his feet ; otherwise his feet* : p. 105.

V. In its ironical sense it commonly follows ὡς : ὡς δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκά σφιν ἐκηβόλος ἄλγεα τεύχει, οὐνεκ' ἐγὼ, &c. *as if forsooth* : Iliad. a, 110. ὡς δὴ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναι σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει— : Plato Gorg. p. 468. (t. iv. p. 69. ed. Bip.) You

decorate your books, says Lucian, ὥς δὴ τι ἀπολαύσων αὐτῶν, *as if forsooth you could really get any good from them*: Adv. Indoct.

VI. With relative and comparative words the affirmation of δὴ is usually emphatical: as in ὅς δὴ, οἷον δὴ, οἷα δὴ, and sometimes in ὥς δὴ: οἷα δὴ εὐδαίμονες—ἀναλίσκουσι, *scilicet*, Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (327. Bip.) τὴν νῆσον, οἷα δὴ θεός, εὐμαρῶς διεκόσμησεν, [*as being a god, which he was*]: Id. in Critia p. 113. (49. Bip.) But sometimes with the relative it is more emphatical, as in the passage cited under I. from Plat. Phædr. p. 258. when it may be rendered by the Latin *adeo*. See Sallust. B. C. c. 37. *id adeo suo more videbatur facere*. Aristotle separates οἷον and δὴ: οἷον Χάρητι δὴ, de Rep. i. p. 185. l. 18.

ΔΗΠΟΥ.—I. When πον in this combination signifies *place*, as in Odys. α, 161. neither of the particles affects the sense of the other; and therefore in that case they need no discussion.

II. But more frequently they coalesce in one word, δῆπον, which has a dubitative sense; πον, which is conjectural, abating the assertory force of δὴ: thus Andromache says that Astyanax will be destroyed by some one or other of the Greeks, ᾧτινι δὴ πον ἀδελφεὸν ἔκτανεν "Εκτωρ, ἢ πατέρ', ἢ καὶ υἱόν: *whose brother, it may be, or perchance, &c.* Iliad. ω, 736.

III. For the most part, however, each particle preserving its natural force, doubt is blended with assertion in δῆπον, and its most frequent use is, when one distrusts, or affects to distrust, his own opinion, and therefore aims at eliciting that of another: [its signification, therefore, is, *I think; If I mistake not; is it not so? as I think you will allow; I think I may say*, and the like.] τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ὄν, ἐστὼς δῆ πον ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι: Plato Parmenid. p. 146. (113. ed. Bip.) σχεδὸν ἴσμεν ἅπαντες δῆ πον, Demosth. Ol. iii. p. 11. l. 41. οὐδεὶς ἄγνοεῖ δῆ πον, Id. Philipp. iv. [p. 131. l. 15. ed. Reisk.] μέμνησθε γὰρ δῆ πον λέγοντ' αὐτόν, Id. de Fals. Leg. p. 233.

And like δὴ, it is used ironically: ἔτι τοίνυν ἱαμβεῖα δῆ πον συλλέξας ἐπέβαινον, Demosth. ib. p. 232. *forsooth*.

IV. Of its assertory and dubitative powers the former commonly preponderates. Thus it is used in interrogation, when there is little or no doubt: ὁδὶ δὲ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐ δῆ πον Στράτων; *it is not Strato, to be sure*: Aristoph. Acharn. 122.

V. In replies it is used when the answerer wishes to make his assertion depend in some measure on the assent of the interrogator: thus, πάντως δῆ πον, Plat. Euthyphr. p. 5. l. 34. Σ. τὸν Ἐρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μῆ; Φ. τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δῆ πον. Id. Phædr. p. 263. (p. 357. ed. Bip.) So in Theætet. p. 163. l. 42. (t. ii. p. 94. ed. Bip.)

VI. Sometimes δῆ πον is used without the least signification of doubt, and merely to elicit or challenge assent: as, οὐ γὰρ δῆ πον ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, Hebr. ii, 16. [*assuredly; verily*, in our translation.] Χαίρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε δῆ πον, says Socrates, Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 20. That he did not speak doubtfully appears from his

words presently following, ἵστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν. So Demosthenes, εἰ γὰρ εἶναι τινα δοκοῖη τὰ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἀδικήματα, οὐδέν ἐστι δὴ π ο υ πρὸς ἐμὲ, pro Cor. p. 315. l. 51.

VII. Γε is sometimes added; when δὴ affirms or asserts, π ο υ elicits assent, and γε limits or restrains: as, τί οὖν ποτε λέγει, [ὁ θεός] φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε, [for this certainly must in any case be granted, that at least he does not assert a falsehood:] Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 21. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη, Id. Sympos. p. 187. l. 12. (t. x. p. 196. ed. Bip.) The sense of these particles is expressed in Latin by *utique*: see Curtius vii, 1, 23.

ΔΗΘΕΝ, ΔΗΠΟΥΘΕΝ.—I. Δῆθεν is—1. ἀπὸ τοῦ δὴ, (i. e. ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν,) *forthwith*, as in Eurip. Orest. 1119. [1117. ed. Pors.]

II. But its most frequent use arises from the assertory force of δὴ, and occurs in cases of simulation, cloaking falsehood under show of truth. See Eurip. Orest. 1320. [1313. ed. Pors.] and Heliodor. Æthiop. i, 30. αὐτὸς δῆθεν, &c. Hence in Heliod. Æthiop. i, 14. it is opposed to τὸ ἀληθές. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 185. l. 9. and following.]

III. By Eustathius (on Odys. α, 1407. l. 15.) it is said to be a *dubitative* adverb; but an example is wanted.

IV. Δήπουθεν is precisely equivalent to δήπου, when the latter suspends assertion in some measure on the assent of another person: as, ἐκεῖνό γε δήπουθεν ἅπαντες ἐπίστασθε: Demosth. de Class. p. 76. l. 50. and de Fals. Leg. p. 205. c. Mid. 398. οὐ γὰρ ἄκαιρον δήπουθεν ἐνομιφλέναι, Lucian. Lexiph. t. ii. p. 336. See Aristoph. Plut. 140. εἰπέ, τί βούλει με πρίσθαι καλόν; οἴμαι δέ σ' ἐρεῖν ἀστραγάλους δήπουθεν, ὦ παῖ: *is it not so?* Aristoph. Vesp. 295.

ΔΗΤΑ.—I. Δῆτα has all the uses and significations of δὴ: as, *jam, by and by, presently, by this or that time*; as, καὶ δῆτα διαλέξομαι πρὸς σέ, Synes. καὶ δῆτα ἡρόμην, Xenoph.

II. It is also *hortatory*: λαβοῦ, λαβοῦ δῆτ', Eurip. Orest. 220. [213. ed. Pors.] and 1231. [1229. Pors.] Add Aristoph. Vesp. 331. [332. ed. Br.]

Hence it is aptly used in supplication, and in conjuring: as in Eurip. Orest. 92. *I pray you now; for heaven's sake*, or the like. Also in deprecation; as, μὴ δῆθ', ἱκετεύω σ', ἐνθάδε: Aristoph. Nub. 696. and in expression of abhorrence or aversion: Ηλ. Θανεῖν Ὅρεσθην κἄμ' ἔδοξε τῇδε γῇ. Ep. μὴ δῆτα. Eurip. Orest. 1329. [1322. ed. Pors.] *Heaven forbid! say not so!* See Eurip. Phœniss. 742. and Demosth. in Mid. p. 410. c. [p. 574. l. 2. ed. Reisk.]

III. Where less emotion of mind is expressed, it may be rendered *by no means*: as in Soph. Philoct. Neopt. βούλει λάβωμαι δῆτα καὶ θίγω τί σου; Phil. Μὴ δῆτα τοῦτό γ'. v. 761.

Sometimes it expresses scarcely any, or no, emotion, and may be translated, *truly, indeed*; or in Latin, *utique, sane*. Α. ταῦτα δῆτ' ἀνασχερά; Δ. οὐ δῆτα. Aristoph. Ach. 619. So Eurip. Phœniss. 1655. and it is used in answers to avoid the bluntness of a bare negative: εἶπον, κινήσας αὐτόν, Σώκρατες, καθεύδεις; οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς:

Plat. Sympos. p. 218. l. 24. (t. x. p. 263. ed. Bip.) See also Soph. Philoct. 732. [735. ed. Br.]

IV. In interrogation also δῆτα, like δὴ, expresses eagerness for information: *tandem; I pray; tell me*: τίνα δῆτ' ἂν λέγοις; Aristoph. Vesp. 1171. So v. 191. Eurip. Or. 1473. Phœniss. 423.

This use results from its hortatory one; for ποῖ δῆτα φεύγω; e. g. (Eurip. Phœniss. 984.) is equivalent to, εἰπέ δὴ, or δῆτα, ποῖ φεύξω; So in v. 990. and in Heraclid. 127.

Hence it is subjoined to ἀλλὰ used abruptly; as, ἀλλὰ δῆτ' ἔλθω; Eurip. Or. 779. q. d. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, εἰπέ μοι, πότερον ἀπελεύσομαι;

V. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα is used as ἀλλὰ δὴ in cohortation. See above, under ΑΛΛΑ, I, x. and Plat. in Soph. p. 249. (t. ii. p. 265. ed. Bip.)

VI. In sum, δῆτα expresses every kind of emotion, and with particular propriety in interrogation: e. g. *self-satisfaction* or *exultation*; as, τί δῆτ', ἐπειδὴν τὰς κίχλας ὀπτωμένους ἴδῃτε; *what will you say then, when you see*, &c. Aristoph. Ach. 1010. *Wonder*: ἔπειτα φαίνεις δῆτα διὰ θρναλλίδας; ib. 917. *Fear*: οἱμοι, τί δῆτά μοι κακὸν γενήσεται ἰδόντι τοιοῦτον ἐνύπνιον; Aristoph. Vesp. 24. *Grief and despair*, [but burlesqued;] τί με δῆτ', ὦ μελέα μῆτερ, ἔτικτες; ib. 311. *Impatience*: τί δῆτα μέλλετε; Eurip. Or. 275. τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφῃ; Plat. Phædr. p. 236. (p. 300. ed. Bip.) *Commiseration*: εἴτα δῆτ' οὐ πόλλ' ἐνεσσι δεινὰ τῷ γῆρα κακά; Aristoph. Vesp. 439.

VII. Δῆτα, as well as δὴ, is inceptive or inchoative, noting a state of preparation or readiness to proceed, with a sense of cohortation: τί δῆτα παράδειγμά τις ἂν—παράθεμενος, ἱκανῶς ἂν εὖροι τὸ ζητούμενον; *well then, what example*, &c. Then, a little afterwards, as if released from the perplexity of deliberation, the speaker proceeds: τί δῆτα οὐ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν—διηρούμεθα, καὶ νῦν—ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐδράσαμεν; *why, what should prevent us from doing what we did in the former case?* Plat. Polit. p. 279. (t. vi. p. 50. ed. Bip.) An example of its use in transition, a use nearly allied to that just mentioned, occurs in the same dialogue, p. 272. βούλει δῆτα ἐγὼ σοι τρόπον τινὰ διακρίνω; *and have you a mind now that I should*, &c. (p. 35. ed. Bip.)

VIII. Δῆτα resembles δὴ as to its use in gradation also, [see Δὴ, V. 1.] [τοῦτον μετὰ Σιτάλκου ἐπινον τὸν χρόνον,] καὶ δῆτα φιλαθηναῖος ἦν ὑπερφύως; *and in truth*; *and I can assure you*—Aristoph. Ach. 142. Hence it is joined with superlatives: καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, *and what is more*; *and what is above all*: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 11. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.) [p. 5. l. 13. ed. Bas. 1.] and with words having the nature of superlatives: ὁρᾷς ὅσον περ δῆτα τοῦτο κερδανεῖς; Aristoph. Vesp. 792.

IX. It is put for δὴ in its assertory or confirmative use also; *in truth*, &c. ἰὼ δύστηνε σὺ, δύστηνε δῆτα διὰ πόνων πάντων φανεῖς; Soph. Philoct. 759. [761. ed. Br.] See Aristoph. Vesp. 13. Acharn. 68. Eurip. Phœn. 164. 1696.

It has a great force of assertion or affirmation, when used interrogatively too; as, ταῦτα δῆτ' οὐκ ἀγχόνῃ; *and are not these things then enough to make one hang one's self?* Aristoph. Ach. 125. See also v. 1126. and Vesp. 415. [417. ed. Br.] The questions are equivalent

lent to affirmations: τί γάρ ἐστιν δῆθ' ὁ κεραυνός; (Aristoph. Nub. 402.) is equivalent to εὖ σὺ λέγειν φαίνει· ἔστι γὰρ δῆθ' ὁ κεραυνὸς ἄλλό τι· ἀλλ' εἰπέ τί ἐστι.

It is assertory also in affirmative answers: Βδ. Δᾶς ἦδε; Φιλ. Δᾶς δῆτ'. Bd. *This a torch!* Phil. *Yes, a torch, I say:* Aristoph. Vesp. 1364. [1373. ed. Br.]

X. Its signification may sometimes be expressed by *then*: βούλει τράπωμαι δῆθ' ὁδοὺς ἄλλας τινάς; Eurip. Phœn. 729. So v. 908. and 916. [Without interrogation it might be rendered, *it seems then you wish me to, &c.*]

EI.—I. The sense of *ει, if*, is conditional. It is put in the first member of hypothetical propositions: as, εἰ γάρ εἰσι βωμοὶ, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοὶ: Lucian. and in 2 Pet. ii, 4. εἰ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, &c. the conclusion follows in v. 9. [On the difference between *ει* and *ἐάν*, see Abr. of Vig. p. 190. l. 27.]

II. Sometimes the supposition or condition is put last; as, μὲνῶ, τὸν ἐχθρὸν εἴ τι τιμωρήσομαι: Eurip. Or. 1102. See Aristoph. Ran. 536. [533. ed. Br.]

III. Sometimes the second member of the proposition, or the conclusion, is understood, the first being interrogative: εἰ νυκτὸς αὐτοῖς προσβάλομεν ἐκ λόχου; *what if we were to, &c.* Eurip. Phœn. 731. Περιεσόμεθα is suppressed, says the Scholiast.

IV. *Ει* is put for *ἐάν*, and usually with an optative mood, whenever *ἂν* is in the *consequent*^a member, [put first in the following example]: and the *ἂν* understood in *ει* has sometimes its potential use; as, βούλοισθ' ἂν—'Αρμενίας γῆς ἐργάζεσθαι ὁπόσῃν ἂν βούλησθε; *Ἐφασαν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι, εἰ πιστεύομεν μὴ ἀδικήσεσθαι: Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 73.

V. Sometimes *ἂν* in the *consequent* has its potential signification; as, εἰ δέ τις τοὺς κρατούντας τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, ἀμφοτέρους ἂν ὠφελήσειε: Isocr. ad Nic. p. 32. See also Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 65. πῶς ἂν τότε, &c.

VI. **Ἀν* in the consequent part has also a signification of the future; as, εἰ μὲν οὖν μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, (for καταγελάσουσί μου)—οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 3. l. 43. (c. 3. ed. Fisch.) See Aristoph. Ran. 536. [533. ed. Br.] and [Acharn.] 1195. [1197. ed. Br.]

VII. But most frequently *ἂν* in the consequent part gives the signification of an oblique future, *ει* being in the antecedent part; as, εἰ μοι τὸ Νεστόρειον εὐγλωσσον μέλος, 'Αντήγορός τε τοῦ Φρυγὸς, δοίη θεὸς, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀπομνημονεύειν: Athen. xv. See on **Ἀν*, V. p. 14. And in dialogues the antecedent part is sometimes spoken by one person, and the consequent, having the signification of an oblique future, by another; as, Σω. Εἰ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ, &c. Φ. Γελοῖόν γ' ἂν, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴη: Plat. Phædr. p. 260. (p. 350. ed. Bip.)

VIII. *Ει* is thus construed with the future indicative, because the future has this in common with the particle *ἂν*, that it takes away

^a I use this logical term for the second inference to *conclusion*, the term used by part of hypothetical propositions, in pre-Hoogveen. J. S.

actuality in the sense of verbs : *εἰ δὲ δὴ πόλεμός τις ἔξει, πόσα χρὴ νομίσαι* *Ζημιωθήσεσθαι* : Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 4. l. 53.

IX. It is construed with the aor. 1. in Hebr. iv, 8. *εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς Ἰησοῦς κατέπαυσεν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ ἄλλης ἐλάλει μετὰ ταῦτα ἡμέρας* : but not in signification of an oblique future, or of contingency, but in putting a case as to something past ; and so *εἰ μὴ* is construed with the indicative of the aorist, when what has been done is put as not done ; as in Iliad. ε, 679. φ, 544.

X. It does not wholly lose its conditional sense, when used in obtesting or conjuring ; as, *κλῦθί μεν, Ἀργυρότοξ, — εἰ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα, ἢ εἰ δὴ ποτε*, &c. Iliad. α, 40. Cf. 395. and 504.

XI. When the proposition is not conditional or hypothetical, *εἰ* is causal, and its member contains the reason, or the premises from which a conclusion is drawn ; as, *αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἀμύνουσιν θεοὶ αὐτοῖ, εἰ τοι Τρῳᾶς ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς πάντας ὀλέσσειν* : *since, because, seeing that* : Iliad. φ, 216. So, *εἰ δὲ τέκνα, καὶ κληρονόμοι* : Rom. viii, 17. *εἰ θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τίς καθ' ἡμῶν* ; ib. 31. Thus *εἰ* is put for *ἐπεὶ* in Acts iv, 9.

XII. *Εἰ* is used in interrogation, both direct and oblique. An example of direct interrogation is in Plato de Rep. *εἰ δ' ἀμφοῖν μεταξὺ κεῖται* ; v. p. 478. (t. vii. p. 63. ed. Bip.) and in Odys. α, 158. Acts i, 6. vii, 1. xix, 2.

XIII. In oblique interrogation it is construed with an indicative mood ; as, *ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἔροίό με, εἰ ἅπασί σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρῶσι χαρίζεσθαι* : Plato Phædr. p. 234. (p. 294. ed. Bip.) See Iliad. ε, 183. 1 John iv, 1. Or with an optative, ἂν being suppressed ; as, *ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τοὺς νόμους ἐπαινοῖεν* : Plut. in Cæs. p. 713. i. e. *ἐπαινοῖεν ἂν*. — *ἀνακρίνοντες τὰς γραφὰς, εἰ ἔχοι ταῦτα οὕτως* : Acts xvii, 11. as other particles [words] interrogative in their nature are construed with ἂν even in direct interrogation ; e. g. *τί ἂν τοῦτο θέλοι εἶναι* ;

XIV. After certain verbs, as *θαυμάζω, χαίρω, ἀχθομαι, δακρύω, κλαίω, ἀγανακτῶ, κρίνω*, *εἰ* expresses the reason or efficient cause of what those verbs signify ; but still its sense is in some degree hypothetical, and not so positive or absolute as that of *ὅτι*, for which it is said to be put : *τῶν κελευόντων μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι, θαυμάζειν ἔφη, εἰ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἰδίων ἄλλον τινα δεῖ πεισθῆναι* : Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 241. *ἔχαιρον, εἰ προσέχει τοῖς πράγμασιν ἤδη καὶ ἐγείρεται ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις* : ib. p. 241. *οὐδὲ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταύταις τὴν Ἑλλάδα, εἰ παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ τῶν πρέσβων ὑβρίζονται* : ib. p. 242. *τί γὰρ δὴποτε Μυροκλέα μὲν ἔκρινας, εἰ παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέταλλα ἐωνημένων εἰκόσιν ἐξέλεξε δραχμῆς παρ' ἐκάστον, καὶ Κηφισοφῶντα γραφὴν ἱερῶν χρημάτων ἐδίωκες, εἰ τρισὶν ὕστερον ἡμέραις ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν ἔθηκεν ἐπὶ μῶας* ; ib. p. 239. See also Æl. V. H. iv, 9. Acts xxvi, 8. and Hor. Serm. i, 1, 87.

XV. Its use, when rendered *ne, lest*, is not unlike that last mentioned : *φόβῳ εἴ τις αἰσθήσεται*, Eurip.

XVI. After a negative it sometimes signifies, *even though* ; as, *οὐκ ἂν, μὰ τὸν Δι', (ὠνησαίμην ἰσχύδας viz.) εἰ κρέμοισθέ γ' ὑμεῖς* : Aristoph.

Vesp. 297. So *si* in Latin: *redeam? non, si me obsecret*: Ter. Eun.

In Odys. 2, 144. where it is said that Ulysses deliberated in which manner, whether embracing her knees, or standing aloof, he should supplicate Nausicaa, εἰ δείξειε πόλιν καὶ εὔματα δόη, *ei* has been thought to stand for ὅπως, but perhaps its force is rather that of exploring the will of another person; *whether he should supplicate her, — IF PERHAPS* [in consequence of that supplication] *she might show him the city, &c.*

XVII. *Ei* is sometimes expressive of a wish; as, εἰ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίοσι: Eurip. Hecub. 836. αἰτουμένῳ μοι κοῦφον εἰ δόησῃ τέλος, Æschyl. S. adv. Theb. 266. And this appears to be its signification in the phrase εἰ ποτ' ἔην γε, which occurs so often in Homer: thus, δαῖρ' αὐτ' ἐμός ἔσκε κυνώπιος, εἰ ποτ' ἔην γε: *I wish he were so still*: Il. γ, 180. There is an aposiopesis or ellipsis after εἰ, *I wish*, so that the following should be the punctuation: εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γε. In Il. λ, 761. Nestor says, ὧς ἔον,—εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γε,—μετ' ἀνδράσιν,—*such I was among men. I wish—: formerly at least I was* [though no longer.] ἐπεὶ οὐ ποτ' ἐμός παῖς, εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γε,—λήθε' ἐνὶ μεγάροισι θεῶν: Il. ω, 426. οἷος Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔσκε μετ' ἀνδράσιν, εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γε, *I wish he were so still; once certainly he was*: Odys. τ, 314. ἐμὸν παῖδ', εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γε, δύσμορον: Odys. ω, 287. Laertes, whose words these are, thought his son was dead. And without γε: πατήρ δέ μοι ἔστιν Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ.—πότ' ἔην γ' ἤδη ἀπέφθιτο λυγρῷ ὀλέθρῳ.

XVIII. *Ei* is sometimes understood. [Hoogeveen's supposed example may be seen in the Abr. of Vig. p. 187. l. 32. but see note *q* on that page.]

ΕΙ ΓΑΡ.—I. These particles are expressive of a wish; but γὰρ still retains its causal sense. This appears plainly when other words intervene; as, εἰ τινα εὖροιμι, ᾧ Βακχί, γραῦν, ἀποσώσοι γὰρ ἂν φανεῖσα: *I wish I could find some old woman, for she, &c.* Lucian. Dial. Mer. iv. t. iii. p. 287. l. 49. This might have been expressed in the usual manner, εἰ γὰρ τινα εὖροιμι, ἀποσώσοι ἂν. In Æschylus, Prometheus, bound to the rock by Jupiter, says, εἰ γάρ μ' ὑπὸ γῆν, νέρθεν τ' Ἀΐδου τοῦ νεκροδέγμονος εἰς ἀπέραντον Τάρταρον ἦκεν, where γὰρ implies approbation of what the chorus had been saying of the tyranny of Jupiter; and assigns, as a ground or reason for that approbation, the case of Prometheus himself, signified by a wish for a different fate. To Cyrus, who had said that Araspes might serve him, Araspes replies, εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο ὃ τι ἐγώ σοι ἐν καιρῷ ἂν γενοίμην αὐτῷ χρήσιμος: Xen. Cyrop. vi. c. 20. understand, *that would be highly satisfactory to me, or the like, for I wish, &c.* Cf. Iliad. β, 371. δ, 189. and 288. σ, 464. where, as in all other passages in which it occurs, αἰ γὰρ (Doric for εἰ γὰρ) signifies, *for I wish*. In Eurip. Orest. 1103. [1098. ed. Pors.] Orestes says to Pylades, ᾧ φίλτατ', εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο καθάνοιμ' ἰδὼν: q. d. *O dearest friend, for you deserve to be dear to me on account of your advice, (to make Menelaus also suffer) which*

delights me so much, that I only wish I could see it successfully executed before my death.

II. Εἰ, when expressive of a wish, is construed with an optative mood, except in the case of the verb *ᾤφελον*, *ᾤφeles*, *ᾤφελε*. When, therefore, it is joined with an infinitive, either *ᾤφελον* or the optative of *ἐθέλω* must be understood; as in *Odyss. η, 311*.

In Latin *si*, unaccompanied by any other particle, expresses a wish; as in *Virg. Æn. vi, 187*.

ΕΙΓΕ, ΕΙΓΕ ΔΗ.—I. In *εἴγε*, *εἰ* puts a case or condition, on which something depends, and which *γε* limits or restricts: *if indeed; at least if; that is if*: as, *εἴγε δρᾶς ταῦθ', ὥσπερ αὐδᾶς, στείχε προσκύσας χθόνα*: *Soph. Philoct. 1403. Can any discourse or language be worse?* says Socrates: *οὐδεὶς*, replies *Phædrus*, *εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις*: *Plat. Phædr. p. 242. (p. 312. ed. Bip.) See Coloss. i, 23. Galat. iii, 4.*

II. *Εἴγε* frequently indicates rather assurance than doubt: as, *ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἐμάθετε τὸν Χριστὸν, εἴγε αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε*: *Ephes. iv, 21. q. d. αὐτὸν γὰρ δῆπον ἠκούσατε, for to be sure, or doubtless, ye have heard him: [if so be that ye have heard him, in our translation.]*

III. When something certain is spoken of, *εἰ* is causal, and *εἴγε* may be rendered, *since, indeed; at least since, or seeing that*: as, *οὐ γὰρ δῆπον, εἴγε φρόνιμον δεῖ γενέσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα σώφρονα ἔσεσθαι, παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἄφρονος σώφρων ἂν τις γένοιτο*: *Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 10. See also Ephes. iv. [iii. 2.]* In such passages the restrictive power of *γε* can scarcely be made appear without supposing an ellipsis: e. g. *οὐ γὰρ δῆπον παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἄφρονος σώφρων ἂν τις γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ δὲ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἴγε ὅτι ἄλλ' ὅτι γε, &c.* The sense of *εἴγε* seems to be causal rather than conditional or hypothetical, in *2 Cor. v, 3. also. [Our translators appear to have thought otherwise.]*

IV. To strengthen affirmation, *δὴ* is added to *εἴγε*: as, *τῇ φύσει φανεῖται τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῷ τόπῳ τὴν μέσσην ἔχον ἐκείνων τάξιν, εἰ γε δὴ [since in truth; since, as is really the case] τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ τὸ ἄρχειν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν*: *Plut. Quæst. Plat. p. 1008. b.*

ΕΙ ΜΕΝ, ΕΙ ΔΕ.—I. When there are two members containing contrary suppositions or conditions, *εἰ δὲ* in the second member answers to *εἰ μὲν* in the first. Both *εἰ μὲν* and *εἰ δὲ* are sometimes thus used elliptically: *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί,— εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι*: *Iliad. α, 136.* Here *εἰ μὲν* marks the antecedent part of the hypothetical proposition, while the consequent, *παύσομαι*, or *καλὸν ἂν εἴη*, or the like, is wholly omitted. See *Eustath. ad l.* who has collected examples. There is another in *Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 7. 3.* Near the end of the 2nd book of *Maccab.* the full expression occurs.

II. There is an ellipsis after *εἰ δὲ* also, most frequently of *βούλει* or *βούλεσθε*: as, *εἰ δὲ, σὺ μὲν μὲν ἀκουσον, ἐγὼ δέ κέ τοι καταλέξω, for εἰ δὲ βούλει*: *Iliad. ι, 262. and in v. 46. βούλονται* is understood after *εἰ δέ*.

This ellipsis of βούλει is most usual before ἄγε in its hortative sense : as, εἰ δ', ἄγε μὲν πειρήσαι, *but if you choose, come then, make the experiment* : Iliad. α, 303. So 525. ι, 170. τ, 108. ν, 580. 582. The kindred word ἐθέλεις is sometimes expressed : as, εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις πολέμοιο δαήμεναι, ὅφρ' εὖ εἰδῆς, ὅσπον φερτὴρ ἐίμι : Iliad. φ, 487. but here on the other hand there appears to be an ellipsis of ἄγε, *come on, try*.

But εἰ δὲ βούλει, or εἰ βούλει δὲ, is used in superaddition, signifying *besides, moreover* ; and in amplification, *nay even ; nay, what is more* : [see Abr. of Vig. p. 189. r. xi.]

III. In εἰ μὲν—εἰ δὲ, or εἰ δὲ μὴ, there is a constant ellipsis :—1. εἰ μὲν ἥρεσκε τί μοι τῶν ὑπὸ τούτων ῥηθέντων, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἦγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπειρώμην, ἃ γινώσκω, λέγειν : Demosth. Philipp. i. [p. 40. l. 5. ed. Reisk.] where ἥρεσκε, expressed after εἰ μὲν, is to be understood after εἰ δὲ μὴ. See Plat. Phædr. p. 273. l. 38. (p. 377. ed. Bip.) where λέγεις ἄλλο τι is understood after εἰ δὲ μὴ.—2. There is an ellipsis of μὲν in the first member : ὁκόσοι ἐκ πλευρίτιδος ἔμπυοι γίνονται, ἣν ἀνακαθαρθῶσιν ἐν τεσσαράκοιτα ἡμέρησιν, ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡ ῥῆξις γένηται ἣν δὲ μὴ, εἰς φθίσιν μεθίστανται, for ἣν μὲν ἀνακαθαρθῶσιν : Hippocr. Aphor. v, 15.—3. Sometimes the second hypothetical proposition only, with εἰ δὲ μὴ, is expressed, and the first, in which εἰ μὲν should have been, is wholly omitted : as, ὁ Κροῖσος—προηγόρευε τοῖσι Λαμφακηνοῖσι, μετιέναι Μιλτιάδεα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σφέας πίνυος τρόπον ἀπείλεε ἐκτρίψειν : Herodot. Erat. vi, 37. The first proposition, if expressed, might have been, εἰ μὲν τὸν Μιλτιάδεα μετιέναι ἐβούλοντο, καλῶς ἂν ἔσσεσθαι. So, μάλιστα μὲν εὐρετὴς γίνου τῶν βελτίστων· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μιμοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις καλῶς ἔχοντα : Isocr. ad Nicocl. p. 35. Add Revel. ii, 16.

IV. When εἰ δὲ μὴ is repeated in a sentence having more than two members, it is to be rendered by *sin minus*, or *si id non*, rather than by *alioquin* : as in Plat. de Rep. v. τίνας ἂν συμκροτάτου μεταβαλόντος, ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις· μάλιστα μὲν ἑνός· εἰ δὲ μὴ δυοῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅτι ὀλιγίστων : p. 473. (t. vii. p. 52. ed. Bip.) *if not one, two ; if not two, as few as possible*.

It is remarkable that εἰ δὲ μὴ follows sentences in which μὴ, either negative or prohibitory, precedes ; as, ὅστις οὖν ἐλεύθερος εἶναι βούλεται, μήτε θελέτω τι, μήτε φευγέτω τι τῶν ἐπ' ἄλλοις· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεύειν ἀνάγκη : Epict. Ench. c. 20. μὴ φέρε οὖν πρὸς τὸν μάντιν ὄρεξιν ἢ ἔκκλησιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρέμω αὐτῷ πρόσει : ib. c. 39. In such cases the whole prohibition or negation is to be understood after εἰ δὲ μὴ, as, εἰ δὲ μὴ μήτε θελέτω—μήτε φευγέτω, &c. or as if it were a negation, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὔτε θέλει τι, οὔτε φεύγει, &c. and so, εἰ δὲ μὴ μὴ φέρε, &c.

V. Sometimes γε is added, which rather limits what follows than affects εἰ δὲ μὴ : as, οὐδὲ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιοὺς· εἰ δὲ μήγε, ῥήγνυνται οἱ ἀσκοί, *otherwise this at least, or however, happens, that the bottles are broken* : Matth. ix, 17. So 2 Corinth. xi, 16.

ΕΙ ΚΑΙ.—I. Εἰ καὶ is *although* ; εἰ putting a case or supposition, and καὶ affirming, and resting on it : as, πεπεισμεθα δὲ περὶ

ὑμῶν, ἀγαπητοὶ, τὰ κρείττονα, καὶ ἐχόμενα σωτηρίας, εἰ καὶ οὕτω λαλοῦμεν : *notwithstanding that we use language so harsh and alarming* : Hebr. vi, 9. [For the difference between εἰ καὶ and καὶ εἰ, see the Abr. of Vig. p. 188. r. vi.]

II. Other words are sometimes inserted between εἰ and καί : εἴ τι καὶ παρελίπομεν νῦν,—αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἑαυτῷ εὐρήσει : Demosth. de Class. p. 75. l. 26. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυθώδεστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀρμόσει : Lycurg. adv. Leocr. c. 23. See 2 Corinth. iv, 3.

III. Sometimes the particles are to be considered separately, εἰ signifying *if*, and καὶ also ; as, τί οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ καὶ ἅλλα ὑμῖν ἀγαθὰ προσγένειτο διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ; *what if other advantages also*, &c. Xen. Cyrop. iii, 2, 18. Cr. Οἱμοὶ κακῶν δύστηνος ! ὦ τάλας ἐγώ ! Nu. Εἰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτοις εἰδείης κακά ; Eurip. Phœn. 1356. εἰκότα δ' ἂν ποιοῖμεν, εἰ καὶ τὴν γνώμην τῆς κόρης μάθοιμεν : Heliodor. i, 20.

They are to be considered separately also when εἰ is interrogative, and καὶ relates to a noun^a or pronoun added ; as, ἦν δ' ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρχομαι : Xen. Cyrop. ii, 4, 31.

EI MH.—I. Εἰ μὴ, *if not, unless*, is used in the antecedent part of hypothetical propositions, in which what is introduced by εἰ μὴ in the antecedent part is stated as an obstacle to what is mentioned in the consequent ; as, εἰ μὴ δέδιδει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν τοῖς παιδικοῖς : Plat. Phædr. p. 251. l. 7. (p. 330. ed. Bip.)

Sometimes, when διὰ follows εἰ μὴ, there is an elegant ellipsis, and εἰ μὴ διὰ may be rendered *but for* ; as, Μελτιάδην—εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν Πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἂν : Plat. Gorg. p. 516. (t. iv. p. 150. ed. Bip.) ἐδόκουν—ἂν—καταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν : Thucyd. ii, 18. See also Philo Jud. Legat. ad Cai. p. 774. l. 32.

In the above mentioned propositions εἰ μὴ may be observed to be virtually *affirmative* ; for by εἰ μὴ δέδιδει we understand that the lover *did* fear. Nay, in some phrases it even presses affirmation with vehemence ; as, τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψεύστης ; εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀρνούμενος ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός : 1 John ii, 22. (See Ter. Andr. i, 5, 2.) but in some uses, when ἂν is neither expressed nor understood, εἰ μὴ involves no affirmation, but rather signifies *exception* ; as, οὐκ ἐπιγινώσκετε ἑαυτοὺς, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστιν ; εἰ μὴ τι ἀδόκιμοι ἐστέ : 2 Cor. xiii, 5. *except ye be reprobates*. Had St. Paul been addressing reprobates, [or persons, whom he believed to be reprobate,] he would have said, εἰ μὴ ἀδόκιμοι ἦτε, ἐπιγινώητε ἂν ἑαυτοὺς, ὅτι, &c.

II. In the last example but one (1 John ii, 22) εἰ μὴ presses what is last mentioned, with comparative disregard of what precedes : in some passages it even wholly excludes what precedes by its restriction of what follows ; whence it gradually assumes an exceptive power : thus, οὐδεὶς θεὸς ἕτερος εἰ μὴ εἰς, 1 Corinth. viii, 4. Here εἰ μὴ excepts

^a Why is a noun only, or a pronoun, essential to the phrase ? Might not some other part of speech be added to καί ? as e. g. an *adverb*. Might it not be said, that of a person who had used the words εἰκότως

λέγεται, another inquired εἰ καὶ ἀληθῶς ? Here again Boyle's recipe for dysentery occurs. See Preface to Abridgement of Viger, p. v. n. 2. J. S.

one, with exclusion of the rest. So 1 Corinth. x, 13. In all these passages *εἰ μὴ* naturally follows that from which the exception is made: sometimes however it precedes it: as, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἓνα ἄρτον, οὐκ εἶχον μεθ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ: St. Mark viii, 14. So Cicero puts *nisi* first, de Amicitia c. 5. [§ 18. p. 38. l. 1. of Mr. Barker's 4th edit.]

In such passages it may often be interpreted by *ἀλλὰ*, *but*; as in St. Matth. xvii, 8. St. Mark indeed, in relating the same occurrence almost in the same words, has actually used *ἀλλὰ* instead of St. Matthew's *εἰ μὴ*. With a verb also it may have the signification of *ἀλλὰ*. "The gospel is not another," says St. Paul, *εἰ μὴ τινές εἰσιν οἱ ταράσσοντες ὑμᾶς, καὶ θέλοντες μεταστρέψαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ*: *but there are some, &c.* Gal. i, 7. Even with a verb in the imperative mood, *μηδὲν ἀλλ'*, *εἰ μὴ* "so be": Aristoph. Eq. 1103. So 1 Corinth. vii, 17.

III. *Εἰ μὴ* is put for *ὅτι μὴ*, as, *εἰ μὴ δέδωκε δίκην οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ, he is not content that he has escaped punishment*: Æschin. [See the other example of Hoogev. in the Abr. of Vig. p. 188. l. 32.]

IV. Sometimes *εἰ* and *μὴ* relate to different words; *εἰ* to a verb, and *μὴ* to some other word; when each must be rendered separately, *if, not*; as, καὶ ξυγγνώμη, *εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μάλλον ἀμαρτία, τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνη ἐναντία τολμῶμεν*: Thucyd. i, 32. The order of the sense is, *εἰ τολμῶμεν ἐναντία, μὴ μετὰ κακίας, &c.*

V. "Ἄρα is added to *εἰ μὴ*, and Dionys. of Halic. has used *εἰ μὴ ἄρα* in the same sense as Aristotle has used *εἰ μὴ πον*: ἐνθάδε κριθεῖς, διδόντω αὐτῷ δίκας, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ νόμιμον, *εἰ μὴ ἄρα, ὃ Δέκτιε, ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἴσος ἐσται δικαστῆς*: Dion. Hal. vii. p. 457. *τό τε γὰρ ἄρβρον φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ πον συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν*: Aristot. de Rep. i, 8. *unless haply, or perchance*.

VI. *Εἰ μὴ τι ἀλλὰ* is a phrase by which something is urged, with dismissal, or comparative disregard, of somewhat preceding; as, *μηδαμῶς γε παύση, εἰ μὴ τι ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὐ διεξιὼν*: *if nothing else, yet at least, &c.* Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 509. (t. vii. p. 121. ed. Bip.)

ΕΙΠΕΡ.—I. Other particles of indefinite signification are subjoined to *εἰ*,—*περ, πη, πον, ποτὲ, τίς, τί, πως*. *Περ* limits the condition signified by *εἰ*, so that *εἴπερ* is *si modo, if only, if indeed*: *εἴπερ οἶόν τε*, Plat. de Rep. v. p. 457. (p. 20. ed. Bip.) *γινώσκω τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀνθρώπους*,—*εἴπερ δεῖ ἐνεργὸν καὶ πειθόμενον ἔχειν τὸ στράτευμα, ἐξαιρετέους εἶναι ἐκ τῆς στρατιᾶς*, Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 23. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 189. r. xii.]

II. As *περ* in its limitative sense affects *εἰ* in its conditional sense, so as to make it signify an indispensable condition; so *εἰ* in its causal sense is, by the addition of *περ*, made to signify an indispensable or necessary cause: *ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης, οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἔκ του, οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ* (*since, seeing that*) *ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι*: Plat. Phædr. p. 245. (p. 318. ed. Bip.) Here *τὸ πάντα γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς* constitutes the necessary cause why the first origin is imperishable.

Εἴπερ is used when something is not merely to be proved, but

proved by an eminently cogent or triumphant argument; as St. Paul proves to the Thessalonians that they were worthy of the kingdom of God, for which they suffered, by this argument, εἴπερ δίκαιον παρὰ Θεοῦ ἀνταποδοῦναι τοῖς θλιβουσιν ὑμᾶς θλίψιν, καὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς θλιβομένοις ἄνεσιν μεθ' ἡμῶν: 2 Thess. i, 6. So Aristotle: τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει, κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐσθ' ἐκάστω· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ μάλιστα τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος: Eth. x, 7.

III. In some passages it may be doubted whether the signification of εἴπερ is conditional or causal; as in the following: συνεύχομαι σοι, —εἴπερ ἄμεινον ταυτὸ ἡμῖν εἶναι, ταῦτα γίνεσθαι: Plat. Phædr. p. 257. l. 19. (p. 344. ed. Bip.) In Rom. viii, 17. Beza gives it a conditional sense; Hoogeveen, a causal.

IV. When εἴπερ in its conditional sense is joined to ποτὲ, τις, ἄλλος, or other such indeterminate words, it brings with it an augmentative or intending power, and περ eminently exerts its limitative force; as, τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν, εἴπερ ποτὲ, καὶ νῦν χρήματα εισφέροντας: *if ever, now above all other times*: Demosth. Ol. i. p. 2. l. 5. συμφέρει δ' ὑμῖν, εἴπερ τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ, τὸ νικᾶν: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 42. ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτὲ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο: Thucyd. iv, 55. These two last passages show that καὶ is not always in the opposed or corresponding member, as Viger asserts. [The assertion, being erroneous, has been omitted in the Abridgement.]

Aristophanes adds emphasis and enforcement to the phrase by the insertion of δὴ after εἴπερ: Εὐριπίδῃ, Εὐριπίδιον, ὑπάκουσον, εἴπερ δὴ ποτ' ἀνθρώπων τινι: Ach. 404.

V. An ellipsis is easily discoverable in the examples given;—1. εἴπερ ποτὲ (προσείχετε,)—or (χρήματα εισπενέγκατε.)—2. εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ (συμφέρει).—3. εἴπερ ποτὲ (ὀκνηροὶ ἐγένοντο.)

VI. Sometimes after εἴπερ alone there is an ellipsis to be supplied from something preceding; as, ἔπειρ' ἀπὸ τὰρ ῥοῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς; εἴπερ: Aristoph. [Nub. 226.] underst. βούλει ὑπερφρονεῖν, [or simply ὑπερφρονεῖς.]

VII. An ellipsis also occurs of the whole consequent part of a hypothetical proposition after the antecedent introduced by εἴπερ: as, εἴπερ γάρ κ' ἐθέλῃσιν Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητῆς ἐξ ἐδῶν στυφελίζειν ὁ γὰρ πολὺ φέρτατός ἐστιν: Iliad. α, 581. understand, *he could do it*.

VIII. From the adversative force of περ arises the signification which εἴπερ has of *although*: see Iliad. φ, 577.

IX. Εἴπερ ἄρα occurs elliptically in the middle of sentences; [representing something as doubtful, and therefore what depends on it as conditional or hypothetical: see Abr. of Vig. p. 189. r. xiv.] τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστι φιλίαν ἀπειπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐχθραν ἀνειπεῖν· ἥρκει γάρ, εἴπερ ἄρα [*if friendship was at all events to be renounced*] τὸ μὴ συναλγεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ καὶ προσανιάσαι, πόρρω δεινόν: Synesius. And in interrogative sentences: ὁ Ζεὺς—τί ὑμᾶς τίννεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ, εἴπερ ἄρα: [*if some one must necessarily be punished*] ἐαυτόν; Ctenomachus ap. Euseb. Præpar. 6.

X. Εἴπερ ἄρα is not always thus elliptically used; but sometimes introduces a negation, put as a supposition, for the sake of argument,

and by no means conceded; as, *ὃν οὐκ ἡγείρεν, εἴπερ ἄρα νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται*, if it be true that the dead are not raised: 1 Corinth. xv, 15.

XI. *Εἰ ἄρα* is used elliptically in the same manner as *εἴπερ ἄρα*, in Euseb. Præpar. vi. p. 265. and *εἰ δ' ἄρα* also in the beginning of a subsequent member, with reference to something in a preceding member. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 190. l. 5.]

XII. If the force of *εἴπερ* be considered more minutely and accurately, it will be found that its apparent limitative power depends on *γε* understood; *περ* proposing indefinitely what *γε* restrains to something more particular. Thus *γε* is actually added by Plato, when he makes Theætetus say, in reply to a doubt expressed by Socrates whether he should drop a topic, or discuss it in some manner or other, *τί μὴν, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὁπποῦν φαίνεται δεῖν*; if indeed it appears to be necessary in some manner or other at least: Theæt. p. 187. l. 37. (t. ii. p. 146. ed. Bip.)

ΕΙ ΠΗ, ΕΙ ΠΟΥ, ΕΙ ΠΟΤΕ, ΕΙ ΠΩΣ.—I. The addition of these particles affects the meaning of *εἰ* very little, or not at all. *Εἴπη* and *εἴπου* signify *part* or *place* indefinitely; *if in any part, if any where*: Thucyd. iv. c. 69. and 125. and c. 4.

II. *Ποτὲ* adds indeterminate signification of *time* to the condition expressed by *εἰ*: *if ever; if at any time*: *εἴποτε*—*ἢ εἰ δὴ ποτε*: Iliad. α, 39.

III. *Πως* adds signification of *means* or *manner* indefinitely; *if by any means; if in any manner*: *εἴπως ὥσάμενοι ἔλοιεν τὸ τεῖχος*: Thucyd. iv, 11. *εἴπως δύναιτο καταστήσαντες εἰς Φοίνικα παραχειμάσαι*: Acts xxvii, 12. cf. Rom. i, 10. xi, 14.

ΕΙΤΙΣ.—The original sense of condition in *εἴτις* is on many occasions nearly lost by use; for *εἴτις* and *εἴτι* signify not only *if any one, if any thing*, but *whosoever, whatsoever; every, all*; as, *ἐφθειρον εἴτι χρήσιμον ἦν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ, whatsoever was of use; all that was useful*: Xen. H. Gr. vii, 1, 9. So Rom. xiii, 9. and in Philipp. iv, 8. *ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, &c.* is joined with *εἴτις ἀρετῇ, εἴτις ἔπαινος*. In Latin, *si quis, si qui, si quid*, are used in the same sense: see Cic. in Catil. iii. c. 3. [§ 8.] Virg. Æn. ii, 420. and 159.

ΕΙΤΕ.—I. *Εἴτε* is used in disjunction of propositions when hypothetical. It usually connects *two* cases or conditions, as in Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 3. l. 38. [p. 14. l. 11. ed. Reisk.] but in St. Paul's 1 Ep. to the Corinth. iii, 22. it connects eight.

II. The same may be said of *ἄντε* as of *εἴτε*: *ἄντε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ, ἄντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἤττον*: Plato de Rep. v. p. 453. l. 34. (t. vii. p. 11. ed. Bip.) *whether,—or*.

III. Sometimes *ἢ* follows in the latter member; as, *εἴτε Λυσίας, ἢ τις ἄλλος*: Plat. Phædr. p. 277. l. 35. (p. 386. ed. Bip.)

IV. For *εἴτε* repeated, Homer has *αἶ* followed by *ἥτε*, *whether—or*: Iliad. τ, 147.

V. As *εἰ* is used in expressing doubt, so *εἴτε* repeated, when doubt relates to two things; as in 2 Corinth. xii, 2. 3. Hence its use when deliberation or consideration is mentioned: σκοπεῖτε, εἴτε ὀρθῶς ἐγὼ λογίζομαι ταῦτα, εἴτε καὶ μὴ; Demosth. de Rhod. lib. p. 79. l. 17. τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα, εἴτε ὠφέλειαν, εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει: Plat. Phædr. p. 237. l. 31. (p. 301. ed. Bip.) And in general, when put in each of two members, it stands for *πότερον* and *ἢ*: γελοῖον, — ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος, εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνηὼς: Plat. Euthyph. p. 4. l. 16.

VI. In Thucyd. iv, 22. where *καὶ* follows *εἴτε* not repeated, there appears to be an ellipsis: ὀρῶντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε σφίσιν οἶον τε ὃν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, (underst. εἴτε ἀντεῖπόν τι,) εἴτε καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς συγχωρεῖν.

VII. Sometimes *εἴτε* is followed by *οὖν*, which has a signification of concession, (derived from its collective or conclusive power) conditional however, on account of *εἴτε* preceding; as, δαιμόνια φῆς με νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιὰ: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 27. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν, καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα, καὶ τοῦτο τὸννομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθές, εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος: ib. p. 34.

EAN.—I. 'Εὰν, *if*, (a particle marking the antecedent part of hypothetical propositions) is compounded of *εἰ* and *ἂν*, as *ἐπεὰν*, Ion. of *ἐπεὶ* and *ἂν*. For *ἐὰν* the poets say *αἶκε*, *αἶκεν*, or *εἶκε*: see Iliad. λ, 391. Of *ἐὰν* is formed *ἦν*; so that *ἐὰν*, *αἶκε*, *αἶκεν*, *εἶκε*, and *ἦν* may be considered as identical. The difference between *εἰ* and *ἐὰν* is this, that the former is usually construed with an *indicative* mood; the latter, on account of its component part *ἂν*, with a *subjunctive*: [but see Abr. of Vig. p. 190. l. 27.]

II. 'Αν, when in composition with *εἰ* in *ἐὰν*, may affect a following verb in any of the manners in which it affects verbs when alone and uncompounded. See 'Αν. E. g. it exerts its *potential* force in Iliad. α, 421. *αἶκε πείθεται*, *if he can be persuaded*, for *εἰ ἄρα δυνήσεται πείθεσθαι*. So, *αἶχ' εὖρητέ πα*, *if you can find any any where*, for *ἐὰν εὖρητέ που*: Aristoph. Ach. 732. It signifies *will* in Odyss. η, 315. *οἶκον δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ κτήματα δόην, αἶκ' ἐθέλων γε μένοισ*. 'Εὰν εὖ ποιῆς, for *εἰ θέλεις εὖ ποιεῖν*: Ecclesiastic. xii, 1. See St. Matth. iv, 9. And like *ἂν*, it is construed with a verb denoting will: *ὥστε θερμαίνειν τε, ἐὰν βούλωμαι, καὶ ψύχειν*: Plat. Phædr. p. 268. l. 11. (p. 366. ed. Bip.) See Iliad. η, 375. In denoting the *future*, *ἐὰν* is chiefly construed with the aor. 1. subjunctive; as often as the signification of the future is blended with that of the past; as, *ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἅλας μωρανθῇ*, *but if the salt shall have become insipid*: St. Matth. v, 13. where *ἂν* in *ἐὰν* takes off from the actuality in the sense of the verb *μωραίνεσθαι* just so much as the time intervening between the integrity and the deterioration of the salt. So in St. John xii, 32. *καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ὑψωθῇ ἐκ τῆς γῆς*. q. d. *οὐπω ὑψώθη ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλ' ὑψωθῶ*.

III. 'Εὰν has the same power as *ἂν* in rendering the meaning of other words less determinate. See p. 11. I. and II. Thus *ὃ ἐὰν, whatsoever*, St. Mark vi, 22. Ephes. vi, 8. 1 Corinth. vi, 18. *ὃ*

τι ἔαν, Coloss. iii, 23. ὅσοι ἔαν, Revel. iii, 19. ὅσακις ἔαν, *as often soever as*: Revel. xi, 6. ὅπου ἔαν, *wheresoever*: Judith. viii, 22. 3 Maccab. iii, 29. and St. Matth. viii, 19. where it signifies *whithersoever*. See Casaub. ad Act. Ap. ii, 21. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 191. l. 8. and note *t* on that page.]

IV. Ἐάν is rendered *etsi, quamvis, although*, in 1 Corinth. iv, 15.

EAN MEN, EAN ΔΕ.—I. As εἰ μὲν, εἰ δέ, are used elliptically as correlative, so ἔαν μὲν, ἔαν δέ. Thus in Plato's Protagoras, ἔαν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· ἔαν δέ μὴ (underst. βούληται),—τοσοῦτον κατέθηκε: p. 328. l. 18. (t. iii. p. 122. ed. Bip.) Nay, these conjunctions are interchanged; ἔαν δέ μὴ e. g. instead of εἰ δέ μὴ, following εἰ in Daniel iii, 15. and εἰ δέ μὴ γε following καὶ μὲν (for καὶ ἔαν μὲν) in St. Luke xiii, 9.

II. It may be observed that after an affirmative sentence ἔαν δέ μὴ follows, with an ellipsis of what is denied; after a negative sentence (whether ἔαν μὲν has or has not preceded) ἔαν δέ, with an ellipsis of what is affirmed: e. g. θάρρει, φήσεί τις ἄν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' οὐδὲν ὑβρισθήσῃ· ἔαν δέ, (underst. ὑβρισθῇσωμαι,) τότε ὀργιεῖσθε, νῦν ἀφέντες; Demosth. in Mid. p. 415. l. 50. where it is to be observed also that ἀρα is understood with ἔαν δέ.

EAN ΚΑΙ.—I. As εἰ καὶ signifies *even though*, so do ἔαν καὶ and ἦν καὶ: but with this slight difference, that ἄν in ἔαν has somewhat of indefinite in its signification, or of indeterminate futurity of time; as, ἔαν καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦμόν μὴ παρῇ, τὴν γε διανοίαν τὴν ἐμὴν σῆσθω τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρεσταῖναι: Isocr. Nicocl. p. 72. *even though my body shall not be present*.

II. Other words too are inserted between ἔαν or ἦν and καὶ, as they are between εἰ and καὶ: ἦν τις καὶ μὴ παρακαλῇ—, Thucyd. viii, 2. ἔαν μὴ καὶ μουσικὰ πεφόκη, Plat. de Legg. viii. p. 829. (t. viii. p. 399. ed. Bip.)

EANTE.—I. Ἐάντε repeated differs from εἴτε in being construed with the subjunctive mood, on account of ἄν comprehended in it, and in being scarcely used of the past, but frequently of the future: thus, ἔαν τε ἐνθάδε μαχώμεθα,—ἔαν τε—ἰόντες ὑπαντῶμεν αὐτοῖς.—ἦν τε ἐνθάδε—αὐτοὺς δεχώμεθα, ἦν τε ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἰόντες τὴν μάχην συνάπτωμεν: Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 78. for εἴτε μαχεσώμεθα, εἴτε ὑπαντήσομεν, εἴτε δεξώμεθα, εἴτε συνάψομεν. So with the subjunctive of an aorist, for εἴτε with a future indicative, in the Book of Wisdom, iii, 17. 18.

II. It is used, however, in the signification of the present in Rom. xiv, 8.

III. But when ἔαν τε is put only once, it is not to be considered as compounded; nor is τε to be referred to ἔαν, but to some other word. Thus ἔαν τε γὰρ is put for καὶ γὰρ ἔαν, especially when followed by καὶ superadditory, *even*; as, ἔαν τε γὰρ καὶ περισσώτερόν τι καυχῆσωμαι, &c. 2 Corinth. x, 8.

IV. It is to be observed lastly, that, like εἴτε, ἔαντε scarcely suf-

fers elision before a vowel, except when followed by οὖν : as, εἴτ' οὖν, εἰάντ' οὖν.

ON THE PARTICLES ΕΙΘΕ, ΑΙΘΕ, ΑΙΘ' ΩΦΕΛΛΟΝ, ΑΙΘ' ΩΦΕΛΟΝ, ΑΙΘ' ΟΦΕΛΟΝ.

I. Εἴθε, a particle of wishing, is compounded of εἰ conditional, and θε, the meaning of which does not appear. Were it a simple word, it would be circumflexed. It involves in its signification a supposition or case, and also a dependant consequence, both suppressed ; thus the full expression would be, e. g. εἰ τοῦτό μοι γένοιτο, τὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαιμι ἂν, or εὐτυχὴς ἂν εἶην, or the like.

II. As to its construction, the nature of a wish requires that it should be joined with an optative mood ; as, εἴθε γένοιτο θεοῖς φίλα, Theogn. 729. εἴθε γράψειεν, Plat. Phædr. [p. 195. l. 39. ed. Bas. 1.] But it is construed with an indicative also, not only of ὠφελον constantly, but of other verbs ; as, εἴθε πρώτως σοι ἐνέτυχον, εἴθε τὴν τάξιν προῦλαβον τοῦ φόνου, Lucian. Tyrannic. t. ii. p. 157. l. 32. When an infinitive, with an accusative before it, follows εἴθε, εἷη is understood ; as in εἴθ' σε μὴ θνητοῖσι γερέσθαι πῆμα, Phocylid. 41.

III. It is most frequently construed with the singular number either of the imperfect or of the 2nd aorist of ὀφείλω or ὀφέλλω : as, αἶθ' ὠφελles—σημαίνειν, *would that thou commanded'st!* Iliad, ξ, 84. or without the augment ; αἶθ' ὠφελον ἄγαμος μένειν, *would that I had remained unmarried!* [For more correct information with respect to the construction of εἴθε, see Abr. of Vig. p. 92.]

IV. In the junction of εἴθε and ὠφελον, neither appears to be redundant, as ὠφελον seems to indicate fatality : εἴθ' ὠφέλε, q. d. *I wish it was to have been ; that it had been so fated.*

ΕΙΤΑ, ΕΠΕΙΤΑ.—I. The predominant signification of εἴτα is that of [sequence in] the order or series of time or things ; *then ; next ; afterwards* : ἄνθρωπος ἦν, εἴτ' ἐγένετ' ἐξαίφνης κόραξ : Aristoph. Vesp. 49.

Hence it fitly follows πρῶτον in Aristoph. Vesp. 1101. In Demosthenes a succession of events is thus marked : τὸ πρῶτον,—μετὰ ταῦτα,—πάλιν,—αὖθις,—εἴτα,—μετὰ ταῦτα : Olynth. i. p. 2. [p. 12. l. 26. ed. Reisk.]

II. Εἴτα therefore has place properly, only where there is a succession of members, two at least in number, corresponding to a succession of things spoken of in those members ; but sometimes, even when two such members coalesce, being blended e. g. by the substitution of a participle in the former for a verb, which would have kept it distinct from the latter, εἴτα still retains its place, as if the members had been separate and successive : thus, διὰ τοῦτ' ὁ δυνήθεις, εἴτ' ἴσως κεῖται πυρέττων, for διὰ τοῦτ' ὠδυνήθη, εἴτα, &c. Aristoph. Vesp. 284. πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ, οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἴτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ ; ἢ οὐκ ἔχων ; Plato Sympos. p. 200. l. 5. for

πότερον ἔχει, εἴτα ἐπιθυμεῖ; Δέδοικα γὰρ, μὴ ἀγνοήσασα καὶ σφαλεῖσα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, εἴτα τὴν μέλαιναν ἐμβάλλῃ ἀντὶ τῆς λευκῆς ψήφου, for μὴ ἀγνοῇ καὶ σφαλῇ, εἴτα ἐμβάλλῃ: Ælian. V. H. xiii, 38. [See note a p. 135. Abr. of Vig.]

III. It may denote *resultance*, when one thing is the consequence of another; as in the passage of Ælian just before cited; for the result of the ignorance of the Athenians might easily be the substitution of a black for a white pebble. So Aristoph. Vesp. 52.

IV. Εἴτα signifies *demum, denique, cæterum*; but only when what follows is not dependant on what precedes, but quite different, and does not occupy the last place as its proper place in the order of a connected series or succession. See Aristoph. Av. 1424. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 135. l. 18.]

V. In introducing an interrogation, it denotes consequence, with a signification of vehemence also: ταῦτα δὴ τολμᾷς λέγειν Ἐμφανῶς ἤδη πρὸς ἡμᾶς; εἴτ' ἐγὼ σου φείσομαι; and shall I then spare you? Aristoph. Ach. 311. To a husbandman lamenting the loss of his oxen, Dicæopolis says, ὦ τρισκακοδαίμων, εἴτα λευκὸν ἀμπέχει; ibid. 1073. Change the question into a negation, to which it is equivalent, and the consequence appears: *you ought not then to wear white*. It is especially expressive of indignation, when a consequence is denied: thus, Semichor. καὶ λέγει γ', ἄπερ λέγει, δίκαια πάντα. Semichor. εἴτ', εἰ δίκαια, τοῦτον εἰπεῖν αὐτ' ἐχρῆν; and suppose they are just: what then? ought they to have been spoken by this man? Aristoph. Ach. 561.

VI. The foregoing examples show that one of its uses is to note *incongruence* or *unsuitableness*; as, in the wearing of white clothes while mourning; in the assertion even of what is just and true by a beggar. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 134. r. ii.]

VII. It is used in objections interrupting the discourse of another with vehemence and asperity: εἴτ', οὐ μέντοι λέγεις ἡκεῖν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου; what! and do not you say, &c.? Ælian. V. H. xiii, 13.

VIII. It occurs in objections or replies without any vehemence or asperity: as Artaxerxes, to a father accusing his own son capitally, and enumerating his crimes, εἴτα τολμήσεις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐαυτοῦ τὸν υἱὸν ἀποθνήσκοντα ὑπομεῖναι; Ælian. i, 34. What follows shows that no indignation is expressed.

IX. Sometimes, in abrupt commencements, that from which a consequence is drawn is understood: thus a chorus in Aristoph. begins with these words, εἴτα δῆτ' οὐ πόλλ' ἐνεσσι δεινὰ τῷ γῆρᾳ κακά; collecting the misery of old age from the wretched appearance of an old man: Vesp. 439.

X. In some passages εἴτα signifies, *notwithstanding, nevertheless*; as in the answer of Eteocles to his brother Polynices, who had taxed him with cowardice, κατὰ σὺν πολλοῖσιν ἦλθες πρὸς τὸν οὐδὲν ἐς μάχην; and yet are you come, &c.? Eurip. Phœniss. 601. The inconsistency is objected ironically: q. d. *you believe me to be a coward, it seems; and then you come against me, coward as I am, with numerous forces*.

XI. Ἐπειτα differs little or not at all from εἴτα; for it signifies

consequence, as in Iliad η, 360. and thence is seemingly put, as εἴτα is, for οὐκοῦν: see Iliad. ε, 812. ἔπειτα ποίας ἡμέρας δοκεῖς μ' ἄγειν; Soph. Electr. 263. [266. ed. Br.]

XII. Ἐπειτα has also a use similar to that of εἴτα treated of in § ii. e. g. μή μοι φθονήσῃ, ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι, εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν, ἔπειτ' ἐν Ἀθηναίοις λέγειν μέλλω: Aristoph. Ach. 497. where, it may be observed by the by, ἔπειτα too signifies *nevertheless, notwithstanding*.

XIII. And, like εἴτα, it notes, interrogatively, *inconsistency* or *inconsequence*, with expression of wonder, indignation, &c. (see V. VI.) and so then. Aristoph. Ach. 917. Nub. 226. Vesp. 1128. [1133. ed. Br.]

ΕΠΕΙ.—I. Ἐπεὶ signifies *first, sequence of time; after, after that, when*; as, βῆ δ' ἄρ' ὄνειρος, ἐπεὶ τὸν μῦθον ἄκουσε: Iliad. β, 16. And in oblique phraseology it is construed with an infinitive mood; as, Σκύθας γάρ, — ἐπεὶ τέ σφι Δαρεῖον ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν, μετὰ ταῦτα μεμονέναι μιν τίσασθαι: Herodot. vi, 84.

II. Its second signification, that of *cause or reason, (since, because,)* is not less frequent: thus, Κλυταίμνηστρης προβέβουλα, — ἐπεὶ οὐ ἔθεν ἐστὶ χερσίων: Iliad. α, 114. Each particle in the compound performs its proper function; ἐπὶ with a dative is known to be ratiocinative or causal, being equivalent to διὰ with an accusative; and εἰ limits what ἐπὶ would have left indefinite: thus, ἐπεὶ οὐ ἔθεν ἐστὶ χερσίων is put for ἐπὶ τῷ i. e. διὰ τὸ οὐκ εἶναι χερσίονα: or ἐπὶ τούτῳ, i. e. διὰ τοῦτο, προβέβουλα, *I prefer her for this reason, because, &c.* So, μή με κτεῖν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὁμογάστριος Ἐκτορός εἰμι, Iliad. φ, 95. i. e. ἐπὶ τῷ με μὴ εἶναι ὁμογάστριον. And in Eurip. Med. 342. ἐπεὶ πατὴρ οὐδὲν προτιμᾷ, &c. for ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν πατέρα μηδὲν προτιμᾶν, *because, &c.*

III. Thus ἐπεὶ acquires a causal force; which, however, is sometimes obscure, when it refers neither to what immediately precedes, nor to anything precisely expressed. Thus in the Ranae of Aristoph. Bacchus, under torture, on receiving a lash, exclaims, Ἀπολλων, &c. on which Xanthias says, ἤλγησεν οὐκ ἤκουσας; Bacchus replies, οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἐπεὶ Ἰαμβὸν Ἰππώνακτος ἀνεμνησκόμεν. v. 673. [660. ed. Br.] Here ἐπεὶ assigns a reason, not for Bacchus's not smarting, but for his having exclaimed Ἀπολλων, and the rest of Hipponax's verse.

IV. It is construed elliptically with interrogative particles, when it may be rendered *for*. Thus in the Nubes of Aristoph. Socrates tells Strepsiades that certain names are not masculine: Str. οὐκ ἄρ' ῥεν ὑμῖν; Soc. οὐδαμῶς γ', ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν καλέσειας ἐντυχῶν Ἀμυνία; v. 689. After ἐπεὶ understand εἰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἄρ' ῥενα. After a negative sentence, whether interrogative or not, εἰ is understood; after an affirmative one εἰ μὴ. An example of the former is in Rom. iii, 6. where εἰ ὁ Θεὸς ἄδικος εἶη is understood after ἐπεὶ: of the latter, in Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 100. l. 16. where, after ἐπεὶ, all between σαπρὰ and that word is to be understood. The ellipsis is supplied by St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv, 29. where the causal force of ἐπεὶ will be more apparent if the interrogation τί ποιήσουσιν be changed into direct negation, οὐδὲν ποιήσουσιν. Add Plat. Euthyphr. p. 12. ἐπεὶ ἔστιν

ὅστις ; *for is there any one who ?* or, by the same change, *for there is no one who, &c.*

V. It retains its causal sense also when used elliptically before imperatives ; as, ἐπεὶ εἰπεῖ, *for, (if it be not so) tell me* : Plat. Euthyd. p. 287. l. 21. (t. iii. p. 37. ed. Bip.) ἐπεὶ διδάξον, Soph. Electr. 353. [352. ed. Br.] Aristoph. Vesp. 517. [519. ed. Br.] [See Abr. of Vig. p. 137. l. 17.] See also Rom. xi, 22. where εἰ μὴ ἐπιμείνης τῇ χρηστότητι is understood after ἐπεὶ.

It may sometimes be doubtful whether εἰ or εἰ μὴ is to be understood after ἐπεὶ : i. e. whether the latter is to be referred to the negative or affirmative part of what has preceded it. E. g. in Hebr. ix, 26. where it is said, ἐπεὶ ἔδει αὐτὸν πολλάκις παθεῖν ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, if ἐπεὶ be referred to the *negation* preceding, we must understand εἰ, or εἰ μὴ, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς χειροποιήτα ἅγια, ἵνα πολλάκις προσφέρῃ ἑαυτὸν : if to the *affirmation*, then, εἰ μὴ, or εἰ μὴ, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν, &c. In these two last passages either ἂν is understood with the indicatives on account of the conditional nature of the affirmation, or the indicative is used in place of the optative with ἂν. So, εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκ ἔτι ἐξ ἔργων· ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκ ἔτι γίνεται χάρις. εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ χάρις, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶν ἔργον : Rom. xi, 6. for ἐπεὶ, εἰ μὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἡ χάρις οὐκ ἔτι γένοιτ' ἂν χάρις, καὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἔτι ἂν εἴη ἔργον. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 179. r. iii.]

VI. Sometimes ἄρα, either in its syllogistic or collective use, or in its signification of *effect*, is added to ἐπεὶ, as, ἔγραψα ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι πόρνοις· καὶ οὐ πάντως τοῖς πόρνοις τοῦ κόσμου τούτου,— ἐπεὶ ὀφείλετε ἄρα ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελθεῖν : 1 Cor. v, 10. *for then [the conclusion would be that] you must needs go out of the world.* Ἠγίασται γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἄπιστος ἐν τῇ γυναικί, καὶ ἡγίασται ἡ γυνὴ ἡ ἄπιστος ἐν τῷ ἀνδρὶ· ἐπεὶ ἄρα τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν ἀκάθαρτά ἐστιν· νῦν δὲ ἁγιά ἐστιν : *for, were it otherwise, then would it follow as a consequence or effect, that your children would be impure ; whereas they are pure* : 1 Corinth. vii, 14.

VII. Οὖν also is added, noting the consequence or conclusion from premises, as in Hebr. iv, 6. where the order of argumentation would be, ἐπεὶ ἀπολείπεται— πάλιν οὖν τινὰ ὀρίζει ἡμέραν.

VIII. Τοι too is subjoined to ἐπεὶ, to enforce and strengthen a reason added, and introduced by ἐπεὶ ; as, ἐπεὶ τοι οἶμι με αὐτὸν οὕτως ἂν ποτε κορυβαντιάσαι, ὥς, &c. Lucian. Ep. Saturn. t. iii. p. 408. l. 86. The confirmative force of τοι will appear on resolving the interrogation into its implied negation : οὐ τοι οὕτως ἂν ποτε κορυβαντιάσω.

IX. [On ἐπεὶ τοι γε, next treated of by Hoogeveen, see Abr. of Vig. p. 137. l. 34.]

X. In ἐπεὶ περ, περ has a limitative force on account of γε suppressed, and advances one reason, others being set aside, as the chief or principal, which γε limits and urges : so that ἐπεὶ περ is properly, *for this reason above all others, that,—or principally since,—* : thus, ἐπεὶ περ ὀρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα : Plat. de Rep. v. p. 452. l. 16. ἐπεὶ περ λέγειν ἡρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, ibid. γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκταὶ συνοικεῖν καὶ συμφύλαττειν, ἐπεὶ περ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ συγ-

γενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν, *ib.* p. 456. See also Eurip. Phœniss. 742 and Rom. iii, 30.

The ellipsis of *γε* is supplied by Plato, *ἐπεὶπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα*, Phæd. p. 114. l. 34.

ΕΠΕΙΔΗ.—I. *Ἐπειδὴ* first signifies *time*; and from the force of its component part *δὴ*, *maturity of time, time fully arrived; when now*: ταύτην, *ἐπειδὴ* θαλερὸς εἶχ' ἡβης χρόνος, μνηστῆρες ἦτουν: Eurip. Electr. 20.

II. [On the construction of *ἐπειδὴ* with the optative mood, see Abr. of Vig. p. 138. l. 10.]

III. To signify a precise or instant point of time with more force, *εὐθὺς*, *πρῶτα*, or *τάχιστα*, is added. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 138. l. 23.]

Ἐπειδὴ in this its first sense is sometimes joined with an infinitive mood in oblique phraseology.

IV. In the second or ratiocinative sense of *ἐπειδὴ*, *since, seeing that*, *ἐπεὶ* is both causal and conjunctive; and *δὴ* retains perhaps in some passages its signification of time; as, *τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε*: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 21. l. 10. for *ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος δὴ τετελεύτηκε*, *since he himself is now dead*. But some of the other senses of *δὴ* are far more frequent; as its *inceptive*, e. g. in Plato Phædr. where Socrates, about to enter on a new rhetorical precept, says, *ἐπειδὴ λόγον δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, since then, &c.* p. 271. l. 29. (p. 373. ed. Bip.) where it may also have its confirmative force, serving to strengthen or support a hypothesis; as in Plat. Apol. Socr. *τίθημι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνη*, p. 27. l. 30. and sometimes it seems to have the force of *νῦν*, in signification, not of *time*, but of *opposition*: as, *εἰ μὲν γὰρ—ἐπειδὴ δέ,—* for *νῦν δέ, ἐπεὶ, but now, since, &c.* Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 2. l. 13. [p. 11. l. 4. ed. Reisk.]

V. For *ἐπειδὴ* the poets use *ἐπειὴ*, without the *δ*. See Hom. Il. α, 156. 169. and Eustath. p. 45. l. 5. p. 1678. l. 39.

VI. *Ἐπειδήπερ* scarcely differs from *ἐπεὶπερ*, except in the addition of signification by the insertion of *δὴ*, which performs the same office as in *ἐπειδὴ*. The ellipsis of *γε*, on which the limitative force of *περ* depends, (see *ἐπεὶ*, § x.) is supplied by Plato in the case of *ἐπειδήπερ*, as well as in that of *ἐπεὶπερ*: *δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ γε θεῖα κάλλιστα φῆς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων*: Euthyphr. p. 13. l. 44. The chief or most cogent of all the arguments which might be adduced, is selected: *since, if any thing is true, this at least is certainly true, that you say, &c.*

ΕΠΑΝ, ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ.—I. *Ἐπὰν* differs from *ἐπεὶ* in this, that the latter has place in narration of something *past*, and is therefore construed with the indicative of a past tense; whereas *ἐπὰν* speaks conditionally or hypothetically of something *to come* or *to be done*; one of its component particles, *ἀν*, taking off actuality in the sense of its verb, and therefore it is construed with the subjunctive mood. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 138. l. 33.] Moreover *ἐπεὶ* has a signification of consequence with respect both to time and to ratiocination; *ἐπὰν*

with respect to time only. ἐπὶ—ἀρρώστημά τι συμβῆ, Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 8. l. 39. ἐπὶ δὲ εὗρητε, ἀπαγγεῖλατέ μοι : *when ye shall have found him* : St. Matth. ii, 8. See St. Luke xi, 22.

II. That ἐπὶ is compounded of ἐπεὶ and ἄν, appears—1. from the frequent occurrence of both the particles entire in the compound, ἐπειὶ : see Iliad. ε, 413. ι, 304. and Eustath. p. 652. l. 7.—2. from the practice of the poets, who, as they use κε or κεν for ἄν, so use ἐπεὶ κε or κεν for ἐπεὶ ἄν or ἐπὶ ἄν : see Iliad. η, 5. φ, 575.—3. from the circumstance that Ionic writers and poets, using ἦν for εἶν, use ἐπὶ ἦν also for ἐπεὶ ἄν or ἐπειὶ ἄν (Ionic). See II. α, 168.

Ionic writers resolve ἐπὶ ἦν into ἐπειὶ ἄν : see Lucian. de Syr. Dea p. 454. l. 64.

III. Ἐπειδὴν is compounded of ἐπεὶ, δὴ, and ἄν, of which ἐπεὶ proposes a positive condition ; any delay of the dependent consequence of which, after that condition shall have been fulfilled, is condemned by δὴ, while ἄν removes certainty of time from that consequence : as, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι, *as soon as ; as soon as ever* ; Plat. Apol. p. 6. l. 7. See also p. 23. l. 16.

On account of ἄν it is construed with a subjunctive mood. Very rarely an indicative occurs, as, ἐπειδὴν ἡμεῖς οἰμώζομεν καὶ στένομεν,—ἐπιγελᾷ : Lucian. Dial. Mort. ii. [On the construction of ἐπειδὴν with an optative mood, see Abr. of Vig. p. 138. l. 48.]

ΕΜΠΗΣ.—I. Ἐμπης (Ionic ; the Attic form being ἔμπας and ἔμπα) [note *d* on p. 136. of the Abr. of Vig.] is compounded of ἐν and πᾶσι, some substantive, according to circumstances, being understood. It is very common in poetry, but not so in prose. It has a confirmative force, either absolutely, or relatively to something preceding, which may seem opposed to the verisimilitude of what is to be affirmed.

II. When it asserts or affirms *per se*, or without reference, τρόποις seems to be the substantive understood with ἐν πᾶσι, and it may be rendered *absolutely*, or, *at all* ; as ἔμπης μοι τοῖχοι—φαίνοντ'—ὥσπερ πυρὸς : Odyss. τ. 37. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 136. l. 13.] οὐκ ἐφάμην ῥιγώσμεν ἔμπης. [Odyss. ξ, 481.] εὐχέσθε—σιγῇ· ἡὲ καὶ ἀμφοδίνην, ἐπεὶ οὐ τινα δείδιμεν ἔμπης : Iliad. η, 196. where however it may be corrective of what Ajax had said before of praying *in silence and apart*.

III. When it affirms with relation to what precedes, it assumes an *adversative* nature ; for every adversative includes affirmation. But it is adversative not absolutely but respectively, and with reference to apparent opposition between what precedes and what follows ; and it retains its *assertory* force, inasmuch as assertion or affirmation is required to establish what follows in spite of the apparent opposition of what precedes. It is rendered therefore, *notwithstanding*, *nevertheless*, *however*, *yet*, *still* : as, Δαιμονίη, αἰεὶ μὲν ὅτεαι, οὐδέ σε λήθω· Πρῆξαι δ' ἔμπης οὐτι δυνήσεται : Iliad. α, 563. Sometimes δὲ is added ; ἔμπης δὲ, *attamen, but notwithstanding* : see II. ε, 191. sometimes ἀλλὰ, as in Theogn. 293.

IV. In Sophocles ἔμψης and καίπερ are used correspondently : *ἔποικτεῖρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ἔμψης, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῇ, I pity him nevertheless, although he is inimical to me* : Aj. 122.

That this particle, even in its *adversative* sense, stands for ἐν πᾶσι elliptically, appears from the occurrence in some passages of the entire expression : as, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις οὐ μετενόησεν Ἀλαός, *in all these things, i. e. notwithstanding that they had seen all these things* : Son of Sirach lxviii, 15. [We say, *for all that.*] In the same sense σὺν πᾶσι τούτοις is used by St. Luke xxiv, 21.

When περ precedes ἔμψης, there is an ellipsis after the latter, to be supplied from something preceding : as, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ σε—κελοίμην Ἀργείοισιν ἀμυνόμεναι, χατέουσί περ ἔμψης : Iliad. ι, 514. underst. χατέουσι περ, ἔμψης οὐκ ἂν κελοίμην. *although they were in need, yet, notwithstanding, I would not bid you.* ὄφρα μὲν οὖν δὴ κείνη ἔην ἀχέουσά περ ἔμψης, Odyss. ο, 360. *for ἀχέουσά περ, ἔμψης δὲ ἔην.*

ETEON.—I. Ἐτεόν is by nature an adjective; and in that character it appears to be used in Iliad. β, 300.

But it is far more frequently used as an adverb, to enforce affirmation, and signifies, *in reality, in truth, seriously, in earnest*. It occurs in poetry only, as in Iliad. η, 359. and joined with a word of the same meaning, ἐτεόν γε καὶ ἀτρεκέως : Iliad. ο, 53.

II. In interrogation it frequently denotes eagerness for information, and is rendered, *obsecro, tell me I conjure you; I pray*; as, τί δ' ἐστὶν ἐτεόν; Aristoph. Vesp. 832. [836. Br.] σὺ δ' εἰ τίς ἐτεόν; Id. Eq. 730. [733. ed. Br.] τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐτεόν, ὦ πάτερ; Id. Nub. 93. ἐτεόν, ὦ πάτερ, τί δυσκολαίνεις; *in reality* : Id. Nub. 35. This is said by Phidippides at last, when thoroughly awake, after having given several answers in sleep, or between sleeping and waking. Δὴ confirmatory is added by Apoll. Rhod. εἰ ἐτεόν δὴ ὑμετέρης γαίης Ἀχελώϊος ἐξανίησιν, iv, 292. And, after jesting, Bleepyrus asks, ἀτὰρ πόθεν ἤκεις ἐτεόν; *seriously; in earnest* : Aristoph. Eccles. 376. So, after jokes, ἐτεόν ἡγεῖ γὰρ θεός; Id. Eq. 32.

EYGE.—I. In this combination γε has its restrictive force, waving or discarding what is less urged. There is a two-fold ellipsis; both of εἰ μὲν ἄλλο ποτε before εὔγε, and of εἴρηκας, πεποίηκας, or the like, after it : so that the full expression would be, εἰ μὲν ἄλλο ποτε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔ εἴρηκας.

II. When construed with other words, it is expressive of commendation or approbation; as, εὔγ' ἐποίησας, ἀναμνήσας με, *you did well in reminding me*, Plato Phæd. p. 60. l. 29. εὔγε ἀνένευσας, Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 193. l. 5.

III. When unconnected, it takes the nature of an interjection; thus Strepsiades, having been told by Socrates that a cock was to be called ἀλέκτωρ, and a hen ἀλεκτρυάϊνα, exclaims in delight, εὔγε, νῆ τὸν Ἀέρα! *excellent!* Aristoph. Nub. 667. [657. in the edition printed for Mr. Priestley, 1826.] εὔγε, ἔφη, ὦ Κλεόδημε : Lucian. Lapith. p. 443. l. 99.

IV. Theophrastus subjoins ὅτι : εἶγε, ὅτι με ὑπέμνησας, *good! it is lucky you put me in mind*: περὶ Λαλιᾶς. [p. 40. l. 1. ed. Simps.]

V. It is used ironically, as in Plato's Gorgias, where, when Callicles had praised a life overflowing with every kind of pleasure, Socrates exclaims, εἶγε, ὃ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, *bravo! well spoken!* p. 494. l. 24. (t. iv. p. 103. ed. Bip.)

ΕΥΤΕ.—I. Εὔτε signifies first *as, just as*, in comparisons. In this sense ἥτε is more frequent in poetry, as in Iliad. α, 360. but εὔτε is found in Homer : εὔτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι νότος κατέχευεν ὀμίχλην—ὥς ἄρα τῶν, &c. II. γ, 10.

II. Secondly it signifies *time; when, after*; [note *h* on p. 140. of Abr. of Vig.] and this is its most usual sense : εὔτε πύλας ἵκανε, Iliad. ε, 396. εὔτ' ἡ φᾶρος ἔδειξε, Odys. ω, 146. See Theogn. 356.

III. Sometimes ἂν is subjoined to εὔτε, and, from the force of ἂν, εὔτ' ἂν has always a future signification, and is therefore never construed with the indicative of a past tense : οὔτι δυνήσεται—χραιομεῖν, εὔτ' ἂν πολλοί—θνήσκοντες πίπτωσι : Iliad. α, 243. See Iliad. β, 34. Odys. α, 192.

ΕΩΣ.—I. Ἔως properly denotes uninterrupted action : it differs from ἄχρι and μέχρι scarcely in any thing besides being more frequently joined with verbs : μὴ παύσαιο μήποτ' ἐσθίων τέως, ἔως σάντον λάθης διαβάγεις, *until you burst before you are aware of it* : Aristoph. Pac. 32.

II. The action or state is sometimes without termination, and then ἔως may signify *for ever, always*. This use of ἔως scarcely occurs except in the sacred scriptures ; e. g. ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας ἔως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος : St. Matth. xxviii, 20. Yet in Homer too, ἔως, unconnected syntactically with other words, denotes *perpetuity*, and is rendered *without intermission* ; εἰως μὲν ὀμιλαδὸν αἰὲν ἔποντο,—αὐτὰρ, ἐπεὶ ἴδον, &c. Iliad. ο, 272.

III. But more frequently what is signified has a bound or termination ; and ἔως is then construed with a genitive—1. of *place or space*, as ἔως τῆς θαλάσσης, ἔως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, *as far as, quite to*.—2. of *time* ; as, ἔως τῆς τελευτῆς Ἡρώδου, *until*, St. Matth. ii, 15.—3. of *quantity, measure, number, &c.* as, δώσω σοι ἔως ἡμίσεος τῆς βασιλείας μου, *to, unto*, St. Mark vi, 23. It is construed with a verb also ; and then it is often followed by οὖ or ὅτον, signifying continued progress to a term or limit : with the 1 aor. indic. Ζύμη, ἣν λαβοῦσα γυνὴ ἐνέκρυψεν εἰς ἀλεύρου σάτα τρία, ἔως οὖ ἐζυμώθη ὅλον, *until, &c.* St. Matth. xiii, 33. with the 2 aor. indic. προῆγεν,—ἔως ἐλθὼν ἔστη ἐπάνω οὖ ἦν τὸ παιδίον : St. Matth. ii, 9. [I suppose this last passage is not meant to be an example of the conjunction of ἔως and οὖ, for in it they are wholly unconnected, the antecedent of οὖ being governed by ἐπάνω.] With the 1 aor. subjunct. ἐκέλευσα τηρεῖσθαι αὐτὸν, ἔως οὖ πέμψω αὐτὸν πρὸς Καίσαρα : Acts xxv, 21. With the 1 aor. of the optative, ἂν being understood, it signifies time future with regard to something past, but past with respect to the time of using the ex-

pression: as Phædo says that he walked before the prison, waiting, *ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον*, *until it should be opened*: Plato Phæd. p. 59. (c. 3. ed. Fisch.) So with the 2 aor. Men would have followed Homer and Hesiod about, says Plato, *ὅπη ἤσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν*, de Rep. x. p. 600. (t. vii. p. 294. ed. Bip.)

IV. [When some indeterminate part, rather than the whole, of limited duration is signified,] it is rendered *while, whilst*: *τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστὶ*: Plat. Phæd. p. 89. l. 26. (c. 38. ed. Fisch.) [i. e. not, *as long as it is light*, but, *at some time before it be dark*.] *εἰ καὶ σὺ συγκαλέσας, ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι παρακελεῦσαι*; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 49. and with *ὅτου*: *ἴσθι εὐνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου ταχὺ, ἕως ὅτου εἴ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ μετ' αὐτοῦ*: St. Matth. v, 25.

With the indicative of the imperfect, Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 58. Hom. Il. α, 193. [The word is not in the verse cited.]

V. It is often joined with adverbs, as, *ἕως ἄρτι, ἕως σήμερον, ἕως ὧδε, ἕως ἔτι, ἕως ὅτι*, &c. and with *πότε*; *ἕως πότε—οὐ κρίνεις καὶ ἐκδικεῖς τὸ αἷμα ἡμῶν*; *how long?* Revel. vi, 10. The expression usually denotes eager desire, or impatience.

ΕΩΣ ΑΝ, ΕΩΣ, ΠΕΡ ΑΝ.—I. In *ἕως ἂν*, the latter particle affects the following verb rather than *ἕως*, taking off actuality in its sense: thus in a simile, *ἕως ἂν σώζεται τὸ σκάφος*,—*τότε χρή—πρόθυμον εἶναι*—*καὶ ὑμεῖς τοίνυν*,—*ἕως ἐσμέν σωοί*, &c. Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 52. [p. 128. l. 21. ed. Reisk.] Here, in the protasis *ἂν* is used, because something supposed and not actual is spoken of, *ἕως ἂν σώζεται*: whereas in the apodosis, an actual state is expressed by *ἕως ἐσμέν* without *ἂν*.

II. As *ἕως ἂν* usually involves a signification of future time, it is construed with the subjunctive mood, or the optative; with the former very frequently, with the latter seldom: as, *καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο*: Plat. Phæd. p. 101. (c. 49. ed. Fisch.)

III. With the subjunctive and *ἂν*, or with the indicative alone, it signifies either the term or limit itself, or what is bounded: when the term or limit, it is rendered *until*. Xenophon joins it with the subjunctive of the present, the future being signified: *οὐκ ἀναμένομεν, ἕως ἂν ἡ ἡμετέρα χώρα κακῶται*: Cyrop. iii, 3, 18. Still some signification of the present is preserved; *until the time when the devastation of our country shall be going on*. But the 1 aor. puts as a case, or supposes, *completion* or *consummation*: the cicada, says Plato, sings without food or drink, *ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ, until it be dead*: Phædr. p. 259. (p. 348. ed. Bip.) not *ἕως ἂν τελευτᾷ*, lest any one should understand that it takes nourishment in the article of death. So the 2 aor. *ἐθίζονσι ταῦτα δρᾶν, ἕως ἂν ἐγγένηται αὐτοῖς*, Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 53. *until it shall have been thoroughly learnt or infixed*: not *ἐγγίγνηται*. So St. Matth. ii, 13. v, 26.

IV. When what is bounded is signified rather than the term or limit itself, it is rendered like *ἕως*, *so long as*; but *ἕως ἂν* differs from *ἕως* in this, that the latter *indicates* continuance or duration of something, whereas the former only *supposes it*, or *puts it as a case*: thus,

ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν,—οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, Plato Phæd. p. 66. (c. 11. ed. Fisch.) μέχρι μὲν τίνος ἡδεῖα δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ διατριβή, ἕως ἂν γαργαλίζῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον: Ceb. Tab. p. 182.

V. Whenever ἕως is construed with the subjunctive or the optative mood, ἂν is left to be understood. Examples of the optative have been given under ἕως § iii. The following are of the subjunctive of aorists: ἕως οὗ ἀπολύσῃ τοὺς ὄχλους, St. Matth. xiv, 22. ἕως οὗ λάβῃ, καταφιλήσῃ τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ, S. of Sirach. xxiv, 5.

VI. Sometimes περ is inserted between ἕως and ἂν for indication of uncertainty or indefiniteness in the duration spoken of; as, ἕως περ ἂν ἐμπνέω,—οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 29. (c. 17. ed. Fisch.) *so long as I breathe; q. d. for the whole time of my life, be it long or short.*

I.—OF THE FORCE OF H IN DISJUNCTION, DOUBT OR DELIBERATION, AND INTERROGATION.

I. The primary use of ἢ is disjunctive, and its sense is *or*. Sometimes of two opposite things, or at least of two or more different things, disjoined by ἢ, one is preferred, as true, wise, probable, &c. as, τί οὖν; τούτῳ μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ, πᾶν τουναντίον, μισεῖν; [*or rather:*] Plato de Rep. vi. p. 490. (t. vii. p. 82. ed. Bip.)

It is frequently repeated, as, νῦν δ' ἢδ' ἢ ἐ διαβράσει στρατὸν, ἢ ἐ σώσει: Iliad. ι, 78. *either—or.* ἢ περὶ φόνους, ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς, ἢ τι ἄλλο: Plato Euthyphr. p. 5. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.)

II. When one case of an alternative is approved, as right or preferable, ἢ serves for probation, and is equivalent to εἰ δὲ μὴ, still however retaining its disjunctive nature; as, ἦν (ἀλήθειαν) δίδωκεν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει, ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς: Plato de Rep. vi. p. 490. (t. vii. p. 81. ed. Bip.) *or, as a consequence.* So, οὐχ ἦγον μανθάνοντι ποιητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ, ἢ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἤξει, *ibid.* p. 504. (p. 111. ed. Bip.)

III. Next to its disjunctive use, is (as arising from things disjoined) its use in doubt or deliberation; as, διάνδιχα μερμήριζεν, ἢ ὅγε—'Ατρεΐδην ἐναρίξοι, ἢ ἐ χόλον παύσειεν: Iliad. α, 190. So II. ε, 301.

Instead of ἢ in the first clause, πότερον, εἰ, or the like, is often found: [see Abr. of Vig. p. 140. l. 19.] ἐσώπα, ἀπορῶν πότερα συμβουλεύοι τῷ Κίρῳ κατακαίνειν ἑαυτὸν, ἢ τἀναντία διδάσκειν ὧν, &c. Xenoph. Cyrop. iii, 1, 13. ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ τις δούλου,—ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν οὐδεμία, &c. Aristot. de Rep. ii, 13. *whether—or.* εἰ ἐτερόν,—ἢ ἐ καὶ οὐκ: Iliad. β, 301.

Sometimes εἰ, or πότερον, is understood; as, οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὥς ἐγὼμαι. Τὸ ποῖον; Εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθὴς: for πότερον εὐμαθὴς: Plato de Rep. vi. p. 486. (t. vii. p. 73. ed. Bip.)

Homer adds ἄρα or ῥα conjectural: ὄφρα ἴδωμαι ἢ ἄρ'—ἐλεύσεται, ἢ μιν ἐρύξει γῆ: II. φ, 62.

IV. When the latter of the disjunctive clauses contains what is contrary to the former, it is not necessary to repeat the former, but

ἢ οὐ, with an ellipsis of a verb in the former, is sufficient: thus, *συμφέρει τῇ πόλει, δῆλον ἦδη γενέσθαι, πότερα ἀντιποιήσεται τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ῥοδίων, ἢ οὐ*, (*ἀντιποιήσεται viz.*) Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. p. 79. And sometimes καὶ is inserted between ἢ and οὐ, as in the passage above, from II. β, 301.

For ἢ οὐ, ἢ μὴ sometimes occurs: *τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι, — τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω, ἢ μὴ*: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 18. (c. 1. ed. Fisch.)

V. Bordering on doubt is *oblique interrogation*; and in such interrogation, employing two clauses or members, ἢ stands in the latter member:—1. with εἰ, *πότερον*, or the like, preceding; *εἰπέ, πότερον — τιμᾶς, ἢ — κολάζεις*; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 11. *ἐρωτᾶν, εἴγε ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα ἀντὶ, ἢ καὶ μὴ*: Plat. Ep. vii. p. 347. The disjunctive power also of ἢ is apparent in these passages.—2. Without *πότερον*, ἢ takes the lead in oblique interrogation: *εἰπέ μοι, — ἢ συμβουλευσῶ περὶ αὐτοῦ*; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 11. l. 39. If we understand ἢ οὐ after *συμβουλευσῶ*, there will be two members, and a repetition of ἢ. And in this sense ἢ is repeated by Homer: *τόδε εἰπέ, — ἢ μεμᾶσιν αὔθι μένειν, — ἢ ἐ πόλινδε ἄψ ἀναχωρήσουσιν*; II. κ, 509.

VI. H is found in direct interrogations, which it affects without in the least losing its disjunctive power. First, with *πότερον* or *πότερα* preceding, when an election is to be made from two contrary, or two or more different things, it is altogether disjunctive: as, *πότερα δ' ἡ γῆ, ὧ Κῦρε, ἀμεινον εἶναι, σὺν τῷ σῷ ἀγαθῷ τὰς τιμωρίας ποιῆσθαι, ἢ σὺν τῇ σῇ ζημίᾳ*; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 15. *πότερα κατ' οἴκους, ἢ προσεδρεύων πυρρῇ*; Eurip. Orest. 403. [397. ed. Pors.]

VII. What was said in § iv. applies in the case of interrogation also: thus, *πότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως, ἢ οὐ*; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 473. (p. 51. ed. Bip.) [for ἢ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;] *τὸν Ἐρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μὴ*; [ἀμφισβητησίμων viz.] Plat. Phædr. p. 263. l. 26.

VIII. Although ἢ is not interrogative itself, [see p. 140. l. 43. of Abr. of Vig. and note I on p. 141.] yet it elegantly affects interrogations in which it is used. First, before *τίς*, *πόθεν*, *πῶς*, or the like interrogative words, it indicates vehemence or ardour: thus in Lucian, Philip, having shown Alexander the inconsistency of pretending to be a god, and yet exposing himself to be carried off wounded, and groaning, and streaming with blood, and thus refuting visibly the responses of Ammon and his priests, adds, *ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐγέλασεν ὁρίων τὸν τοῦ Διὸς υἱὸν λειποψυχοῦντα, δέομενον τῶν ἱατρῶν βοηθεῖν*; Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 398. [p. 258. E. ed. Salmur.] Here ἢ disjoins the aggravating particulars in the interrogation, from what has preceded.

Secondly, it is not interrogative, but disjunctive, when contrary things are propounded interrogatively: as, *ἐγὼς πλουτεῖν, ἢ πένητα ποιεῖς*; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 12. or when different things are asked; as, *ποῦ δαὶ νηὺς ἔστηκε θοῇ, ἢ σ' ἡγάγε δεῦρο*—; *ἢ ἔμπορος εἰλήλουθας νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης*; Odys. ω, 299. where ἄρα is to be understood.

Thirdly, in figurative interrogation, by which affirmation or negation is rendered more energetic or vehement, ἢ is expressive of indignation, but still preserves its disjunctive force, as another ques-

tion precedes : thus, τί δὲ λαὸν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνθάδ' ἀγείρας Ἀτρεΐδης ; ἢ οὐχ' Ἑλένης ἕνεκ' ἠυκόμοιο ; ἢ μούνοι φιλέουσ' ἀλόχους—Ἀτρεΐδαι ; Iliad. ι, 340. In the former member ἦ appears, and but appears, to be interrogative.

Fourthly, it is similarly used in reprehension or reproof in which a much slighter degree of indignation is expressed ; as in the words of Jupiter to the immortal horses, ἃ δειλῶ, τί σφῶι δόμεν—θνητῶ ;—ἦ ἵνα δυστήνοισι μετ' ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε' ἔχητον ; Iliad. ρ, 445. Here may be an ellipsis : *why did we give you ? tell the reason, or did we give you, that, &c.* So St. Paul, ἦ μόνος ἐγὼ καὶ Βαρνάβας οὐκ ἔχομεν ἔξουσίαν τοῦ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι ; 1 Cor. ix, 6. Ἡ indicates the difference between this question and those which precede it.

Fifthly, without any preceding interrogation it denotes indignation ; as when Jupiter declares that Hector shall not mount the chariot drawn by immortal horses, and adds, ἦ οὐχ' ἄλλis, ὥς καὶ τεύχε' ἔχει, καὶ ἐπεύχεται αὐτῶς ; Iliad. ρ, 450.

Sixthly, in objurgation it is emphatically repeated : ἦ ἀφ' ὑμῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐξῆλθεν ; ἢ εἰς ὑμᾶς μόνους κατήνησεν ; 1 Cor. xiv, 36.

Seventhly, when no antecedent interrogation is expressed, one understood will show the disjunctive force of ἦ, as, τὸ μὲν οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν—ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ οἶει ; Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 491. l. 12. (p. 83. ed. Bip.) underst. ὁμολογεῖς ταῦτα before ἢ οὐκ οἶει ; The ellipsis is extremely evident, when after ἦ what is opposed or contrary is not understood, but plainly expressed ; as, τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφρεστάτας, κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχεύσας, διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι ἢ οἶει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φάουλῃς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως, τροφῇ διολλυνμένης, γίγνεσθαι ; or, *do you think ?* &c. ibid. l. 42. (p. 85. ed. Bip.)

Eighthly, through an ellipsis also it expresses vehemence in interrogation ; as, τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐλπis, ἢ χαρὰ, ἢ στέφανος καυχήσεως ; ἢ οὐχὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς ; 1 Thessal. xi, 19. q. d. τίς ἄλλος ἢ ὑμεῖς ; ἢ οὐχὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς ;

Ninthly, and lastly, it has a slight signification of reprehension in questions put to excite the recollection of what one ought to know, [or to tax one with acting or speaking in a manner inconsistent with some knowledge which one ought to have :] thus Plato, to make something clearer which had been said, asks, ἦ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε, καὶ χρήμασι, καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι ; de Rep. vi. p. 492. (p. 87. ed. Bip.) and Minerva inciting Telemachus to destroy the sailors, says, ἦ οὐκ αἶεις, οἷον κλέος ἔλλαβε διὸς Ὀρέτης ; &c. Odys. α, 298.

From this multitude of examples it appears that ἦ is not interrogative itself, but affects interrogation in various manners.

II.—OF THE USE OF THE PARTICLE Ἡ IN COMPARISON.

I. When ἦ is used in comparison, its primary disjunctive force is

still evidently retained ; for in reality it disjoins the things compared : thus, ὁ λόγος πρόκειται, πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, *or* : Plat. Phædr. p. 237. (p. 301. ed. Bip.) ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοὶ, *before you proceed against me* : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 5.

II. With respect to construction, ἢ is often followed by κατὰ or ὡς, as, τὰδε ἔργα μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον, *too great for the power of man* ; μείζω ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι, *beyond the power of any one to set forth in words*. See Demosth. Phil. ii. p. 26.

III. When a thing is compared, not with others, but with itself, as to different predicates, ἢ is elegantly put between two adjectives in the comparative degree, as in Odyss. α, 165. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 27. l. 35.]

IV. *H is disjunctive too, or comparative, when it follows ἄλλος and ἄλλοιός : [Abr. of Vig. p. 140. l. 27.] although in this use, when removed to a great distance from those words, it occasions some obscurity ; as in Odyss. τ, 267. where ἀλλοῖον—ἢ Ὀδυσῆα, *different from Ulysses, not to be compared with Ulysses*, are separated by a verse and a half intervening.

HMEN, HÆ.—I. By the conjunction of μὲν and δὲ with ἢ, the poetical correlative particles ἡμὲν and ἡδὲ (for which ἰδὲ is sometimes substituted) are formed. When ἡμὲν is in the first clause or member, ἡδὲ always corresponds to it in the following ; but ἡδὲ is sometimes in the latter, when ἡμὲν is not in the former.

II. They disjoin *contraries*, as, ἡμὲν ἀνακλῖναι πυκινὸν νέφος, ἡδ' ἐπιθεῖναι, *either—or* : Iliad. ε. or *different things*, as, οὐ γάρ τις νόον ἄλλος ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοήσει, οἷον ἐγὼ νοέω ἡμὲν πάλαι, ἡδ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν : *whether—or* : i. e. *both—and* : Iliad. ι, 105. ἴσασ' Ἀργείων ἡμὲν νέοι, ἡδὲ γέροντες, *ibid.* 36. So v. 227.

III. Sometimes the use of ἢ in doubt or deliberation appears in these particles : ὅφρ' εὖ γίνωσκῃς ἡμὲν θεόν, ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα : Iliad. ε, 128. [Hermann has observed that Hoogveen is in error here. See Abr. of Vig. p. 141. l. 3.]

IV. In the foregoing examples the force of ἢ appears to predominate ; but there are others, in which, on the other hand, the copulative power of μὲν and δὲ is employed, without any regard to the disjunctive power of ἢ. In such cases however it is to be observed that ἡμὲν is rarely or never put in the first clause, but either μὲν uncompounded, or some other connective. Thus, ὡς ἔφατ' οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον, ἡδ' ἐπίθοντο : Iliad. η, 379. Here it is not *one or the other* of κλύον and ἐπίθοντο, that is meant, but *both* : *they heard and obeyed*. So, περὶ μὲν φάσθαι ἔπος, ἡδ' ἐπακούσαι, *ib.* 100. Cf. v. 79.

V. This copulative use appears more evidently when τε occurs in the first clause instead of μὲν : as, καὶ τοι Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιξε σκῆπτρόν τ' ἡδὲ θέμιστας, *ib.* 99. Ἐκτορ τ' ἡδ' ἄλλοι Τρώων ἄγοι, Iliad. μ, 61.

VI. Sometimes ἡδὲ is copulative, with καὶ preceding : Τρῶες, καὶ Δάρδανοι, ἡδ' ἐπίκουροι, *and* : Iliad. μ, 368. and on the other hand καὶ follows ἰδὲ (ἡμὲν however being understood) in a sentence of

three clauses ; ποῦ τοι τόξον, ἰδὲ πτερόεντες οἵστοι, καὶ κλέος ; Iliad. ε, 171.

VII. That ἡδὲ has a copulative use appears also from its being placed between καὶ and τε, as, χρυσὸν, καὶ χαλκὸν, ἡδὲ γυναῖκας,—πολιὸν τε σίδηρον ἄξομαι : Iliad. ι, 366. Moreover, τε, καὶ, ἡδὲ are used as equivalent : πελέαι τε, καὶ ἰτέαι, ἡδὲ μυρῖκαι : Iliad. φ, 351. and τε, ἡδὲ, καὶ : "Ἠρῇ τ' ἡδὲ Ποσειδάων, καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη : II. α, 401. and τε, ἡδὲ, ἡδὲ : καίετο δὲ λωτός τ', ἡδὲ θρύον, ἡδὲ κύπειρον : II. φ, 352.

ΗΚΕΝ, ΗΠΕΡ.—I. Ἦκεν. These are two distinct particles, and should be kept separate ; though H. Stephens, to show both that they may be conjoined, and that κεν is merely expletive, cites, ἀνδρῶν δ' ἡκέν τις μοι ἐρίσσειται, ἡὲ καὶ οὐκί : Odys. δ, 80. and, θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται, ἡκεν νοστήσας ἀποτίσσειται, ἡὲ καὶ οὐκί : Odys. α, 267. but κεν reduces the sense of the future from certainty or necessity to bare possibility. See p. 12. vi. *It may possibly be that, &c. and, whether it may happen, that, &c.*

II. Ἦ in its comparative use is qualified by the junction of περ in its adversative sense, *although* ; as, ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἀρείοσιν ἡέπερ ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ὠμίλησα : Iliad. α, 261. i. e. ἡ ὑμῖν, καίπερ κρατίστοις οὔσι : *with braver men than you, although very brave, however brave you may be.* Thus in St. John ἡπερ is more emphatical than ἡ alone would have been : ἡγάπησαν τὴν δόξαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἡπερ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, xii, 43. i. e. *more than the praise of God, although that praise is the most worthy of love.*

ΗΠΟΥ.—To ἦ expressing doubt or deliberation is added πού conjectural : they do not however coalesce in one compound particle, although joined by accentuation : νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἡπου Σαπφούς τῆς καλῆς, ἡ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἡ καὶ συγγραφῶν τινῶν : *either it may be (or possibly) of Sappho, &c. Plat. Phædr. p. 235. (p. 296. ed. Bip.)*^a

ΗΤΟΙ.—I. In this combination ἦ is disjunctive, and τοι confirmative. Its true and principal use is to evince or confirm by particulars what has been before advanced more generally : thus Theophrastus, having observed that a prater is tiresome to his hearers, proceeds to support the position by mention of various effects ; ὥστε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἡτοι ἐπιλαθέσθαι, ἡ νυστάζει, ἡ μεταξὺ καταλιπόντας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι : Eth. Char. c. 7. [p. 42. ed. Simps.]

Ἦτοι is placed first, and the simple disjunctive ἦ follows, because it was sufficient to add the confirmatory particle once in the beginning, and to leave it to be understood in the other clauses. See also Eurip. Orest. 1197. [1508. ed. Pors.] and Rom. vi, 16. in which last passage the confirmatory force of τοι will be more evident if the

^a In translating ἡ καὶ συγγραφῶν τινῶν, of συγγραφῶν, which signifies *prose writers*, in contradistinction to Sappho and seems not to have been aware of the sense Anacreon. J. S.

mark of interrogation be placed after *ὑπακούετε*, so as to make the former part of the verse interrogative, and the latter affirmative. The sense of the latter part will then appear to be, *one thing or the other unquestionably is certain, you are either the servants of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness.*

II. The next use, which borders on the confirmatory one, is in interrogation, when signified to be serious; as, *τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας*; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 27. *do not we in reality suppose them to be either, &c.*

III. The confirmatory force is sometimes so faint, that the particle appears to be employed rather for declaration or distinction, and may be rendered *nempe, that is to say*; as, *οἶμαι, τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου γεγονότων λόγων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σε πεποικέναι γεγενῆσθαι, ἦτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ἢ ἄλλους ἐνὶ γε τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα*: Plat. Phædr. p. 242. (p. 311. ed. Bip.) *ὥς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο εὐδαίμων οὔτε πόλις, οὔτ' ἀνὴρ οὐδεὶς, ὃς ἂν μετὰ φρονήσεως ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνῃ διαγάγῃ τὸν βίον, ἦτοι ἐν αὐτῷ κεκτημένος, ἢ ὁσίων ἀνδρῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν ἔθεσι τραπεῖς τε καὶ παιδευθεὶς ἐνδίκως*: Id. Ep. vii. p. 335.

IV. When *ἦτοι* is alone, [not followed by *ἢ*,] the disjunctive power of *ἦ* almost wholly disappears; but still it retains its office of particularizing what has before been mentioned only in general, or as a whole: thus, after speaking of Juno's chariot, as a whole, Homer proceeds to description of its parts, *τῶν ἦτοι χρυσέῃ ἵπῳ, αὐτὰρ ὑπερθεὶν χάλκε' ἐπίσσωτρα, — πλῆμναι δ' ἀργύρου, &c.* Iliad. ε, 720. So, *τῆσδε δύο γενόμεσθα, σὺ δ' ἄμφω δειροτομήσεις*. This verse contains a general assertion, which, in those following it, is explained by particularizing: *ἦτοι τὸν πρότωσι μετὰ πυλῆεσσι δάμασσας ἀντίθεον Πολύδωρον, — νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐνθάδε μοι κακὸν ἔσσεται*: Iliad. φ, 90. *nempe, savoir, to wit.*

H.—I. The primary and true sense of *ἦ* is that of *affirmation*: it is explained therefore by *ὄντως, ἀληθῶς, in reality, in truth*; as in Iliad. α, 519. Its affirmation affects whole sentences or propositions, as, *ἦ μάλα σ' οὐ βέλος ὦκὺ δαμάσσατο*, Iliad. ε, 274. *ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρῶμαι*, II. φ, 54. and it is not, like *ὄντως*, syntactically connected with other words; so that *ὁ ἦ καλός*, for *ὁ ὄντως καλός*, would be a solecism.

II. To direct interrogation (for in indirect it is not used) it imparts emphasis and energy; still retaining its affirmative force; as, *ἦ ματρὶ μὲν πάρεσι σύμμαχοι θεοὶ, τῷ δ' οὐ πάρεσι μᾶλλον ἡδίκημένῳ*; Eurip. Orest. 582. q. d. *ἄρα τῷ ὄντι, &c.* *ἦ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται — διαγινώσκειν*; *will he then in truth, &c.* Plat. Phædr. p. 262. (354. ed. Bip.) *ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πονεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι*; Id. Theætet. p. 188. (t. ii. p. 148. ed. Bip.)

H ΓΑΡ, Η ΓΑΡ ΑΝ.—I. In *ἦ γὰρ* it is remarkable that the former particle affects the latter: this happens because *γὰρ* is always a subjunctive particle. *Ἦ* is confirmatory of the causal signification of *γὰρ*, as in Priam's words, who, after giving orders to keep the city gates open for the reception of his routed forces, adds the reason, *ἦ*

γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγγὺς ὅδε κλονέων, *for in truth; or, for too surely,* &c. Iliad. φ, 532. So Calchas gives a reason for bespeaking the protection of Achilles; ἡ γὰρ ὀτομαι ἄνδρα χολώσέμεν, ὃς μέγα πάντων Ἀργείων κρατεῖ: Iliad. α, 78.

II. In interrogation also γὰρ is subjoined to ἡ, when used in the sense of ἄρα τῷ ὄντι: thus Socrates asks Phædrus whether he does not mean the trite and common rules of rhetoric; as that the proœmium should come first, &c. ταῦτα λέγεις; ἡ γὰρ τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης; Plato Phædr. p. 266. (p. 363. ed. Bip.) [See Abr. of Vig. p. 142. l. 14.] *is it not so?* Phædrus answers ναί. In this use the particles are most frequently by themselves, at the end of sentences; as, τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἀμαρτάνει,—λεκτέον. ἡ γάρ; Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (355. ed. Bip.) Socr. *μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφῆσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα*· ἡ γάρ; Ph. ναί. ib. p. 265. (360. ed. Bip.)

III. ῚΗ γὰρ is sometimes used in questions neither anticipating, nor followed by, assent; as, τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μαθεῖν ἰόντα, καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον· ἡ γάρ; The answer is, πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄποποι ἔσονται σοι τοιοῦτοι, &c. Plat. de Rep. v. p. 475. (t. vii. p. 56. ed. Bip.)

IV. The force of γὰρ is more obscure, when ἡ γὰρ interrogatively are the first words that a person uses: in that case however it argues or concludes from something preceding. Thus Aglaitidas to Cyrus, who was pleased with something told him, ἡ γὰρ οἶει, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, τούτους ἀληθῆ λέγειν ταῦτα; concluding from Cyrus's words, that he believed what had been told him: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 11. and Pylades, concluding from something said by Orestes, that Menelaus had returned, ἡ γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τήνδ' ἀφιγμένους χθόνα; Eurip. Or. 736. [729. ed. Pors.] See also Eurip. Phœnis. 1666. In such cases γὰρ may perhaps retain in some degree its *causal* power, and assign a reason for the interrogation, drawn from what precedes.

V. ῚΗ γὰρ expresses also some degree of surprise with indignation; *itane vero? indeed? is it so?* Call. οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Σώκратες; Socr. ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε; ἡ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀναίδην οὕτω, &c. Plat. Gorg. p. 494. (t. iv. p. 104. ed. Bip.)

VI. In ἡ γὰρ ἂν, which is a formula, the sense of which depends on a supposition or condition not expressed, γὰρ concludes or reasons, ἡ confirms or supports the reasoning, and ἂν affects the following verb in one or other of the modes explained under that particle: οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις· ἡ γὰρ ἂν, Ἀτρεΐδῃ, νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο: Iliad. α, 232. εἰ μὴ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἥρασες is understood, says Eustath. *for* (did you not rule a worthless people) *you would assuredly have committed an outrage now for the last time.* εἴθε γράψειεν, ὡς χρὴ πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ— ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημωφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι: Plat. Phædr. (p. 281. ed. Bip.) underst. *εἰ οὕτως ἔγραψεν.* In very many passages ἡ γὰρ ἂν may be rendered *otherwise*, as in the verse of Homer above cited: thus, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ φανερώς προσέθηκε τὰ ῥήματα, ἡ γὰρ ἂν ὑποπτεύσαντες αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐχθρὸν, ἔφυγον: Chrysost.

This interpretation, *alioquin* or *otherwise*, has arisen from putting out of consideration the condition or supposition not expressed; for when it is expressed, ἦ γὰρ ἂν cannot be so translated; e. g. ἦ γὰρ κεν δειλός τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καλεοίμην, εἰ δὴ σοι πᾶν ἔργον ὑπείξομαι, ὅτι κεν εἶποις: *Iliad.* α, 293.

Η ΔΗ, Η ΜΑΛΑ ΔΗ.—I. Other confirmatory particles are subjoined to ἦ. First δὴ. ἦ δὴ may doubtless be employed in expressing great surprise at something unexpected. Its expression of indignation, and its use in confirming the indignity of a thing by a present example (in which δὴ discovers its primary signification of time) may be seen in the following passage: ἦ δὴ λoίγια ἔργα τάδ' ἔσσεται, οὐδ' ἔτ' ἀνεκτὰ, εἰ δὴ σφῶ ἔνεκα θνητῶν ἐριδαίνετον ᾧδε: *Iliad.* α, 573. where the double affirmation gives a nervous character to the expression.

II. Μάλα also is added to augment the affirmation of ἦ: ἦ μάλα σ' οὐ βέλος ὠκὺ δαμάσσατο: *Iliad.* ε, 274.

III. The greatest force is given to affirmation, when δὴ is subjoined to ἦ μάλα: thus Achilles, astonished at the reappearance of Lycaon, says, ᾧ πόποι, ἦ μέγα θαῦμα τόδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι ἦ μάλα δὴ (of a certainty, beyond all doubt) Τρῶες μεγαλήτορες, οὐσπερ ἔπεφνον, αὐτῖς ἀναστήσονται: *Iliad.* φ, 55.

Η ΔΗΠΟΥ. Η ΜΕΝ. Η ΜΗΝ.—I. To ἦ is subjoined also δήπον, which indicates a consciousness of truth with a desire at the same time to elicit the assent of another. Sometimes, however, the conjectural force of πον in the compound is either much diminished, or quite lost; or the whole formula ἦ δήπον is used ironically; as, ἦ δήπον μάλ' ἔολπας ἐνὶ φρεσὶ, φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ, ἡματι τῷδε πόλιν πέρσειν Τρώων ἀγερῶχων: *Iliad.* φ, 583. *you hoped forsooth, &c.*

II. Μὲν too is subjoined; which, like γε, by its nature limits, and by limiting presses, and by pressing asseverates: σὺ δὲ σύνθεο, καὶ μοι ὁμοσσον, ἦ μὲν μοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν καὶ χερσὶν ἀρήξιν: *Iliad.* α, 77.

III. The affirmation or asseveration of ἦ is strengthened by the addition of μὴν. These particles serve—1. for grave or serious affirmation; as, ἦ μὴν καὶ νέος ἔσσι, ἐμὸς δέ κε καὶ πᾶσι εἴης ὀπλότερος γενεῇφιν: *in truth; believe me;* *Iliad.* ι, 57.—2. for threats; as, ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ σε τήμερον βλέπειν σκύτῃ ποιήσω: *Aristoph. Vesp.* 641. ἦ μὴν σὺ δώσεις αὖριον τούτων δίκην, *ib.* 1323. *as sure as you are alive, &c.*—3. for adding solemn asseveration to promises or compacts; as, ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσαι τοῦ ὀφλήματος—ἦ μὴν ἐκτίσειν τὸ ἀργύριον: *who shall solemnly undertake to pay the money;* *Demosth. in Timocr.* p. 467. [p. 712. l. 24. ed. Reisk.] Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ ὑπέδεξάτο, ἦ μὴν, ἕως ἂν τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λείπηται,—μὴ ἀπορήσειν αὐτοῦ τροφῆς: *Tissaphernes undertook, on the solemn pledge of his faith, &c.* *Thucyd.* viii, 81.—4. for expression of admiration or wonder; a person enforcing, as it were, his own credence, by this double asseveration; as, ᾧ Ζεῦ,—ἦ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα: *Plat. Euthydem.* p. 276. *as I am alive.*—5. for confirmation by

oath ; as, θεοὺς ὀμνυμι, ἢ μὴν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν πλεον σε διαφέρειν φιλανθρωπία ἢ στρατηγία : Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 4, 7. νῆ τὸν κύνα, — ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον : Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 22. (c. 7. ed. Fisch.) ὀμνυμί σοι, — ἢ μὴν — μηδέποτε σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς μήτε ἐπιδείξειν, μήτ' ἐξαγγελεῖν : Id. Phædr. p. 236. (299. ed. Bip.) [See note o on p. 141. of the Abr. of Vig.]

These particles were so constantly used in swearing, that they assumed the nature of a regular formula, employed not only by a person himself taking an oath, but in indirect recital of the substance or purport of an oath taken, or in binding any one by the obligation of an oath, even when the very words of the oath are not dictated, but the substance only proposed ; as, πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὄρκοις, οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἢ μὴν ἔσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους, οὓς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατὸν : Thucyd. iv, 88. ὄρκοις Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἢ μὴν, οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους, ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους : Id. iv, 86. πρότερος δὲ λέγε, ἀλλ' ἐπομοσάμενος, ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἔρεῖν : Lucian. t. ii. in Tox. c. 11.

Theocritus joins all the three particles ἢ μὴν τοι together in asseveration : ἢ μάν τοι κῆγ' ὅτι σὺριγγ' ἔχω ἐννεάφωνον, Id. viii, 21.

Ἡ ΠΟΥ, with the annexed particles. — I. These two particles, of which ἢ is affirmative, and που conjectural, express a degree of probability amounting almost to certainty. They do not coalesce in one word ; if they did, ἢ would have an acute accent.

II. First, they are used in supposing something very probable, but not demonstrable ; as, ἢ που διὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπορίαν, πολλάκις μὲν ἐδεξιώσαντο ἀλλήλους, εἰκότως δὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὠλοφύραντο : Lysias Or. Funebr. p. 505. *in all probability ; doubtless*. So, presently afterwards, ἢ που διὰ τὸν παρόντα φόβον, πολλὰ μὲν ψήθησαν ἰδεῖν, ὧν οὐκ εἶδον, πολλὰ δ' ἀκοῦσαι, ὧν οὐκ ἤκουσαν. But in speaking of what was certain, or what he might safely assume as certain, he omits που : ἢ πολὺν πλεῖστον ἐκείνοι, (the Athenians who fought under Themistocles) κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων διήνεγκαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς βουλευμασι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου κινδύνοις. As the hearers of Lysias were Athenians, there was no likelihood that the truth of this proposition would be disputed.

III. Secondly, ἢ που is significative of circumspection and caution in speech ; as, Ἡράκλεις, ἢ που, ὃ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὅπη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει : *it is much but* — : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 4. (c. 4. ed. Fisch.) ἢ που ἂν, ὃ Ἀγλαΐταδα, εἰ γε κλαίειν ἐπειρώμεθά σε ποιεῖν, σφόδρα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐμέμφον : Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 13.

IV. Thirdly, as affirmation often induces assent, these particles are employed in eliciting or laying out for that assent : as, ἢ που σοφὸς ἦν, ὅστις ἔφασκε, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσης, οὐκ ἂν δικάσαις : *it appears, I think, that* — ; *to be sure* — : Aristoph. Vesp. 724.

V. Fourthly, they are employed in arguing from signs or circumstances not infallible ; as, ἢ που αὐτός γε πολλὰ ἔχει, ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμῶν ἐκάστω τσαυτὰ δέδωκεν : Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 4, 31.

VI. In arguments *a fortiori* : ὅπου γὰρ οἰκίσαι πόλεις οἰοί τε γεγό-

νασιν, ἥ που βουλευθέντες ἡμεῖς πολλοὺς ἂν τόπους τοιοῦτους δυνηθεῖμεν κατασχεῖν: Isocr. de Pace: *if they could, much more easily could we.*

VII. Ἡ που is used in interrogation also, ἥ denoting vehemence, and που being conjectural. The conjectural sense of που, *perhaps, it may be*, is very evident in many questions; as, τίς δ' ἄλλος; ἥ που τῶν ἀπ' Αἰγίσθου φίλων; Eurip. Or. 435. γυναῖκες, ἥ που τῶνδ' ἀφώρμηται δόμων τλήμων Ὀρέστης; ib. 842.

VIII. It befits questions asked through presage of calamity; as, ὦ φίλτατ', ἥ που ξυμφορὰν ἔχεις φέρων; Eurip. Phœniss. 1079.

IX. Also questions asked by persons hanging back through fear or apprehension: thus Socrates to one who encouraged him to proceed with an exposition about which he hesitated, ὦ ἄριστε, ἥ που βουλόμενός με παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 450. (t. vii. p. 5. ed. Bip.) *is it not (for I doubt it is) for the purpose of emboldening me, that you say so?*

X. Also questions put to elicit assent; as, ἥ που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως, ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν; Plat. Gorg. p. 469. (t. iv. p. 49. ed. Bip.) *doubtless you will allow that, &c.* Socrates answers, ἦτρον ἥ ὁ ἀποκτινύς.

XI. The particle ἄρα added indicates a firm conclusion from premises: thus from the boast of Gorgias that no one had for many years asked him any thing new, Chærephon concludes, ἥ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρίνη, *then of course, I suppose, you easily answer*: Plat. Gorg. p. 448. (t. iv. p. 6. ed. Bip.) Που is added, either to elicit the assent of Gorgias, or to detract somewhat from the strength of the conclusion, since it was possible that some one might yet put a new question to him.

XII. Γε sometimes follows ἥ που after some intervening word, which word it affects; as, ἥ που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως, ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν; Plat. Gorg. p. 469. (49. ed. Bip.) Γε waves or discredits the consideration of a preceding point, whether he who, supposing himself to be acting justly, had put another to death, were to be pitied, in order to press more strongly the question which follows: *doubtless you will grant then I suppose, that he at least who is put to death unjustly, &c.*

XIII. In ἥ που γε δὴ, γε urges the latter part of an argument, with comparative disregard or concession of the former, and δὴ emphatically affirms and enforces what follows, being at the same time a corrective of the effect of που in diminishing the confirmatory force of ἥ: τοῦτο δὲ σάσεως αἴτιον γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἥ που γε δὴ παρά γε θυμοειδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν, *much more than certainly with high-spirited and warlike men*: Aristot. Polit. ii, 5.

XIV. The sense of ἥ που γε καὶ is nearly the same, καὶ being copulative or exaggeratory: ἀδύνατον δὲ καὶ Φαῖδρον οὐ μόνον κατὰ Σωκράτην εἶναι, ἥ που γε καὶ ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι, Athen. Deipnos. xi. p. 505. On account of the negation in ἀδύνατον, it may be rendered, *much less that he should have been also, &c.* Γε indicates that even if it should be conceded that Phædrus lived in the time of Socrates,

yet that at least, from his age, he could not have been what is last mentioned.

HΔH.—I. "Hδh differs from νῦν in signifying *maturity, full readiness or preparation*; [or *actual commencement*,] *already*. *Repel the hostile enterprises of Philip*, says Demosthenes, τοῖς μὲν ἀμυνομένοις ἤδη, χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧν ἂν δέωνται, διδόντες: Phil. iv. p. 55. οὐ μόνον ἤδη πάρεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρελήλυθε: ibid. p. 57. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀξίνη πρὸς τὴν ῥίζαν τῶν δένδρων κεῖται: St. Matth. iii, 10.

II. With a past tense it signifies something which has or had already taken place, but without ascertaining the precise time: ἡ ὥρα ἤδη παρήλθεν, St. Matth. xix, 15. τῷ δ' ἤδη δύο μὲν γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων ἐφθίατ': Iliad. α, 251.

III. Sometimes it denotes one thing immediately consequent upon another; as, κἀντεῦθεν ἤδη πάταγος ἦν τῶν ἀσπίδων, Aristoph. Ach. 538. So that it signifies the term of commencement, as in the following example also, πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτῆς, ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ: St. Matth. v, 28.

IV. And, on the other hand, it signifies also a time long past; as, ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἀρείοσιν ἤεπερ ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ὠμίλησα: Iliad. α, 261. *before now*.

V. With a future tense it signifies a time speedily following the present; as, αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπὶ νῆα θοὴν κατελεύσομαι ἤδη, *immediately*; *forthwith*: Odys. α, 303. So Iliad. α, 760. [λ, 820.]

VI. When ποτε is added, if a past tense be used, time long since past is signified, as in the passage already cited from Iliad. α, 261. and in ἤδη μὲν ποτ' ἐμεῦ πάρος ἔκλυσεν εὐξαμένοιο: ib. 454. If a future tense, then time to come, at a great distance; as, πάνποτε ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μοῦ δεόμενος, εἴπως ἤδη ποτε εὐοδωθήσομαι ἐν τῷ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς: *if at length at some time or other*, Rom. i, 10. On the other hand the addition of νῦν excludes all delay; *now at once*; *instantly*: ἤδη νῦν Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἄμνον, Iliad. α, 456.

I.—OF THE PARTICLE INA IN ITS SIGNIFICATION OF THE FINAL CAUSE.

I. "Iva, when it signifies the final cause, regards future time, and is always construed with the subjunctive mood, [see Abr. of Vig. p. 205. r. 1.] because it takes away the act [or actuality in the sense] of the verb: εἴ τις δορυξός, ἢ κάπηλος ἀσπίδων, ἵν' ἐμπολᾷ βέλτιον, ἐπιθυμεῖ μαχῶν: *that he may sell better*: Aristoph. Pac. 447. ταῦτα λέγω, ἵνα ὑμεῖς σωθῆτε: St. John v, 34.

II. That, of which ἵνα signifies the final cause, is sometimes suppressed; as, καὶ νῦν, ἵνα ἄγῃτε τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς σκηνοπηγίας: Maccab. i, 9. underst. ταῦτα γράφομεν. In v. 18. there is no ellipsis.

III. Since the final cause or end is something in contemplation or desire rather than in act, whenever it is expressed with negation, ἵνα

μη is constantly used, not ἵνα οὐ: [see Abr. of Vig. p. 165. l. 18.] ὁρᾷς, ὅσους ἄνωθεν ἐπεφόρησε τῶν λίθων, ἵνα μὴ λάβητε μηδέποτε αὐτήν: Aristoph. Pac. 225. It is to be observed that μηδέποτε, not οὐδέποτε, is used for the same reason.

IV. When the optative mood follows it, the potential particle ἄν appears to be understood: δῶκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ἵν' ἐκδηλος—γένοιτο: Iliad. ε. 2. for γένοιτ' ἄν.

V. The following is a very different use from those preceding, [in stating a case or supposition:] μέιζονα ταύτης ἀγάπης οὐδεὶς ἔχει, ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ: *that a man lay down his life, &c.* St. John xv, 13. It limits degree or quantity.

VI. [In the following examples of the construction of ἵνα with the indicative mood, Hoogveen does not allow that it signifies the final cause; but see Abr. of Vig. p. 205. r. i. l. 15. and foll.] πρὸς οἷα χωρία φεύγειν αἰροῦνται οἱ λαγῶ, ἐν τούτοις τὰ δίκτυα δυσόρατα ἐνεπετάνυνες, ἵνα ἐν τῷ σφύδρα φεύγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐμπίπτων ἐνέδῃ: Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 40. ὑπὸ τῇ ῥινὶ μάλιστα ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς στέφεσθαι,—ἵνα ὡς πλεῖστον ἀνέσπων τῆς ἰδονῆς: Lucian. Nigrin. t. i. p. 75. ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς τὴν προτέραν ζήτησιν—ζητεῖν, ἵνα τότε δόντος δίκην τοῦ θηρίου τούτου,—ἀπηλλάγμεθα τούτου τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ, δίκην ἀζίαν δόντος: Dinarch. c. Demosth. p. 93. ἔτι δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἄν ἐξελέγξει ζητῶν, ἐξήτησεν ἄν με τὸν παῖδα, τὸν γράφοντα τὰς μαρτυρίας, ἵν', εἰ μὴ παρεδίδουν, μηδὲν ἀδικαίον λέγειν ἐδόκουν: Demosth. adv. Aphob. iii. p. 562. In the example given of its construction with the indicative of the present, ἐξαῦδα,—ἵνα εἶδομεν ἄμφω, (Iliad. α, 363.) εἶδομεν is put for εἶδωμεν. [See Hermann. de metris, i. p. 85.] With the indicative of the future: πολλὸν δ' ὀρυμαγδὸν ὄρινε φιτρῶν καὶ λάων, ἵνα παύσομεν ἄγριον ἄνδρα: Iliad. φ, 314. μακάριοι οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ἔσται ἡ ἐξουσία αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς: Revel. xxii, 14.

VII. When the end or purpose of any thing is inquired, τί is subjoined to ἵνα, but without being dependent on it; there is an ellipsis always of some verb in the subjunctive mood: as, ἵνα τί με ἐγκατέλιπες; *wherefore or why hast thou forsaken me?* St. Matth. xxvii, 46. i. e. ἵνα τί ἐργάσῃ, or the like. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 206. l. 24.] q. d. *with what intention?* τί βουλόμενος; So, ἵνα τί ὑμεῖς ἐνθυμεῖσθε πονηρὰ ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν; St. Matth. ix, 4. underst. ὠφεληθῆτε. See 1 Corinth. x, 29. More frequently ἵνατί is written, in one word; as, ἵνατί ταῦτα λέγεις; Plat. Apol. p. 26. (c. 14. ed. Fisch.) ἵνατί βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος; Id. in Sympos. p. 205. (t. x. p. 234. ed. Bip.)

Sometimes δὴ is added, denoting the eagerness of the inquirer: ἵνα τί δὴ τοῦτο δρᾶτον; *why, I pray, or beseech you?* Aristoph. Pac. 408. and δὴ sometimes precedes τί: ἵνα δὴ τί τὴν ἔνγην προσέθηκε; Aristoph. Nub. 1194.

II.—OF THE OTHER USES OF INA IN SIGNIFYING EFFECT, TIME, AND PLACE.

I. "Iva sometimes signifies *effect*, being put for ὥστε, or καθ' ὃν Hoog.

τρόπον : as, δύο μεγεθῶν δοθέντων καὶ τομέος, δυνατόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν τομέα πολυγώνον περιγράψαι, καὶ ἄλλο ἐγγράψαι ὅμοιον αὐτῷ, ἵνα τὸ περιγραφέν πρὸς τὸ ἐγγραφέν ἐλάσσονα λόγον ἔχῃ, ἢ τὸ μείζον μέγεθος πρὸς τὸ ἐλάσσον : so that : Archimed. Prop. v. But this use of ἵνα for ὥστε signifying effect is infrequent, and μὴ is usually added. See St. Luke ix, 45. where it is said that an expression of Christ, ἦν παρακεκαλυμμένον ἀπ' αὐτῶν, (*the disciples*) ἵνα μὴ αἰσθωνται αὐτό. See also Galat. v, 17. and St. John xvii, 12.

II. In Revel. ix, 20, after a negative, ἵνα μὴ signifies the effect that would have followed repentance : *the rest of the men, which were not killed by these plagues, yet repented not of the works of their hands*, ἵνα μὴ προσκυνήσωσι τὰ δαιμόνια, *that they should not worship devils*.

III. In some passages it seems doubtful whether the final cause or the effect is signified ; as, ὁ δὲ μ' ἐποίησε τυφλόν, ἵνα μὴ διαγιγνώσκωμι τούτων μηδένα : Aristoph. Plut. 91.

IV. Ἴνα denotes *time, when* : as, ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα, ἵνα δοξασθῇ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου : St. John xii, 23. So xiii, 1. Aristophanes also has been cited for this sense : καὶ ταῦτ' ἐβελήσεις ἀπομόσαι μοι τοὺς θεούς, ἵν' ἂν κελύσω ἡ γὰρ σε ; *whenever* : Nub. 1235. [1214. ed. Bekk. See Hermann. ad l. who refers to Hom. Od. ε, 27. σοὶ δὲ γάμος σχεδόν ἐστιν, ἵνα χρὴ καλὰ μὲν αὐτὴν ἐννυσθαι, &c.]

V. Its signification of *place, where*, is much more frequent ; and in that signification it is always construed with an indicative mood, since something actual, and not contingent, is spoken of ; as, κεῖθι γενοίμαν, ἵν' ὁ κήρυξ φησί : Aristoph. Vesp. 750. So Pac. 204. and Plato Euthyphr. p. 12. l. 11. and 22. (c. 13. ed. Fisch.) ἵνα τε ξυνέχουσιν τένοντες ἀγκῶνος, τῇ τὸν γε φίλης διὰ χειρὸς ἔπειρεν αἰχμὴ χαλκείη, *in the part where* : Iliad. v, 478. And, like other adverbs of place, it is construed with a genitive case, as, οὐχ ὅρας ἵν' εἰ κακοῦ ; Sophocle. ἔμαθεν, ἵνα ἦν κακοῦ, Herodot.

VI. As ὅς is sometimes put for ἐκεῖνος, [Abr. of Vig. p. 13. l. 3.] so ἵνα (but rarely) for ἐκεῖ, *there* : κείνους δὲ κηχρόμεθα πρὸ πυλάων ἐν φυλάκεσσι, ἵνα γάρ σφιν ἐπέφραδον ἡγερέεσθαι : Iliad. κ. 127.

VII. In its signification of *θρον, where*, the particle περ is often subjoined to it ; as, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἐν τῇ Ἰνδῶν χώρα κισσόν, οὐδ' ἵνα περ αὐτοῖς ἄμπελοι ἦσαν, *wheresoever* : Arrian. de Exp. Al. v, 2. q. d. in those places, where vines are found, whatever those places may be. In the foregoing passage περ has its use of rendering things indeterminate ; in the following it restricts or limits : ἐκεῖνον μὲν αἱ ἀδελφαὶ θαπνέτωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐριδανῷ, ἵνα περ ἔπρσεν : Lucian. t. i. p. 280.

VIII. It signifies *whither* ; as, ἐς τὴν Συκελίαν, ἵνα περ τοπρῶτον ὤρμητο, ἀποπλεύσαντες, ἐπολέμουν : Thucyd. iv, 48. and so in iv, 74.

IX. It has been said to have an adversative sense, *although, even though* ; as, ἵνα γάρ σοι τοῦτο πρὸς ὀλίγον δῶμεν, τὸ ἐξεῖναι, ὅσakis ἂν ἐθέλῃς, ἀποκηρύττειν,—οὐχ ἁπλῶς, οἶμαι, οὐδ' ἐπὶ πάσαις αἰτίαις ἀποκηρύξεις : Lucian. Abdic. t. ii. p. 177. ἵνα δέ σοι δῶ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα κεκρικέναι, ὅσα ὁ Καλλίνος ἐς κάλλος, ἢ ὁ Ἀοίδιμος Ἀττικὸς—γράψαιεν, σοὶ τί ὄφελος, ὃ θαυμάσιε, τοῦ κτήματος ; Id. adv. Indoct. p. 100. t. iii.

But in such passages it may indicate the *end*, which the speaker has in view, that of conceding something to his opponent, in order that he may carry some other point that he wishes.

I.—KAI COPULATIVE.

I. The primary use of *καὶ* is copulative, *and*; and from its use in connecting things following one another, arises that in which it signifies celerity, or the instantaneous consecution of one thing after another: πάντες ἀλλαγησόμεθα ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ σάλπιγγι· σαλπίζει γάρ, καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται: 1 Corinth. xv, 52. i. e. ἅμα τῷ σαλπίζειν, *at the sound of the trumpet*.

II. Hence it denotes *readiness* or *alacrity*: καὶ σοὶ φράσω τὸ πρᾶγμα δεινὸν καὶ μέγα, Aristoph. Pac. 402.

III. In the New Testament only, it sometimes so closely connects two opposed clauses or members, that one cannot be taken without the other; and thus it performs the office of *μὲν* and *δέ*: thus, ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε πόθεν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀνέφξέ μου τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς: St. John ix, 30. for ὑμεῖς μὲν οὐκ οἴδατε, ἀνέφξε δέ. [*and yet he hath opened mine eyes.*] So, τίς ἀσθενεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀσθενῶ; τίς σκανδαλίζεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ πυροῦμαι; 2 Corinth. xi, 29. The inseparability of the clauses will be more evident, if the sentences be made affirmative instead of interrogative: οὐδεὶς ἀσθενεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀσθενῶ, &c. See also 1 Corinth. ix, 7.

IV. The same is to be observed where it connects contraries, in which case it plainly serves instead of *μὲν* and *δέ*: βούλει σὺ μέντοι, κ' οὐχὶ βουλήσῃ τάχα: Eurip. Phœniss. 906.

V. If it has here an adversative sense, it has it not of itself, but takes it from the nature of the opposed clauses or members: thus, ἀγαθὴς ζωῆς ἀριθμὸς ἡμερῶν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄνομα εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, *the days of, &c. may be numbered, but, &c.* Jes. Sir. xli, 13. ἠθελήσαμεν ἐλθεῖν—καὶ ἄπαξ, καὶ δις, καὶ ἐνέκοψεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Σατανᾶς, *but, &c.* Thessal. ii, 18.

VI. It is used in transition, being put, instead of *μὲν* δὴ, or *μὲν οὖν*, in the conclusion of one head or part, followed by *δέ* in the beginning of the next: thus, καὶ ἐποιοῦν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα: Thucyd. iii, end of c. 1. then c. 2. begins, ταῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος. So in the end of b. iv. Hence in conclusions it is joined with *μὲν* δὴ, as, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα, so frequently occurring in Plato.

VII. By its copulative use may be explained its employment in comparisons; for κατὰ ταῦτα οὗτος ἤχησε καὶ κιθάρα κρουσθεῖσα, *just as a harp*, (Paus. in Attic.) is in reality, οὗτος καὶ κιθάρα ἤχησε κατὰ ταυτά: and τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιον τῇ ὄψει καὶ τὸ βούκερας, (Theophrast.) is τοῦτο καὶ βούκερας ὅμοιον τῇ ὄψει.

VIII. The same may be said when things differing from each other are set in opposition, [and *καὶ* is rendered *from* or *than*;] for ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, e. g. (Aristot. Polit. i.) is ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἑτέρα ἐστὶ, or ἑτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ χρ. κ. ὁ πλ.

II.—OF KAI IN ITS SIGNIFICATION OF TIME.

I. From the primary copulative use of *καὶ* is derived its signification of *time*, properly of time immediately following something, and determined by *ὥς, ὅτε*, or the like, preceding; as, *ὥς ἀπῆλθον ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν οἱ ἄγγελοι, καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ποιμένες εἶπον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*: St. Luke ii, 15. *then*. See 1 Maccab. v, 1. Sus. 19. and St. Luke ii, 21. So after *ἐγένετο*: *ἐγένετο δὲ ὥς ὥρων τριῶν διάστημα, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ—εἰσῆλθεν*: Acts v, 7.

II. Hence it is put for *ἵνα, when*: *ἦν δὲ ὥρα τρίτη, καὶ ἐσταύρωσαν αὐτὸν*: St. Mark xv, 25. So Hebr. viii, 8. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 40. l. 35.]

III. On account of its signification of *immediately*, *καὶ* is joined with *ἐξαπίνης*: *ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὄψε, καὶ ἐπεπαιώνιστο αὐτοῖς ὥς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρῦμναν ἐκρούοντο*: Thucyd. i, 50.

IV. It has the signification of time also, when repeated, so that *καὶ* in the apodosis answers to *καὶ* in the protasis. In this case the first is rendered *after that, when*, and the second is not translated; thus, *καὶ ἤκουσε Λυσίας, ὅτι Φίλιππος—ζητεῖ παραλαβεῖν τὰ πράγματα, καὶ κατέσπενσε τοῦ ἀπελθεῖν*: 1 Maccab. vi, 55—57. *καὶ εἶδεν Ἰούδας—, καὶ ἐξῆλθεν*, &c. *ibid.* vii, 23.

III.—OF THE HORTATORY USE OF KAI.

I. From its signification of time or of readiness has arisen the *hortatory* or *excitative* use of *καὶ*, as with the imperative mood, for *δή*: *καὶ μοι κάλει τὸν ταξίαρχον*, Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 222. [p. 499. ed. Reisk.] *καὶ μοι λέγε τὴν γραφὴν λαβὼν*, for *λέγε δή μοι, read me now*, &c. Demosth. pro Cor. p. 320. [p. 243. l. 7. ed. Reisk.] Here the copulative force of *καὶ* is so far preserved, that it connects what goes before with what follows by the exclusion of all delay.

II. This excitative or impulsive force of *καὶ* is observable chiefly in the commencement of abrupt questions, where it denotes also impatience for reply: thus Orestes to Pylades, who had proposed to kill Helen, *καὶ πῶς; ἔχει γὰρ βαρβάρους ὁπάοντας*: Eurip. Or. 1110. [1108. ed. Pors.] *καὶ πῶς πατρῴαν γαῖαν οὐ σῶσαι θέλω*; Id. Phœniss. 907. This form of interrogation is very fitly used to express wonder at what is paradoxical: *εἰ τις*, says Socrates, *ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν*: on which Theætetus asks *καὶ πῶς; why how can that possibly be?* Plat. Theætet. p. 188. (t. ii. p. 148. ed. Bip.)

III. *Εἴτα*, which has a similar force, is joined to *καὶ* in this use: *κἄν' οὐχὶ φεύγεις γῆς ὑπερβαλὼν ὄρους; and do you not then*, &c. Eurip. Orest. 443.

IV. But sometimes *καὶ* before a question is merely copulative; as when the question is contained in one of two propositions or affirmations connected by *καί*: thus, *ὁ Κνήμων—ἀπεκρούσατο, καὶ, τί ταῦτα; ἔλεγεν*. Heliodor. Æthiop. ii, 2. where the construction is

ἀπεκρούσατο καὶ ἔλεγεν. Or when καὶ comes between two questions ; as, ἀλλὰ τί ἐστὶν τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ τί τοῦτο ὥφελεῖ ;

IV.—OF THE SUPERADDITORY USE OF KAI, AND (THENCE DERIVED) ITS USE IN RENDERING THE MEANING OF WORDS INDETERMINATE.

I. In this use καὶ, besides being copulative, superadds something to what has preceded. It is most frequent in the phrase οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ, but οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ is usually understood : nay, there is sometimes after οὐ μόνον an ellipsis of other words also to be supplied from what has gone before ; as, ταῦτά γε ταῦτά καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασι, *the gods too*, &c. Plat. Euthyphr. p. 8. i. e. ταῦτα οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄνθρωποι (or ἐκεῖνοι, the persons before spoken of,) ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασι. So, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἔμαντοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι : Plat. Phædr. p. 228. (p. 282. ed. Bip.) i. e. εἰ ἐ. Φ. ἀ. οὐ μόνον Φαῖδρον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμ. ἐπ. δὲ μοι ἀντὶ κακῶν καὶ τι παθεῖν ἀγαθόν, Theogn. 342. i. e. ἀντὶ κακῶν δός μοι οὐ μόνον μηδὲν κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν τι παθεῖν. He asks for two things, to be freed from ill, and to enjoy good : here is the copulative force of καὶ. Again, to the liberation from evil he superadds the enjoyment of good : here is the superadditory force of the same particle.

II. Whenever καὶ is repeated in the same clause or member, it is in one place superadditory ; as, καὶ μοι λέγε καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα λαβὼν, Demosth. pro Cor. p. 324. *this psephism too* : for others had been read before. See also Isocr. ad Nicocl. p. 41. [p. 51. l. 1. ed. Battie.] and Theogn. 666. So in καὶ γὰρ καί· καὶ δὴ καί· καὶ μὴν δὴ καί· καὶ μὴν καί· of which below. Hence many affirmative formulæ beginning with καὶ, as καὶ μάλα· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε· καὶ ὀρθῶς γε· καὶ πάνν γε· in which καὶ is not merely copulative, but additory : q. d. *you have spoken not only truly, but admirably also*.

III. In this use καὶ is sometimes very emphatical, and may be rendered *even*, especially when it superadds what is more to what is less, whether the latter be expressed or understood : as, ἀλλ' Ἀχιλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, &c. Iliad. ι, 494. Here what is less is expressed and precedes ; in the following example it is understood : Τυδείδης, ὃς νῦν γε καὶ ἂν Πατρὶ μάχοιτο : Iliad. ε, 362. underst. οὐ μόνον μάχοιτ' ἂν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀνδρείοτάτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ, &c.

IV. When accompanied with negation, it may be rendered *ne quidem* ; as, οὐ πῶ ἦσθου καὶ ἓνα ἄνδρα δι' ἀφροσύνης μὲν ἐπιχειροῦντα κρείττονι ἑαυτοῦ μάχεσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δ' ἡττηθῇ, εὐθὺς πεπανμένον τῆς πρὸς τοῦτον ἀφροσύνης ; an nondum animadvertisti quinquam, ne unum quidem hominem, qui, &c. Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 18.^a

^a I have given Hoogveen's translation in Latin, that the reader may better judge whether or not he has mistaken the meaning of the passage. It appears to me that

it was not the intention of Tigranes to ask Cyrus, whether he had never met with even one instance of a man's acting in the manner mentioned, but whether he had

V. The brevity arising from the ellipsis sometimes occasions a degree of obscurity ; as, *εἰ δ' ἡ ἀπαρχὴ ἁγία, καὶ τὸ φύραμα· καὶ εἰ ἡ δόξα ἁγία, καὶ οἱ κλάδοι* : Rom. xi, 16. which would be fully expressed thus : *εἰ ἡ ἀ. ἀ. οὐ μόνη αὕτη ἁγία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ φύραμά ἐστιν ἁγίον, &c.* The full expression is in Plato : *Ἀνσίου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος, οὐ μόνον ἀπαξ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευσέν οἱ λέγειν* : Phædr. p. 228. (p. 282. ed. Bip.) He might have said more briefly, *ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος, καὶ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων, ἔ. ο. λ.*

VI. When *ὥς* precedes *καὶ* in its superadditory use, *οὕτω* is understood before *καὶ*, as in the Lord's prayer : *γενηθῇ τὸ θέλημά σου, ὥς ἐν οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, for *οὕτω καὶ*. So, *καὶ ὑμεῖς* for *οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς*, Acts viii, 51.

VII. To its additory use may be referred its employment as an adjection to such relative words as *ὅ τι, οἷον, ὅπου, ὅθεν*, &c. rendering, like *cunque* in Latin, the sense more indefinite ; as, *παρεφύλαττον, ὅ τι καὶ μειδιάσειε, what it could be that made him smile* : Lucian. *Lapith.* t. iii. p. 428. *τὰς τῶν προβάτων ἐρέας, οἷαι καὶ ἦσαν, (such as they were, of whatever kind or quality) ἐποίουν ἱμάτια, καὶ ἐφόρουν*, *Palæphat.* fragm. de *Invent. purp.*

The particle *δὲ* is sometimes interjected, as, *ὅ τι δὲ καὶ*. [See *Abr. of Vig.* p. 14. l. 20.]

VIII. This use of imparting indefiniteness it seems to have, when put before *τι*, as in *Iliad.* φ, 268. *ἐκ ποταμοῖο σαῶσαι· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τι πάθοιμι.* And before *ἄλλος*, as, *ἐγὼ δ', εἶπερ τι τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλῳ προσηκόντως εἴρηται, νομίζω κάμοι νῦν ἀρμόττειν εἰπεῖν* : Demosth. *adv. Timocr.* p. 462. *any other whomsoever.* So, *ἄξιον δὲ, εἶπερ περὶ του καὶ ἄλλου, καὶ περὶ τοῦδε, ὃν νῦν ἀνέγνω, διελθεῖν* : *ib.* p. 468. *about any other whatsoever.*

V.—OF THE ADVERSATIVE USE OF KAI.

I. When *καὶ* is *adversative*, (*although*), it is construed with a participle expressed or understood ; and *μέντοι, ὅμως*, or some other red-ditive word, is understood in the clause opposed to that in which *καὶ* is : as, *τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόωτο*, *Iliad.* λ, 653. i. e. *καίπερ ἀναίτιον ὄντα, ὅμως ἂν αἰτιόωτο.* But the participle is usually expressed, as, *Ἐκτορα καὶ μεμαῶτα μάχης σχήσεσθαι ὄω*, *Iliad.* ι, 651. for *καίπερ μεμαῶτα, σχήσεσθαι μέντοι, [ὅμως.]* See *Iliad.* μ, 171.

This adversative force of *καὶ* is more manifest, when *ὅμως* is expressed ; as, *μόλις κατιόντας, καὶ ἐπὶ τράχηλον ὠθοῦντος τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ, ὅμως ἀντιβαίνοντας* : Lucian. *Dial. Mort.* t. i. p. 437.

Kai is adversative in *Æschylus*, S. c. Th. 198. [180. ed. Blomfield.] *κεῖ μὴ τις ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐμῆς ἀκούσεται*, for *ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ, but if any one, &c.*

not known an individual too, in contradistinction to a whole town, act in that manner : for the words immediately following are, *πάλιν δ', ἐφη, οὕτω ἐώρακας*

πόλιν ἀντιπατομένην πρὸς πόλιν ἑτέραν, ἥ τις, ἐπειδὴν ἡττηθῇ, παραχρῆμα ταύτην, ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, πείθεσθαι θέλει ; J. S.

ΚΑΙ ΓΕ, ΚΑΙ ΓΕ ΔΗ.—I. Καὶ and γε are usually separated by some other word or words; but they are joined in Acts xi, 18. [ii, 18.] Their use is in superadding something of more moment to something of less; not waving or setting aside the latter, as γε alone would do, but amplifying and exaggerating the whole.

II. First, with καὶ copulative. Menel. Ἑλληνικόν τι [τοί] τὸν ὁμόθεν τιμᾶν αἶε. Tynd. Καὶ τῶν νόμων γε μὴ πρότερον εἶναι θέλειν: Eurip. Orest. 487. [481. ed. Pors.] [*yes; and what is more, &c.*] q. d. what you have said is true, but this is no less true, [and of still greater importance.] So, Nuncius. μεῖζόν τι χρήζεις παῖδας ἢ σεσωμένους; Joe. καὶ τὰπίλοιπά γ' εἰ καλῶς πράσσω, κλύειν: Id. Phœniss. 1218.

When καὶ is repeated in this use, γε is put after the first καὶ, as, καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε, καὶ ἐπέελεγχον ὥς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ: Plat. Phædr. p. 267. (p. 364. ed Bip.)

III. Γε augments the signification of alacrity or promptness which καὶ has when used abruptly; thus, on the incidental mention of something, Socrates says, καὶ καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας, *I am very glad you have happened to put me in mind*: Plat. Phædr. (p. 363. ed. Bip.)

IV. The augmentative and amplifying power before spoken of is most conspicuous when καὶ is *superadditory*; as in Eurip. Phœniss. 1675. where Antigone says, συμφεύξομαι τῷδ' ἀθλιωτάτῳ πατρὶ: and, Creon having commended her filial piety, but reprehended her folly, adds, καὶ ξυνθανοῦμαι γ', ὥς μάθης περαιτέρω, *nay, what is more, I will even die with him, &c.*

V. After εἴπερ in the protasis, γε is sometimes omitted in the apodosis, as, εἴπερ ποτε, καὶ νῦν: Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 2. [p. 10. l. 25. ed. Reisk.] for καὶ νῦν γε.

VI. There is also sometimes an ellipsis of εἴπερ καὶ ἄλλος, as in Odyss. α, 46. καὶ λίαν κείνός γε εἰκότι κεῖται ὀλέθρῳ, i. e. εἴπερ. τις καὶ ἄλλος, καὶ ἐκεῖνός γε, &c.

VII. The superadditory power of these particles is most frequently observable in affirmative answers: thus to Socrates's words, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἦκομεν, Callicles replies, καὶ μάλα γε ἁστείας ἑορτῆς, *and a very elegant feast too*: Plat. Gorg. [p. 303. l. 2. ed. Bas. 1.] and to the words, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι, Simmias, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, *and rightly too*: Id. Phæd. p. 109. (c. 58. ed. Fisch.)

VIII. They have the same force too when affirmation of a thing is heightened by denial of the contrary; as in the reply, καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, Plat. Phædr. p. 278. (p. 388. ed. Bip.) which is equivalent to Homer's, κατὰ μοῖραν εἶπας.

IX. Nor does it wholly disappear, when they are put for καὶ γοῦν, that is, when something said is illustrated or confirmed by an example; as in Aristoph. Vesp. 1087. ἄρα δεινὸς ἦν τόθ', ὥστε πάντα μὴ δεδοικέναι: which he proves by an example, καὶ κατεστρεψάμην γε τοὺς ἐναντίους, *and moreover truly, as a proof of my boldness, &c.*

X. Sometimes δὴ is added. To one saying, he knew not whence Apollodorus had got the name of *μανικός*, or *madman*, Apollodorus replies, καὶ δηλόν γε δὴ, ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενος καὶ περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μάλινμαι: Plat. Sympos. p. 173. q. d. ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν

ἐλαβον, οὐ μόνον ὅτι οὕτω διανοούμενόν με φασιν μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δηλον. He not only assigns a reason, but superadds by καὶ that it is evident : this superaddition is limited by γε : *and this certainly, or at least, is manifest.* Then δὴ confirms and supports either the superaddition or the limitation, or both.

KAI ΓΑΡ, with the annexed particles.—I. In καὶ γάρ, *for*, the latter particle is to be considered as compounded of γε and ἄρα. Thus in this sentence, πειθαρχεῖσθαι δεῖ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ προστεταγμένοις : καὶ γάρ ἐστι σωτὴρ ἡμῶν, the two propositions are connected by καὶ ; γε limits or restricts the latter, *he is certainly, or at least, our Saviour ;* and, lastly, ἄρα indicates the congruity between the two propositions, or the justness of the conclusion drawn. See what has been already said of ἄρα and γάρ. Or the meaning of the particles may be accounted for by supposing an ellipsis of ἄλλο σοι ἐρῶ after καί. These words actually occur in Xenophon's *Cyrop.* ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς φίλους πλουσίους ποίω, τοὺτους μοι νομίζω θησαυροὺς, καὶ φύλακας ἐμοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν πιστοτέρους εἶναι ἢ εἰ φρουροὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπεστησάμην. Καὶ ἄλλο δέ σοι ἐρῶ· ἐγὼ γάρ, &c. viii, 2, 19. Hence καὶ γάρ is rendered simply *for*. See Plato *Phædr.* p. 257. (344. ed. Bip.) p. 275. (382. ed. Bip.) *Aristoph. Vesp.* 269. and so in almost every page of Greek authors.

II. Other words sometimes intervene ; as, δέδοικ' ἔγωγε· καὶ τὸ πρὶν γὰρ ἐκ λόγων καλῶν κακῶς ἔπραξα, *Sophocl. Philoct.* 1261. [1268. ed. Br.]

III. Καὶ γάρ is used in the same elliptical manner as γάρ alone. See Γάρ, I, iii. Thus to a remark that certain fables about the Gods ought not to be made public, but told δι' ἀπορρήτων, the reply is καὶ γάρ οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποὶ, *in truth, or for in truth, &c.* Plato de *Rep.* ii. p. 378. (t. vi. p. 248. ed. Bip.) understand, from what precedes, δι' ἀπορρήτων δεῖ τοιαῦτα λέγεσθαι. Sometimes the ellipsis is to be supplied, not with any preceding words, but by something extrinsical. Thus to the Armenian's reason for his rebellion, καλὸν ἐδόκει μοι εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, καὶ παισὶν ἐλευθερίαν καταλιπεῖν, Cyrus replies, καὶ γάρ ἐστι καλὸν μάχεσθαι ὅπως μήποτε τις δοῦλος μέλλοι γενήσεσθαι : *Xenoph. Cyrop.* iii, 1, 10. underst. *καλῶς εἶπας, καὶ γάρ, &c.* And so in affirmative answers, καὶ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο, καὶ ὁρθῶς γάρ, καὶ γάρ εἰκός, and the like.

IV. When καὶ follows καὶ γάρ in a distinct member of a sentence, the first καὶ rather answers to the second, making a polysyndeton, than connects the reason given by γάρ with what precedes ; especially when some other word intervenes between καὶ and γάρ : as in the words of Pylades giving a twofold reason for his unwillingness to survive Orestes, καὶ συγκατέκτανον γάρ· οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι· καὶ πάντ' ἐβούλευσ', ὧν σὺ νῦν τίρεις δίκας : *Eurip. Orest.* 1089. [1087. ed. Pors.]

V. In this combination too, καὶ is sometimes *superadditory* ; with an ellipsis of οὐ μόνον and of some preceding word : thus, *Socr.* οἷε σὺν τινα τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὅπωςτιοῦν δύναντος Λυσία, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτόν, ὅτι συγγράφει ; *Phædr.* οὐκουν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γάρ ἂν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὀνειδίζει : *Plat. Phædr.* p. 258. (p.

346. ed. Bip.) *for he would tax his own propensity too*—. The full expression would be, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῇ τοῦ Δυσίου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.—So in p. 231. also, (289. Bip.)

VI. When superadditory, καὶ γὰρ sometimes expresses indignation interrogatively; as, καὶ σὺ γὰρ φθέγγῃ, κάθαρμα; *and you too, miscreant, do you open your mouth forsooth?* Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 445. Here καὶ signifies *also*, and γὰρ is to be resolved into γε ἄρα. See those particles.

VII. Sometimes γὰρ appears to be understood; as in 1 John i. 1. 2. ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν—περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ (for καὶ γὰρ) ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη,—. So, πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία: *ibid.* iii. 4. Although indeed such passages may be referred to the *interpretative* or *explanatory* use of καὶ.

VIII. To καὶ γὰρ is added δὲ, either in its signification of time, or corroborative, or inceptive. [See on Δὲ, p. 42. ii. p. 44. i. p. 46. i.] In Aristoph. Vesp. 1475. [1483. ed. Br.] it is doubtful which: in the following it may have either of those three significations; [Phil. κλῆθρα χαλάσθω τάδε·] καὶ γὰρ δὲ σχήματος ἀρχή—. Xanth. μᾶλλον δέ γ' ἴσως μανίας ἀρχή. *ibid.* [1484. ed. Br.] either *now*, or *truly*, or *now then!* And with the order inverted: ἐγὼ εἴσομαι· καὶ δὲ γὰρ εἰμ' ἐγὼ Κλέων, *ibid.* 1219. [1224. ed. Br.]

IX. When a second superadditory καὶ is subjoined to καὶ γὰρ δὲ, [an assertion or] proof receives new force and corroboration from the contrary opposed to it; as in the words of Planudes, who, after saying that the deformity and natural defects of Æsop subjected him to slavery, adds, καὶ γὰρ δὲ καὶ θαῦμα ἂν ἦν, εἰ οὕτως ἀτόπως ἔχοντι τοῦ σώματος ἐξεγίνετο τὰς τῶν δουλούντων ἄρκυς διαφυγεῖν: Æsop. Vit. p. 6. *for in truth it would have been even a wonder*, &c. [The preceding words are, ἃ πάντα καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν δουλείαν Αἰσώπῳ παρασκευάσαι, p. 10. ed. Genev. 1628. There is no vestige of the Greek idiom in La Fontaine's French, "Avec ces défauts, quand il n'aurait pas été de condition a être esclave, il ne pouvoit manquer de le devenir."]

X. Εἰ or εἴπερ is added to καὶ γὰρ, not affecting γὰρ but καί: as, καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ ἔτι ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ: *for though he was crucified through weakness, yet*, &c. 2 Corinth. xiii. 4. Γὰρ is ratiocinative, εἰ concedes an objection, and καὶ is superadditory.

XI. Καὶ following καὶ γὰρ, *for*, is always *superadditory*; as in the words of St. Paul following those above cited, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀσθενοῦμεν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ζησόμεθα σὺν αὐτῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ, &c. *for we also are weak in him*, &c.

XII. In καὶ γὰρ οὖν the two last particles have the force before explained, [see pp. 30. 31. iii. iv. v.] and καὶ either connects or superadds; as, καὶ γὰρ οὖν τὰ γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα, Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 495. l. 27. (t. vii. p. 92. ed. Bip.) *and rightly in truth; for certainly these are the things that are said; therefore you have truly mentioned them as such*.

XIII. Καὶ γάρ ῥα is poetical only: πολὺ βούλομαι αὐτὴν οἶκοι ἔχειν· καὶ γάρ ῥα Κλνταιμνήστης προβέβουλα Κουριδῆς ἀλόχου: Iliad. α. 113. Καὶ is copulative, connecting the first member with the second;

γὰρ assigns a reason for what is expressed in the first member, and that reason is Agamemnon's preference of Chryseis to Clytæmnestra; lastly ῥα (by aphæresis, for ἄρα) signifies the *effect* or *consequence* of Chryseis's superiority, (ἐπεὶ οὐ ἔθεν ἐστὶ χερσίων,) which was Agamemnon's preference of her.

XIV. Τοι also is added to καὶ γὰρ, and then καὶ is either superadditory or copulative, γέ limits, ἄρα notes effect, and τοι confirms: as, ἐγνώ τὴν τιμὴν οὐχὶ τῷ κυρίῳ τῶν πραγμάτων δεδωκώς· καὶ γὰρ τοι οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἔδωκε χρήματα τοῦ λοιποῦ: Demosth. de fals. Leg. p. 218. [Abr. of Vig. p. 196. note a.]

XV. But most commonly γὰρ in καὶ γάρ τοι retains its *causal* force, either affecting τοι, or being affected by it. It is affected by it when τοι corroborates the reason introduced by γὰρ, as, μάρτυρας τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς ἐγγὺς ὄντας τοῦδε τοῦ μνήματος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων τάφους παρέχονται· καὶ γὰρ τοι μεγάλην ἀντὶ μικρᾶς ἀπέδειξαν τὴν πόλιν, ὁμοιοῦσαν δὲ ἀντὶ στασιαζούσης ἀπέφηναν: *for in truth*—Lysias Orat. Funebr. p. 516. So, τίνα—ἐρείομεν—ὀνειροπόλον· καὶ γὰρ τ' ὄναρ ἐκ Διὸς ἐστίν: Iliad. α, 63. On the other hand γὰρ affects τοι, when it introduces an argument or proof in support of the confirmation or asseveration expressed by τοι, as, the ancient Athenians thought, says Lysias, θηρίων μὲν ἔργον εἶναι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων βίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι· ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσήκειν νόμῳ μὲν ὀρίσαι τὸ δίκαιον, λόγῳ δὲ πείσαι, ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτοις ὑπηρετεῖν, ὑπὸ νόμου μὲν βασιλευμένοις, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ διδασκόμενοις. καὶ γὰρ τοι καὶ φύντες καλῶς, καὶ γνόντες ὅμοια, πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ θαυμασὰ οἱ πρόγονοι τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων εἰργάσαντο, &c. *and indeed, or yes indeed, for, &c.* Lysias Or. Fun. p. 498.

XVI. For καὶ γὰρ τοι, Lysias has καὶ τοι γὰρ: καὶ τοι γὰρ ἀγήρατοι μὲν αὐτῶν αἱ μνήμαι, &c. Or. Fun. p. 522.

ΚΑΙ ΔΗ, ΚΑΙ ΔΗ ΚΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΔΗ ΟΥΝ.—I. Καὶ and δὴ are first so combined as that each preserves its proper and primary sense, *and now*. So Iliad. α, 161.

II. The superadditory force of καὶ is evident, when καὶ δὴ signifies *immediately, at once*: e. g. δεινὸν, καὶ γόητα, καὶ σοφιστὴν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων ἐμὲ, ὡς, ἐὰν πρότερός τις εἴποι τὰ προσόνθ' ἐαυτῷ περὶ ἄλλου, καὶ δὴ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοντα: Demosth. pro Cor. [p. 318. l. 3. ed. Reisk.] q. d. as if the truth of the imputations could be established not only by argument well or ill founded, but *even at once* from the mere circumstance of their being cast first upon another by one liable to them himself.

III. In the following passage καὶ signifies *readiness*, and δὴ is *hortatory*: ἀλλ', ἵνα μὴ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγων πόρρω τοῦ καιροῦ γένωμαι, παρεῖς ἅπαν τὸ μέσον, καὶ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ κύρια τοῦ λόγου τρέψομαι: [*now then; come then;*] Aristid. Panath. So Jocasta, invited by Polynices to question him freely, begins with, καὶ δὴ σ' ἐρωτῶ, Eurip. Phœniss. 390.

IV. Καὶ δὴ serves for confirmation of a position or assertion, when one proceeds to specification of what has been more generally mentioned; as, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐμψυχότατα τῶν ὁσίων ἦν, ὀλιγίσταις ξυνέφραττε σαρξίν· ἃ δ' ἀψυχότατα, ἐντὸς πλείσταις καὶ πυκνοτάταις. καὶ δὴ [*and*

so, truly,] κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν ὀστέων, δη μὴ τίνα ἀνάγκην ὁ λόγος ἀπέβαινε δεῖν αὐτὰς εἶναι, βραχεῖαν σάρκα ἔφυσεν: Plat. Tim. p. 74. although here too καὶ δὴ may have some sense of readiness and self-adhortation.

V. In this use καὶ and δὴ are sometimes separated; as, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάσῳ τῇ φύσει, κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐσθ' ἐκάσῳ. This is general; then specifically with asseveration, καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ μάλιστα τοῦτο ἀνθρώπος: Aristot. Eth. x, 7.

VI. So δὴ in its confirmatory use is separated from καὶ: καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν, ὅταν γε, &c. Plat. Theætet. p. 188. (t. ii. p. 148. ed. Bip.)

VII. They are separated too when indicative of the arrival of discourse at the proposed or main point, after introduction; thus, after explaining some circumstances of the story of Orithyia, Plato adds, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγενῆναι: and thus it was that, &c. Phædr. p. 229. (p. 285. ed. Bip.)

VIII. In καὶ δὴ καὶ the first καὶ is copulative, and the second super-additory. The particles so joined are used, firstly, when after mention of other things, something is added which the aim or tendency of the discourse requires, or when one of several things is more particularly urged and insisted on. Thus Adimantus, discussing with Socrates the question whether the guards should possess gold and silver, says they ought not to be without advantages, when the other citizens possess lands, houses, furniture; and proceeds, καὶ δὴ καὶ, ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγε, χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι, &c. and moreover, to come to the point in question, &c. Plat. de Rep. iv. (t. vi. p. 326. ed. Bip.) So Socrates, speaking of the invention of letters, says that Theuth πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὗρεῖν, καὶ γεωμετρίαν, καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἐτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβέλας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα: and moreover the subject of our present discourse, letters: Plat. Phædr. p. 274. (p. 379. ed. Bip.) [p. 213. l. 1. in ed. Bas. 1. See Abr. of Vig. p. 184. note L.]

IX. Secondly, in hastening to a conclusion after refutation of objections; and as this involves some alacrity, the particles have a hortatory sense. Thus after refutation of the objections against the happiness of the life proposed for the guards, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἢ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται, ἢ φύλακας: and now then, &c. Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (t. vi. p. 328. ed. Bip.)

X. Thirdly, in the apodosis of similes: thus Æschines says that Demosthenes likens him to the Sirens, καὶ γὰρ ὑπ' ἐκείνων οὐ κηλεῖσθαι φησιν τοὺς ἀκρωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀπόλλυσθαι—. καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ τὴν φύσιν μου γεγενῆσθαι ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἀκούοντων: c. Ctesiph. p. 306. [and in the same manner forsooth, that my rhetorical skill, &c. p. 621. l. 1. ed. Reisk.]

XI. Fourthly, in transition from a thesis, or general position, to a hypothesis or particular case: thus in Plato's Phædrus, after this thesis, the sayings of wise men are not to be rejected, but what they say is to be well weighed and considered, the hypothesis follows

in these words : καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον, *and consequently therefore, what has now been said too*, &c. p. 260.

XII. Καὶ δὴ οὖν has the same effect, οὖν beginning and applying. Plato might have said καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν, &c. for he has used these particles in applying to Lysias in particular an observation which he had before made more generally : καὶ δὴ οὖν μοι ἔδοξε δις καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, &c. Phædr. p. 235. (p. 295. ed. Bip.)

KAI ΜΑΛΑ, KAI ΜΑΛΑ ΓΕ.—I. In καὶ μάλα, καὶ is always superadditory, and μάλα intends or heightens what has been said. The particles are used chiefly in affirmative answers : thus, Socr. πενθεὶ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἐταῖροι. Phædr. καὶ μάλα : *and exceedingly too* : Plat. Phædr. p. 258. (p. 346. ed. Bip.) i. e. οὐ πενθεὶ ἀπλῶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλα πικρῶς. So, ἀμβλυώττονσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Id. de Rep. vi. p. 508. (t. vii. p. 119. ed. Bip.)

II. If the affirmation of καὶ μάλα is to be restricted or limited, γε is added ; as, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν. Call. καὶ μάλα γε : Id. in Gorg.

III. In continued discourse μάλα affects a following word instead of the preceding καὶ ; and sometimes even in affirmative answers : thus to the words of Socrates, ὁ μὲν ὡς τῷ ἐρώντι, ὁ δ' ὡς τῷ μὴ, δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην, Phædrus replies, καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικῶς, *and very manfully too* : Plat. Phædr. p. 265. (360. ed. Bip.) where καὶ is superadditory, for οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ, and μάλα intends or augments the signification of ἀνδρικῶς.

KAI MEN, KAI MEN ΔΗ, KAI MEN ΔΗ KAI.—I. The particles μὲν δὴ are used in commencing a speech or composition, or some principal part of it ; but when καὶ is prefixed, it is either copulative, connecting something new and weighty with what precedes ; or incitative, either of the speaker or writer himself, or of the hearer or reader : thus in the introduction of a fresh argument in Plato's Phædrus, καὶ μὲν δὴ, εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἰροῖτο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοι ἢ ἐκλεξίς εἴη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸν παντὶ ἐπιτηδείατον, ἐκ πολλῶν : *and again too ; and moreover ; and besides* ; p. 231. (p. 290. ed. Bip.) q. d. *come now, let us consider this also*, &c. So in p. 232. καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθυμήθησαν, ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἐγνώσαν.

II. When καὶ is added to καὶ μὲν δὴ, it is superadditory ; and the whole may be rendered, *and moreover* ; as, πρώτη καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔθετο, καὶ πολιτείαν κατεστήσατο, &c. After this has been proved, is added, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν—τὰς μὲν εὐροῦσα, τὰς δὲ δοκιμάσασα, χρῆσθαι τοῖς λοιποῖς παρέδωκε : Isocr. Paneg. p. 94. So Plato Phædr. p. 233. (p. 293. ed. Bip.)

KAI MHN, KAI MHN KAI, KAI MHN ΠΟΥ KAI.—I. In καὶ μὴν, καὶ is sometimes copulative, sometimes superadditory ; and μὴν is affirmative. When καὶ is copulative, the whole may be rendered,

and truly; as, *συμμάχων δέησεται, καὶ τούτων πλειόνων, ἐὰν καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἀντιτάττηται*: καὶ μὴν οἱ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέλοντες εὐποιοιτέοι, ἵνα θέλωσι προθυμεῖσθαι: Xenoph. Mem. ii. p. 752.

II. Καὶ is superadditory in Aristoph. Vesp. 519. Phil. καὶ τούτοις γ' ἐπιτρέψαι θέλω. Bdel. καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ: *and truly I also*; and in Euripides too perhaps, Phœniss. 707.

III. Hence καὶ μὴν is rendered, *moreover*: as, καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον, &c. Odys. λ, 592. [581.] and so in v. 592.

IV. In these significations a twofold use of the particles is to be observed, not without asseveration. The first is when something new is introduced, and then they are rendered *at* in Latin. Thus in Aristoph. Vesp. 859. [863. ed. Br.] the chorus having heard orders given for bringing several things, says, καὶ μὴν ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς καὶ ταῖς εἰχαῖς φήμην ἀγαθὴν λέξομεν ὑμῖν: [*but we too; and as to us, we will, &c.*] See Euclid. in Optic. p. 603. And especially when something not only new but unexpected is introduced: as, ἐγελάσατε, ὦ καθάρματα, εἰ τῇ νύμφῃ προὔπινον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου θεοῦ Ἡρακλέους; καὶ μὴν εὖ εἰδέναι χρὴ, ὥς, ἦν μὴ λάβῃ παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν σκύφον, &c. [*and yet I would have you know, &c.*] Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 430.

V. Of this sense of new accession the dramatic writers have eagerly availed themselves in announcing the unexpected appearance of a fresh person, and this is the second use alluded to above; as, καὶ μὴν γέροντι δεῦρ' ἀμιλλάται ποδὶ ὁ Σπαρτιάτης Τυνδάρεως, &c. Eurip. Orest. 456. [450. ed. Pors.] So v. 1503. [1517. Pors.]

VI. From this signification of something new and unexpected, arises its use in abrupt commencement of speech or writing: thus Lucian begins his piece Adv. Indoct. with καὶ μὴν ἐναντίον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐθέλεις, ὁ νῦν ποιεῖς.

VII. Sometimes the new matter introduced by καὶ μὴν consists of an *objection* or *exception*; which any one who urges wishes of course to strengthen, and this is done by the affirmative force of μὴν: thus Creon offers this objection to risking an engagement, καὶ μὴν τὸ νικᾶν ἐστὶ πᾶν εὐβουλία: Eurip. Phœniss. 728.

VIII. As καὶ is expressive of alacrity, and μὴν of asseveration, καὶ μὴν is fitly used by persons entering on the commencement of a subject; thus Phædrus, beginning to repeat what Socrates wished to hear, καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή: Plat. Phædr. So Aristoph. Vesp. 546. [548. ed. Br.]

IX. Also for instigation: ἄγε νῦν, ἄγε πᾶς καὶ μὴν ὁμοῦ 'στίν, ἦδ' ἐγγύς. μὴ νῦν ἀνῶμεν, &c. Aristoph. Pac. 512. [*why, I tell you—*]

X. Also in threats, which it enforces by asseveration; as, καὶ μὴν προσελθέτω πρὸς ἐμ' ὑμῶν ἐνθαδὶ ὁ βουλόμενος, [*hark ye; mark me:*] Aristoph. Plut. 929.

XI. Sometimes καὶ, always superadditory, is subjoined to καὶ μὴν, as, καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ, οὔτε μείζονος, οὔτε τιμιωτέρου, οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφίενται: *and moreover, &c.* Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 485. (t. vi. p. 71. ed. Bip.)

The latter καὶ is often separated from καὶ μὴν, and in that case it sometimes belongs to a different clause; as, καὶ μὴν, ὅτι χωρὶς τῆς ἄλλης αἰσχύνης,—καὶ μεγάλοι κίνδυνοι περισσᾶσιν—τὴν πόλιν, ῥάδιον

δεῖξαι: Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 211. The construction is, καὶ μὴν ῥάδιον δεῖξαι, ὅτι, χωρίς αἰσχύνης, καὶ μεγ. κίνδ. great dangers too, π. τ. π.

XII. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ is used by persons suspending, or affecting to suspend, their assertions on the assent of others; as, καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλης φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μὴ: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 485. (t. vii. p. 53. ed. Bip.) Καὶ is copulative, μὴν assertory, που diminishes or softens the assertion, and the last καὶ is superadditory: *again, I may certainly assume, I think, that this also is to be considered, &c.*

KAI NYN.—I. Each of the particles in this combination has often its separate and usual signification, *and now*, as in Acts xvi, 37. but other uses are to be noticed; and in general they mark transition from previous matter to the main point or scope of discourse, as in Acts xx, 22. and 25.

II. And more particularly transition from motives urged for granting a petition to the petition itself; as in 2 Maccab. xv, 22.

III. Hence καὶ νῦν is used in conclusions, as in St. John xvii, 5. *now therefore*. So Acts xiii, 11.

IV. On account of the aversion to delay indicated in some of its uses, it becomes hortatory or significative of urgency, with the imperative mood, especially when καὶ is considered as protreptic; but it follows and depends on something introductory. Thus Menelaus, after mentioning among other things, that he had just heard of the murder of Clytæmnestra, says, καὶ νῦν ὅπου 'στιν, εἶπατ', ὃ νεάνιδες, Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖς, ὃς τὰ δειν' ἔτλη κακὰ: Eurip. Or. 375. [369. ed. Pors.] *and now then tell me, &c.*

V. Sometimes καὶ νῦν is both illative and hortatory; as, καὶ νῦν—τοὺς ῥεστώτας πολέμιους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, *now therefore, &c.* Thucyd. iv, 63. So Acts vii, 34.

KAIΠEP.—I. The proper power of καίπερ is *quamquam*, καὶ being superadditory, and περ rendering meaning less determinate: whence καίπερ augments a preceding affirmation or negation by indefinite magnitude: πρὸς ταῦτ' ὅν Εὐφραῖός σοι γίγνεται οὐχ ἥκιστα ἂν χρήσιμος, καίπερ πρὸς ἄλλα ὧν ἀνδρείος: Plat. Epist. v. *although indeed, &c.*

II. From this sense arises its adversative use: as, τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνεται ὑποχωρήσας δέ, καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὄν, εὐπορον ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος: Thucyd. iv, 10. but perhaps the adversative particle is in reality ὅμως understood: καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὄν, ὅμως εὐπορον ἔσται. So, ὥστε καὶ τὸν Ἑρμῶνα, καίπερ ἐν κακοῖς ὄντα,—ἀντιμαρτύρεσθαι, for ὅμως ἀντιμαρτύρεσθαι. See also Hebr. v, 8. where ἔμαθεν is for ὅμως ἔμαθεν. This ellipsis is supplied by Demosthenes; ἕκαστον ὑμῶν, καίπερ ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες, ὅμως ἐπαναμνήσαι βούλομαι: Philipp. ii.

III. The poets are fond of disjoining these particles by interposing some other word; as Hom. II. α, 217. καὶ μάλα περ θυμῷ κεχολωμένον. So i. 623. And with ὅμως added: κῆγ' ὃ σ' ἰκνοῦμαι, καὶ γυνή περ οὖσ',

ἔμως : Eurip. Or. 679. [672. ed. Pors.] With an adverb, καὶ ὁψέ περ, Iliad. ι, 247. Homer has disjoined them even without necessity, Il. ε, 135.

IV. A threefold ellipsis is to be observed :—1. of καὶ, which is peculiar to poetry ; as, τοῖς δ' οὔτι δυνήσεται, ἀχνύμενός περ, χραισμῆν : Il. α, 241. for καίπερ ἀχνύμενος.—2. of περ, as, σὺν σοι, καὶ κακὸς ὢν, γίγνομαι ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ : Theogn. 1114. for καίπερ κακὸς ὢν.—3. of both particles ; as, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλον, κύριος πάντων ὢν : Galat. iv, 1. for καίπερ ὢν.

ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ.—I. Καὶ ταῦτα serves for aggravation or exaggeration of something preceding it : [in English, *and—too* ; *and that* : in Latin *præsertim*. See notes *m* and *n* on p. 63. of the Abr. of Vig.] Sometimes ποιέω is understood ; as, σὺν δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα (ποιεῖς) σοφὸς ὢν, *and that too notwithstanding that you are wise* : Plato Gorg. p. 508. (t. iv. p. 132. ed. Bip.) This ellipsis is supplied by Demosthenes, who, having reproached Apollodorus with indulging in licentious amours, adds, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα ἔχων ποιεῖς, pro Phorm. p. 605. Sometimes πάσχω, as, μόνος ἐγὼ σοι ἄμοιρος, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν γειτόνων οἰκῶν : Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 435. for καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω. So, καταφαγεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἱερὲς τοῦ Διὸς : Aristoph. Plut. 1176. Sometimes some other foregoing verb is to be understood ; as, ταῦτα πάντα, ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστα δεῖ, ἐπίσταται φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς οὐδενὸς διδασκάλου πώποτε φοιτήσαντα : Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 9. [underst. ἐπίσταται φ.] οὐ γὰρ οἶδα προστυχὼν τοιούτῳ κάλλει, πολλὰς καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐκ ἐξώρους αἰχμαλώτους ἤρηκώς : Heliodor. v, 20. for καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα. Here it is put after πολλὰς instead of before it in the usual manner. νυνὶ γάρ, ὃ πάντες ἐθρυλλεῖτε, ὡς Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖ Φιλίππῳ, γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι : Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 2. Here not only γέγονεν is understood, but οὕτως also, the amplification or augmentation expressed by καὶ ταῦτα being taken from the *manner* in which the event had happened ; καὶ ταῦτα γέγονεν οὕτως, ὡς, &c. See also Demosth. Epist. iii. [p. 1485. l. 18. ed. Reisk.]

II. Sometimes no verb can well be understood ; and ταῦτα appears to drop the nature of a pronoun, and assume that of a particle ; as, τί γὰρ εὐδαίμων γ' ἢ μακαριστὸν μᾶλλον νῦν ἐστι δικαστοῦ, ἢ τρυφερώτερον, ἢ δεινότερον ἔξων, καὶ ταῦτα γέροντος ; Aristoph. Vesp. 549. τί τοῦτο ; κόρη ἔνοπλος ; says Vulcan, when he has laid open Jupiter's head ; μέγα, ὦ Ζεῦ, κακὸν εἶχες ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ; εἰκότως γοῦν δῆθύμιος ἦσθα, τηλικαύτην ὑπὸ τὴν μήνιγγα παρθένον ἔωγονῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ἔνοπλον : Lucian. Dial. Vulc. and Jov. t. i. ἀφ' ἐνὸς ἐγενήθησαν, καὶ ταῦτα νεκρωμένον, *and him too become dead*, καθὼς τὰ ἄστρα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τῷ πλήθει, &c. Hebr. xi, 12. It might be rendered, *although become dead* ; but the latter sense would be less forcible and energetic. Καὶ ταῦτα is found, but rarely, after the participle ; as, Περικλέους δὲ οὐκ ἐφείσω, τεθνηκότος καὶ ταῦτα : Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 504. for καὶ ταῦτα τεθνηκότος.

III. The nature of a pronoun is sometimes so obviously retained,

that it is varied by cases; [and by genders and numbers also. See Abr. of Vig. p. 63. l. 27.] as, οὗτοι γὰρ μῦθοι Ἰώνων οὐκ ἄγουσι Ἀπατούρια, καὶ οὗτοι κατὰ φόνον τινὰ σκῆψιν: Herodot. i, 147. for καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἄγουσι Ἀπατούρια.

KAI TI; KAI TI, KAI TI KAI.—I. Καὶ τί is used in sudden transition from something on which one has been dwelling to something of more moment, or more in point; as, καὶ τί σοι τὸν Ὀρφέα ἢ τὸν Νέανθον λέγω, ὅπου καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐγένετο τις,—ὅς τὸν Ἐπικτήτου λύχρον,—κεραμεοῦν ὄντα, τρισχιλίων δραχμῶν ἐπρίατο; Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 111. *and why should I mention Orpheus, &c.* (after mentioning them.)

II. But τι enclitic diminishes the superadditory force of καὶ, as, ἐν ὀλιγοῖσι ἐπινοοῦντο, ὡς οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς, ἢ ῥαδίως ληψόμενοι βίη. καὶ τι αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατὸς, ἔτι ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὦν, ἐπέσχε: *and moreover in some measure, &c.* Thucyd. iv, 5.

III. A second superadditory καὶ is subjoined, the force of which is weakened by τι, as, κατεσείσθη τὸ τεῖχος ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τι καὶ κατηρέφθη αὐτοῦ: Arrian. Exp. Al. ii, 22. *and moreover some small portion also, &c.*

IV. Some other diminuent word is sometimes added; ὀλίγον e. g. βραχὺ, or the like; as, καὶ τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἔτι βραχὺ, Thucyd. iv, 109.

KAITOI, KAITOITE, KAITOI KAI.—I. The first and pre-valent signification of καὶ τοι is, *and truly*. It is used, when something follows worthy of fresh attention; as, καίτοι σὺ μὲν δύο ἢ τρία (βιβλία) παρ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων (the booksellers) πριάμενος ἔχεις· οἱ δὲ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν διὰ χειρὸς ἔχουσιν αὐτὰ, Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 111.

II. In introducing some new accession to argument by way of corroboration: thus Cyrus, after persuading Cyaxares to be the aggressor, and attack the enemy in order to daunt them, adds, καίτοι, εἴτι ἐκείνους μὲν φοβερωτέρους ποιήσομεν, ἡμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς θαρράλευτέρους, πολὺ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐγὼ πλεονέκτημα νομίζω: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 19. *and truly; or besides. [now; but;]*

III. In pressing an argument in support of advice: thus Hermocrates, after advising the states of Sicily which were at variance, to consult in common, adds, καίτοι γινῶναι χρῆ, ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, ἢ ξυνοδος ἔσται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Συκελίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων δυνησόμεθα ἔτι διασῶσαι: Thucyd. iv, 60. *and indeed.* [It seems rather to introduce a qualification of the advice already given, or an addition to it; *but then.*]

IV. When what has been said is supported by examples or instances, καίτοι performs the office of γοῦν. Thus in Aristophanes the priest of Jupiter says, he has nothing to eat, because no one sacrifices; and the reason being inquired, he replies, ὅτι πάντες εἰσι πλούσιοι, which reason he confirms by example, καίτοι τότε, ὅτ' εἶχον οὐδέν, ὁ μὲν ἂν ἦκων ἔμπορος ἔθυσεν ἱερεῖόν τι σωθεῖς, &c. Plut. 1179.

[*Opposition* seems rather to be intended here, AND YET, *when they had nothing, &c.*]

V. It serves for conclusion or peroration : thus in the *Plutus* of *Aristophanes*, *Poverty*, after recounting the privations which must be endured, if all were rich, adds, *καίτοι τί πλέον πλουτεῖν ἐστί, πάντων τούτων ἀπορούντας* ; 531. [*and yet ; or but now.*] *καίτοι τοῦτο ἐστί παίζοντος* : *Plat. Apol. Socr.* p. 27.

VI. It is used in conclusion also, when that conclusion is not so much in words as in acts : thus *Ulysses* desists with the following words from endeavouring to dissuade *Neoptolemus* from restoring *Philoctetes* his arms ; *καίτοι σ' ἐάσω* [*however I will have done with you,*] *τῷ δὲ σύμπαντι στρατῷ λέξω τάδ' ἔλθων, ὅς σε τιμωρήσεται* : *Sophocle. Philoct.* 1250. [1257. ed. Br.]

VII. It is used in meeting an objection which is understood : thus *Hermocrates* advises the *Sicilians* not to bring the *Athenians* as allies into *Sicily* ; and adds, *καίτοι τῇ ἐαυτῶν ἐκάστοις, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μάλλον, ἢ τὰ ἔτοιμα βλάπτοντας, ξυμμάχους τε ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαμβάνειν* : *Thucyd.* iv, 61. The objection here anticipated is, *and are allies of no advantage then, although one's enemy be superior?* to which it is replied, *yes, they may sometimes be of service, but yet, &c.* So, *διαφθείρειν αὐτὸν ἔφη ἐμέ· καίτοι οὕτω καλὸς κηραθὸς ἦν ἐκεῖνος, ὥς καὶ, &c.* *Xen. Cyrop.* iii, 1, 38. [*and yet.*] After *καίτοι* underst. *ὅπως μὴ ἐπιλέγῃς, ὅτι δίκαια ἄρα πέπονθεν.* The ellipsis is supplied by *Lucian* : *καίτοι, ὅπως μὴ ἐς ἐκείνην ἔχῃς καταφεύγειν τὴν ἀπολογίαν ὕστερον, ἐπιλάθεσθαι λέγων ἐν τοσούτῳ θορύβῳ καὶ πράγματι, δὲς σε τήμερον προσηγόρευκα* : *Lapith.* t. iii. p. 436.

VIII. It is used in introducing a concluding argument ; [of such weight as to supersede the necessity of foregoing ones.] Thus *Cupid*, after defending himself against the charges of *Venus*, adds, *καίτοι τί ἐγὼ ἀδικῶ, δεκνὺς τὰ καλὰ, οἷά ἐστιν ; ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ ἐφίεσθε τῶν καλῶν· μὴ τοίνυν ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθε τούτων* : *Lucian. dial. Ven. et Cupid.* t. 1. [p. 146. D. ed. Salmur. *Καίτοι* here signifies, *but after all.*]

IX. *Καίτοι* sometimes urges an objection ; as, ὁ *Ζεὺς* δῆπου πένεται· —εἰ γὰρ ἐπλούτει, πῶς ἂν—ἀνεκήρυττεν τῶν ἀθλητῶν τοὺς νικῶντας, στεφανώσας κοτίνου στεφάνῳ· *καίτοι* [*whereas*] *χρυσῷ μάλλον ἐχρῆν, εἰπερ ἐπλούτει* : *Aristoph. Plut.* 585.

X. It is sometimes adversative ; as, ἀμέλει, μὰ τὸν Δί', οὐκ ἐνασπιδώσομαι. λέξω δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν *Λακεδαιμονίων*, ἃ μοι δοκεῖ· *καίτοι* δέδοικα πολλά· *although ; and yet* : *Aristoph. Ach.* 369. where δέδοικα is opposed to ἀμέλει. And in v. 465. *Dicaeopolis*, after receiving several things from *Euripides*, says, ἀτέρχομαι· *καίτοι τί δράσω ; δεῖ γὰρ ἐνός, οὗ μὴ τυχῶν ἀπόλωλα* : where to ἀτέρχομαι is opposed οὐκ ἀτέρχομαι, the sense of which is latent in τί δράσω ; or οὕτω δεῖ ἀτέρχεσθαι : [*but yet, upon second thoughts, &c.*]

XI. It is used in the same manner as καὶ μὴν to announce an unexpected arrival : [see καὶ μὴν, § v.] Thus *Eteocles*, seeing *Creon* arrive, while he is giving orders to send for him, says, *καίτοι ποδῶν σῶν μόχθον ἐκλνεί παρών· ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτὸν πρὸς δόμους στείχοντ' ἐμούς* : *Eurip. Phœniss.* 702. [On *καίτοι*, see note z, p. 195. *Abbr. of Vig.*]

XII. Γε is often added, which by its restrictive force augments the assertory force of τοι, as, *καίτοι γ' ἐστὶ σωφρων*: Aristoph. Ach. 611. q. d. *if any thing is true, this certainly is: this at least is certainly true.*

XIII. So when *καίτοι* replies to a tacit objection; as, *ὡς οὖν ἔγνω ὁ Κύριος, ὅτι ἤκουσαν οἱ Φαρισαῖοι, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς πλείονας μαθητὰς ποιεῖ καὶ βαπτίζει ἢ Ἰωάννης· καίτοι γε [although indeed] Ἰησοῦς αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐβάπτισεν, ἀλλ' οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ*: St. John iv, 2. The tacit objection is that Jesus baptized no one. So in Acts xiv. it is said that God suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: to this it might be objected, that he could not have neglected the nations, since there were so many proofs of his beneficence. This possible objection is obviated therefore in v. 17. *καίτοιγε οὐκ ἁμάρτυρον ἑαυτὸν ἀφῆκεν ἀγαθοποιῶν οὐρανόθεν*: *although in truth.*

XIV. In this use it is construed with a participle: *ἀνιαρῶς φέρει τὴν τελευτήν, καίτοιγε τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον διαχλευάζων τοὺς μορμολυτομένους τὸν θάνατον*: Æschin. Socrat. dial. de Mort. So Acts xvii, 27.

XV. Γε is often separated from *καίτοι*, affecting the word, to which it is subjoined, by its superadditory force, the accession effected by γε being confirmed by *καίτοι*: as, *πολλοῦ γε δέω· καίτοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι*: Plat. Phædr. p. 228. (p. 282. ed. Bip.) *προσφθέγμασιν γὰρ οὐ μιάνομαι σέθεν*, says Helen, (speaking to Electra of the slaughter of Clytæmnestra) *εἰς Φοῖβον ἀναφέρουσα τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. καίτοι στένω γε τὸν Κλυταιμνήστρας μόρον*: Eurip. Orest. 77.

XVI. *Καίτοι* strengthens or confirms, and γε urges a new accession of proof in argumentation: as, *εἶπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπιόρκους, πῶς δῆτ' οὐχὶ Σίμων' ἐνέπηρσεν, οὐδὲ Κλεώνυμον, οὐδὲ Θέωρον, καίτοι σφόδρα γ' εἰς' ἐπιόρκοι*; Aristoph. Plut. 398. The accession is marked by *σφόδρα*: not simply perjurers, but thoroughpaced perjurers. [*And yet, here too.*]

XVII. Γε has the same use in pressing a word which gives an objection its greatest weight: thus Brasidas says, he fears the reason of the Acanthians for not admitting him into their town, is that they doubt his ability to repulse the Athenians; and adds, *καίτοι στρατιῇ γε τῇδ', ἣν νῦν ἐγὼ ἔχω,—οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι, πλείονες ὄντες, προσμίζειν*: Thucyd. iv, 85. *this very army, consisting then of no more men than now*: [*but; and yet.*]

XVIII. Γε performs the office mentioned in § xiii. even when disjoined from *καίτοι*: as in Aristoph. Ran. 1104. where Æschylus, after taxing Euripides with having taught the rowers to contradict the magistrates, adds, *καίτοι τότε γ' ἦνικ' ἐγὼ ὤζων, οὐκ ἠπίσταντ', ἀλλ' ἦ μάζαν καλέσαι, καὶ ῥυππαπαὶ εἰπεῖν*: [*whereas in my time, &c.* v. 1072. ed. Br.] The possible objection met by *καίτοι* is, *but they used to do so before.*

XIX. Γε is so added in an adversative sense also: thus Socrates, after saying that his accusers almost made him forget himself, *οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον*, adds, *καίτοι ἀληθές γε οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν*, [*and yet.*] Plat. Apol. [p. 7. l. 3. ed. Bas. 1.]

XX. Γε is repeated in Plato's Phædrus; where to Socrates, saying

the discourse was brought to its close, Phædrus replies, *καίτοι γε ᾧμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν*, p. 241. (p. 310. ed. Bip.) *and yet I certainly thought at least*, &c. The first *γε* corroborates the objective force of *καίτοι*, and the last restricts *ᾧμην*.

XXI. *Καὶ* superadditory is also subjoined to *καίτοι*, as, *ὦν μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοκράτωρ ἦν ἐγὼ κατὰ τὴν πρεσβείαν, τοῦτον ἔσχε τὸν τρόπον ὑμῖν· ἃ δ' οὗτοι, πλείους ὄντες, ἐνίκων, ἅπαντ' ἀπόλωλε. καίτοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἂν πάντα ἀκολούθως τοῦτοις ἐπέπρακτο, εἴ τις ἐπείθετό μοι*: Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 222. *but moreover every thing else too*, &c. [*Καὶ* regards *τᾶλλα*, and not *καίτοι*.]

KAN, KAN EI, KAN EI MH.—I. *Κᾶν* is composed of *καὶ* ἂν, and is a long syllable: Aristoph. Nub. 1128. [1114. ed. Bekk. for Priestley, 1826.] When it is to be shortened, it is written *κ' ἂν*, separately; Theogn. 610. [See Hermann. de emend. rat. Gr. gramm. i. 8. p. 36.] *Κᾶν*, for *καὶ ἐν*, has no accent.

II. When *καὶ* is copulative, and ἂν conditional, a subjunctive mood always follows, ἂν belonging to the conditional clause, and *καὶ* to the apodosis; as, *ἐσωφρόνησας· κᾶν τὰ λοιπὰ οὕτω φρονῆς, ἴσως ἂν ἐκτὸς κλαυμάτων ἔχοις πόδα, and—, if*: Soph. Philoct. 1252. [1259. ed. Br.] where ἂν may be thus resolved, *καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἐ. κ. ἔ. πόδα, ἂν φρονῆς ο. τ. λ.* So, *κᾶν μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι*: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 9.

III. But when, *καὶ* being copulative, ἂν is not conditional, but significative of an oblique future, a subjunctive mood is not put after it, when a condition or supposition follows; as, *κᾶν ἐξέπραξεν, εἰ κατημέλησ' ἐγὼ, and he would have effected it, if*, &c. Soph. Aj. 45.

IV. Sometimes ἂν or ἦν answers to *κᾶν*, when the conditional part of the sentence consists of two members or clauses; as, *κᾶν μὲν πόλεμον αἰρήσθε, μηκέτι ἤκετε δεῦρο ἄνευ ὅπλων, εἰ σωφρονεῖτε· ἦν δὲ εἰρήνης δοκῆτε δεῖσθαι, ἄνευ ὅπλων ἤκετε*: Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 72.

V. *Καὶ* is sometimes referred to an apodosis which is not expressed; as, *κᾶν μὲν ποιήσῃ καρπὸν· εἰ δὲ μή γε*, &c. St. Luke xiii, 9. After *καρπὸν* understand *εὖ ἔξει*, or *ἄφες αὐτήν*, or the like.

VI. When repeated, *κᾶν* may be rendered *whether—or*: as, *πάντα κινεῖται, κᾶν ῥῆγμα, κᾶν στρέμμα, κᾶν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ᾗ*: Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 8. Sometimes it signifies *or* when single, as, *ὁ τὴν Λεπτινῆς, κᾶν τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου λέγῃ*: Demosth.

VII. Sometimes *καὶ* is superadditory, and ἂν signifies the future; as, *ᾗ, ἂν εἰρήνην ὄντας σωφρόνους, (οἰόμεθα αὐτοὺς) κᾶν νῦν ἐπιπληῆσαι, that they would reprove us too*: Plato Phædr. p. 269. (p. 368. ed. Bip.) *νομίσαντες κᾶν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἕκαστοι ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς*, Thucyd. viii, 2.

And in this sense it is used elliptically, as, *εἰ περὶ ἐνὸς τέχνη καλῶς ἡπίσταντο λέγειν, κᾶν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων*: Plat. Ion. p. 534. (p. 187. t. iv. ed. Bip.) underst. *ἡπίσταντο λέγειν*.

VIII. *Κᾶν* is also compounded of *καὶ* superadditory and ἂν conditional, *καὶ* pertaining to what precedes, and ἂν to what follows; as, *ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν κᾶν, ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι—διηλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διηλθες, [διέλθης?]* Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 506. (t. vii. p. 115. ed. Bip.) Here *καὶ* pertains to *ἀρκέσει*, otherwise the second *καὶ* would

be redundant. *If you wish your children, and wife, and friends to live for ever*, says Epictetus, *you are foolish*; and presently adds, οὕτω κἄν τὸν παῖδα θέλῃς μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν, μωρὸς εἶ, and so also, *if, &c.* Enchir. c. 19. So Matth. xxi, 21. xxvi, 35.

IX. Κἄν is sometimes *even*; καὶ being superadditory, and ἂν potential: τοῦτο δὲ ὁ κἄν παῖς γνῶνῃ, Plat. Euthyd. p. 279. which is to be thus resolved, τοῦτο δὲ γνῶνῃ ἂν καὶ ὁ παῖς: which is elliptical, for γνῶνῃ ἂν οὐ μόνον ὅστις οὖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ παῖς. So Lucian, ἐγὼ δὲ κἄν ὀρθοστάδην δειπνήσαιμι, Lapith. t. iii. p. 427.

X. Or ἂν being significative of *will*. Thus with the imperative, κἄν ὡς ἄφρονα δέξασθῃ με, 2 Cor. xi, 16.

XI. Or of an oblique future; as, ἵνα κἄν τοῦ κρασπέδου τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ ἄψωνται, *that they might touch even, &c.* So Acts v, 15. κἄν ἐδέδετο αὐτῷ κεραυνῷ καὶ βροντῇ, *he would even have been bound*: Lucian. Dial. Merc. et Mart. t. i. p. 268.

XII. Ἄν has the significations of will and of an oblique future blended in Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 36. where Tigranes, having been asked how much he would give as a ransom for his wife, answers, ἐγὼ μὲν κἄν τῆς ψυχῆς πριαίμην.

XIII. Or ἂν is conditional, and the superaddition expressed by καὶ more forcible and emphatical; as, κἄν τῶν ἱματίων αὐτοῦ ἄψωμαι, *if I may but even touch his clothes*: St. Mark v, 28. κἄν θηρίον θίγῃ τοῦ ὄρου λιθοβοληθήσεται, Hebr. xii, 20.

XIV. Κἄν signifying a conditional superaddition is construed even with a participle: ἵσως βουλήσεται κἄν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τυχεῖν ὧν μᾶλλον ἢ κρίναι κακῶς: Aristoph. Nub. 1128. [1114. ed. Bekk. for Priestley, 1826.] for καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἂν οὕτω τύχοι.

XV. From this use arises another, which may be called adversative, κἄν being rendered *although*; the conditional superaddition however still remaining: as, ὁ γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ἐγὼ ληφθεῖν, τοιαῦτα πράτων καὶ κατασκευαζόμενος, οὗτος ἐμοὶ πολεμεῖ, κἄν μήπω βάλλῃ: Demosth. Phil. iii. p. 46. The separate force of each particle may be preserved by rendering κἄν *even then*, *if or when*. So καὶ for καὶ εἰ, Eurip. Orest. 295. [279. ed. Pors.] In this sense ἂν may be put before καὶ. See p. 16. iv.

This adversative sense is augmented by ὅμως in the apodosis; as, κἢν με φάγῃς ἐπὶ ῥίξαν, ὅμως ἐτι καρποφορήσω, Epigr.

XVI. On account of that use of ἂν which is treated of in p. 11. r. i. κἄν expresses some degree of doubt or uncertainty; as, πελασται καὶ τοξόται γένοιντ' ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας κἄν ἑξακισμύριοι, [*even, perhaps, to the amount of sixty thousand*:] Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 6.

MA.—I. Μὰ is a particle used for juratory confirmation of something said: by itself it neither affirms nor denies.

II. It is commonly used in negation, οὐ or some other negative word being either expressed or understood. In affirmation ναὶ is usually prefixed: μὰ Δία however occurs, as an affirmative oath, without ναί: as, πολλάκις ὠρακίαισα, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, Libanius. μὰ Δ' ἐχλεύασέ σου Φιλόξενος τὰ ἔπη: Lucian. de Calumn. t. iii. p. 144. μὰ τὴν Ἀρτεμιν, Ἀκοντίῳ γαμοῦμαι: Aristænet. Ep. x. p. 60.

III. But it is much more frequently used in negation with *οὐ* ; either *preceding*, as, οὗτοι, μὰ τὴν γῆν, ταῦτα κατέδεσθον μόνω : Aristoph. Pac. 1117. and, οὐ μὰ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα, &c. Hom. Il. a, 86. or, as is oftener the case, *following*, and pertaining also to what comes after ; as, μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 14. So Philipp. iii. p. 50. [p. 124. l. 22. ed. Reisk.]

Or with some other negative word ; as, ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, γὰρ πεπύσμην οὐδενός : Aristoph. Pac. 614.

IV. Sometimes after *οὐ*, that which is to be denied must be assumed from the foregoing words ; as, Prytanis: κάθησον, σίγα. Dicæop. μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, γὰρ μὲν οὐκ : Aristoph. Ach. 59. underst. *I will not sit still and be silent.* And so in negative replies, as, τί οὖν ; ἂν τις εἴποι· σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά ; Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε : Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 3. underst. γράφω, &c. See Aristoph. Ach. 101. Plato Euthyphr. p. 13. (c. 15. ed. Fisch.)

V. Sometimes, for the sake of greater emphasis, *οὐ* both precedes and follows, but still without pertaining to *μὰ*, as, οὐ, μὰ τὸν Δί', οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρει : Plat. de Rep. vi. (l. vii. p. 70. ed. Bip.) So in Phædr. p. 261. (p. 351. ed. Bip.) Οὐδὲν τοοῦτο precedes in Aristoph. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσται δεινόν, οὐ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς : Vesp. 26.

VI. When *οὐ* is not expressed, ἀλλὰ commonly follows, expressing an opposition which shows that *οὐ* is suppressed ; as in Aristoph. Plut. 1085. [Ran. 1052. ed. Br.] Eurip. πότερον δ' οὐκ ὄντα λόγον τοιοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα ; Æschyl. μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ὄντα. for μὰ Δί', οὐ ξυνέθηκας οὐκ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὄντα. See Aristoph. Plut. 1009. [1008. Br.] Vesp. 173. 296. [297.] 678. [680.] 948. [954.] 1400. Pac. 438. [439.] 987.

Ἀλλὰ sometimes follows at a considerable distance : thus in Eurip. Phœniss. μὰ τὸν μετ' ἄστρον Ζῆν', &c. is in v. 1013. and ἀλλὰ opposed to the negation is in v. 1016. The ellipsis is supplied in Aristoph. Ran. 1214. [1183. ed. Br.] where Euripides having said that Œdipus was a happy man, Æschylus replies, μὰ τὸν Δί', οὐ δῆρ', ἀλλὰ κακοδαίμων. So also in Vesp. 169.

VII. Sometimes instead of ἀλλὰ, γὰρ follows, which implies the suppression of a negative by expressing the cause of the negation : as, γεγράφεται παρ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ἱερωμένους δέχεσθαι σε, καὶ διορθομένον εἴκειν. ἦν δὲ μὴ γράψης, ἔφη, οὐ δέξονται με ; μὰ Δί', εἶπε· ἐμὴ γὰρ, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀρχή : Philostr. de Vit. Apollon. Tyan. iv, 40. Here *οὐ* is evidently suppressed before *μὰ Δί'*.

The negative is sometimes to be assumed, not from any preceding words, as in the last example, but extrinsically ; as, μή τι, ἔφη, προστίθης ; μὰ Δί', εἶπεν, εἴρηκα γὰρ, ib. vi, 11. for *οὐ*, μὰ Δί'.

VIII. Οὐ μὰ, ναὶ μὰ, μὰ all occur in the same verse in Aristoph. Cl. οὐκ αὖ μ' ἔασεις ; Isic. οὐ μὰ Δία. Cl. ναὶ μὰ Δία. Isic. μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, (underst. οὐκ ἔασω σε :) Eq. 338. [339.]

I.—ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PARTICLES MEN AND ΔΕ.

I. Of *μὲν* and *δὲ* it may be said in general that they are correlative

particles employed to connect, and at the same time to oppose or to distinguish propositions, or clauses of sentences, or words.

II. When they refer to two things already distinguished or opposed, *μὲν* usually refers to the first, and *δὲ* to the last; as, *πειρῶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα εἶναι φιλόπονος, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν φιλόσοφος· ἵνα τῷ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖν δύνῃ τὰ δόξαντα, τῇ δὲ προορᾷ ἐπίστη τὰ συμφέροντα*: Isocr. ad Dem. p. 20. But sometimes the contrary is observed; as, *ἡγοῦ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων πολλὰ πολλῶν εἶναι χρημάτων κρείττω, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (i. e. χρήματα) ταχέως ἀπολείπει, τὰ δὲ (i. e. ἀκούσματα) πάντα τὸν χρόνον παραμένει*: ib. p. 11. So p. 20. init. and, *περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ δόξαν καλὴν, ἣ πλοῦτον μέγαν τοῖς παισὶ καταλιπεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (viz. πλοῦτος) θνητὸς, ἡ δὲ (δόξα) ἀθάνατος*: Id. ad Nicocl. p. 41.

III. Hence may arise ambiguity, which is obviated by some addition, or by repetition of something preceding; as, *ἔχει δὲ ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν· γεωργοῦσιν τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν Εἰλωτες, τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίουχοι*: Aristot. Polit. ii, 8. and sometimes there is a repetition with both *μὲν* and *δὲ*: [of which the example may be seen in the Abr. of Vig. p. 2. l. 16.] *Μὲν* is referred to the former of two things and *δὲ* to the latter, and the contrary, with strange variation, in Isocr. Nicocl. p. 59. and 60.

IV. *Μὲν* and *δὲ* are not inelegantly subjoined to words repeated by the figure *anaphora*; as, *ἔχον μὲν ψυχὴν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα*, Plat. Phædr. p. 246. (p. 320. ed. Bip.) See also de Rep. vi. p. 494. (t. vii. p. 91. ed. Bip.) *ἔργον μὲν νυκτὸς λῦσαι ἵππους, ἔργον δὲ χαλινῶσαι, ἔργον δ' ἐπισάξαι, ἔργον δ' ἐπιθωρακίσασθαι*: Xen. Cyrop. iii.

V. Regularly these particles are subjoined to the words which have a mutual relation or opposition: but in poetry a regard to the metre has sometimes produced a different arrangement; as, *ἦτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε, &c.* Il. γ, 213. for *Μενέλαος μὲν*: for Ulysses is opposed to him; and, *οὐδὲ μὲν ἄλλοι Τρῶες ἐφ' ἵππων ἡγερέθοντο, ἀλλ' ἀποβάντες ὄρουσαν*: Il. μ, 82. for *οὐδ' ἐφ' ἵππων μὲν, ἀλλ' (for δὲ) ἀποβάντες*.

VI. In dialogues the connection effected by *μὲν* and *δὲ* is not destroyed by the interruption of another speaker, but is completed by subsequent continuation of what had been begun: as, Socr. *προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον—; ἦ γὰρ τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης*; Phædr. *ναί. Socr. δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα, &c.*

VII. Sometimes the *μὲν* is used by one speaker, and the *δὲ* by another, anticipating the remaining words of the former: thus when one has said that he does not reckon certain persons among philosophers, but thinks them *ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις*, another continues, *τοὺς δ' ἀληθινούς τίνας λέγεις*; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 475. (t. vii. p. 57. ed. Bip.)

VIII. Sometimes the form of words following with *δὲ* is varied, so as not to be conformable to that which has preceded with *μὲν*: as, *εἶτα τῷ μὲν Δάμιδι,—οὐκ ἄδικα μέντοι ἔπαθες, ἔφην—· σὺ δὲ, ὦ Ἀκαρνᾶν, τί αἰτιᾷ τὸν ἔρωτα*; Lucian. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 442. The regular construction would have been, *τῷ μὲν Δάμιδι ἔφην,—τῷ δὲ Δάμιδι, σὺ, ὦ Ἀκαρνᾶν—*.

IX. When there are three or more members or clauses, *μὲν* is put

in the first, and δὲ in each of the following. An example of three is in *Iliad*. ε, 385. of four in *Lysias Orat. Fun.* p. 490. [p. 54. l. 6. ed. Reisk.] of five in *Theocrit.* viii, 57. of six in *Lysias Or. Fun.* p. 501. [p. 91. l. 3. ed. Reisk.] of a great number in *Iliad*. β, 494. 511. 527. 536. 546. 557. 559. 569. 581. 591. 603. and so on to the end of the catalogue. But sometimes the δὲ is suppressed in every member or clause, as in *Solon*. v. 43.

X. When there is a subordinate partition in either of the principal clauses or members, it is effected by a subsidiary addition of μὲν and δέ: as, ἐπαίνου μὲν ἔνεκα πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύεσθαι· λαβεῖν δ' ἐν ταῖς γνώμας βεβαίως τοῦτο, ὥς, &c. *Xen. Cyrop.* iii. p. 84. So in the beginning of the 1 *Philipp.* of *Demosth.* [p. 40. l. 1. ed. Reisk.] εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινος is opposed to ἐπεὶ δὲ, and in the first member there is a subordinate opposition of εἰ μὲν ἤρεσκε to εἰ δὲ μή.

XI. When there is a third partition subordinate to the second, μὲν and δέ are thrice used, each severally in the member or clause to which it belongs, so that the first δὲ answers to the last μὲν, the second to the second, and the last to the first: thus, (A) Ἐὰν μὲν¹ δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαίταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαθόντα, (i) μακάριον μὲν² καὶ ὁμοιοσητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμιοι ὄντες, (a) δουλωσάμενοι μὲν,³ ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγένετο, (b) ἐλευθερώσαντες δέ,¹ ᾧ ἀρετῇ, (ii) τελευτήσαντες δέ² δὴ ὑπὸ πτεροῖ καὶ ἐλαφοῖ γεγονότες, &c. (B) ἐὰν δέ³ διαίτη φορτικωτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῃ, φιλοτίμῃ δὲ χρήσωνται, &c. *Plat. Phædr.* p. 256. (p. 341. ed. Bip.)

XII. *Herodotus* repeats μὲν and δέ without any subordinate partition, but with a repetition of certain words in place as it were of such partition: εἰ δὲ ἡ στάσις ἥλλακτο τῶν ὥρέων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τῇ μὲν νῦν ὁ βορέης τε καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐστᾶσι, ταύτῃ μὲν τοῦ νότου ἦν ἡ στάσις καὶ τῆς μεσημβρίας· τῇ δὲ ὁ νότος νῦν ἔστηκε, ταύτῃ δὲ ὁ βορέης, ii, 26.

XIII. Μὲν is sometimes [for the sake of perspicuity] repeated even in the same member, when there are but two, as when the initial words are repeated on account of a long hyperbaton; thus, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον, καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἥ— —, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει,— αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται: *Plato Phæd.* p. 108. (c. 57. ed. Fisch.)

XIV. Instead of δέ other particles are sometimes used as correlative to μὲν: thus, παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως: *Iliad*. γ. 214. So *Eurip. Orest.* 562. [556. ed. Pors.] and *St. Paul, Rom.* xiv, 20.— οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον,— αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ', *Il.* α, 50. Τὸ μὲν πλεῖον πολυαῖκος πολέμοιο χεῖρες ἐμαὶ διέπουνσ'· ἀτὰρ— σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μείζον: *ib.* 166. τοῦτο μὲν— τοῦτ' αὖθις, for τοῦτο μὲν, τοῦτο δέ: *Soph. Antig.* 107. [165. ed. Brunck.] ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, οὐ μέντοι δύναται: *Aristot. de Rep.* i, 6. μανθάνω, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ· ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν, &c. *Plat. de Rep.* vi. p. 511. (p. 124. ed. Bip.) ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπίστασθαι— οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει οὐδὲ σμικρὸν ἁρμονίας ἐπάτειν—: *Plat. Phædr.* p. 268. (p. 367. ed. Bip.) δυστυχῶν μὲν, πλὴν ἀλλ' Ἑλλήνων: *Heliodor. Æthiop.* vi, 7.

When difference only, and not opposition, is denoted, καὶ or τε is sometimes put in the place of δέ: as, κάρτιστοι μὲν ἔσαν, καὶ καρτίστοις ἐμάχοντο: Iliad. α, 267. Πάλιν κατάσθηθ' ἡσύχῳ μὲν ὄμματι, χροῖα τ' ἀδήλῳ τῶν δεδραμένων ὑπέρ: Eurip. Orest. 1317. [χροῖα δ' ἀδήλῳ in Porson's edition v. 1311.] On the contrary δέ is put for τε, and answers to a preceding τε, in Iliad. ε, 359. φίλε κασίγνητ', ἐκκόμισαί τέ με, δὸς δέ μοι ἵππους.

II.—OF THE USE OF THE PARTICLES MEN AND ΔΕ.

I. The first use of these particles is in transition; when μὲν is put in the conclusion of one part of a speech or narration, and δέ in the beginning of the next; as, ἀλλ' ἦτοι μὲν ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὖθις. νῦν δ' ἄγε, νῆα μέλαιναν ἐρύσσομεν, &c. Iliad. α, 140. ὁ μὲν οὕτως εἶπεν. ἀκούσαντες δέ οἱ Πέρσαι, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 19.

II. This use is most remarkable when the transition is from one important or capital part of a history or other work to another: thus Thucydides closes his account of the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, and at the same time his third book, with these words, ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἔκτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε, ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψε· and begins his account of the seventh year, and his fourth book, with τοῦ δ' ἐπιγενομένου θέρους, &c. See also the conclusion of the fifth chapter, and the commencement of the sixth, of Aristot. de Rep. i.

III. The second use is in partition, when the article is joined with each of the particles; as, τό τ' αὖ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἄλκιμον εἶναι, οὗ τῷ μὲν προσῆκον, τῷ δ' οὐ: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 5.

The partition is more remarkable, when the whole to be divided precedes in the genitive case: as, ἣν δέ ἡμέων οἱ μὲν καταπροδιδῶσι, οἱ δέ μὴ θέλωσι τιμωρεῖν: Herodot. vii, 157. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δέ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν: Epict. Ench. c. 1.

IV. This use is remarkably elegant, when μὲν and δέ mark different parts or respects of a single thing: ἡ τοῦ βεύματος ἐκείνου πηγή—ἡ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδν, ἡ δ', ἀπομεινόμενη, ἔξω ἀπορρέει: Plat. Phædr. p. 255. (p. 339. ed. Bip.) ἄρ' οὖν ἂν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἶδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δέ οὐ; Id. de Rep. v. p. 475. (p. 56. ed. Bip.)

V. The fourth use is in signifying that two things mentioned are not to be disjoined: this is effected by the negative οὐ followed by μὲν and δέ, a second negative being subjoined to δέ: as, δεῖν γὰρ ὄντων οὐχ ὁ μὲν τλήμων, ὁ δ' οὐ, Eurip. Hel. 652. Another example is the climax in Demosth. pro Cor. p. 339. [p. 288. l. 8. ed. Reisk. See Abr. of Vig. p. 197. l. 14.] See ad Herenn. iv, 25. [§ 34.]

VI. In the fifth use the particles are adversative, when μὲν introduces something which might seem at first to preclude what is expressed by the words with which δέ is connected; as, τούτους ἂν μοι δοκῶ καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντας ῥῶον φέρειν, ἢ τοὺς μισοῦντας μὲν, ἐκπλεω δέ πάντα ἀνάγκη διαποιοιμένους: those, who, although they hate, yet

nevertheless, &c. Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 28. οὐδὲν μὲν εἰς ἀλλήλας προίενται, τίκτουσι δὲ ὧα : Ælian. V. H. i, 15.

The opposition is not less elegant in a sentence of one member ; as, μόλις μὲν, ἐξέτεινε δ' εἰς ἡπαρ ζήφος, Eurip. Phœniss. 1340. ἤδε γὰρ γυνὴ δούλη μὲν, εἴρηκεν δ' ἐλεύθερον λόγον : Soph. Trach. 62.

VII. This adversative use depends on ὅμως, which is usually understood, but sometimes expressed : as, Θετταλοὶ δὲ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης μὲν, ὅμως δὲ ἐμῆδιζον : Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 298. μόλις μὲν, ἐπείθετο δ' οὖν ὅμως : Heliodor. Æthiop. viii, 7.

VIII. The sixth use is to denote celerity ; as, τὸ μὲν ἔπεσεν, ἡ δ' ἔχει δαῖτα : Ælian. V. H. i, 2. *no sooner does it fall into the web, than she (the spider) seizes her repast.*

IX. The seventh use is in exception ; as, ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τόδε δὲ : *nothing—except this* : Plat. de Rep. v. (p. 7. ed. Bip.) ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἐφιλοφρονήσατο αὐτῷ, εἶπε δὲ : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 8. λέοντα καὶ νοσοῦντα τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὀνίνησι· φάρμακον δὲ ἔστιν αὐτῷ τῆς νόσου βρωθεὶς πίθηκος, Ælian. V. H. i, 9. Sometimes a negative word is used without ἄλλος, as, λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα, Δημνίου δὲ καὶ Ἰμβριίου : Thucyd. iv, 28.

X. The eighth use is elliptical ; and this is threefold : First, when μὲν is suppressed ; as, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν ; PH. παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου· πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον, &c. for παρὰ Λυσίου μὲν : Plat. Phædr. in init. See St. James ii, 11. St. Matth. xvi, 26. and p. 38. ii.

Without the observation of this ellipsis, many passages cannot be rightly understood or interpreted : thus, in Rom. vi, 17. χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ, ὅτι ἦτε δούλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας, appears an absurdity, when thus taken separately ; but μὲν being understood after ἦτε, shows that the clause is to be taken in close connection with the following one in which δὲ corresponds to μὲν : ὑπηκούσατε δὲ ἐκ καρδίας εἰς τὸν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδασχῆς. And in Acts viii, 39, 40. Πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἤρπασε τὸν Φίλιππον, καὶ οὐκ εἶδεν αὐτὸν ὁ Εὐνούχος· ἐπορεύετο γὰρ τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ χαίρων· Φίλιππος δὲ εὗρέθη εἰς Ἀζωτον,—the mere proceeding of the eunuch on his journey seems no good reason why he did not see Philip ; but when we understand μὲν after ἐπορεύετο, it appears that the reason indicated by γὰρ is to be inferred from both the clauses taken together, in the connection marked by the two correlative particles.

XI. Μὲν is frequently suppressed in partitions having a subdivision in one or other of the members ; as, τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσθλὴ μὲν ἀπόκρισις, ἐσθλὰ δὲ ἔργα· τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄνεμοι δειλὰ φέρουσιν ἔπη : Theogn. 1167. for τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν, &c. and in the subordinate partition of the first member : τελαμῶσιν ἔλκη τὰ μὲν ἐγὼ σ' ἰάσομαι, τλήμων ἱατρὸς ὄνομ' ἔχουσα, τάργα δ' οὐ· τὰ δ' ἐν νεκροῖσι φροντίσει πατὴρ σέθεν : for ὄνομα μὲν, &c. Eurip. Troad. 1232. or of both : ὅς πρῶν μὲν ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἥρῃ στεῦτ' ἀγορεύων, Τρωσὶ (μὲν) μαχήσεσθαι, ἀτὰρ Ἀργεῖοισιν ἀρήξει· νῦν δὲ μετὰ Τρώεσσιν (μὲν) ὀμιλεῖ, τῶν δὲ λέλασται : Iliad. ε, 831.

XII. On the other hand δὲ is omitted either in the apodosis, or together with it. First, in the apodosis : φοῖτα γ' ἄλλοτε μὲν πρόσθ' Hoog.

Ἐκτορος, ἄλλοτ' ὅπισθεν, for ἄλλοτε δέ: Iliad. ε, 595. ἀλλ' ἤδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στομίῳ ἑσμέν' ἀποβλέπειν χρή καὶ ἀποσκοπεῖν πόρρωθεν τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους: Lucian. Dial. Mort. xxvii. c. 8. and frequently after ἔπειτα, when πρῶτα μὲν has preceded; as in Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (p. 356. ed. Bip.) After εἶτα in Aristoph. Vesp. 1101. [1106. ed. Br.]

XIII. Δέ is suppressed *together with* the apodosis itself, when there is an aposiopesis occasioned by interruption; as, Œd. ὦ θύγατερ, αἰνῶ μὲν σε τῆς προθυμίας. Ant. ἀλλ' εἰ γαμοίμην, σὺ δὲ μόνος φεύγεις, πάτερ; Eurip. Phœniss. 1677. So Lucian: οὐτοσὶ μὲν ὅτι Κέρβερός ἐστιν, &c. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 412. [p. 270. B. ed. Salmur.]

XIV. And where there is no appearance of aposiopesis; thus, *Tantalus was punished*, says Electra, ὡς μὲν λέγουσιν, ὅτι—ἀκόλαστον ἔσχε γλώσσαν: Eurip. Orest. 8. Here the apodosis may be, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ σαφῶς οἶδα, or the like. And so Dicæopolis, begging of Euripides the stage dress of one of his heroes, whose name he cannot recollect; when several have been named to him, and at last Bellerophon, says, οὐ Βελλεροφόντης, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνος (*the one I mean*) μὲν ἦν χωλὸς, προσαιτῶν, στωμύλος, δεινὸς λέγειν: Aristoph. Ach. 427. [428. Br.] Here the apodosis may be ἄλλους δ' ἔω.

XV. This ellipsis of the apodosis is very frequent when μὲν is added to the first person, especially of the singular number; when it is both restrictive and affirmative; as, ἐμοὶ μὲν, εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ' Ἑλλήνων χθόνα τεθράμμεθ', ἀλλ' οὖν ξυνερά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν: Eurip. Phœniss. 500. *to me at least certainly it appears so, whatever others may think*. So Dicæopolis, when ordered to be silent, answers, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ἦγὼ μὲν οὐ: Aristoph. Ach. 59.

XVI. When the affirmation of μὲν might appear too strong, it is lessened by the addition of πον, as, μνημονεύεις μὲν πον, ὅτι, &c. Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 504. (p. 110. ed. Bip.) Cf. Iliad. γ, 308.

XVII. The affirmation is more emphatical, when one affirms not only of others, but more especially of himself, for whom his own consciousness enables him best to answer; as, ἡθελήσαμεν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς (ἐγὼ μὲν Παῦλος) καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δις: 1 Thessal. ii, 18. *I Paul at least certainly*.

XVIII. In dialogues it sometimes happens that when one speaker has used μὲν in a restrictive sense, another taking it as correlative to δέ in an apodosis to follow, answers it himself with δέ, as, Lamach. ἐγὼ μὲν πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις αἰεὶ πολεμήσω—. Dicæop. ἐγὼ δὲ κηρύττω καὶ Πελοποννησίοις, &c. Aristoph. Ach. 620.

XIX. In these and the like passages, where μὲν occurs without δέ, it may, if its use only be regarded, perform the office of γε: but if its nature be considered, it is always necessary to assume an apodosis extraneously: for it is even found joined with γε, as in Iliad. α, 216. and in Aristoph. Ach. 153. [154.] In the first passage, therefore, χρή μὲν σφώτερόν γε, θεᾷ, ἔπος εἰρύσασθαι, the apodosis λήγειν δὲ ἔριδος is to be understood, which is in v. 210. and in the passage of Aristoph. Dicæop. κάκιστ' ἀπολόμην εἴ τι τούτων πείθομαι, ὧν εἶπας—. Theor. καὶ νῦν ὅπερ μαχιμώτατον Θρακῶν ἔθνος ἔπεμψεν ὑμῖν. Dicæop. τοῦτο μὲν γ' ἤδη σαφές: γε limits τοῦτο, and μὲν requires its apodosis,

which is to be understood, τὰ δὲ πρόσθεν λεχθέντα ἔω. See also v. 754. and Lucian. adv. Indoct. i. iii. p. 108. init.

XX. From the affirmative use of μὲν arises its use in *approbation*; as, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, Plat. de Rep. v. p. 472. αὐταὶ μὲν ὄζουσι ἀμβροσίας καὶ νέκταρος, Aristoph. Ach. 195.

XXI. It is used also in *recommendation*; as Amphitheus, in offering the truces, says, αὐταὶ μὲν εἰσι πεντέτεις: Aristoph. Ach. 187. in which passages also the ellipsis of the apodosis before treated of may be supposed.

XXII. Sometimes both particles are suppressed; as, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ, τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης: Plat. Phædr. p. 244. for τὴν μὲν ἐκ θεοῦ, τῆς δὲ παρ' ἁ. γ.

MEN ΔΗ.—I. Δὴ is subjoined to μὲν, first in its primary signification of *time*; *now*; as, τὰ μὲν δὴ τόξ' ἔχεις: Soph. Philoct. 1300. [1308. ed. Br.] So Hom. Il. α. 514.

II. Sometimes μὲν is limitative or restrictive, and δὴ superadditory; when something more important or urgent is added to what has preceded; when the last and finishing accession is made to representation or discourse. Thus the deserters inform Cyrus that his enemies ἐξίοιεν τε ἤδη σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις, καὶ παρατάττοι αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔξω ὦν, καὶ παρακελεύοιτο μὲν δὴ τοῖς αἰεὶ ἔξω οὔσι πολλὰ τε καὶ ισχυρὰ: *and moreover that he was now even exhorting them*, &c. Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 48.

III. Μὲν δὴ are used in entering on a subject after prefatory matter; as, τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων περὶ ὁμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε αἰεὶ ἐρῶσιν, &c. Plat. de Rep. vi. (p. 71. ed. Bip.) *let this then*, &c. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ πῦρ, καὶ γῆ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀήρ, ὅτι σώματα ἐστί, δηλον: Id. in Timæo p. 53. (p. 351. ed. Bip.)

IV. In transitions too, μὲν δὴ concludes what precedes, and δὲ in the apodosis commences that which is to follow; as, Χρυσάντας μὲν δὴ οὕτως εἶπεν· ἀνέστη δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ Φεραύλας Πέρσης: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 7. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω· τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς—λάβωμεν: Plat. Phædr. p. 246. (p. 321. ed. Bip.)

V. When δὴ is added in the apodosis as well as in the protasis, it has its hortatory force, without dropping its use in transition; as, ὁ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὃν, περὶ οὗ βουλευτέον, εἴρηται τε καὶ ὠρισται βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν, &c. *now then, looking to that*, &c. Plat. Phædr. p. 258.

VI. In transition μὲν δὴ may be understood in the conclusion of one topic, when the next begins with δὲ alone; thus, in ὦν ἔνεκα δεῖ μόνους καὶ προστάτας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἡγεμόνας τῶν πόλεων γίνεσθαι. Ἐπέδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἀρετήν: Lysias Or. Fun. p. 513. after ὦν we may understand μὲν δὴ: *on account of these things then truly*, &c. and δὲ may be rendered *farther*.

VII. From the primary signification of time which has been noted in δὴ, arises the use of μὲν δὴ in conclusions: for on finishing a subject, a kind of self-satisfaction and complacency, or exultation, at

having now shown, or proved, what was proposed, is indicated : and indeed in transitions *δη* seems to have no other effect than that of concluding what has preceded. Plato concludes a dissertation on friendship with these words : τὸ μὲν δὴ φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν πέφανται φιλεῖν, *thus then truly it appears, &c.* Lys. p. 222. (t. v. p. 250. ed. Bip.) and one, in which he shows that although such a republic as he has described may no where actually exist, yet it does not follow that it is not the best, with these, τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκαστέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, ταῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δὴ γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν : *this being so then, do not exact of me, &c.* de Rep. v. p. 473. (t. vii. p. 51. ed. Bip.) Hence those conclusions so frequent in Plato, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα and καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτη : [*so much then for this.*]

VIII. The particles being thus frequently used in commencement, transition, and conclusion, it will readily appear that they suit *continuation* also ; for continuation of the same subject is often carried on through different divisions. Thus, ἡ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτὸν καθέωρων —κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον μὲν σφῶν ἐπέχοντα, ταύτη πυκνὰς ἐπέταξαν τῇ ὄχθῃ τὰς ἱλας τῶν ἵππων. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφότερά τὰ στρατεύματα ἐπ' ἄκρον τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφειστώτες—ἡσυχίαν ἦγον : Arrian. de Exp. Al. i, 15. *afterwards ; after this ; this being done.* This use is very common in recital of dialogues, or of any words spoken alternately by more than one person : thus Xenophon, after reciting the words of Tigranes, proceeds, ὁ μὲν δὴ Κύρος ἐπὶ τούτοις εἶπε φεῦ τοῦ ἀνδρός. ὁ δὲ Ἀρμένιος ἔλεξεν οὕτως : Cyrop. iii, 1. 39. Thus continuation has always some resemblance to commencement ; especially when narration is resumed after interruption ; as in Aristoph. Plut. 728.

MEN OYN, MEN OYN ΓΕ, MEN OYN ΔΗ.—I. When μὲν is prefixed to the collective particle οὖν, and δὲ or some particle of similar power follows, a double conclusion is indicated, which is distinguished by μὲν and the particle opposed to it. Thus Menelaus, being entreated by Orestes to assist him, replies that he has but a small force left, whence he concludes, μάχη μὲν οὖν ἂν οὐχ ὑπερβαλοίμεθα Πελασγὸν Ἄργος· εἰ δὲ μαλθακοῖς λόγοις δυνάμεθ', ἐνταῦθ' ἐλπίδος προσήκομεν. Eurip. Or. 690. [683. ed. Pors.] *in battle therefore certainly, or at least, &c.*

II. Μὲν οὖν, as well as μὲν alone, has a restrictive sense : ἐν μὲν οὖν τουτί μ' ἕασον ἐλκύσαι, καὶ μηκέτι, *this one only or at least ;* Aristoph. Pac. 327.

III. It is also inceptive, after general introduction ; but with less indication of preparation or promptness than *δη* gives to μὲν *δη* in a similar use : περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτειῶν οἶμαι πᾶσι δοκεῖν, &c. *with respect then to commonwealths, &c.* Isocr. Nicocl. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εὐσέβει τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, Isocr. ad Demon. p. 8. It is even used in the beginning of a whole work, [but with reference to something introductory : see Abr. of Vig. p. 200. l. 6. and note *h* on p. 169.] δὲ being afterwards used for transition in beginning each following head or chapter. Thus Theophrastus, after a preface, begins the first chapter of his ethic characters with, ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δόξειεν ἂν

εἶναι—προσποίησις, &c. the second with τὴν δὲ κολακειάν ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις—: the third with ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ, &c. and so on.

IV. It is used in commencement of action also, as well as of speech; as, χωρεῖτ', ἐπειγώμεσθ'. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τρίβον τήνδ' ἐκφυλάξω: Eurip. Or. 1257. [1255. ed. Pors. and *I then, for my part*, &c.]

V. Hence it has in some manner an incitative force, without dropping its collective or inceptive one; as, νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, [ὦ ἄνδρες] προσευξώμεσθα πρῶτον τῇ θεῷ: now therefore come, let us first, &c. Aristoph. Pac. 559. Μὲν may moreover exert its restrictive power.

VI. Μὲν οὖν, like μὲν δὲ, is used in conclusion, especially when the sum or result of what has been told in a long recital is collected: thus a messenger in the Phœnissæ of Euripides closes his narration of the Thebans' defence of their city, and the repulse of the enemy, with these words, πύργων μὲν οὖν γῆς ἔσχομεν κατασκαφὰς εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν ἡμέραν· εἰ δ' εὐτυχὴς ἔσται τολοιπὸν ἡδε γῆ; θεοῖς μέλει. v. 1203. So St. Luke closes his account of the liberation of the Apostles, with οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπορεύοντο χαίροντες: Acts v. 41.^a

VII. Hence it suits the peroration of a whole speech: thus, ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἃ τε γινώσκω, παρήνεσα, &c. Isocrat. Nicocl. [ad Nicocl. p. 61. l. 8. ed. Battie.]

VIII. It is used in resuming a discussion interrupted by narration, or narration interrupted by discussion: thus Aristotle resumes a discussion interrupted by an anecdote of Thales, with these words, Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν,—&c. de Rep. i. 7. and Thucydides, after a digression, thus resumes his narration, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρεσκευάζετο. ὁ δὲ Ἰπποκράτης — τὸν Δημοσθένη προαπέστειλε, &c. iv. 76, 77. See also Acts xxviii, 5.

In these passages the transition is facilitated by the cooperation of δὲ with μὲν οὖν, as in the passage also above cited from Acts v. and in St. John xix, 24.

IX. And in the same manner transition in general is marked and made evident by the association of these particles: e. g. ταῦτα μὲν ὦν δι' ἀμοιβαίων οἱ παῖδες ἄεισαν· τὰν πυμάτων δ' ᾧδαν οὕτως ἐξἄρχε Μενάλκας, Theocr. viii, 61. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα· εἰ δέ τι σὺ ὑποθῆς, ἡγούμενος παραλελεῖσθαι, ἐρώτα: Plat. Phædr. p. 234.

X. Μὲν οὖν is used in the same manner as μὲν δὲ for continuation; that continuation being no more than transition from one part of the same subject to another: see Hebr. vii, 11.

XI. For μὲν οὖν the Ionic writers and the poets use μέν νυν both for commencement and transition: as Herodot. e. g. vi, 109. ii, 27.

^a Hoogeven observes of the passage from Euripides, that the indication of conclusion is almost wholly in οὖν, since μὲν is opposed to the following δέ. The same may perhaps be said of the words of St. Luke: for immediately after the con-

clusion of the subject, follow these words, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις, &c. And the words βούλου δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. immediately follow the passage presently afterwards cited from Isocrates. J. S.

XII. From the collective use of *μὲν οὖν* is derived its force in confirmation or asseveration, which of course is strengthened by the support of argument. This force *οὖν* has alone; but *μὲν*, when not followed by *δὲ*, increases it by its limitative or restrictive power. The particles exert the force now spoken of most frequently in affirmative answers, the arguments on which assent or affirmation is founded being understood, and to be assumed extraneously; but some preceding words, or similar to some preceding, or some other words adjutory of the affirmation, being prefixed to *μὲν οὖν*. E. g. —1. a preceding word; *οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδουκεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας*; Euth. *δέδουκε μὲν οὖν*: *he does fear, in truth*: Plat. Euthyp. (c. 13. ed. Fisch.) *ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως*; Pr. *οὕτω μὲν οὖν*: Id. in Phileb. *οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ*; Πεισόμεθα *μὲν οὖν*: Id. de Rep. v. p. 469. (p. 43. ed. Bip.)—2. Similar words: *ἄρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς*; Answ. *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό*: Id. Phædr. p. 230. (p. 286. ed. Bip.) *τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφύως τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι εἰρησθαι*; Socr. *δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν*: ib. p. 234. (p. 294. ed. Bip.)—3. Other words auxiliary to the affirmation: *ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν*, ib. p. 262. l. 7. (p. 354. ed. Bip.) *παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν*, ib. p. 269. (p. 368. Bip.) *παντελῶς μὲν οὖν*: Id. de Rep. vi. p. 496. l. 9. (Bip. 94.) *πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα*, Id. in Phileb. [p. 154. l. 30. ed. Bas. 1.] *πάνν μὲν οὖν*, Id. de Rep. v. p. 468. (p. 41. ed. Bip.) [and in Phileb. p. 154. l. 24. ed. Bas. 1.]

XIII. It is used in affirmative answers to anticipated objections stated interrogatively with a negative: as, *οὐδὲν οὖν ἔχεις ἀντὶ τοῦ δείπνου*; *ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, yes you have*: Epict. Ench. c. 32.

XIV. Also for encouragement, in place of *ἡμέλει*, *quiet your apprehensions*. Thus in the Orestes of Euripides, the chorus, having been chidden by Electra for awaking her brother Orestes, replies, *εὐδειν μὲν οὖν νιν ἔδοξα, be easy; I think he still sleeps*: v. 169. [nay.]

XV. The confirmation expressed by *μὲν οὖν* is heightened by its *corrective* use, when something affirmed is substituted for something preceding, which is denied: thus in the Vesp. of Aristoph. the indictment against the dog ends with, *τίμημα κλωὸς σύκινος*: to which Philocleon replies, *θάνατος μὲν οὖν κύνειος, ἦν ἅπαξ ἀλφ'*: *nay, &c.* v. 893. [898. ed. Br.] See also Aristoph. Ach. 285. Or when something more correct, or of more importance, follows, without denial of what precedes; as, Philocl. *ἐξαμαρτάνω δικάζων*; Bdel. *καταγελῶμενος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐπαίεις ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν, οὐς σὺ μονοῦ προσκυνεῖς*: *nay, what is more*: Aristoph. Vesp. 513. [515. ed. Br.]

XVI. *Δὴ* being added, *μὲν οὖν δὴ* is both inceptive and hortatory: thus Socrates, after a definition mutually agreed on, begins, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως, ἅπαντι δῆλον*: Plat. Phædr. p. 237. (p. 301. ed. Bip.)

XVII. By transposition *μὲν δὴ οὖν* is formed; of which *μὲν δὴ* serves for transition, and *οὖν* for conclusion or inference: as, *ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε διαίταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἀγαθόντα, μακάριον καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσι*: *if therefore, &c.* ib. p. 256. (341. Bip.)

MENTOI, with the annexed particles.—I. *Μέντοι* appears to be sometimes one compound word, at other times two separate particles in juxta-position; the latter seems to be the case, when *τοι* affirms, and *δέ* following is to be referred to *μέν*; as, *ταχύ μέν τοι παρήγγελλον, ταχύ δέ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἐπόλουν*: Xen. Cyrop. ii. 4. 2. and so in iii. 3. 9.

II. When *δέ* does not follow, *τοι* may strengthen the limitation expressed by *μέν*: as, *οὐ μέν τοι ἐγὼ τόσον αἰτίος εἰμι, I certainly am not in truth so much to blame, &c.* Iliad. φ, 371.

III. These particles are used in questions put for the purpose of eliciting assent rather than for information; as, *εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέν τοι ποθὲν—λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὠρείθυιαν ἀρπάσαι*; Socr. λέγεται γάρ: Plat. Phædr. p. 229. (p. 284. ed. Bip.) Socr. σὺ δ' εἰπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι μέν τοι; Phædr. τοῦτ' αὐτό: ib. p. 261.

IV. That the corroborative power of *τοι* is increased by the restrictive power of *μέν* appears principally from answers in which something which precedes is repeated with emphasis; as, *ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν,—ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδεια εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν*. Ans. *ἡμέτερον μέν τοι*: Plat. de Rep. ii. p. 374. (t. vi. p. 243. ed. Bip.) q. d. *ἡμέτερον μέν τὸ δ' ἄλλων ἐῷ λέγειν*. [See note c, p. 198. of Abr. of Vig.]

V. The serious affirmation of *μέν* limitative and *τοι* corroborative is particularly suited to oaths: *ὄμνυμι γάρ σοί τινα μέντοι τίνα θεῶν*: Plat. Phædr. p. 236. (299. Bip.) [Hoogeveen appears to have mistaken the sense of this passage. See Abr. of Vig. p. 199.]

VI. And to grave and serious speech: *εἶτα τῷ μέν Δάμιδι αἰτιώμενόν τὸν υἱόν, Οὐκ ἄδικα μέν τοι ἔπαθες, ἔφην*: Lucian. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 442. Hence to *monition*: thus Hermon to the philosopher Zenothemis, who was making loud outcries on account of the hurts he had received, *μύνησο μέν τοι, ὦ Ζηνόθεμι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδιάφορον ἡγῇ τὸν πόνον*: remember, however, O Zenothemis, &c. Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 450. So *tamen*, when for *revera*: Ov. de Pont. iii, 2, 30.

VII. They too speak seriously who urge or hasten any thing; hence *μέν τοι* in a hasty address: Aristoph. Ran. 172. [See note c, p. 198. of Abr. of Vig.]

VIII. *Μέν τοι* is used also, when what precedes having been refuted, or dismissed as unworthy of refutation, something is laid down as certain, and particularly urged: thus St. Paul, having warned Timothy to shun profane and vain babbling, such as that of Hymenæus and Philetus, who asserted that the resurrection was already past, adds, *ὁ μέντοι στερεὸς θεμέλιος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστηκεν, &c.* 2 Tim. ii. 19. the sense being, *whatever they may babble, this at least is certainly beyond all controversy*.

IX. *Μέντοι* is said to be *adversative*; but when it appears to be so, it in reality confirms a clause or member opposed to another: thus, in Aristoph. Ran. 61. *οὐκ ἔχω φράσαι ὅμως γε μέντοι σοὶ δι' αἰνιγμῶν ἔρῳ*, it confirms the opposition of the second clause to the first, effected by *ὅμως*, *μέν* restricting the signification of *ἐρῳ* to a particular manner δι' αἰνιγμῶν, and *τοι* confirming that restriction.

X. This apparently adversative use it has especially when, after *μὲν*, it is put in the apodosis instead of *δέ*. [See p. 103. xiv.] In this case the difference between it and *δέ* is, that *δέ* simply opposes adverse clauses or members; whereas *μὲν τοι* affirms the opposed clause or member, in which it is, with limitation or restriction; each of its component particles performing its proper office. Thus, *πειθον μὲν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων κειμένοις· ἰσχυρότατον μέντοι νόμον ἡγοῦ τὸν ἐκείνων τρόπον*: Isocr. ad Demon. p. 19. *τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἀναίσχυντα ἐδόκει πεποιηκέναι—· ἐς μὲν τοι τὸ φανερόν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα λέγειν, yet however—*: Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 426. *Μὲν* is sometimes suppressed in the first clause or member: *τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἔμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν—δίδειμι*: Plat. Phædr. p. 228. (p. 283. ed. Bip.) So in Euthyphr. [p. 1. l. 9. ed. Bas. 1.] And sometimes not only *μὲν*, but some preceding word, is understood; as to Socrates saying, *shall we read the exordium?* Phædrus replies, *εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὁ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι*: Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (357. Bip.) underst. *ἀναγνῶμεν μὲν*.

XI. In this use of *μέντοι*, *ὅμως* is sometimes added: when one of the particles may appear redundant, unless *ὅμως* be supposed to retain something of the signification of *ὅμως*, in the same manner. Sometimes, says a military officer in Xenoph. Cyrop., *I march in the front, and at other times in the rear*; *ἐμοὶ μέντοι ὅμως πειθόνται ὑστέρω ἰόντι, ἵνα ἐθίζωνται καὶ ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἀφηγεῖσθαι ὁμοίως πειθόμενοι*, ii. 3. 22. *yet the soldiers obey me equally, or in the same manner, &c.*

XII. *Μέντοι* in Plato de Rep. i. p. 329. (p. 150. ed. Bip.) [p. 371. l. 45. ed. Bas. 1.]—*εὐφήμει, ὃ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον—*, is translated *vero* by Cicero, de Senect. c. 14. [§. 47.—p. 17. l. penult. of Mr. Barker's fourth edition.]

XIII. In those verses of Aristophanes, *πρωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος—ἤν ἐστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα· τοῦ δὲ πένητος, ἤν φειδόμενον, —περιγίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ μηδὲν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν*, Plut. 554. Budæus translates *μέντοι, vice versa, rursus, [on the other hand:]* Hoogeveen, *tamen*.

XIV. *Μέντοι* in Thucydides is frequently followed by *γε*, which however is separated from it by some other word, and affects not *μέντοι*, but the intervening word, [or the intervening word with others.] Thus, the Athenians, says Thucydides, after their battle with the Bœotians, set up a trophy, *οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ βεβαίως οὐδέτεροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν*: iv. 72. Here *μέντοι* is used adversatively, and *γε* limits *ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ, with respect at least to the total result of the engagement.*—So Brasidas tells the Thessalians, that he would not force a passage through their country; *οὐ μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἰργεσθαι, but yet he thought at least that he ought not to be opposed*: iv. 78.—The name *Ἕλληνες* was derived from Hellen, says Thucydides, *οὐ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε χρόνου ἡδύνατο καὶ ἀπασιν ἐκνικῆσαι, but yet that the name could not obtain, at least for a long time, &c.* i, 3. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 199. r. xii. and note e.]

XV. *Ἀλλὰ μέντοι* is put for *ἀλλὰ μὴν* in argumentation. *Which do you think more prudent*, says Tigranes to Cyrus, *to punish so as*

to benefit, or so as to injure yourself? The latter mode, replies Cyrus, would be to punish myself. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μέντοι, rejoins Tigranes, μεγάλα γ' ἂν ζημιῶ, εἰ τοὺς σεαυτοῦ κατακαίνοις τότε, ὅποτε σοι πλείστον ἄξιοι εἶεν κεκτῆσθαι: *Cyrop. iii, 1, 9. [and yet, or but, to do so and so, as you propose to do, would be to injure yourself greatly; therefore it would be imprudent to act as you propose.]*

I.—OF THE PRIMARY POWER OF THE PARTICLE MH, TAKING AWAY BY ITSELF THE CERTAINTY OF ACTION.

I. The primary power of *μη* indicates a mind solicitous in wariness or taking heed, earnest in dissuasion and prohibition, ardent in deprecation, vehement in aversation, eager in interrogation. These affections or emotions are not denoted by *οὐ*, which simply denies: and the difference between the two particles is that *μη* is *prohibitory*, and *οὐ* *negative*. [For more correct information, see *Abr. of Vig. p. 165.*]

II. The form in which *μη* takes away the certainty of action is threefold,—by itself,—or joined with some word having the same effect,—or, lastly, with a word, having the same effect, understood. When it takes away action by itself *prohibitively*, the imperatives βλέπε, ὄρα, πρόσεχε, preceding, it is construed either with an aor. 1. subj. as, βλέπετε, μή τις ὑμᾶς πλανήσῃ, *take heed lest any man, &c.* St. Mark xiii, 5. or with the imperative mood, as, ὁρᾶτε, μη θροεῖσθε, *Matth. xxiv, 6.* or with the indicative of the future, as, βλέπετε, μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, *Coloss. ii, 8.* But more frequently in the sense of prohibition those imperatives βλέπε, &c. are absent: thus, with the subjunctive, μη εἴπῃς, *say not, Rom. x, 6.*: see *Coloss. ii, 21.*: with the imperative, μη οἶον δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτω καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, *Plato de Rep. iv, p. 420. (p. 328. ed. Bip.)* μη ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, *ib.* But, as *Thom. Mag.* teaches, when construed with the imperative mood, it must have a present tense; when with the subjunctive, an aorist: [see *Abr. of Vig. p. 166. l. 31.*] μη νῦν λακήσῃς, λίσσομαι σ'.—ὦ πονηροί, μη σιωπᾶτε, *Aristoph. Pac. 381.* An aorist of the imperative, in the third person, is used by *St. Matthew xxiv, 18.*

III. Greater emotion is expressed, when the imperative or subjunctive is suppressed after *μη* prohibitory: as, ὄρα μη, viz. προσκύνει, or προσκυνήσῃς, *see thou do it not: Revel. xix, 10. cf. xxii, 9.* ὥστε διπλοῦν ἀνθ' ἁπλοῦ τοῦνείδος γίγνεται· καὶ γὰρ μισεῖν τοὺς ὁμοφύλους δοκεῖς, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην. Μη σύ γε: *Aristid. Orat. ad Achill. t. ii. p. 426. ed. Jebb.*

IV. When there are two clauses or members, the prohibition extends to both; as, μή μ' ἔπεισιν μὲν στέργε, νόον δ' ἔχε καὶ φρένας ἄλλη: *Theogn.*

V. When an infinitive mood follows it, the infinitive depends on something preceding, as in oblique phraseology, and then *μη* forbids what is expressed by the infinitive: thus, σέ—Μήδειαν, εἶπον τῆσδε γῆς ἔξω περᾶν φυγάδα,—καὶ μή τι μέλλειν: *Eurip. Med. 274.* Οὐ μέλ-

λιν could not have been properly said. Χρηματισθέντες κατ' ὕναρ, μὴ ἀνακάμψαι πρὸς Ἡρώδην, St. Matth. ii, 12. not οὐκ ἀνακάμψαι.

VI. But the infinitive seems sometimes, especially in poetry, to be put *independently* with μὴ, for an imperative: e. g. μὴ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως,—ψεύδεα μὴ βάζειν, [Phocylid. 3, 5. So, μὴ πίστευε τάχιστα, 75. μὴ μιμοῦ κακότητα, 73.] In prose: μὴ ἀπορρέμβεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσης ὁρμῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδόναι: Antonin. eis éavt. iv, 14. Add vñ, 15.

VII. When μὴ follows an imperative, it does not forbid the act signified by the imperative, but some modification of it: as, τετμήσθω σφαῖρα· μὴ διὰ τοῦ κέντρου: Archimed. de Sphær. et Cylindr. πορισ. 1.

VIII. Secondly, when certainty of action is taken away after words signifying fear and solicitude, μὴ is construed usually with an aorist, especially with the first; as, δέδια, μὴ τούτοις μετ' ἐκείνου πολεμεῖν ἀναγκασθῶμεν, Demosth. de Class. p. 73. φοβηθεῖσα, μὴ ὁ νεανίσκος ἐξαγορεύσῃ τὸ αἷσχος αὐτῆς, Lucian. Dial. Jun. et Laton.

IX. When a verb has either no first aorist, or one seldom used, μὴ is construed with the second: δεδιέναι, μὴ πάθῃ αὐτὸ: Plat. Phæd. p. 78. δέδοικα, μὴ—ἡμεῖς—πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ, ὧν οὐκ ἡβουλόμεθα,—eis ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ: Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 3. [p. 13. l. 19. ed. Reisk.]

X. Μὴ, after verbs of fearing, is construed not only with a subjunctive having a future signification, but with an indicative even of a past tense, when something already past, or already decided either affirmatively or negatively, is spoken of: ἦν (εἰρήνην) δέδοικα μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δέδοικα, μὴ λελήθαμεν, ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι, ἐπὶ πολλῷ ἄγοντες: Demosth. [de fals. Leg. p. 372. l. 1. ed. Reisk.] νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα, μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν: Thucyd. iii, 53. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 167. l. 13.]

XI. When it is construed with the optative mood, ἂν in its potential sense appears to be suppressed: [see Abr. of Vig. p. 167. l. 11.] as in Iliad. φ, 329. and in Aristid. καὶ σφόδρα δεῖσαι (viz. ἐδόκουν) μὴ ἐπιθεῖντό μοι: Serm. Sacr. 1. p. 278. ed. Jebb.

XII. Sometimes φοβοῦμαι, or some other verb expressive of fear, is understood; as, μὴ λάβωσί σ' ἄσμενοι, Eurip. Or. 774. [μὴ οὐ λ. Pors. 766.] Decimus, says Appian, *used many precautions, μὴ χρόνιος ἡ πολιορκία γένοιτο, fearing lest, &c.* B. C. iii. p. 558. See Odys. ε, 467. compared with 473.

XIII. Thirdly, the certainty of action is taken away by μὴ, when used in *deprecation*: for this use the optative mood is most suitable; as, μὴ τοῦτο θεὸς τελέσειεν, Odys. v, 344. But a subjunctive is in Aristoph. Pac. 376. μὴ, πρὸς θεῶν, ἡμῶν κατείπης, ἀντιβολῶ σε: and in Plato, μὴ, πρὸς Διὸς, ἀποστής, de Rep. v. p. 506. and an indicative of the future, in the second person, in Euripides, μὴ, πρὸς θεῶν, κήρυκα τολμήσεις θένειν: Heracl. 272.

XIV. The vehemence of deprecation, as well as of prohibition, is increased, when the verb is suppressed after μὴ: thus Medea, when ordered to go into exile, exclaims, μὴ, πρὸς σε γονάτων, καὶ νεογάμον κόρης: Eurip. Med. 324. and still more by the reduplication of the

particle; as, *μὴ, μὴ καλέσης, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν*: Aristoph. Vesp. 1409. [1418. ed. Br.] See Virg. *Æn.* xi, 278.

XV. Fourthly, certainty is taken away by *μὴ*, when used in *aversion*. It is then construed with the optative mood; and, when the object of aversion has been mentioned before, *γένοιτο* usually follows; as, *ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ; μὴ γένοιτο, God forbid!* Rom. vi, 2. So v, 15. and xi, 1.

XVI. And in this use also *μὴ* is emphatically repeated, the object of aversion being suppressed after it; as, *Ἄρει δέ; and to Mars also?* Tryg. *μὴ, μὴ*: Aristoph. Pac. 456. Thus it is used for *μηδαμῶς*: *προήσσεσθε τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν; μὴ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ δεινὸν γὰρ καὶ αἰσχρόν*: Dinarch. in ed. Dem. p. 103. but *μὴ* repeated is more energetic than *μηδαμῶς*. Aristoph. uses both in the same passage: Tryg. *βούλεσθε Λαρινῶ βοῖ; Chor. βοῖ; μηδαμῶς. Tryg. ἀλλ' οὐ παχείᾳ καὶ μεγάλῃ; Chor. μὴ, μὴ. Pac. 926.*

XVII. Fifthly, *μὴ* takes away actuality, when a supposition or case is put negatively, either with or without interrogation; as, *τίς δὲ δοῦναι δύναται ἑτέρῳ, ἃ μὴ ἔχει αὐτός*; Epict. Enchir. c. 31. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 165. l. 33.] *οὐκ ᾔετο προσήκειν οὐδενὶ ἀρχὴν, ὅστις μὴ βελτίων εἴη τῶν ἀρχομένων*: Xen. Cyrop. viii, 1, 37.

XVIII. Sixthly, it denies somewhat with respect to a thing put or regarded as actual, although not actual; as, *πᾶν δένδρον μὴ ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν ἐκκόπτεται, &c.* St. Matth. iii, 10. vii, 19. See also xviii, 13. and St. Mark vi, 34. *Οὐ* and *μὴ* are distinguished in Xen. Mem. i, 2, 10. *βία δὲ καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστίν; ἀρ' οὐχ, ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἥττω μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ βιασάμενος, ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ*;

XIX. Hence it has some similarity to *condition*; for *μὴ* ποιοῦν καρπὸν καλὸν may be interpreted *ἐὰν μὴ ποιῇ*. It is chiefly with a genitive case that *μὴ* is used with this sense: as, *Θεοῦ διδόντος, μὴδὲν ἰσχύει φθόνος, καὶ μὴ διδόντος, μὴδὲν ἰσχύει πόνος*: Nazianz. i. e. *ἐὰν ὁ Θεὸς διδῷ, and, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ διδῷ. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ, ἐμοῦ μὴ δηλώσαντος, ἃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς, διαμαρτάνοιτε τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἡμῖν ὀργιζοίμην*: Isocr. Nicocl. p. 56.

II.—ON THE PARTICLE MH, WHEN JOINED WITH OTHER WORDS TAKING AWAY CERTAINTY OF ACTION.

I. As *μὴ* takes away actuality, it is aptly joined with other particles having the same effect; as with *ἂν*: *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστίν ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν, ὃ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δῶσιν*: Plato Euthyphr. (c. 18. ed. Fisch.) and therefore it fitly follows *ὅταν*, compounded of *ὅτε* and *ἂν*, because *ὅταν* signifies uncertain time: *ὅταν γε ἀληθὴ μὴ οἴηται οἰόμενος*, Plat. in Theæt.—and *ὅς ἐάν* in St. Luke vii, 13. cf. viii, 18.—and *ἂν*, when *ἂν* affects the whole sentence, of which *μὴ*, with the word to which it is added, constitutes a part; as, *οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῦον*: Aristot. de Rep. i. p. 178. although here indeed *μὴ* may by itself take away actuality by introducing a condition, for it may be explained by *εἰ μὴ*: and the

negative particle employed, when not in the conditional clause, is οὐ: as, εἰ ἦς ὧδε, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανέ μου ὁ ἀδελφός, not μὴ ἂν ἀπέθανε.

This is more evident in conditions constantly denoting something uncertain; whence μὴ is most aptly subjoined to εἰ, εἰάν, and the like conditional particles. Thus, εἰάν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα χαλκὸς ἡχῶν: 1 Cor. xiii, 1. καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται: Aristot. de Rep. i. c. 9. Thus it elegantly concludes a sentence with a double condition, εἰ τέ τις φησιν, εἰ τε μὴ: Plato Phædr. p. 277. the preceding verb being understood: and also after ἐφ' ᾧ τε, signifying a condition: ἀγοράζειν—ἔξεστι,—ἐφ' ᾧ τε πωλεῖν πρὸς ἐμέ, Λαμάχῳ δὲ μὴ: Aristoph. Ach. 722.

II. Because what we have in view is not yet attained, [and so not actual,] μὴ is very frequently subjoined to particles signifying the final cause: as, ἐνδον καθεύξας, ἵνα θύραζε μὴ ἔξη, not ἵνα οὐ: Aristoph. Vesp. 70. ἵνα μὴ ἦ σχίσμα, 1 Cor. xii, 24. ἐν νῶ εἶχον τοὺς ἔσπλους τοῦ λιμένος ἐμφράξαι, ὅπως μὴ ᾗ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐς αὐτὸν, Thucyd. iv, 8. and with ἂν between: πᾶν—ἔργον—πράττοντας,—ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 494. (p. 91. ed. Bip.)

III. When an optative follows, ἂν potential seems to be suppressed: as, ἐπὶ τοῦ νότου ἔφερον,—τῷ χεῖρε ἐς τοῦπίσω ξυμπλέκοντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπίπτοι: Thucyd. iv, 4.

IV. "Ὅπως μὴ is construed with a future indicative also: ἀλλ' ἄθρει, κατὰ τῆς πύελον τὸ τρήμ' ὅπως μὴ κδύσεται: Aristoph. Vesp. 141. although with the future the *manner* rather than the *end* is signified: *how, or in what manner he may be prevented from escaping.*

V. The final cause is indicated also by εἰς with the neuter article and infinitive mood with μὴ; following: ταῦτα δὲ τύποι ἡμῶν ἐγενήθησαν, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἐπιθυμητὰς κακῶν: 1 Cor. x, 6. not εἰς τὸ οὐκ εἶναι.

VI. The words taking away actuality are sometimes suppressed. Thus ἂν is suppressed not only when μὴ must follow, even without such suppression, because of ὅπως preceding, (sec. iii.) but also when μὴ follows ὁπότε: or, (which comes to the same thing,) ὁπότε is in that case put for ὁπότεν, either in its potential use, or in that in which it renders the sense indefinite, with an optative mood following; as, αἰεὶ, ὁπότε μὴ ἄλλο τι σπουδαιότερον πράττειν, ταύτη τῇ παιδιᾷ ἐχρῶντο: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 20. *whenever they were not doing, &c.* So viii, 1. 38.

VII. When μὴ is construed with a participle, an indefinite person [or thing] is signified, ἂν being latent; which appears, when the participle is resolved into a verb, with ὅς ἂν, or ὅς εἰάν, preceding it: as, πᾶν δένδρον, μὴ ποιῶν (for ὃ εἰάν μὴ ποιῇ) καρπὸν, ἐκκόπτεται: St. Matth. vii, 19. See also xii, 30.

VIII. "Ἴνα, or ὅπως, is suppressed in xxxiv, 16. of Son of Sirach: φάγε, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, τὰ παρακείμενά σοι, καὶ μὴ διαμασῶ, μὴ μισηθῇς.

IX. Nor is ἵνα only with a subjunctive defective, but ἂν, in its potential use, with an optative: Ἀθήνη δύν' Ἀἴδος κινέην, μὴ μιν ἰδοὶ ὄβριμος Ἄρης: Iliad. ε, 845.

III.—OF THE NEGATIVE, AND AT THE SAME TIME ELLIPTICAL, USE OF MH.

I. *Mh* also, as well as *ou*, denies ; but with this difference, that *ou* denies the whole, *mh* only a part ; or, which amounts to the same, *mh* denies the predicate, and not the subject : and here an ellipsis is to be particularly observed ; for a word is very frequently to be supplied from what precedes : thus, τὸν ἐρῶντά τε, καὶ μὴ, κρινοῦμεν : Plat. Phædr. p. 237. (p. 301. ed. Bip.) Κρινοῦμεν comprehends the whole : the parts are τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντα, the last word being assumed from what precedes. If the particle employed had been *ou*, κρινοῦμεν, and not ἐρῶντα, must have been repeated : so p. 238. (p. 304. ed. Bip.)

II. In this use *mh* elegantly closes a sentence ; as, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μὴ : Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (p. 356. ed. Bip.) and a little afterwards, τὸν ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μὴ ;

III. It denies a predicate understood, which has been affirmatively expressed as to a fore-mentioned subject : ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μὴ, Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 486. (p. 73. ed. Bip.)

IV. By an idiom peculiarly Greek, *mh* with the article before it denies elliptically what has been before affirmed of another subject : as, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεῦειν δεινῶν, οἱ μὴ, τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται, for οἱ μὴ δεινοί : Plat. de Rep. vi. t. vii. p. 75. ed. Bip.

V. The ellipsis is evident in the foregoing examples : it is supplied in Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 29. (c. 15. ed. Fisch.)

VI. To make the difference between *mh* and *ou* plain, it is to be observed, that *mh* is used when either the whole is denied by opposition of the contrary, as, φῆς ἢ οὐ ; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 29. or when a whole, different from what precedes, is denied ; as, ἀποκτεῖναι με δύνανται, βλάψαι δ' οὐ : Epict. Ench. c. 79. [The Reader should be apprized that Professor Hermann considers this doctrine of Hoogeveen about the difference of *mh* and *ou* as entirely erroneous.]

VII. *Mh* denies in conjunction with an infinitive, being prefixed to a part of a proposition, not the whole : βούλει μὴ προσαγορεύειν ἐμέ ; Aristoph. Ach. 1112. [1113. ed. Br.] Here *mh* affects προσαγορεύειν, not βούλει : *will you refrain from addressing me ? [may I beg that you will say nothing to me ?]* ἄρα δεινὸς ἢ τόθ', ὥστε πάντα μὴ δεδοκέναι, so as to condemn all dangers, to fear nothing : Id. Vesp. 1086.

VIII. And so with a participle : τοῦ δὲ Κλεοδήμου, καθ' ὃν ὁ ψόφος ἐγένετο, μὴ προσποιουμένον τὴν ἀπόρρησιν : Lucian. Conviv. p. 429. [not taking it to himself ; i. e. dissembling his consciousness that he had done it.] τί δ' οὖν ἐποίησεν ἡ Ἐρις μὴ παροῦσα, because she was not one of the company : Id. dial. Panop. et Galen. [p. 195. D. ed. Salmur.]

IX. But *ou* also may be construed with a participle, when some whole, and not a part only, is denied ; as, ἑώρα—οὐς εἶδεῖεν φιλοῦντας αὐτοὺς, τούτους μισεῖν οὐ δυναμένους : Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3, 49.

where *οὐ* does not affect *δυναμένους* alone : ἐρῶντας μὲν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν, ἐξὸν δ' ἀπολαύειν, οὐ τολμῶντας, i. e. οὐ τολμῶντας ἀπολαύειν : Lucian. Timon. c. 14.

X. What has been hitherto said of *μὴ*, and of the difference between it and *οὐ*, applies to the compounds also of *μὴ*, and to the difference between them and the compounds of *οὐ* : *μηδεὶς, μηκέτι, μηδαμῶς, μηδέποτε*,—*οὐδεὶς, οὐκέτι, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδέποτε*, &c. See St. Mark xii, 24. 1 Timoth. i, 7. Epict. Enchir. c. 18. Acts xxviii, 18.

XI. The difference between *μὴ* and *οὐ* is plainly marked in the following passage ; ὃ Χρυσάντα, μηδὲν σε λυπούντων αἱ τοῦ Ἀσσυρίου παρακελεύσεις· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται καλὴ παραίνεσις, ἥτις τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἀγαθοὺς αὐθημερόν ἀκούσαντας ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσει. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν τοξότας γε, εἰ μὴ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦτο μεμελετηκότες εἴεν· οὐδ' ἀκοντιστάς, οὐδὲ μὴν ἱππέας γε· οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ γε σώματα ἱκανοὺς πονεῖν, ἣν μὴ πρόσθεν ἡσκηκότες ᾤσιν : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 50. Μηδὲν λυπούντων, because it is a prohibition, not a negation ; οὐδεμία παραίνεσις, because it is a manifest negation ; τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἄγ. not οὐκ ὄντας, on account of the nature of the participle. On the contrary, οὐκ ἂν τοξότας,—οὐδ' ἀκοντιστάς, οὐδὲ μὴν ἱππέας· οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ γε σώματα, because it is negation that is expressed ; but ἣν μὴ, not ἣν οὐ, because the clause is conditional : and so εἰ μὴ ἔμπροσθεν before.

IV.—OF THE INTERROGATIVE USE OF MH.

I. *Μὴ* gives emphasis to questions that are figurative, and not put for the sake of information : as, *μή πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι* ; Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 486. (p. 74. ed. Bip.) So Rom. iii, 3.

II. The emphasis is increased by asperity ; *μὴ ἀνελεῖν με σὺ θέλεις, ὃν τρόπον ἀνείλες χθὲς τὸν Αἰγύπτιον* ; Acts vii, 18. *Μὴ σὺ μείζων εἶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ* ; St. John viii, 53.

III. Since a desire of discovery is common to persons conjecturing, suspecting, and inquiring, *μὴ* is fitly prefixed to the conjectural particles ἄρα and ποτέ : *ἔπειτα δὲ εἰσῆγει με, μὴ ἄρα τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς ἦ, whether what is commonly said, or the common saying, may not perhaps be true* : Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 441.

MH GAP, with the annexed particles.—I. *Μὴ* deprecatory, and γὰρ ratiocinative, are used elliptically in replies : as, *ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω*. Glauc. *μὴ γὰρ. no, do not, I pray* : Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 509. The ellipsis may be supplied thus, *καλῶς εἶπας, ὅτι ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω· ἵκετεύω γὰρ μὴ τι ἀπολείψῃς*. The nature of the phrase will be more evident, if the deprecation be changed into negation ; *καλῶς εἶπας· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπτέον οὐδέν*. The ellipsis is supplied in Lucian. Dial. Menel. and Prot. [p. 193. E. ed. Salmur.]

II. *Γὰρ* causative also is joined with *μὴ* interrogative, elliptically : ἄλλοι ἔλεγον, Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός. Ἄλλοι δὲ ἔλεγον, *Μὴ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Γαλιλαίας ὁ Χριστὸς ἔρχεται* ; St. John vii, 41. [q. d. *why how can that be? for is it possible that Christ can come out of Galilee?*] The

nature of the ellipsis will be seen more plainly, if οὐ γὰρ negatively be put instead of μὴ γὰρ interrogatively. *This is not Christ, for Christ will not come out of Galilee.*

III. But in the following passage each of the particles retains its proper force distinctly and independently of the others, μὴ being prohibitive, [or deprecatory,] γὰρ causative, and γε restrictive: τίς οὐχὶ κατέπνυσεν ἂν σοῦ, μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεως γε, μηδ' ἐμοῦ; Demosth. de Cor. [p. 295. l. 9. ed. Reisk.] Γὰρ gives a reason for his having said σοῦ, and γε limits πόλεως.

IV. And so in μὴ γὰρ δὴ: ἀλλὰ τό γε προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα ὁ δαίμων οὐκ ἀφαιρήσεται, μὴ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῆς γνώμης ἡμῶν οὐ κατισχύσει, Synesius: where δὴ appears to be superadditory or augmentative. [Μὴ γὰρ δὴ is in the passage last cited from Demosth. See also Abr. of Vig. p. 164. r. ix.]

V. Μὴ γὰρ οὖν also is said: *It is not fit*, says Pylades to Orestes, *that Menelaus should enjoy prosperity, and that your father, yourself, your sister and your mother should perish; and that he should possess your habitation after having recovered his wife by your father's arms; μὴ γὰρ οὖν ἔσθην ἔτι, εἰ μὴ πὶ κείνῃ (Helen) φάσγανον σπάσω μέλαν*, Eurip. Or. 1147. [1145. ed. Pors.] Μὴ is expressive of a negative wish; οὖν is collective, *therefore*. [I should explain γὰρ by the following ellipsis, rather than by Hoogeveen's improbable periphrasis: *Menelaus ought not to prosper; and he shall not prosper; for, &c.*]

ΜΗ ΟΤΙ, ΜΗ ΟΤΙ ΓΕ, ΜΗ ΟΤΙ ΔΗ.—I. An ellipsis of λέξω or λέγοιμι after μὴ in μὴ ὅτι gives that combination a signification equivalent to *not only*: it differs from μὴ μόνον in that it conjoins unequal things, whereas μὴ μόνον may join equal things: οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών: Xen. Mem. i. p. 731. οὐδ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ἀσφαλῶς ἐργαζοίμεθα, μὴ ὅτι τὴν τούτων, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ἡμετέραν: Id. Cyrop. iii, 2, 21. See also Plat. Ep. vii. p. 329.

II. Strictly speaking, neither is ὅτι put for μόνον, nor does μὴ ὅτι signify *not only*; but rather μόνον is understood; as in those words of Plato, νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰδε ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τρίχας, καὶ σάρκα, καὶ ὅσῃ, καὶ αἷμα, καὶ ξύμπαν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, &c. Conviv. p. 207. (p. 240. ed. Bip.) i. e. καὶ μὴ μόνον λέγοιμι, ὅτι τὰδε ἀπολλύς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, &c. The ellipsis is supplied in Philipp. ii, 12. where μὴ ὥς is used instead of μὴ ὅτι.

III. Sometimes another word intervenes; as, μὴ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν ἄρχοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖς φοβοῦνται, μᾶλλον τοὺς αἰδουμένους αἰδοῦνται τῶν ἀναιδῶν οἱ ἀνθρώποι: Xen. Cyrop. viii, 1, 28.

IV. Sometimes γε confirmative or corroborative is added; as, οὐ γὰρ θέμις, μὴ ὅτι γε θύειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιβαίνειν τοῦ νεώ: Heliodor. Æthiop. vii, 11.

V. When what exceeds, or is most urged, is placed last, if the former part of the sentence is affirmative, ἀλλὰ, or ἀλλὰ καὶ follows in the latter, as in the last example from Plato: but if the former part is negative, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ follows in the latter, as in the first examples from

Xenophon. But when that which has the greatest stress laid on it, or is most urged, precedes, *μη* *ὅτι*, or *μη* *ὅτι* *γε*, follows, ἀλλὰ disappearing; and the particles may then be rendered *much less*: *ὥστε οὐδὲ ὅποσοι τινὲς αὐτοῖς εἰσιν οἱ βασιλεῖς, ἔμελλον εὐρήσειν, μη* *ὅτι* *τὴν στρατιάν*: Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 429. *μέγα σοι μαθεῖν, ὅτι γε-γένηται*: τὸ δὲ πῶς, οὐδὲ ἀγγέλοις ἐννοεῖν; *μη* *ὅτι* *γέ σοι συγχωρήσομεν*: Gregor. cited by Budæus, p. 479.

VI. Δὴ also confirmative is added; *ἂ καὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερεπὲς, μη* *ὅτι* *δὴ ἔργῳ*: Plat. Phædr. p. 240. (p. 308. ed. Bip.)

MH OY, MH OYK.—I. In *μη* *οὐ*, or *μη* *οὐκ* before a vowel or diphthong, or *μη* *οὐχ* before an aspirated vowel or diphthong, also *μη* *οὐχ*, each particle has manifestly its own proper and separate office, when *μη* interrogates directly: as, *μη* *οὐκ ἤκουσαν*; *have they not heard?* Rom. x, 18. *μη* *οὐκ ἔγνω Ἰσραήλ*; ib: v. 19. So 1 Cor. ix, 4.

II. After verbs of fearing, *μη* in *μη* *οὐ* expresses suspicion or doubt as to what is feared: *ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὑμᾶς, μη* *οὐ* *κοινοὶ ἀποβῆτε, lest you should prove not impartial*: Thucyd. iii, 53. *δέδοικα, μη* *οὐκ ἔχω τοσαύτην σοφίαν, I fear I have hardly so great wisdom*: Xen. Mem. ii, 3, 10. Sometimes the verb of fearing, or the kindred verb *ἔρα*, or the like, is suppressed: *ἀλλ' ὅπως μη* *οὐχ οἶός τ' ἔσομαι, but I doubt I shall not be able*: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 506. (p. 115. ed. Bip.) So Iliad. α, 28.

III. *Μη* *οὐ* is joined with an infinitive; when effect is signified: *τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποῖον δὴ παραμύθιον, ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς δίδους, ποιήσει τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνόντι, μη* *οὐχ* *ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας*; Plat. Phædr. p. 240. (p. 307. ed. Bip.) and with *caution*; *εἰπέ μοι, τί φειδόμεσθα τῶν λίθων, (as if taking heed) μη* *οὐ* *καταξάινειν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἐς φονικίδα*; Aristoph. Ach. 310. *οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μη* *οὐκ ἐπο-φειδιστον εἶναι*, Plat. Phædr. p. 277. (p. 386. ed. Bip.) or *prevention*: *τόσον δ' ἐκόμπασε, μηδ' ἂν τὸ σεμνὸν πῦρ νιν εἰργάθειν Διὸς, τὸ μη* *οὐ* *κατ' ἄκρων περγάμων ἐλεῖν πόλιν*: Eurip. Phœniss. 1183. or with a verb of pretermittting before it: *οὐδὲ θέλω προλιπεῖν τόγε, μη* *οὐ* *τὸν ἔμὸν στοναχεῖν πατέρ' ἄθλιον*: Soph. Electr. 136. or of abstaining; *οὐκ ἀπέχονται μη* *οὐ* *πολίτην τιθέναι*, Aristid. Orat. in Apellam. And with negative words preceding; *νῦν μὲν, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, οὐκ ἂν ἔξαρνος γένοιο μη* *οὐκ* *ἐμὸς υἱὸς εἶναι*: *you will not deny that you are my son*: Lucian. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 94. So, *οὐκ ἂν ἔξαρνος γένοιο μη* *οὐχ* *φάρμακον ἀποδεδόσθαι Κρίτωνι ἐπὶ τὸν πατέρα, you will not deny that you sold poison*, &c. Id. Lapith. p. 440. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 163. r. iv, v, vi. p. 167. l. 31.]

MHΔE, MHTE.—I. *Μηδὲ* and *μήτε* differ in this, that *μηδὲ* is relative, *μήτε* copulative: yet, as *δὲ* is sometimes copulative, being put for *καὶ* or for *τε*, so *μηδὲ* may sometimes be put for *μήτε*. These particles differ from *οὐδὲ* and *οὔτε*, as *μη* differs from *οὐ*. After *μη* or *μήτε*, follows *μήτε*, after *οὐ* or *οὔτε*, *οὔτε*: *ὑμεῖς δ' Αἰγινέες οὔτε τρίται, οὔτε τέταρτοι, οὔτε δωδέκατοι, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ, οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ*. Orac.

ap. Scid. ; but it may be otherwise, when the tenor of discourse is interrupted by a fresh partition.

The following particulars are to be observed : first—when after οὐ or μὴ, οὐδὲ or μηδὲ follows, then in the first division or clause of the sentence μὲν is to be understood, as correlative to δὲ in the compound following : μὴ τὺμβον φθιμένων ἀνорύξῃς, μηδ' ἀθέατα δείξῃς ἡελίω : Phocyl. 95. i. e. μὴ ἀνорύξῃς μὲν. Add St. Matth. vii, 6. 1 John ii, 15. Pythag. v. 37. Secondly,—after an affirmative part of a sentence, or at least after a part which is negative or prohibitive, μηδὲ and οὐδὲ follow rather than μήτε and οὔτε : as, φοῖτα κηρύκεσσι λιγυφθόγγοισι κελεύων, κλήδην εἰς ἀγορὴν κυκλήσκειν ἄνδρα ἕκαστον, μηδὲ βροῶν : Iliad. ι, 12. Thirdly—when there are many divisions or clauses, μὴ is put once, and μηδὲ many times afterwards, as in Phocyl. 168. sqq. Fourthly,—when there are two or more distinct prohibitions, or when two or more parts of one proposition are denied, μήτε, μήτε are used, not οὔτε, οὔτε : as, μήτε γαμοκλοπέειν, μήτ' ἄρσενά κύπριν ὀρίνειν, μήτε δόλους ράπτειν, μήθ' αἵματι χεῖρα μαίνειν : Id. Νουθετικ. 1.—So St. Matth. xi, 18. Fifthly—when three or more things are denied, those of the same kind are denied by μήτε, those of a different kind by μηδὲ : as, Σαδδουκαῖοι μὲν γὰρ λέγουσι, μὴ εἶναι ἀνάστασιν, μηδὲ ἄγγελον, μήτε πνεῦμα : Acts xxiii, 8.

In a single passage of Plato's Parmenides, οὐ, οὐδὲ, οὔτε, οὐδὲ, μήτε, μήτε, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὐδὲ, μήτε, μήτε, &c. occur with surprising variation, each particle preserving in every place its peculiar force. That passage, ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος—ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὄν, ἴσου ἀεὶ εἶη ἑαυτῷ, which will serve to illustrate what is said of the use and difference of those particles, is in p. 150. (t. x. p. 124. ed. Bip.) [p. 147. l. 48. ed. Bas. 1.]

II. When what is expressed in the latter of two clauses or members is less than what is expressed in the former, which is denied or prohibited, μηδὲ is emphatical, and may be rendered *not even* ; and in this use there is an ellipsis, to be supplied either from the first clause, or from something extraneous : οἱ στρατηγοὶ μὴ ξένους ἔχοντες τοὺς μὲν συμμάχους ἀγῶσι καὶ φέρωσι, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους μηδὲ ὀρῶσιν : Demosth. de Rep. Ordin. p. 68. *Let not the generals with their foreign troops harass and plunder the allies, while they do not even come in sight of the enemy* : for, but as to the enemy, not only not harass and plunder him, but not even come in sight of him. So 1 Cor. v, 11. Of the second kind of ellipsis the following is an example : ὅπως μὲν—ἐγὼ ἄχθομαι τρέφων ὑμᾶς, μηδ' ὑπονοεῖτε : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 20. for μὴ πιστεύετε μὲν, μηδ' ὑπονοεῖτε, *believe not, nay suspect not even*.

III. And in this use μηδὲ follows μήτε : μήτε λαμβάνειν ἕτερον ἐτέρον μηδὲ τῶν ὑπερημέρων, Demosth. adv. Mid. p. 386.

ΜΗΠΟΤΕ.—I. These particles are sometimes separated by other words : φοβούμενοι Ἀθηναίους, μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὀρμώμενοι ποτὲ σφισι μεζονι παρασκευῇ ἐπέλθωσιν : Thucyd. iv, 1. So ix, 29. and Aristoph. Pac. 487. [438. ed. Br.] ἀλλὰ μήτοι ποτὲ διάπειραν λάβοιμι : Synes. p. 479.

II. Ποτὲ is an adverb of time ; and with a signification of indefinite

time, explicit or implicit, it is joined to *μη* in all the uses of the latter. When *μη* signifies the final cause, something to be avoided being spoken of, it takes away so much from the certainty of the thing, as caution may prevent; and then *ἵνα* or *ὅπως* is understood before *μήποτε*: thus, ἴσθι εὐνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου ταχὺ, —μήποτε σε παραδῶ ὁ ἀντίδικος τῷ κριτῇ: St. Matth. v, 25. *lest at any time*, &c. See also xiii, 29. and Hebr. ii, 1. *ἵνα* is actually added by St. Luke xiv, 29. —*ἵνα μήποτε*—πάντες οἱ θεωροῦντες ἄρξωνται ἐμπαίξειν αὐτῷ.

III. When *μη* is prohibitive, *ποτε* excludes all time: *μήποτε φεύγοντ' ἄνδρα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, Κύρνε, φιλήσης*: Theogn. 333. *do not ever or at any time*. Here not only *ἵνα*, but also *βλέπε, ὅρα*, or *πρόσεχε*, is understood.

IV. The ellipsis of the imperative is supplied in Hebr. iii, 12. where *μήποτε* is construed with a future of the indicative. See also St. Luke xxi, 34.

V. It is construed with an infinitive mood in oblique phraseology, in Eurip. οἶμαι δὲ πατέρα—πολλὰς γενεῖου τοῦδ' ἂν ἐκτεῖναι λιτὰς, *μήποτε τεκούσης εἰς σφαγὰς ὧσαι ξίφος*: Orest. 291. [*μη τῆς τεκούσης*, Pors. 285.]

VI. It has the same force after words signifying fear or solicitude, as in the final cause, or in prohibition; and in that situation it is construed with the subjunctive of the first aorist, or of the second, when the first is wanting or little used: οὐδὲν δεινὸν, *μήποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους, ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ*: Plat. de Rep. v. p. 465. (p. 35. ed. Bip.) Add 1 Maccab. xii, 40. Hebr. iv, 1.

VII. *Μήποτε*, as *μη*, is used in deprecation, with an optative mood, *ποτέ* excluding all time: *μήποσ', ὦ τέκνον, κλέος τοιόνδε σοὶ γένοιτ' ἂν ὑφ' Ἑλλήνων λαβεῖν*: Eurip. Phœniss. 579.

VIII. From its signification of uncertain time *μήποτε* has acquired its *conjectural* use: *κέλευσον ἀσφαλισθῆναι τὸν τάφον ἕως τῆς τρίτης ἡμέρας, μήποτε (lest perhaps) ἐλθόντες οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ νυκτὸς, κλέψωσιν αὐτόν*: St. Matth. xxvii, 64.

IX. In this use it is construed with an indicative mood also, *μη* being interrogative: *μήποτε δὲ δεῖ γράφειν ἀντὶ τῆς Ἀνθείας Ἀντειαν*; Athen. xiii. p. 586. So St. John vii, 26.

X. When an optative mood follows, *ἂν* potential may be fitly understood; as in *διαλογοζομένων πάντων ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν περὶ τοῦ Ἰωάννου, μήποτε αὐτὸς εἴη ὁ Χριστός*: St. Luke iii, 15.

XI. This particle suits *suspicion* and *circumspection*, being construed with a subjunctive mood: *ὑποπτος δὲ γεγόμενος ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς, μήποτε διάληψιν ὁ βασιλεὺς σχῇ*: 2 Maccab. iii, 32. and *doubt*: *μήποτε δὴ αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς μετάνοιαν, ἢ perchance*: 2 Timoth. ii, 25.

XII. When *ἄρα* conjectural is added, *ποτε* has rather a signification of time: as, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικρὺς ἀπενέγκασθαι γραφὴν κατ' αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα οὐκ ἔδοκίμαζον, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνα δὲ, *μήποτε ἄρα (lest perhaps at some time) ἀγριάναντες οἱ φίλοι τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐξάψωσι κατ' αὐτῶν τοὺς δικαστάς*: Æl. V. H. ii, 13. ἐντετάσθω σοὶ προσοχή, *μήποτε ἄρα ὑποβρύχως εἰς ἰδιωτισμὸν*: Epictet. c. 45.

XIII. *Μήποτε* is sometimes used when no doubt really exists, for the purpose of softening what might otherwise appear too harsh or

uncourteous: ἐὰν ᾗ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἡ βουλή αὕτη ἢ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, καταλυθήσεται· ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ Θεοῦ ἔστιν, οὐ δύνασθε καταλῦσαι αὐτὸ, μήποτε καὶ θεόμαχοι εὗρεθῆτε: Acts v, 39.

XIV. Μήποτε οὐ, like μὴ οὐ, does not absolutely nullify the thing denied, but merely doubts, ποτε being either conjectural or significative of time: ἀπεκρίθησαν δὲ αἱ φρόνιμοι, λέγουσαι· μήποτε οὐκ ἀρκέσῃ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν: St. Matth. xxv, 9. This passage is cited on account of the ellipsis; for οὐκ pertains to ἀρκέσῃ, not to μήποτε, οὐκ ἀρκέσῃ being equivalent to ἀπολίπη. The ellipsis being supplied, the full phrase would be, μὴ γένοιτο, ἵνα μήποτε οὐκ ἀρκέσῃ.

ΜΗΠΩ, ΜΗΠΩΓΕ, ΜΗ ΠΩΠΟΤΕ.—I. Πω also, a particle of time, as well as ποτε, is joined to μὴ: but μήποτε usually respects the future; μήπω terminates the past with negation, and, on account of the nature of μὴ, is conjoined with particles taking away actuality, as εἰ, ἐάν, κἄν, and the like: for as the Greeks say εἰ μὴ, not εἰ οὐ, so they say εἰ μήπω, not εἰ οὐπω: εἴπερ τάγε πρῶτα (νόματα viz.) μήπω ἔκειτο, Plat. Cratyl. p. 438. (t. iii. p. 342. ed. Bip.) οὗτος ἐμοὶ πολεμεῖ, κἄν μήπω βάλλῃ: not yet: Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 46.

II. Μήπω, as well as μὴ, is put before an infinitive in oblique phraseology: τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδόν: Hebr. ix, 8.

III. And as μὴ is usually joined with a participle, so μήπω, not οὐπω: νέον ὄντα, καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα, τί τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ μὴ: Plat. de Rep. v. p. 475. (p. 56. ed. Bip.)

IV. Γε restrictive is added to μήπω: Socr. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον διαβάς ἀπέρχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι. Phædr. Μήπωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ: not yet at least: Plat. Phædr. p. 242. (p. 310. ed. Bip.)

V. Τι also is added to μήπω: Iliad. δ, 234.

VI. Μὴ πώποτε is, not as yet, or never as yet: ἀπάγου τὴν σὴν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰληφθαι ἔγωγε αἰχμάλωτον ταύτην νομίζω, σοῦ γε μὴ πώποτε φυνγόντος ἡμᾶς: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 37.

ΜΗΠΩΣ.—I. Πως added to μὴ gives a signification of indefinite mode or manner as to what is to be shunned or doubted; and ἵνα, ὅρα, or ὅρα ἵνα, δέιδω or the like, is usually understood before it: Διὸς δ' ἐποπίζεο μῆνιν, μήπως τοι μετόπισθε κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπαίνη: Iliad. ε, 147. underst. ἵνα. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν κλάδων οὐκ ἐφείσατο, μήπως οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται: Rom. xi, 21. underst. ὅρα.

II. A verb also or noun signifying fear or solicitude may be understood, as δέισας in the following passage: καὶ οὐκ ὥς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην,—μήπως ἐγὼ Μελίτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 19. This ellipsis is supplied by Homer, Iliad. ε, 298.

III. Μήπως is used in a dubitative sense by Theognis: ἀλλὰ γ' ἀναστάς, περήσω, μήπως καὶ πόδας οἶνος ἔχῃ: v. 506. whether in some manner, or whether perhaps.

IV. In 1 Thessal. iii, 5. ἔπεμψα εἰς τὸ γινῶναι τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν,

μήπως ἐπέπρασεν ὑμᾶς ὁ πειράζων, Beza translates *μήπως*, *ne quomodo*, *lest by some means*, or *in some manner*; Castellio, *ne forte*, *lest perhaps*. If it is not expressive of fear or of doubt here, it is at least exploratory.

MHTI.—I. As μήποτε and μήπω exclude time, and μήπως mode or manner, so μήτι excludes anything indefinite. Sometimes τι is separate from μη, and does not affect it; as, μή τι φόβονδ' ἀγόρευε, *say not any thing in recommendation of flight*: Iliad. ε, 252. μή τι ἄλλο (*any thing else*) λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι; Plat. Gorg. p. 487. So in Phædr. p. 273. (p. 376. ed. Bip.) [Τι this head belongs the passage of Aristoph. Pac. 326. cited by Hoogeveen (v1.) as an example of a question indicating wonder.]

II. But when there is no other word on which it depends, or to which it is referred, it assumes the nature of a particle, and coalesces with μη, to which it communicates an unlimited force of prohibition; as, μήτι σὺ ταῦτα ἕκαστα διείρεο, *not at all*; excluding inquiry about any particular whatever: Iliad. α, 551. So, μήτι σὺ, ᾧ Τιγράνῃ, ἔφη, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με, χαλεπήνης τῷ πατρὶ: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 38.

III. Μήτι is emphatically used in figurative questions which imply, and are equivalent to, an absolute denial of what is asked: μήτι συλλέγουσιν ἀπὸ ἀκανθῶν σταφυλήν; St. Matth. vii, 16. μήτι τὸ ὕδωρ κολῦσαι δύναται τις; Acts x, 47.

IV. But when the question is not figurative, τι indicates incipient serious opinion in the case of good, and serious fear in the case of evil.—1. Μήτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς Δαβίδ; said the people who saw the miracles of Christ: St. Matth. xii, 23. But this seriousness of opinion disappears in sarcastical questions; as, μήτι ἀποκτενεῖ ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι λέγει, ὅπου ἐγὼ ὑπάγω, ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν; St. John viii, 22.—2. An example of the indication of serious fear is in St. Matth. xxvi, 22. μήτι ἐγὼ εἰμι, Κύριε; Cf. v. 25. and St. Mark xiv, 19.

MHTOI.—I. Μήτοι seldom or never occurs unconnected with any other particle: if it ever does, it must be compounded of μη prohibitive, and τοι corroborative, adding force to the prohibition.

II. But μήτοι γε very frequently occurs; μη usually prohibiting, τοι assuring or enforcing, and γε limiting. To Cyrus, promising to give his soldiers a double feast, an officer replies, μήτοι γε ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ, εἰ μη καὶ διπλᾶς τὰς γαστέρας ἡμῖν παρέξεις, *by no means at least in one day*, &c. Xenoph. Cyrop. ii, 3, 24. and in the passage of Synesius cited by Budæus, Comm. p. 475. γε is referable to μήτοι: σὺ δὲ μῦθέποτε πλεύσεις; εἰ δέ ποτε δεήσοι, ἀλλὰ μήτοι φθινοντός γε μηνός. So that this passage is not altogether a "dependable example of μήτοι alone. Μήτοι is separated in a similar manner from γε in the following passage: πολὺ δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα (Ὁμήρου) μήτοι θεοὺς γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους, καὶ λέγοντας, ὦ μοι ἐγὼ δειλὴ, ὦ μοι δυσαριστοῦκεια· εἰ δ' οὖν θεοὺς, μήτοι τὸν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν, &c.

* See Supplement to Mr. Todd's Johnson by J. S. published in 1819.

not certainly, or, not by any means, at least to represent the gods bewailing, &c. Plat. de Rep. iii. p. 388. (p. 265. ed. Bip.)

III. For greater vehemence of expression δὴ is added; to compensate, as it were, for the loss of asseveration and emphasis which τοι suffers by being subjoined enclitically to μή: ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδ' ἄλλόν τινα ἡξίουں ἂν ταῦτα ὀνειδίζειν, μή τοι γε δὴ Πλάτωνα: *much, much less Plato certainly*: Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 368. *Such beauty could not fail to strike even a tasteless clown*, μήπογε δὴ σε καὶ τὴν σὴν πολυπειρίαν, says Heliodor. Æthiop. vii, 10.

MHN.—1. Μὴν is a particle which augments the force of affirmation. It appears to differ from τοὶ in simply affirming that part to which it is added; from δὴ, in expressing exultation, as it were, at the establishment or confirmation of something brought to its highest pitch; from γε in this, that γε urges what follows, at the same time remitting, conceding, or waving, what precedes; whereas μὴν affirms what follows without remitting or waving anything that precedes, and often adds a fresh asseveration of what has been already proved or affirmed. Affirmation or corroboration is its primary force, and this it has even when it is said to be adversative. Hesychius explains καὶ μὴν by ὄντως δὴ: it signifies therefore, *in reality, in truth*: πανταχῇ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἔξουσιν. Πολλὴν γε. Τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων, οὐδὲν δεινὸν, μήποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ: [*but truly, or now*]: Plat. de Rep. v. p. 465. (p. 35. ed. Bip.) And Plato, after saying that the true philosopher bestows all his attention on what benefits the mind, not the body, adds, σώφρων μὴν ὅγε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος: de Rep. vi. p. 485. (p. 72. Bip.)

II. After negation, μὴν added to a negative enforces negation; as, when Orestes has said καὶ μὴν τόδ' ἔρξας, δις θανεῖν οὐ χάρομαι, Pylades replies, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐγὼ μήν: Eurip. Or. 1117.

III. The corroborative force of μὴν is augmented in a challenge to make the experiment of something which a person is dared to do at his peril: εἰ δ' ἄγε μὴν πείρησαι, ἵνα γνῶωσι καὶ οἷδε αἰψά τοι αἶμα κελαινὸν ἐρώσει περὶ δουρί: Iliad. α, 302.

MΩN, with its concomitant particles.—I. Μῶν interrogates, and concludes or infers at the same time. Thus the sausage-maker, who says he does not think himself worthy of being at the head of affairs at Athens, is asked by Demosthenes, with a keen stroke of satire on the Athenians and their demagogues, μῶν ἐκ καλῶν εἰ κἀγαθῶν; *why? how so? are you then sprung from worthy and respectable progenitors?* Aristoph. Eq. 184. See also Aristoph. Ach. 329. Pac. 157. [258. ed. Br.] 280. [281.] 1042.

II. Sometimes that from which the inference expressed by μῶν is drawn, is put after it with γάρ: τί; ἔφη. ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γάρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς: Plat. Phædr. p. 84. (c. 35. ed. Fisch.)

III. When μῶν μὴ is in a preceding clause, and ἦ in a following, μῶν μὴ signifies *utrum, whether*: ἐὰν δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένῃται ἀδικία, μῶν

μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἕξει; Μηδὲν ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη: Plat. de Rep. i. p. 351. (p. 200. ed. Bip.)

And so μὴν μήτι: τί δέ; οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὀριζόμενοι, μὴν μήτι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἐμπλεοὶ τῶν ἐτέρων; ἢ οὐ; Id. de Rep. vi. p. 505. (p. 113. ed. Bip.)

IV. But when a negative is required in the interrogation, οὐ is added; as, ἐν οἷς τί χρῆν ποιεῖν ἐμέ; μὴν οὐχ, ὅπερ ἐποιοῦν; *ought not I to have done what I did do?* Plat. Ep. iii. p. 316. See also Aristoph. Pac. 280. [281. Br.] Plat. 372.

NAI, NH.—I. Naì is a particle expressive of affirmation or assent; as in replies: οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ᾧ Ἀδείμαντε; Naì, ἦδ' ὅς. *yes, said he*: Plat. de Rep. v. p. 449. (p. 3. ed. Bip.) ἦ γὰρ τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης; ναί: Id. in Phædr. p. 266. (p. 363. Bip.)

II. By affirming a negation it sometimes has the effect of a negative: ψυχὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀνδρείοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἦκιστ' ἂν τι ἐξώθει πάθος ταραξείε τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειε; Answ. ναί. *it is as you say*, i. e. *it by no means can*. Plat. de Rep. ii. p. 381. (p. 254. ed. Bip.) and without interrogation: ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ ἀδικουμένους ἀδύνατόν ποῦ φίλους εἶναι. Answ. ναί. Id. in Lysid. p. 215. Naì affirms the negation expressed by ἀδύνατον: or there may be an ellipsis; ναί, τοῦτό γε καλῶς or ἀληθὲς εἶπας: for similar words follow ναί in Plato's Euthyphr. p. 9. (c. 9. ed. Fisch.) οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν, οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὥς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην: Answ. ναί, τοῦτο μὴν ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

III. Without previous interrogation ναὶ assents, with confirmation, either to the words of others, or of one's own: to those of others, as in Æschin. adv. Ctesiph. p. 281. [p. 437. l. 11. ed. Reisk.] Of one's own words it is altogether confirmatory or corroborative; and in this use it is sometimes emphatically repeated: ναί, ναί, τεύχεο δῶμα, κύον, κύον, ᾧ ἐνὶ δαίτας ποιήσεις: Callim. Hymn. in Cer. 64.

It is confirmatory in ostestation also, and indicates vehement desire: ναὶ ἀδελφε, ἐγὼ σου ὀναίμην ἐν Κυρίῳ ἀνάπαντόν ποῦ τὰ σπλάγχνα ἐν Κυρίῳ; *yea brother*, &c. Philem. 20. λέγει ὁ μαρτυρῶν ταῦτα. Naὶ ἔρχομαι ταχύ. Ἀμήν. Naὶ ἔρχου, Κύριε Ἰησοῦ: *even so, come Lord Jesus*: Revel. xxii, 20. [Abr. of Vig. note f, p. 147.]

IV. Naὶ δὴ assents with confirmation: ναὶ δὴ, ὄντως δὴ, Hesych. and ἀλλὰ is added in the figure anthypophora: τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων· ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες· ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων: Iliad. a, 286. Naὶ assents, δὴ confirms, and ἀλλὰ objects. See Iliad. ψ, 627. Naὶ μὴν has the same force as ναὶ δὴ: see Oppian. Halieut. iii, 482. [On ναί, see Abr. of Vig. pp. 147. 148. and notes e, f, g, h.]

V. The particle νῆ confirms, affirms, and assents, being at the same time juratory: as, Megar. διαπεινᾶμες αἰὶ ποττὸ πῦρ. Dicæop. ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι, νῆ τὸν Δί', ἦν αὐλὸς παρῇ: Aristoph. Ach. 751. See also Pac. 217. [218. ed. Br.] and it is used in expressing approbation of the sentiments of another: thus to Socrates, saying, οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω ποῦ ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος, Euthyphro replies, πόρρω μέντοι, νῆ Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες: Plat. Euthyphr. (c. 4. ed. Fisch.)

VI. *Nḡ Δία* is much used in affirmative answers : see Cebes Tab. [p. 22. l. 15. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1738.] Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (p. 357. ed. Bip.)

And in one's own answer to a figurative question put by one's self, *νῆ* awakens attention : *τί σοὶ ταῦτα νῦν λέγω ; καὶ καλεῖν φημι δεῖν τούτους ; ἐγὼ, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθῆ μετὰ παρρησίας ἔρω πρὸς ὑμᾶς, &c.* Demosth. Philipp. p. 28.

VII. It appears to be used ironically : *πλὴν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο λέγουσι, νῆ Δία, &c.* Demosth. de Cherson. [p. 91. l. 26. ed. Reisk. See note *l*, p. 148. of the Abr. of Vig.]

VIII. In the oath *νῆ τῷ θεῷ*, when used by women, *τῷ θεῷ* meant Ceres and Proserpine ; when by men, Castor and Pollux. See Aristoph. Pac. 213. [214. ed. Br. See Abr. of Vig. p. 148. notes *g* and *k*.]

IX. When an appellative noun, and not the name of a god, follows *νῆ*, that particle is significative of protestation or testification, rather than of an oath : *καθ' ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκω, νῆ τὴν ὑμετέραν καύχησιν, ἣν ἔχω ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ : I protest by your rejoicing, &c.* 1 Cor. xv, 31.

X. It has a notable use in concession, when *γε* following assists the argument or assertion of an adversary by some addition ; as, *ναί, φησιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Κεφάλου καλὸν, τὸ μηδεμίαν γραφὴν φεύγειν· [καὶ] νῆ Δε', εὐδαιμόν γε : yes truly, and what is more, fortunate too :* Demosth. de Cor. p. 348. [p. 310. l. 29. ed. Reisk.] Then immediately follows *ἀλλὰ* introducing an objection opposed to the adversary's : *ἀλλὰ τί μᾶλλον ὁ πολλάκις μὲν φυγὼν, μηδεπώποτε δὲ ἐξελεγχθεὶς ἀδικῶν, ἐν ἐγκλήματι γίγνεται· ἂν διὰ τοῦτο δικαίως ;*

But the subsequent *ἀλλὰ* does not always introduce an objection : by an ellipsis of *οὐ μόνον* it is sometimes superadditory : Xanthias, accusing Labes the dog, *τυρὸν πολὺν κατεσικέλιζε, καὶ νέπληγ' ἐν τῷ σκότῳ* : Philocleo (the judge) : *νῆ τὸν Δε', ἀλλὰ δηλὸς ἐστίν :* Aristoph. Vesp. 907. [911. ed. Br.] i. e. *νῆ τὸν Δε', οὐ μόνον ἤκουσα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δηλὸς ἐστίν.*

XI. *Nḡ Δε'* ἀλλὰ and ἀλλὰ *νῆ Δία* differ in this, that the latter best suits objections supposed by anticipation ; the former replies to objections : thus, ἀλλὰ *νῆ Δία*, *ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἴσως εἴποι πρὸς ταῦτα :* Demosth. adv. Leptin. [p. 457. l. 22. ed. Reisk.] [See Abr. of Vig. notes *i* and *j*, p. 148.]

NY, NYN, NYNI, NYN.

I.—OF THE PARTICLES NY AND NYN.

I. *Nṽ* is a poetical particle, signifying an indivisible point, or instant, of present time : *νῦν δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ ψευδάμενοι μαχόμεσθα· τῷ οὐ νύ τι κέρδιον ἡμῖν ἔλπομαι ἐκτελέεσθαι*, Iliad. η, 353. *now* : although in this passage *νν* may denote conclusion or consequence, as in Iliad. α, 383. *τῷ οὐ νν* standing for *τοίνυν οὐ* by tmesis ; *τοίνυν* being compounded of *τοι* (whence *τῷ*) and the enclitic *ννν*. This *ννν* is formed by the adjection of *ν* to the enclitic *νν*, and has the same signification.

See *Iliad*. ψ, 485. compared with *Aristoph. Nub.* 644. [634. ed. Bekk.] [See *Abr. of Vig.* note *m*, p. 148.]

II. *Nūn* signifies either present time, or past or future time bordering on the present: ὅπερ νῦν προῦθέμεθα, *Plat. Phædr.* p. 259. (p. 349. ed. Bip.) i. e. ἀρτίως, *just now*. νῦν ἐζήτουν σὲ λιθάσαι οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, καὶ πάλιν ὑπάγεις ἐκεῖ; *St. John xi*, 8. The disciples represent the occurrence as but just past, although some considerable time had elapsed.

III. With a future tense it signifies time removed from the present by a momentaneous interval: ἦ μάλα σ' οὐ βέλος ὠκὺ δαμάσσοτο πικρὸς οἰστός, νῦν αὖτ' ἐγχείη πειρήσομαι, αἶ κε τύχοιμι: *Iliad*. ε, 279.

IV. *Nyni* is Attic; and Eustathius observes that it is used of present time only: p. 1840.

V. As *δη* from its primary signification of time acquired a hortatory use, so *νῦν* also; for those who earnestly incite others, wish to exclude all delay. Hence *νῦν* suits imperatives: σὺ νῦν διάφερε τῶν κακῶν, *Eurip. Or.* 251. [σύ νυν, ed. Pors. 245.] λέγε νῦν ἀνύσας τι τὴν τρόπιν τοῦ πράγματος, *Aristoph. Vesp.* 30. πιθοῦ νυν, *Eurip. Or.* 1101. [1099. ed. Pors.] ἄγε νῦν, ἴωμεν: *Aristoph. Vesp.* 1255. *Pac.* 851. Cf. *St. James v*, 1. ἴθι νῦν, ἀκουσον: *Aristoph. Pac.* 669. φέρε νῦν, κατείπω τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον: *Aristoph. Vesp.* 54.

VI. There is so close an affinity between *νῦν* (or *νν*) and *δη*, that not only both particles are similarly used in impatient interrogation, (see p. 43. and *Iliad* α, 414.) but instead of the compound ἐπειδὴ the poets use ἐπεὶ νν: as, αἶθ' ὄφελος παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀδάκρυτος καὶ ἀπῆμων ἦσθαι, ἐπεὶ νύ τοι αἴσα μίνυνθά περ, οὔτι μάλα δῆν: *Iliad*. α, 416. where the Schol. explains ἐπεὶ νύ τοι by ἐπειδὴ σοι.

II.—OF THE PARTICLES CONJOINED WITH NYN.

I. *Nūn δὲ* is frequently used in opposition;—of the present time to the past, as, ὅς πρὶν μὲν ὑμᾶς δυστυχεῖν, φίλος παρῆν, νῦν δ' οὐκέτ' εἰμὶ δυστυχοῦντί σοι φίλος; *Eurip. Orest.* 1096. [1094. ed. Pors.]—of the present to the future; as, ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰσαῦθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγῆσει· νυνὶ δὲ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἠρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν: *Plato Euthyphr.* p. 6. (c. 7. ed. Fisch.)

II. Sometimes *νῦν δὲ*, without any evident signification of time, is opposed to a past tense preceding: as, τιμὴν πέρ μοι ὄφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίσσαι Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης· νῦν δ' οὐδέ με τυτθὸν ἔτισεν: *Iliad*. α, 355.

III. Often the signification of time almost wholly disappears: as in ταῦτ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς φίλα· νῦν δ' ὁ μὲν ἔρδων ἐκφέυγει, τὸ κακὸν δ' ἄλλος ἔπειτα φέρει: *Theogn.* 739. Here also however there is an opposition, indicated by δὲ, to past time latent in the wish ταῦτ' εἴη φίλα, which is equivalent to ταῦτ' ὄφελεν εἶναι φίλα.

IV. This adversative use is most frequent, when the conditional particle εἰ, or ἂν, precedes: as, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτενον—, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἅμα τῇ παρακελεύσει ἐπιούμην· νῦν δὲ—πειράσομεν πείθειν: *Thucyd.* iv. c. 126. See also *Hebr.* xi, 16. And with γὰρ following

μέν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς γυναικα σωφρονεστέραν ξίφος μεθεῖμεν, δυσκλεῖς ἂν ᾔην φόνος· νῦν δ' ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης Ἑλλάδος δώσει δίκην· Eurip. Orest. 1134. [1132. Pors.] The μὲν is sometimes omitted; as, εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτὸ καλὸν ἔφην, σοφὸν θ' ἄμα, οὐκ ᾔην ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις· νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὁμοιον οὐδέν, οὐτ' ἴσον βροτοῖς· Eurip. Phoeniss. 504.

V. Νῦν οὖν serves for transition, and, with an imperative mood, at the same time for incitation: νῦν οὖν, πρὸς Διὸς, λέγε μοι, δ νῦν σαφῶς εἰδέναι διίσχυρίζου· ποῖον δὴ τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβές· Plat. Euthyphr. p. 5. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.) *now therefore*. Οὖν concludes, from the assertion of Euthyphro, that he was able to give the information required.

VI. When what has preceded is more brief, the close or conclusion with incitation, rather than transition, is indicated: thus Cyrus, after a short question: νῦν οὖν λεγέτω τις ἐνθάδε ἀναστὰς περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, *now then*, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 3, 4.

VII. Καὶ νῦν is used in the same manner by Thucydides: καὶ νῦν —αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς αἰδιον ξυμβώμεν, &c. iv, 63.

ΟΙ, ΟΙ ΜΟΙ.—I. Οἷ is a particle of lamentation: it is often joined with a nominative case, as, οἷ ἐγὼ, Eurip. Orest. 1018. and 1347. [1340. ed. Pors.]

II. More rarely with an accusative; as, οἷ ἐμὲ δειλὴν, Epigr. cited by H. Steph. [Thesaur. Index 1524. d.]

III. But it is most frequently joined with the dative μοι, and coalesces with it in one word, οἶμοι; which is sometimes used independently of construction, as an interjection; as, οἶμοι, διατρίψεις, κἀπολεῖς τριψημερῶν: Aristoph. Vesp. 845. but it assumes the nature of a compound, as to its use, when construed with a nominative: οἶμοι κακοδαίμων, ὡς ἀπόλωλα δειλαιοι: Aristoph. Plut. 851.

IV. When a genitive follows, ἔνεκα is understood: οἶμοι τῶν κακῶν! Aristoph. Plut. 389. οἶμοι τῶν κτημάτων! οἶμοι τῶν ἀγρῶν! Lucian. Catapl. p. 642.

V. For οἶμοι, ᾧμοι is sometimes used: ᾧμοι ἐμῶν παθῶν! Eurip. Phoeniss. 1545. ᾧμοι ἐμῆς αἵτης, Apoll. Rhod. i, 290. And the μοι is sometimes repeated: ἃ δ' ἴαχεν, ἴαχεν, ᾧμοι, μοι: ib. 1465.

VI. By the abuse of a rustic it expresses immoderate joy: οἶμ' ὡς ἤδομαι! Aristoph. Nub. 771. [See Abr. of Vig. note o, p. 149.]

ΟΜΩΣ.—I. Ὅμως and ὁμοίως are of the same origin; and therefore ὅμως is sometimes put for ὁμοίως, *in like manner*; as, καὶ ἐςλέοντα ὁπότε ἀλλαγεῖς, ὅμως οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔξω πίστεως: Lucian. Dial. Menel. et Prot. and so 1 Cor. xiv, 7. and ὁμοίως for ὅμως, *nevertheless, notwithstanding*; as, οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει, εἰδέναι μὲν γράμματα, καὶ κατέχειν τὰ μαθήματα πάντα, ὁμοίως δὲ μέθυσον καὶ ἀκρατῆ εἶναι: Tab. Ceb. p. 220. [See Abr. of Vig. note r, p. 149.]

II. Hence it appears why ὅμως is reckoned among adversative particles; for it supports or enforces the affirmation or negation of one or other, or of both, of two [opposed] propositions, with some comparison or association: it requires therefore regularly a sentence of two members, καίτοι, καίπερ, εἰ καὶ, ὡς, or the like, being in the pro-

tasis, and *ὅμως* in the apodosis : e. g. *εἰ καὶ οὐκ ἔχω φράσαι, ὅμως ἐρῶ σοι δι' αἰνιγμῶν*. Not only however is *καίτοι*, or the like particle, sometimes defective in the first member, but *ὅμως* is sometimes found in a sentence consisting, as to form, of only one member : as, *εἰς τὰ μηδέν σοι χρήσιμα, ὅμως ἐκ πολλῆς τῆς περιουσίας ἀναλίσκεις* : Lucian. t. iii. adv. Indoct. p. 115. to explain which the sentence must be put into the following form : *εἰ καὶ ἓν μὴδέν σοι χρήσιμά ἐστιν, ὅμως ἐκ πολλῆς περιουσίας εἰς αὐτὸ ἀναλίσκεις*. And so, when a preceding verb is changed into a participle : *Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν, ὅμως προσέθετο καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ* : Thucyd. vi, 5. for *καίτοι* [*εἰ καὶ*] *ταῦτα εἶπεν, ὅμως, &c.*

III. The particles *εἰ καὶ, καίτοι, &c.* with the whole protasis even, may be understood, when *ἀλλὰ* is prefixed to *ὅμως* : as, *καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται*.—*πολλά γε, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή* : Plat. Euthyphr. (c. 16. ed. Fisch.) for, *ἀλλ', εἰ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον, &c.* and, *ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ οἱ γεωργοί, ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον, &c.*

IV. For *ἀλλ' ὅμως, ὅμως δέ* is frequently used, with a similar ellipsis ; as, *ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τούτων βελτίους γενέσθαι· ὅμως δέ οὐκ ἄχρηστα κἀκεῖνά ἐστιν* : Tab. Ceb. p. 219. And *οὖν* also is sometimes added : Plato, after mentioning several obstacles to his voyage to Sicily, adds, *ὅμως δ' οὖν πάντα χαίρειν ἕστας ἦλθον* : Ep. iii. The collective force of *οὖν* may be made apparent by an admissible transposition ; the participle *ἕστας* being changed into a verb, and the protasis being assumed either from what precedes or extraneously ; thus, *τούτων δέ καίπερ οὕτως ἔχόντων, ὅμως ταῦτα χαίρειν εἶων· ἦλθον οὖν*.

V. *Μέντοι* also is subjoined to *ὅμως* : *ἐστὶ μὲν οὐκ ἴσον—πρὸς τοὺς πράξαντας διαλυσσάμενους τῶν οὐκ εἰδόντων κατηγορεῖν· ὅμως μέντοι,—εἰ μεγάλα ὑμῖν καὶ θαυμαστὰ τὰ δίκαια εἶναι ταῦτα ὑπολαμβάνετε, ἀποδόντες τὰ τρία τάλαντα, περαίνετε* : Demosth. adv. Nausimach. p. 634. "*Ὅμως* compares *οὐκ ἴσον τῶν οὐκ εἰδόντων κατηγορεῖν*, and *ὑπολαμβάνειν ταῦτα δίκαια ἔχειν*, and *μέντοι* confirms and supports the comparison.

VI. *Γε* restrictive is added to the last mentioned particles : *δι' ἐρμηνέως συμβάλλομεν τὰ λεγόμενά ποτε· ὅμως μέντοι γε οὐκ ἄχρηστον ἦν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τὴν φωνὴν ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχειν* : Tab. Ceb. p. 219. where there may be a transposition, for *οὐκ ἄχρηστόν γε, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least not without use*.

VII. "*Ὅμως γε μέντοι* also occurs : see Aristoph. Ran. 61. Vesp. 1335. [1344. ed. Br.] See p. 35.

VIII. "*Ὅμως γε μὴν* also is said : *οὐκ εἶδον οὕτως ἄνδρ'—ἐπιλήσμονα· ὅστις σκαλοθυράτι· ἄττα μικρὰ μανθάνων, ταῦτ' ἐπιλέλθεται πρὶν μαθεῖν· ὅμως γε μὴν αὐτὸν καλῶ θύραζε δευρί* : Aristoph. Nub. 631. Here are two different things, *ἐπιλέλθεται πρὶν μαθεῖν*, and *καλῶ θύραζε*. These two are set together, as equally true, by *ὅμως* : *γε* limits *καλῶ* : *yet nevertheless I will at least call him forth, and do all I can ; I will make another trial* : and this is confirmed by *μὴν*.

ΟΠΗ, ΟΠΟΤΕ, ΟΠΟΤΑΝ, ΟΠΟΥ.—I. "Οπη signifies, *in what part, where, in what respect*: ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτω διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ· εἶπω σοι ὅπη; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 12. (c. 13. ed. Fisch.) εὐροιμ' ἂν ὅπη σαθρός ἐστιν, ib. p. 5. In this use ὅπη and ταύτη are correlative: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτη ἔχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω: Id. Phædr. p. 246. (p. 321. ed. Bip.)

II. Sometimes motion is signified: [Abr. of Vig. p. 150. r. i.] τοῦτ' ἤδη, ὅπη ἀποβήσεται, ἄδελον: Plat. Phædr. p. 3.

III. With ἂν following it is rendered *wheresoever*: ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς, Plato Phædo p. 113. (c. 61. ed. Fisch.) ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη ἰτέον: Id. de Rep. ii.

IV. Οὖν is sometimes added; as, πότερον ἑάσομεν αὐτὸ, ἢ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον, ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον; Theæt. τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἴπερ γε καὶ ὀπηροῦν φαίνεται δεῖν: Plat. Theæt. p. 187. (p. 146. ed. Bip.) That the force of οὖν may not be lost, the full expression may be supposed to be εἴπερ γε εἰ μὴ πάντη, ἀλλ' οὖν ὅπη φαίνεται δεῖν: the order being, εἴπερ γε φαίνεται δεῖν, εἰ μὴ πάντη, ἀλλ' οὖν ὅπη δεῖ.

V. Τί also is inserted between ὅπη and οὖν: ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπητιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτε, ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 35. (c. 23. ed. Fisch.) *you who seem to be something, of some consideration, on whatever account, or on all accounts, or in any respect.* The force of τι appears more plainly when it is in an oblique case separately from ὀπηροῦν: πρὸς γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχητέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων, ἰσχυρίζεται περὶ τινος ὀπηροῦν: Id. in Soph. p. 249. (p. 266. ed. Bip.)

VI. Περ added to ὅπη makes the sense more indefinite: πρῶτον μὲν σοι τὰ περὶ Δίωνα ὑπάρξει ταύτη γινόμενα, ὀπηπερ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃς: Plat. Ep. vii. p. 339. *in what way or manner soever*: here it is correlative to ταύτη.

VII. Ὅποτε is construed with the indicative, subjunctive, and optative moods. With the indicative of the imperfect, denoting somewhat actually past, and at a definite time: ὀπότε μιν ξυνδῆσαι Ὀλύμπιοι ἤθελον ἄλλοι, *when*: Iliad. α, 399. and so θ, 230. With the optative of the imperfect, to signify something past, but at an indefinite time, for ὀπότε ἂν or ὀπότεαν: as, ἐπεμέλετο ὁ Κῦρος, ὀπότε συσκηνοῖεν, ὅπως εὐχαριστότατοί τε ἅμα λόγοι ἐμβληθήσονται, καὶ παρ-ορμῶντες εἰς τὰγαθόν: *whenever*; *as often as*: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 1. and in the same sense Lucian joins it with the optative of the 1 aor. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἐγέλων, ὀπότε σκωφθεῖεν: Lapith. t. iii. p. 432. For ὀπότεαν or ὀπότε ἂν, it denotes, with the optative of the imperfect or aorist, a time indeterminate and mixed, future with regard to the time at which the words are used, and past with regard to the case or supposition put: thus, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὀπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδῃ, καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος, καὶ εἰς ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 41. and in the same sense with the subjunctive of the 1 aor. τὸ δὲ δὴ σάρκας ὅσοις συνδοῦν ὀπότε νοσήσῃ: Plat. Tim. p. 84. (t. ix. p. 417. ed. Bip.) and so Iliad. α, 163.

VIII. On account of the affinity between consequence in time and in ratiocination, it takes a causal signification, *since, seeing that*: μέγας δὲ σύ γε, ὦ Φεραῦλα, ὁπότε γε καὶ ἡμῖν τάξεις ἂ ἂν δέοι ποιεῖν: Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3, 7. [See Abr. of Vig. notes *c* and *d*, p. 155.]

IX. By its junction with ἂν, ὁπότεν is formed; which signifies, *as often as, whensoever, when*. It is construed with an optative of the 1 aor. as, ὁπότεν γοῦν ἀναγκασθείμεν, ἀπολειφθέντες που, —ἀσιτεῖν, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν: Plat. Sympos. p. 219. (p. 266. ed. Bip.) or with the subjunctive of the present: οὐ γὰρ περὶ συμικρῶν ὄρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἶμαι γενήσεσθαι τότε, ὁπότεν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν: Id. in Sophist. p. 231. (p. 229. ed. Bip.) or of the 2 aor. ὁπότεν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται: Id. in Phædr. (p. 328. ed. Bip.) It is properly construed also with the indicative of the future, because by the genius of the Greek language the future itself takes away so much from the actuality of the verb's sense, as there is time between the present and the future case supposed: ὁπότεν δὴ φθέγγομαι ἐγὼν ἰάχουσα, τότε σχεῖν ἀκάματον πῦρ, *when I shall speak*: Iliad. φ, 341. [But see Abr. of Vig. p. 154. l. 11.]

X. Ὅπου signifies the place in which any thing is, or is done; *where*: and it is correlative with ἐκεῖ: ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρὸς ὑμῶν, ἐκεῖ ἔσται καὶ ἡ καρδία ὑμῶν: St. Matth. vi, 21. And whenever either of these correlatives is not expressed, it is understood: οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν, ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 11. Cf. St. Matth. vi, 10. [See Abr. of Vig. note *s*, p. 151.]

XI. It signifies also motion to a place, *whither*: ὅπου ἐγὼ ὑπάγω, ὑμεῖς οὐ δύνασθε ἐλθεῖν: St. John viii, 21. So xiv, 4. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 151. l. 3.]

XII. The correlative of ὅπου is not always ἐκεῖ: for in oblique interrogation ὅπου answers to ποῦ: Streps. ἀλλ' ἡ Λακεδαίμων ποῦ 'στιν; Discip. ὅπου 'στιν; αὐτῇ: Aristoph. Nub. 214. before ὅπου 'στιν, underst. ἐρωτᾷς; which is expressed in Xen. Cyrop. ii, 4, 31. ἦν δ' ἐρωτᾷ, ὅπου εἰμί, λέγε τάληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις.

XIII. Hitherto of ὅπου as an adverb: it has more of the true nature and force of a particle, when employed in ratiocination: as when Timon says to Jupiter that Salmoneus did not act so very absurdly in thundering against him; and adds, πῶς γάρ; ὅπου γε καθάπερ ὑπὸ μανδραγόρα καθεύδεις: *since, seeing that*: Lucian. Timon. p. 103. [p. 59. A. ed. Salmur.]

XIV. This use obtains especially in arguing from what is greater to what is less, and the contrary; and it is to be accounted for from an analogy between *place* and a *circumstance*: καὶ τί θαυμαστὸν, εἰ τοῦτο ἔπαθες ἀνόητος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος ἄνθρωπος, —ὅπου καὶ Πύρρον, φασί, τὸν Ἑπειρώτην, τὰ ἄλλα θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα, οὕτως ὑπὸ κολάκων ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ποτὲ διαφθορήναι, ὥς πιστεύειν, ὅτι ὅμοιος ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ: Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. p. 116. *when they say that even Pyrrhus, &c. for we, as well as the Latius, (who use, cum, quando, for quandoquidem),* suppose an analogy between a circumstance and *time*.

XV. In this sense ἦπου, *doubtless, undoubtedly*, is correlative to it: ἦπου αὐτὸς γε πολλὰ ἔχει, ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμῶν ἐκάστῳ τοσαῦτα δέδωκεν: Xen. Cyrop. viii, 4, 31. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 151. l. 14.]

XVI. Το ὅπου is added ὅν, with the same effect as when it is added το ὅπη: (see ὅπουν:) τί δέ; ἀνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾶς ὄντα, ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὅπουν; *any where*: Plat. Soph. p. 249. (p. 266. ed. Bip.) δεσμός ἔσθ' ὅπουν, ὥστε μένειν ὅπουν, πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία; Id. in Cratyl. p. 403. (270. Bip.)

ΟΠΩΣ.—I. The primary power of ὅπως is that of designating manner relatively; but the word to which it is referred, i. e. οὕτως or τρόπον, is not usually expressed: thus, δημοφάγον δὲ τύραννον, ὅπως ἐθέλεις, κατακλίνει: *as, in whatever manner*: Theogn. 1183. With indication of doubt, τρόπον is understood in Aristoph. Pac. οὐδ', ὅπως αὐτῇ προσήκει Φειδίας, ἡκηόειν: *how*: v. 615. So ὅπως ἔχω πρὸς δεῖπνα, ὁ παρεληλυθὼς μου βίος ἅπας μαρτύριον ἂν γένοιτο: Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 434. In Plato οὕτως is expressed as its correlative: πολλὸν κράτιστόν ἐστιν, οὕτως, ὅπως δύναμαι, λέγειν: Phædr. p. 228. (p. 283. ed. Bip.) ῥητέον σοὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως, ὅπως οἶός τε εἶ: p. 236. (299. Bip.)

II. This primary power of ὅπως is not lost, when in construction with the subjunctive of the 1 aor. it denotes the final cause; for then it properly signifies *that so*, or *that in this manner*, or *by this means*: *as*, ἐπ' αὐτὴν δὲ εὗρητε, ἀπαγγεῖλατέ μοι, ὅπως κἀγὼ ἐλθὼν προσκυνήσω αὐτῇ: St. Matth. ii, 8. See also v. 23. where the full phrase would be, καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο ταῦτα, ὅπως, &c. Οἱ Φαρισαῖοι συμβούλιον ἔλαβον, ὅπως αὐτὸν παγιδεύσωσιν ἐν λόγῳ: Id. xxii, 15. Here not only the end is signified, but the manner of attaining it. When the first aorist is not in use, the second is employed: ἐκπλεῦσαι, ὅπως ἐπιπλέον ὁ σῖτος ἀντίσχη: Thucyd. i. 65. παρασκευάσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην, ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσῃτε, καὶ μὴ πάθητε ταυτὸν, ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον: Demosth. Ol. i. [p. 9. l. 17. ed. Reisk.] Here the first aor. of the verb that has one is used. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 151. l. 38.] When it is construed with the optative, ἂν is understood, commonly in its potential use: παρ δὲ οἱ αὐτὸς ἔσθ' ὅπως θανάτῳ βαρείας χεῖρας ἀλάκοι: Iliad. φ, 548. ἐδόκει οὖν μοι ἀφεμένῳ τῆς εὐθὺν ὁδοῦ, ἀπαντᾶν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως ῥᾶστα ὅμῳ γενόμεθα: Æschin. Soer. Dial. de Morte. [Abr. of Vig. p. 151. l. 45.] Nor with the indicative of the future does it lose its signification of *manner*: it may be rendered, *by which mode*, or *that in this manner*: ὅπως μὲν ταῦτα ἔξετε, ἐμοὶ μελήσει, *in what manner*: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 15. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 152. l. 13.] ὁρθῶς ἐστί τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται οὗτοι ἀριστοὶ: Plat. Euthyphr. οὐκ ἔχεις τέχνην, ὅπως μενεῖς παρ' ἡμῖν: Eurip. Med. 322. which is equivalent to οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως μενεῖς. But although ὅπως is not properly of itself significative of the final cause, yet, without detriment to the sense of many passages, it may be rendered as if it were, *that, in order that*.

III. The indicative of the future with ὅπως is put after a past tense, where in Latin the subjunctive of the imperfect is used: αἰεὶ ἐπεμέλετο ὁ Κῦρος—ὅπως εὐχαριστότατοί τε ἅμα λόγοι ἐμβληθήσονται: Cyrop. ii, 2, 1. ἔπρασσον, ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἦξει: Thucyd. iii, 4.

IV. It is construed with the indicative of the future in the sense of *how, in what manner*, after verbs of fearing: ἐν μόνον δέδοικα—

ὅπως ἐγὼ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ὑμεῖς φατέ ἔχειν με, ταύτης δεσπότης γενήσομαι : Aristoph. Plut. [200. ed. Br.]

V. Also in injunctions : ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀγωνιεῖ, φρόντιζε, τὰ 'πίλοιπ' ἄριστα : Aristoph. Eq. 685. ἄγε νῦν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβάλωμαι—, εὐθέως ὑφαρπάσει : Id. Nub. 489. but the verb expressing the injunction or exhortation is usually omitted. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 153. note x.]

VI. And in that sense it is construed, in entreaties, with the subjunctive mood : νῦν οὖν ὅπως σώσης μ', ἐπεὶ κἀπώλεσας : Id. Nub. 1179.

VII. When ὅπως appears to be used interrogatively, either the interrogation is latent in the whole sentence, or ἐρωτᾷς is understood : thus, Streps. πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν ; Socr. ὅπως ; viz. ἐρωτᾷς ; *do you ask me how?* Aristoph. Nub. 677. And thus in Eurip. Hecub. 398. where ὅπως is said to signify *so* or *thus*, Hoogeveen understands ἐρωτᾷς, with reference to πῶς in the foregoing verse.

VIII. In the protasis of similes it signifies *as*, i. e. (without loss of its primary signification) *in the manner that, in the same manner as* ; and then it is usually not put first ; as, λέων ὅπως, for ὡς λέων : thus, κάπροι δ' ὅπως θήγοντες ἀγρίαν γένυν, ξυνήσαν : Eurip. Phœn. 1389.

IX. From this use is derived that in which it signifies *time relatively* ; i. e. with reference to some occurrence following the particular time denoted. When the time is definite, ὅπως is construed with the indicative of a past tense ; as, ἡχῆς δ' ὅπως ἤκουσαν, ἀργὸς οὗτις ἦν : *when ; as soon as* : Eurip. Phœniss. 1155. See also 1464. but when indefinite, with the subjunctive mood : ἐπὶ Μοῖριος βασιλῆος, ὅπως ἔλθῃ (in some edd. ἔλθοι), ὁ ποταμὸς ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ πήχεας τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ἀρδεσκειν Αἴγυπτον τὴν ἐνερθε Μέμφιος, *whenever* : Herodot. ii, 13.

X. "Ὅπως ἂν is used potentially ; as, with the optative mood, εἰ πολὺν χρόνον ἐσκόπει Φιλοκράτης, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα ἐναντιωθείη τῇ εἰρήνῃ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἄμεινον εὐρεῖν οἶμαι, ἢ τοιαῦτα γράφοντα : Demosth. de fals. Leg. p. 202. *how*. Ἄν may also be considered as potential, when ὅπως is construed with the subjunctive mood, in signification of *the end* or *purpose* : αὐτὸς σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι, ὅπως ἂν με διδάξης περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 11. (c. 13. ed. Fisch.) φιλοῦσιν—ἐν ταῖς γωνίαις τῶν πλατειῶν ἐστῶτες προσεύχεσθαι, ὅπως ἂν φανῶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις : *that, in order that* : St. Matth. vi, 5.

XI. "Ὅπως ἂν denotes proportion : ὅπως ἂν, οἶμαι, καὶ παραστῶσιν τύχαι : *accordingly as ; prout* : Eurip. Med. 331.

XII. Also time not defined or limited : see Acts iii, 19.

XIII. When ὅπως is used with signification of the end or purpose, and of prevention at the same time, μὴ is added with the subjunctive mood : (see on μή :) ξυνέβησαν πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη ἐλεῖν Ἀθηναίους, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβροθήσωσιν ἐκ Νισαίας οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, *in order that the Peloponnesians might not, &c.* Thuc. iv, 66. The manner also is indicated here. See too, Thucyd. iv, 8.

XIV. Neither is the indication of manner lost after verbs of fearing : as, οὐ φοβῆ ἰδικαζόμενος τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπως μὴ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων ; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 4. (c. 4. ed. Fisch.)

XV. And, as *ὅπως* is construed with an indicative of the future in injunctions or adhortations, so *ὅπως μὴ* in prohibitions [or precaution:] σκοπεῖσθε μέντοι τοῦτο,—ὅπως μὴ λόγους ἐροῦσι μόνον οἱ παρ' ἡμῶν πρέσβεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργον τι δεκνύειν ἔξουσιν: Demosth. Ol. ii. p. 7. And, as in the former case, so in the latter, *ὅρα*, or the like, is understood: *ὅπως μὴ*—τὸν πόλεμον ἐκώπυρσεν', Aristoph. Pac. 307. for *ὁρᾶτε*, *ὅπως μὴ*: see you do not; take care lest.

XVI. There is some difference, when the first person of the future follows: ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 506. (p. 115. ed. Bip.) under. βλέπτεον, εὐλαβητέον, or σκοποῦμαι, εὐλαβοῦμαι: [*but I doubt I shall not be able.*]

XVII. Ὅπως οὐ is construed with an indicative of the present in Isocr. Nicocl. θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ἔχόντων, ὅπως οὐ καὶ τὴν ῥώμην, καὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν κακῶς λέγουσιν: [p. 64. l. 13. ed. Battie. *I wonder how it is that they do not, &c.*]

XVIII. Several particles are subjoined to *ὅπως*, which render the signification indeterminate: as, δὴ: τὰ δὲ πτώματα—σωρηδὸν κατεπίμπρατο, ἢ ὅπως δὴ ἐρρίπτετο: Herodian. iv. 6. δῆποτε: τοῦτο πέπρακται νῦν ὅπωςδῆποτε: Demosth. Ol. iii. p. 11. Οὐν: ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁπουοῦν δοξάζων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς οὐ ψευδῇ δοξάσει, κἄν ὅπως οὐν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχη: Plato Theæt. p. 188. (p. 148. ed. Bip.) τιοῦν: μὴδ' ὅπως τιοῦν δεινὸς λέγειν: Id. Apol. Socr. περ: τὸ μὲν ὦν λευκὸν διακρίνει τὴν ὕψιν, τὸ δὲ μέλαν συγκρίνει, ὅπως περ (for ὅπως περ) τὸ θερμὸν διαχεῖ τὰν ἀφάν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνάγειν δύναται: in the same manner as: Auct. inc. de Anima Mundi. [See Abr. of Vig. pp. 151—153. and the notes.]

OTE, OTAN.—I. When *ὅτε* signifies definite past time, it corresponds to *τότε*, and is construed with an indicative of the preterperfect or of an aorist: εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος, ὅτε ἶδεν αὐτὸν, "Ἦκει ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς τε καὶ χρυσοῦς Γοργίας, ἔφη ὁ Γοργίας· ἢ καλὸν γε, &c. Athen. Deipnosoph. xi, p. 505. *when*. So St. Matth. xxi, 34.

II. When the time signified is indefinite, *ὅτε* is construed with the optative mood, ἂν being understood; and it may then be rendered, *as often as*, *whensoever*: τοιοῦτοι νῦν πάντες, ὅσοι Τρώεσιν ἄρωγοί, εἶεν, ὅτ' Ἀργείοισι μαχοίετο: Iliad. φ, 429. ἐκάλεε δὲ καὶ ἔτιμα, ὅτε τινὰς ἴδοι τοιοῦτό τι ποιήσαντας: Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 30. With a subjunctive in Homer: οὐδέ τί μιν χρεὼ ἔσται τυμβοχοῆς, ὅτε μιν θάπτωσιν Ἀχαιοί: Iliad. φ, 323. Here however it does not signify *as often as*, but *when* indefinitely.

III. It signifies *since*, *seeing that*: ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο ὁ ἔρως ἐστίν ἀεὶ, Plat. Symp. p. 206. (p. 236. ed. Bip.)

IV. Ὅτε μὲν—ὅτε δέ, is, *at one time, at another time*: οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις, ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις, μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς: Aristot. Polit. ii, 5. ὅτε μὲν θοὰ γούνα' ἐπαλλεν συνεχέως, ὅτε δ' αὖτε μεταλλήγων καμάτοιο,—βοάσκειν: Apollon. Rhod. i. 1270. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 154. note b.]

V. Sometimes ἄλλοτε δὲ follows *ὅτε μὲν*, as in Iliad. λ, 64.

VI. Ποτέ μὲν—ποτέ δέ is put after ὅτε μὲν—ὅτε δέ, as equivalent: Procl. in Plat. Theolog. i, 4.

VII. Sometimes *ὅτε δὲ* is expressed, and *ὅτε μὲν* understood ; as in *Iliad. ρ*, 178.

VIII. "*Ὅτε μὴ* is an antique phrase for *εἰ μὴ*, *unless, except* : *Iliad. ν*, 319. See Eustath. p. 984. l. 29. [*Il. π*, 227. *Od. π*, 197.]

IX. "*Ὅταν* is compounded of *ὅτε* and *ἄν* : this appears from the poets, who use *κεν* for *ἄν*, using *ὅτε κεν* for *ὅταν*, as Homer, in *Iliad. ι*, 498. and from the occurrence of *ὅτε ἄν* separately for *ὅταν*, as in *Iliad. φ*, 347.

X. It signifies indefinite time, and is therefore fitly construed with the subjunctive mood, especially of an aorist : *ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ὁ Κύριος τοῦ ἀμπελῶνος, τί ποιήσει τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἐκείνοις* ; St. Matth. xxi, 40. *when*. It may sometimes be rendered, *if ever ; if at any time* : as in *Iliad. α*, 567. *μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν, ὅτοι θεοὶ εἰς' ἐν ὀλύμπῳ, — ὅτε κέν τοι ἀάπτους χεῖρας ἐφείω*.

XI. With the subjunctive of the present : *σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ*, (*ὅ τι ἄν*, Forst. *δ*, τ' *ἄν*, Fisch.) *πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκᾳ πράττει* : Plat. *Apol. Socr. p.* 28. (c. 16. ed. Fisch.)

XII. With the indicative : *οὕτως οὐδὲ συμφέρει ἄρα ἐνίοις πλουτεῖν, ὅταν μὴ ἐπίστανται τῷ πλούτῳ χρῆσθαι* : Ceb. Tab. p. 229. [p. 51. l. 7. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1738. Hermanu rightly pronounces this phrase a solecism, and reads *ἐπίστωνται* : he refers to Bast. on Greg. Cor. p. 115.]

XIII. It sometimes signifies, *whilst ; as long as* : *ὅταν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ὦ, φῶς εἰμι τοῦ κόσμου* : St. John ix, 5. seemingly for *eis ὅτε ἄν*, for which Homer says *εἰσόκε* : see *Il. β*, 332.

XIV. "*Ὅταν* occurs in a *causal* sense, *since, seeing that* ; but seldom more than *ὅτε* : *ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ πέφυκε φθάνεσθαι, τοῦ μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν ὀρωμένου, τοῦ δὲ, ἐπειδὴν ἐμπελάσῃ τῇ ἀκοῇ· καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν τὸ μὲν τάχιστον ἢ τῶν ὄντων, λέγω δὲ τὸ πυρῶδες, τὸ δὲ ἦττον ταχύ* : Aristot. *de Mundo c.* 4.

OTI.

I.—OF THE ETYMOLOGY AND PRIMARY POWER OF OTI.

I. "*Ὅτι* is compounded of the relative *ὅ* and the indefinite *τι* : this appears from Homer's using *ὅ* alone for *ὅτι*,—*γινώσκων, ὃ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπέιρεχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων* : *Iliad. ε*, 433. See also *α*, 120. and Eustath. p. 569. and p. 1057. l. 18.

II. Hence appears its genuine power ; which is to commence a clause or member, making, by its relative nature, that clause, containing a finite mood, depend on a preceding verb ; so that *ὅτι*, followed by such a clause, is equivalent to *τὸ* followed by a clause with an infinitive mood : thus, *ἤκουσα ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ* is equivalent to *ἤκουσα τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς εἶναι* : i. e. *ἤκουσα τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο*. So, *τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι* is in place of an accusative.

III. In construction it answers to *τοῦτο* either preceding or following : *ἐγγὺς οὐ παύσομαι, τοῦτ' ἴσθ' ὅτι* : Aristoph. *Av.* 1408. See *Jud.* 5. Homer puts *τόγε* before *ὅ*, instead of *τοῦτο* before *ὅτι*, *Iliad.*

α, 120. Τοῦτο follows in Aristoph. Av. 1176. οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι δ' εἶχε πτερὰ, τοῦτ' ἴσμεν.

IV. The uses of ὅτι are principally three; the *narrative*, the *causal*, and the *intensive* or *augmentative*: to these may be added its use in signification of *time*.

II.—OF THE NARRATIVE USE OF OTI, FROM WHICH ITS OTHER USES ARE DERIVED.

I. The narrative use of ὅτι is twofold:—1. when the narrator relates in his own person, employing oblique phraseology, and—2. when he relates as in the person of another, employing direct phraseology. In the first case, the oblique phrase may be resolved into an accusative case and infinitive mood; as, λέγω ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐστὶ σοφός, into λέγω Σωκράτην εἶναι σοφόν: and it is to be remarked that, when something past is spoken of, the best authors generally use the optative mood: as, οἱ δ' Ἴνδοι—ἔλεξαν, ὅτι πέμψειε σφᾶς ὁ Ἰνδῶν βασιλεὺς, καὶ κελεύσειεν ἔρωτᾶν, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 4, 7. *that the king had sent them*, &c. But of something present Xenophon uses the indicative, presently afterwards: ἀκούετε ὅτι οὐκ ἀδικοῦμεν τὸν Ἀσσύριον οὐδέν. Add Dion. xxxvii. p. 56. c.

II. In narration, if what is expressed by the verb or participle preceding ὅτι, and what is expressed by the verb following it, were synchronous, then the verb following ὅτι is put in the present tense, although the verb or participle preceding it is in a past tense: ^a thus, διαγγελείσης οὖν, ὅτι νοσεῖ, φήμης: Phil. Jud. Legat. ad Cai. p. 770. ἤρξατο ὁ Ἰησοῦς δεικνύειν τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀπελθεῖν εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ: Matth. xvi, 21.

But if what is expressed by the preceding verb or participle in the past tense was subsequent to what is expressed by the verb following ὅτι, then the latter verb is put in a past tense: ^a the following passage exemplifies both cases: θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τοῦ Πέτρον παρρησίαν καὶ Ἰωάννου, καὶ καταλαβόμενοι ὅτι ἄνθρωποι ἀγράμματοί εἰσι, καὶ ἰδιῶται, ἐθαύμαζον, ἐπεγίνωσκόν τε αὐτοὺς, ὅτι σὺν τῷ Ἰησοῦ ἦσαν: *that they had been with Jesus*: Acts iv, 13. See also St. John iv, 1.

III. An infinitive mood very seldom follows ὅτι. H. Steph. (in Append. ad al. Script. de dial. Att. p. 77.) cites Thucyd. and Xen. and, θεωρῶ, ὅτι—μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι τὸν πλοῦν occurs in Acts xxvii, 10. for ὅτι μέλλει.

IV. When a narrator speaks as in the person of another, whose words he recites in direct phraseology, ὅτι and the following verb cannot be resolved into an accusative case with an infinitive mood: as, τὸν δ' ἀποκρίνασθαι (λέγεται) ὅτι βασιλεῖαν μὲν οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην: Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3, 26. See St. James i, 13. St. Matth. ix, 13. xxvii,

^a This is one of many passages, which I have ventured to remodel, for reasons similar to those mentioned in the Preface to the Abridgment of Viger p. v. l. G. J. S.

43. Acts v, 23, 25. Rom. ix, 17. St. Mark i, 15. xiv, 26. 58. 1 John iv, 20. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 203. l. 25.]

V. Sometimes direct phraseology follows *ὅτι*, even when the speaker recites his own words: τότε ὁμολογήσω αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔγνων ὑμᾶς. ἀποχωρεῖτε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν: St. Matth. vii, 23.

VI. When the words recited regard neither the reciter nor the person to whom or of whom he recites, it may be doubtful whether the phraseology be direct or oblique: [i. e. whether *ὅτι* be redundant or not:] as, εἶπατε, ὅτι οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ, νυκτὸς ἐλθόντες, ἔκλειψαν αὐτὸν, ἡμῶν κοιμωμένων: St. Matth. xxviii, 13. So St. Mark vi, 15. St. John iv, 10.

VII. "*Οτι* is prefixed to a whole discourse or disquisition, be it ever so long: as, ὃν δὲ (λόγον) μέλλω λέγειν, Σησιχόρον—· λεκτέος δὲ ᾧδε· ὅτι, οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἄν—φῇ—&c. Plat. Phædr. p. 244. (p. 315. ed. Bip.) and, λέγωμεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, ὦ Σωκράτες τε καὶ Γλαῦκων, &c. Id. de Rep. v. p. 452. (p. 10. ed. Bip.)

III.—OF THE ELLIPTICAL USE OF OTI.

I. There is an ellipsis before *ὅτι*:—1. of something previously expressed; as, τί λέγει; ὅτι Σωκράτης γέγονε τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφώτατος: where, in the answer, λέγει is understood before *ὅτι*.

II.—2. Of something extraneous: as, ὃ δὲ πάντων καταγελαστότατον, (underst. τοῦτ' ἔστι) ὅτι τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις τὰ χερίστα τυγχάνομεν διαφυλάττοντες: Isocr. Paneg. p. 161. καὶ, ὅτι ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, λάβε μοι τὰ ψηφίσματα, καὶ τὴν ἐκμαρτυρίαν ἀνάγνωθι τὴν Ἀριστοδήμου, καὶ κάλει πρὸς οὓς ἐξεμαρτύρησεν, &c. Æschin. de Fals. Leg. p. 249. Before *ὅτι*, ἵνα δῆλον ᾖ, or the like, is to be understood. So, ὅτι δ' οὐδὲν ψεῦδος εἶρηκα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, λαβέτω μοι τὸ ψηφισμα ὃ γραμματεὺς, &c. ib. p. 253.

III. The grammarians also and expositors prefix *ὅτι* before a fresh observation, understanding *ιστέον* or *σημείωσαι*: examples may be seen in almost every page of Eustathius's comm. on Homer.

IV. Sometimes, especially in compilations, φασίν, or φησίν ὁ καὶ ὁ, is understood before *ὅτι*: thus, ὅτι διαμαρτάνει Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Νεαίρας, λέγων, Πλαταίεας γεγράφθαι ἐν τῇ Ποικίλῃ στοᾷ: Harpocration. ὅτι πρὸς τὴν φυλὴν τοῦ κτησαμένου αἱ πρὸς τοὺς δούλους λαγχάνονται δίκαι: Suid. in. v. ὅτι.

The full expression sometimes occurs; as, λέγουσιν ὅτι Αἰῖλος—· λέγουσιν ὅτι γυναῖκες—· φασίν ὅτι Μίνως: Palæphat. c. 11. 13. 18. 19. &c. and in Harpocration, after the very same words which Suidas uses elliptically: ὅτι νόμος ἔστιν, ὑπὲρ τεσσαράκοντα ἔτη γενόμενον χορηγεῖν παισίν: Suid. ὅτι νόμος ἔστιν, ὑπὲρ τεσσαράκοντα ἔτη γενόμενον χορηγεῖν παισίν, Αἰσχίνης τε ἐν τῷ κατὰ Τιμάρχου φησὶ, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ: Harpocration. And to the following words of Suidas, ὅτι οἱ ποιητοὶ παῖδες ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὸν πατρῶον οἶκον οὐκ ᾔσαν κύριοι, εἰ μὴ παῖδας γνησίους καταλίποιν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ ποιησα-

μένου, Harpocration adds, Ἀντιφῶν ἐπιτροπικῶ Καλλιστράτου, καὶ Σόλων ἐν εἰκοστῇ τῶν νόμων.

V. Ὅτι is used elliptically in concluding a sentence: as, Οὐκοῦν κακῶ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κακίον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. Answ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι: Plat. Gorg. p. 275. (p. 63. ed. Bip.) Here either the preceding words are to be understood, or something extraneous, as, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀληθές ἐστιν. Hence δῆλον ὅτι, or, in one word, δηλονότι, used in assent, and sometimes in explanation.

VI. Sometimes it concludes very emphatically; as after σάφ' ἴσθι, or οἶδα: Sycoph. οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ γὰρ ἐνθάδ' ἐστὼν οὐδενί. Chremyl. μὰ τὸν Δι' οὐκ οὖν τῷ γε σῶ, σάφ' ἴσθ' ὅτι: Aristoph. Plut. 890. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποδώσεις, οὐδὲ φιαλεῖς, οἷδ' ὅτι: Id. Vesp. 1339. [1348. ed. Br.] See Eurip. Phæniss. 1611.

VII. There is sometimes an ellipsis of ὅτι itself. Eustathius says this is the case in v. 194. of Iliad. σ. ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὄγ' ἐλπομ' ἐνὶ πρώτοισιν ὀμιλεῖ: but in that verse ἐλπομαι is perhaps parenthetical.

IV.—OF THE CAUSAL USE OF ΟΤΙ.

I. Even in the causal use of ὅτι, its narrative force will, upon due examination, be found to be preserved; for its causal force is owing to an ellipsis of διὰ and τοῦτο before it: τοὺς πολλοὺς λέληθεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστον: Plat. Phædr. p. 237. (p. 301. ed. Bip.) *because they do not, &c.* The full phrase would be, διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι, *on this account, that, &c.* as in St. John xv, 19. ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἐστὲ, — διὰ τοῦτο μισεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κόσμος.

II. Sometimes τοῦτο only is understood, and διὰ coalesces with ὅτι in the word διότι. That διότι *because*, and ὅτι, are equivalent in signification, appears from their being used indifferently in passages corresponding as to form and construction: Ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστι, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν; and, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον, διότι φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλό τι; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 10. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.) See also Plat. in Phædr. p. 244. (p. 315. ed. Bip.)

III. In 1 John iii, 20. ὅτι is repeated without reason in the opinion of Hoogeveen; who therefore reads v. 19. and 20. as follows: (19.) καὶ ἐκ τούτου γινώσκωμεν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμὲν, καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, (20.) ὅ, τι ἐὰν (*whatsoever*) καταγινώσκη ἡμῶν ἡ καρδιά, ὅτι μετῴων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν, καὶ γινώσκει πάντα.

IV. Other words besides διὰ and τοῦτο are sometimes understood: as, Socr. φησὶ γὰρ ποιητὴν εἶναι με θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο, τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὡς φησι: Euthyphro. μανθάνω, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαντῶ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 3. (c. 2. ed. Fisch.) After μανθάνω underst. ὅθεν πλάττει ταῦτα.

V. Sometimes τί ἐστὶν is understood before ὅτι: whence it is rendered, *wherefore*, or *why*: as, ὅς κ' εἴποι, ὅτι τόσπον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων: Iliad. α, 64. See St. Mark ix, 11.

VI. Under the causal sense of *ὅτι* may be mentioned that which is assigned to it, when said to be put for *καθότι*, *in respect of being*; *as being*; *so far forth as*; for these senses are so nearly allied, that it is almost always doubtful which is preferable: see the passage quoted above from Plato, p. 139. l. 29. and 1 John iii, 9. Rom. vii, 20. [21.] and perhaps there is no passage in which *ὅτι* must necessarily be taken to stand for *καθότι*.

VII. "*Ὅτι* sometimes denotes, not the *cause*, but the *sign* of a thing: as, κατέδυ ὁ ἥλιος, *ὅτι* νύξ ἐστίν: and, ἀφένονται αἱ ἁμαρτίαι αὐτῆς αἱ πολλαὶ, *ὅτι* ἠγάπησε πολὺ: St. Luke vii, 47. That *ὅτι* in this last passage expresses the sign, and not the cause, is apparent from what Christ adds, *ὃ δὲ ὀλίγον ἀφίεται, ὀλίγον ἀγαπᾷ*: he does not say, *τῷ δὲ ὀλίγον ἀγαπῶντι ὀλίγον ἀφίεται*.

V.—ON THE AUGMENTATIVE OR INTENSIVE, AND OTHER USES OF ΟΤΙ.

I. The intensive use of *ὅτι* with superlatives may be explained by reference to its origin: e. g. *ὅτι* μάλιστα εὐδαίμων, *as happy as possible*, Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (p. 327. ed. Bip.) is properly οὕτως εὐδαίμων, ὡς ὃ, *τι* μάλιστα [εὐδαίμων ἐστι.] "*Ὅπως* ἔσονται *ὅτι* ἄριστοι, Id. in Euthyphr. is ὅπως ἔσονται τοῦτο, ὃ, *τι* οἱ ἄριστοι εἰσιν. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 204. l. 24.]

II. The real nature of the phrase was in the course of time forgotten or neglected, so that *ὅτι* coalesced with its superlative in one word: thus *ὀτιήδιστα*, Xen. Cyrop. vii. p. 175. l. 36. *ὀτιμάλιστα*, Plat. Cratyl. p. 439. l. 5. *ὀτιμεγαλοπρεπέστατον*, Xen. Cyrop. ii. p. 57. l. 3. *ὀτιπορρώτατω*, Lucian. adv. Ind. t. iii. p. 113. *ὀτιχορησιμώτατα*, Thucyd. viii, 74. *ὀτιτάχιστα*, Plat. Euthyd. p. 302. Instead of *ὀτιτάχιστα*, *as soon as possible*, it is singular that *ὅτι* τάχος is sometimes used: γράφων *ὅτι* τάχος, Hippocr. Epist. ad Hystanem; and in one word, ἐβούλετο *ὀτιτάχος* ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει, Thucyd. vii, 42.

III. "*Ὅτι* is said to be put for *ὥστε*, signifying *effect*; as in 1 John iv, 17. but there *ὅτι* is explicative: ἐν τούτῳ, *in this is our love made perfect*, *ὅτι*—THAT, *as he is, so are we*. In the Gospel too of St. John vii, 35. πῶς οὗτος μέλλει πορεύεσθαι, *ὅτι* ἡμεῖς οὐχ εὐρήσομεν αὐτόν; *ὅτι* is causal, and assigns a reason for the question πῶς, &c. It is causal also in St. Matth. xiii, 13. and in δεδιώς, *ὅτι* ἀπηχθανόμην, Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 21. (c. 7. ed. Fisch.)

IV. One passage occurs in which *ὅτι* has a signification of time; *when*; ἔρχεται ὥρα, *ὅτι* οὐκ ἔτι ἐν παροιμίαις λαλήσω ὑμῖν: Gospel of St. John [xvi, 25. "*Ὅτε* is the common reading.]

VI.—ON THE PARTICLES JOINED WITH ΟΤΙ.

I. "*Ὅτι* μὴ is *except*. A prudent man, says Plato, *ought not* ὁμοδόλοισ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾷν, *ὅτι* μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς:

Phædr. p. 274. (p. 378. ed. Bip.) οὐ γὰρ ἦν κρήνη, ὅτι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου: Thucyd. iv. 26. οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πρόποτε τῆς πόλεως ἐξήλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμὸν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος: Plat. Crit. p. 52. (c. 14. ed. Fisch.) Here ὅτι μὴ and εἰ μὴ are plainly equivalent. [For the true nature of the expression ὅτι μὴ, see Abr. of Vig. p. 204. l. 13.]

II. "Οτι is sometimes put before τί in questions: Charon. μάτην τὸν Παρνασσὸν αὐτῇ Κασταλία, καὶ τὴν Οἶρην, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὄρη μετεκινήσαμεν. Mercur: ὅτι τί; *how so?* literally, *because what?* Lucian. in Charon. t. i. p. 497. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 204. l. 6. and note L.]

III. The expression of eagerness and impatience in ὅτι τί is augmented by the addition of δὴ, as in Aristoph. Plut. 136. τῆς οἰκίας σαντοῦ ἀλλότριος γέγονας. καὶ ὁ Ξάνθος, ὅτι τί δὴ; καὶ ὁ Αἰσωπος, ὅτι χθὲς μεθύων συνέθου τὴν θάλατταν ἐκπιεῖν: Planudes in Vit. Æsop. p. 48. [p. 69. l. 19. ed. Genev. 1628.]

IV. For ὅτι τί δὴ; ὅτι δὴ τί; is said; and ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; as in Plat. de Rep. i. p. 343. (p. 180. ed. Bip.) And as ἐπειὶ is put for ἐπειδὴ, and ἡ ἐ for ἡδὲ, so οὕτω τί; for ὅτι δὴ τί; as in Aristoph. Nub. v. 782. [784. ed. Br. 774. Bekker's, for Mr. Priestley, 1826.]

V. Of ὅ τι separately, as it is not a particle, this is not the place to treat: one thing however may be observed, that in dialogue it follows and answers to τί, in the same manner as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅπου to ποῦ, &c. thus, Bdel. ὁ δὲ τί πρὸς ταῦτ' εἶφ; Phil. ὅ τι; [*do you ask me what? what did he say? why*] ἀλεκτρυόνος μ' ἔφασκε κοιλίαν ἔχειν: Aristoph. Vesp. 789. [793. Br.] See also v. 1434. [1443. ed. Br.]

OY, OYK, OYX, OYXI.—I. Οὐ is put before a consonant, οὐκ before a vowel, οὐχ before an aspirated vowel. On the difference between οὐ and μὴ, see μῆ. Οὐ denies a whole proposition, μὴ a part only: thus, πενθεῖν δ' οὐ σε θανάμῳ τύχας: Eurip. Med. 268. So St. Matth. xv, 26. and 1 Corinth. xiii, 4. 5. 6. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 165. l. 15.]

But there is an exception, when οὐ is joined to a noun by hyphen: as, for in that case it negatives that word only to which it is joined: as, ἐγὼ παραζηλώσω ὑμᾶς ἐπ' οὐκ ἔθνει, Rom. x, 19. κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως, Thucyd. v, 50. αἰρία δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ἐμελλεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦ φόρου ἢ οὐκ ἀπόδοσις, *the non-payment of the tribute*: Lucian. Ver. Hist. i.

II. Οὐ sometimes denies absolutely or generally, and is opposed to ναί: see St. Matth. v, 37. St. James v, 12.

III. In negative answers it is often accompanied by an ellipsis: as, ἀρα μὴ ἄλλό τι ᾗ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Answ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο: Plat. Phædr. p. 64. (c. 9. ed. Fisch.) for οὐκ ἄλλό ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο. The ellipsis is supplied by St. John i, 21.

IV. There is an ellipsis also, when, in antithesis or opposition, οὐ ends a sentence, or a member, having always, on account of its emphasis, an acute accent, and rejecting κ even though a vowel or diphthong follow: as, φαῖμεν ἂν ἢ οὐ; Plat. Protag. p. 330. (p. 127. ed. Bip.) εἰ δυνατόν ἢ οὐ; Id. de Rep. v. p. 452. (p. 10. ed. Bip.)

This is most frequent in sentences of which the clauses or members are distinguished by *μὲν* and *δέ*: as, τοῖς μὲν λόγοις ἠΰφρανε, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὐ: Eurip. Orest. 287. ἐν μὲν ἅρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐ: Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (p. 356. ed. Bip.) So de Rep. v. p. 453. init. and p. 475. (p. 10 and 56. ed. Bip.) See Herodot. ii, 37.

V. *Μὲν* is not always expressed in the first clause or member: ἡ γλῶττα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐ: Plat. in Sympos. p. 199. (p. 221. ed. Bip.) and so in Gorg. p. 520. (159. Bip.)

VI. *Οὐ* final sometimes ends a clause, and not a sentence; as, σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ· ἀλλὰ πάσης; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 475. (p. 56. ed. Bip.) So Epict. Enchir. c. 9. [and Herodot. in the passage above quoted, ii, 37.]

VII. The emphasis is increased when *οὐ* is repeated: οὐ μέτεστι τῶν ἴσων οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν, οὐ μέτεστιν, οὐ: Demosth. in Mid. p. 401.

VIII. *Οὐ* is emphatical in figurative questions, equivalent to affirmations, and demanding assent: πῶς εἶπας; οὐκ ἄρα δεύτερον δολοῦμεθα; Soph. Philoct. 1281. [ἀρ' οὐ δειν. Br. 1288.] In this use *οὐ* very frequently occurs: τί δέ; ἡ ἱατρικὴ, οὐχὶ ἡ ἐκούσα κακὰ ἐργαζομένη περὶ τὰ σώματα ἱατρικωτέρα; Plat. Hipp. p. 375. (p. 223. ed. Bip.) So St. Matth. v, 46.

IX. It expresses indignation: οὐκ ἔδει λυθῆναι, &c. St. Luke xiii, 16.

X. It loses its emphasis when doubt is indicated; as it is perhaps in the question, οὐκ ἐγὼ σε εἶδον ἐν τῷ κήπῳ μετ' αὐτοῦ; St. Luke xviii, 26.

XI. With the second person of the future indicative it commands emphatically in the form of interrogation: οὐκ ἀφήσεις τὸν σάκον; Aristoph. Ach. 822. τοὺς συκοφάντας οὐ θύραζε ἐξείρξετε; ib. 825. οὐ σιωπήσεσθε; Aristoph. Pac. 308. οὐ παύσῃ βαρβαρικά ἡμῖν ᾄδων; Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 445. See Aristoph. Ach. 564. Pac. 1124. and Plutarch. Apophth. p. 180. Aristoph. uses the imperative as equivalent; see Vesp. 450. [452. Br.] compared with 446. [448. Br.] And in the same sense he uses the indicative of the present: ib. v. 456. [458. Br.] See Ter. Eun. iv, 7, 29.

XII. But without interrogation, *οὐ* with the 2nd pers. of the future indicative expresses prohibition: as, οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, &c. See Exod. xx, 13. 14. 15. 16. Rom. vii, 7. Matth. v, 21. 27. vi, 5. Without *οὐ* the second person of the future commands: see Matth. v, 48.

XIII. Sometimes *οὐ*, when construed with a verb, does not merely negative the signification of it, but denotes with it the opposite of that signification: as, τί πέρει; τί μάτην οὐχ ὑγιαίνει; why are you beside yourself, or mad? Aristoph. Pac. 94. Thus οὐ φημι is to be taken rather as a positive than a negative expression, I deny: οὐ φησιν δώσειν, Hom. Il. η, 386. See Aristoph. Ach. 614. 771. οἱ μὲν φασιν ἀδικεῖν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 8. (c. 9. ed. Fisch.) [See Abr. of Vig. p. 164. l. 10.]

XIV. *Οὐ* with λέγω and other kindred verbs has not this signification: see St. John xvi, 26. The reason why the use is confined to

φημι is, that φημι has a peculiar sense of assent or affirmation : thus, οὐ καταφρονεῖς ἐκείνου τοῦ σκυτοτόμου ; says Socrates to Alcibiades : φήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὑπολαβὼν πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης, &c. *Alcibiades having assented, having replied in the affirmative* : Ælian. V. H. ii, 1.

XV. This opposite signification is sometimes given to nouns as well as verbs by οὐ : as, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, Rom. iii, 20. which does not mean, *all flesh shall not be justified, but some shall be excepted* : the meaning is, NO FLESH shall be justified. Μὴ is used in the same manner. See Psalm lviii, 5. 1 Corinth. i, 29. Aristoph. Vesp. 1086. [1091. ed. Br.] Also οὐδέποτε, and similar negatives : οὐδέποτε ἔφαγον πᾶν κοινόν, *I have never eaten any thing that is common* : Acts x, 14.

XVI. Οὐ affects the adverb ἥκιστα also in the same manner : ἔρωτες ἡμῖν τῶν ἀρχαίων πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι εἰς μνήμην ἐδόθησαν, καὶ οὗτος δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα : Ælian. V. H. xii, 34. for μάλιστα, *principally, especially*.

XVII. Οὐ sometimes virtually affirms, when it is used elliptically to express assent to a negative proposition : thus, Chor. οὐ πώποθ' οὕτω καθαρῶς οὐδενὸς ἠκούσαμεν, οὐδὲ ξυνετῶς λέγοντος. Phil. οὐκ. ἀλλ' ἐρήμας ᾤεθ' οὕτω ῥαδίως τρυγήσειν : Aristoph. Vesp. 629. [634. ed. Br. where οὗτος.] *True ; you say true : you have never heard any one speak so well : but, &c.*

XVIII. There is often an ellipsis of μόνον after οὐ : οὐκ ἐψεύσω ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τῷ Θεῷ : Acts v, 4. for οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις. See St. Mark ix, 37. St. John iii, 27. 30. vii, 16. xii, 44. The existence of this ellipsis has been denied except when ἀλλὰ καὶ follows the negative, as it follows μὴ in Thucyd. οἱ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγυς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, iv, 22. See Duker. So, μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος σκοπεῖτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐτέρων ἕκαστος : Philipp. ii, 4. and οὐ in Homer Il. ε, 379. and in Plat. de Rep. vi, p. 492.

XIX. When οὐ is accompanied by another negative word in such passages as the following, it cannot properly be considered as redundant : ἀναβλέψας δὲ ὁ Σάκας ἔρωτᾷ, τίος ἔτυχεν ; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἔφη, οὐδενὸς τῶν παρόντων : Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3, 29. for οὐ denies simply, whereas οὐδεὶς for οὐδὲ εἷς, (οὐδὲ being equivalent to *ne quidem, not even*,) excludes all exception.

XX. But when οὐ follows οὐδέν, a more emphatical affirmation is produced : as, ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδένα κίνδυνον ὄντιν οὐχ ὑπέμειναν οἱ πρόγονοι, Demosth. This however is not the case, when οὐδὲ and οὐκ regard different clauses or members ; as, οὐδ' ἦν ἐνθ' ἀφίκηαι ἀλωμένη, οὐ σευ ἔγωγε σκυζομένης ἀλέγω : Iliad. θ, 482. for the observation in § xviii. will apply here ; the order of the sentence, with respect to the signification, being, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἀλέγω σευ σκυζομένης, οὐδ' ἦν ἐνθ' ἀφίκηαι ἀλωμένη. Οὐ negatives ἀλέγω, and οὐδὲ excludes place. [Οὐκ denies simply ; οὐδὲ repeats the negation even on the supposition of the strongest case that could be put : *no, not even if you go to the abodes of Iapetus and Saturn.*] Nor is it the case when there are many negatives, provided they deny different things : as, ἔθηκαν ἐν μνήματι λαξευτῷ, οἱ οὐκ ἦν οὐδέπω οὐδεὶς κείμενος : St. Luke

xxiii, 53. *wherein never man before was laid.* Οὐ negatives the verb, οὐδέπω excludes all past time, and οὐδεὶς every person: thus, οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, Plat. Parmen. [Abr. of Vig. p. 162. r. ii.]

XXI. Secondly, after a negative verb, as, ἀρνούμαι, οὐ cannot properly be deemed redundant: thus, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ψεύστης, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀρνούμενος ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός; St. John ii, 22. So μὴ is usually put after negative or prohibitive verbs; as, τοῦ παιδίου ἀρνούμενου μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι, *the boy denying that he had dropped them:* Lucian. Laphth. [p. 853. D. ed. Salmur.] ἀπαγορεύω μὴ ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν: Aristoph. Ach. 168. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 167. l. 31.]

ΟΥ ΓΑΡ, with annexed particles.—I. Whenever negation is accompanied by statement of a cause or reason, the particles οὐ γὰρ are employed, independently of each other, so that they may be separated: οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένους μύθους ἐξακολουθήσαντες, ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου—δύναμιν: 2 Pet. i, 16. St. Peter might have said, σεσοφισμένους γὰρ μύθους οὐκ ἐξακολουθήσαντες, &c. τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται: Rom. viii, 7. Here, on the other hand, St. Paul might have said οὐ γὰρ ὑποτάσσεται. The same may be said of οὐδὲ γὰρ and οὔτε γάρ.

II. In argumentation the reason of a reason is often given, as in Iliad. α, 152—154. So, οὐ γὰρ δὴ πον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ: Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 21. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.) See Bud. p. 495. and Rom. viii, 7.

III. Οὐ γὰρ is used elliptically in negative answers, γὰρ having the same effect, as what is understood would have had if expressed; the effect of putting the matter beyond doubt by establishing the negation on a reason; so that οὐ γὰρ thus employed may be rendered, *no indeed; by no means:* thus Phædr. οὐκουν δὴ τό γ' εἰκός. Socr. οὐ γάρ. Plat. Phædr. p. 276. (p. 384. ed. Bip.) Cynisc. οὐδὲ τοῦτό με θέμις εἰδέναι; Jup. οὐ γάρ. Lucian. Jup. Confut. t. ii. p. 638. The ellipsis may be supplied in some such manner as the following: οὐ θέμις τοῦτ' εἰδέναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὠφελῇ θείης οὐδὲ ἔν.

IV. And when not responsive, οὐ γὰρ subjoined to a negation, or to a question, denies emphatically and decidedly: ἐβαλον εἰς φυλακὴν, καὶ νῦν λάθρα ἡμᾶς ἐκβάλλουσιν; οὐ γάρ: Acts xvi, 37. *and now do they thrust us out privily? nay verily: τί δ'; αὐλητάς τις εἰμὲν τοι δοκεῖ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ οὐ γάρ; or not at all; or by no means:* Epicharm. ap. Diog. Laert. iii. p. 195.

V. With an ellipsis of ἄρα, οὐ γὰρ is used in an interrogation equivalent to an assertion with its reason subjoined: thus, οὐ γὰρ φανῶ τοὺς πολεμίους; (Aristoph. Ach. 826.) is equivalent to ἐχρῆν τοῦτον φαίνειν, ἔστι γὰρ πολέμιος.

VI. Οὐ γάρ; by itself, is sometimes a question intended rather to elicit assent to something preceding, than to gain information: *is it not so? δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ, ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογημένων, αὐτὸν ἐαντὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔχοντα. οὐ γάρ;* Plat. Gorg. p. 480. (p. 73. ed. Bip.) [See Abr. of Vig. p. 183. note h.]

VII. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ, translated *for*, is an elliptical phrase, in which

οὐ γὰρ assigns a negative reason, and ἀλλὰ opposes something different : μὴ σκώπτέ μ', ὦ δέλφ'. οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλ' ἔχω κακῶς : Aristoph. Ran. 58. i. e. οὐ γὰρ σκώπτω, ἀλλ' ἔχω κακῶς.

In the foregoing example the ellipsis is supplied from something before expressed : in the following it must be supplied by something extraneous : Phædr. οὐ δὴ τό γ' εἰκός : Socr. οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους—σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράφει : Plat. Phædr. p. 276. (p. 384. ed. Bip.) Here after οὐ γὰρ, κατορθώσκειν ἂν τι, or the like, must be understood. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 168. r. iv. and note g.]

VIII. That this ellipsis is not imaginary, appears from Aristoph. Ach. 402. where the words expressed between οὐ γὰρ and ἀλλὰ, show that some such are to be understood when not expressed : Dicæop. ἐκκάλεσον αὐτόν. Cephis. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. Dicæop. ἀλλ' ὅμως : οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμ', ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν. He might have said elliptically, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν.

IX. Sometimes οὐ and γὰρ in this phrase may each have reference to a different ellipsis : as, δείραντες ἡμᾶς δημοσίᾳ, ἀκατακρίτους, ἀνθρώπους Ῥωμαίους ὑπάρχοντας, ἔβαλον εἰς φυλακὴν, καὶ νῦν λάθρα ἡμᾶς ἐκβάλλουσιν : οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξαγαγέτωσαν : Acts xvi, 37. Οὐ denies the justice of the proceeding just before mentioned, οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς λάθρα ἐκβάλλειν : γὰρ assigns a reason, Ῥωμαῖοι γὰρ ἔσμεν : and ἀλλὰ opposes what follows to what precedes.

X. In οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ καὶ there is a twofold ellipsis ; for μόνον is suppressed after οὐ γὰρ : and these particles do not deny what precedes, but signify that it is not all, and of less weight than what is afterwards introduced by ἀλλὰ καὶ : as, τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἶε—κρατήσειν ; Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἦδ' ὅς. Οὐ γὰρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια : Plato de Rep. vi. p. 492. (p. 87. ed. Bip.) More fully, οὐ γὰρ μόνον οὐδεὶς κρατήσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ, &c.

XI. In οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἂν pertains to a following verb, and there is a condition understood. Thus in the passage quoted above (l. 14.) from Aristoph. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμι would be more fully expressed, εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκκαλέσεις, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμι. And with a signification of an oblique future : οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα, for otherwise, for had he not possessed such knowledge, all would never have been, &c. Plato Cratyl. p. 436. (p. 338. ed. Bip.) More fully, εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε, &c.

XII. Δὴ added to οὐ γὰρ confirms the negative argumentation of those particles : μεῖζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἰσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι : Plat. Apol. p. 20. (c. 5. ed. Fisch.) for I truly know nothing of it.

XIII. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ is used in arguing from the greater to the less : as, εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτεροι ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἱ γε τεχνῖται, &c. Aristot. de Rep. ii, 5. for certainly the artificers at least are not—.

XIV. The force of δὴ is so far diminished by που subjoined, that a readiness to hear any objection is indicated : οὐ γὰρ ἂν δῆπου—παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἀφρονος σώφρων ἂν τις γένοιτο : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 17. for you will allow, I suppose ; for I think I may say ; or the like.

XV. The causal power of γὰρ in negative answers has already been

treated of; *οὖν* strengthens the support given by *οὐ γὰρ* in a negative answer to the preceding negation of another person: so that *οὐ γὰρ οὖν* is never used except after a previous negation: thus, *οὐδὲ μὴν ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι δυνάς τριάδι*: *Ans.* *οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. *Plat. Phæd.* p. 104. (c. 53. ed. Fisch.) *τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθῦα (ψυχὴ) οὐδὲν πλεον ἀναρμοστίας, οὐδὲ ἀρμονίας μετέχει ἄν*. *Ans.* *οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. *Ib.* p. 93. (c. 42. ed. Fisch.) Here the particles are left as vestiges of argumentation and conclusion, of which they perform the office, and the ellipsis of which must be supplied from something extraneous. But when the preceding negation is either supported by a reason, or introduced as a conclusion, the ellipsis with *οὐ γὰρ οὖν* needs not be supplied extraneously: for either the reason or the conclusion may be assumed from what has been previously expressed; the former when *γὰρ* precedes, the latter when *ἄρα*: thus, *Euth.* *γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται· οὐ γὰρ που ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσσομαι, ὡς σύ γε ἕτερον*. *Socr.* *οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. *Plat. Euthyphr.* Here the ellipsis is to be supplied thus: *ἕτερός με γραφὴν γέγραπται· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε βουλοίμην ἕτερον· ἀληθῶς οὖν ἔλεγες*. When the illative particle *ἄρα* precedes, *οὖν* concludes from the preceding inference; as, *οὐ ταυτὸν ἄρα ἐστι*. *Ans.* *οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. *Plat. Soph.* p. 256. (p. 280. ed. Bip.)

XVI. *Που* added to *οὐ γὰρ* lays out for assent by semblance of doubt: as, *τί νεώτερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι σὺ ἐνθάδε διατρίβεις; οὐ γὰρ που καὶ σοὶ δίκη τις οὕσα τυγχάνει*: *Plat. Euthyphr.* *for to be sure you also are not engaged in a cause, or, for I suppose you too are not, &c.* When *ἂν* is added, it is potential, and is to be referred to its own verb, from the sense of which it takes away actuality: *ὅπως ἂν φαίνεται κάλλιστος τοῖς μὴ γινώσκουσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν που τοῖς γε εἰδόσιν*: *Plat. Sympos.* p. 221. ed. Bip.

XVII. Sometimes a limitation or restriction is expressed by *γε* following: *τίνας ἔνεκ' ἂν τις—ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἔνεκα; οὐ γὰρ που ἐκείνων γε, ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ*: *Plat. Phædr.* p. 258. (347. ed. Bip.) Here is an ellipsis, which may be thus supplied: *εἰ γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα ζῆν, οὐκ ἐκείνων γέ που ἡδονῶν ζῆν ἂν, ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ*.

XVIII. That *που* is not always dubitative, appears from passages in which doubt can have no place; e. g. *οὐ γὰρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε σεαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἀρμονία συγκεκριμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι· ἢ ἀποδέξῃ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες*: *Plat. Phæd.* p. 92. (c. 41. ed. Fisch.)

XIX. *Οὐ γὰρ* too is equivalent to *οὐ γὰρ δὴ*: *ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν λόγον, πῶς, ἔφη, Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ τοι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκῶς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω*: *Plat. Euthydem.* p. 286. (p. 35. ed. Bip.) Here *οὐ γὰρ*, *συνήμῃ* being understood, gives a reason with negation for the words *πῶς λέγεις*; that negative reason is confirmed by *τοι*, and *ἀλλὰ* opposes something different to what precedes. The ellipsis is supplied by Homer: *ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γὰρ τ' ἴδμεν, ὅπη Ζῆφος, οὐδ' ὅπη ἦώς, οὐδ' ὅπη ἥελιός φαεσίμβροτος εἰσιν ὑπὸ γῆν, [εἴς τ' ὑπὸ γαίαν, *Odyss.* κ, 191.] οὐδ' ὅπη ἀννείται· ἀλλὰ φραζώμεθα θάσσον*: *Od.* ι, 190.

ΟΥ ΔΗΠΟΥ, ΟΥ ΔΗΠΟΥ ΓΕ, ΟΥ ΜΕΝ.—I. In οὐ δῆπον, *πον* softens the positiveness of the negation expressed by οὐ δῆ, and makes it depend on the suffragant negation of another person, which it is intended to elicit: as, ἄρχοντας γάρ πον, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δῆπον ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας. *Ans.* οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν: *Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 502. (p. 106. ed. Bip.) it is certainly not impossible, you will allow, &c.*

II. Οὐ δῆπον γε *is, certainly not, at least as I think*: θαυμάζω δ' ἐγώ γε, εἰ τοῖς μὲν τὸ νόμισμα διαφθείρουσι θάνατος παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστίν ἢ ζημία, τοῖς δ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν κίβδηλον καὶ ἄπιστον ποιοῦσι λόγον δώσετε. οὐ δῆπον γε, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί: *Demosth. adv. Leptin. [p. 508. l. 16. ed. Reisk.]*

III. The use of οὐ μὲν is obvious, when it is correlative to some particle following in the apodosis, as, δέ, ἀλλὰ, ἀτάρ, or the like: οὐ μὲν σοὶ ποτε ἴσον ἔχω γέρας— ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πλεῖον—χεῖρες ἐμαὶ διέπονσ', &c. *Iliad. a, 163.*

When no such particle corresponds to it, its use is more obscure; as in the same book of the *Iliad*, δαίνυντ' οὐδ' ἔτι θυμὸς ἐδέετο δαιτὸς εἴσης, οὐ μὲν φόρμιγγος περικαλλέος: *v. 603.* Here it seems to be in a manner circumscriptive or limitative, accompanying an addition worthy of more particular notice: *nor indeed of the harp.*

IV. In οὐ μὲν δῆ, οὐ is negative, μὲν restrictive, and δῆ confirmative: ἔστι, νῆ Δί', ἀνὴρ σύσκηνος ἐμός, ὃς ἐν παντὶ μαστεύει πλεον ἔχειν. Ἄλλος δ' αὖ ἐπήρετο αὐτὸν, ἦ καὶ τῶν πόρων; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ μὲν δῆ: *Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 22.*

V. In οὐ μένου, οὐ denies, μὲν limits, and οὖν concludes: οὐ μένου με προσεδόκας, ὅτι καὶ κοθόρνους εἶχες, ἀναγνῶναι σ' ἔτι: *Aristoph. Ran. 564. [557. ed. Br.]* The force of each word will appear more plainly, upon transposition: ὅτι μὲν κοθόρνους εἶχες, οὐ προσεδόκας οὖν μ' ἀναγνῶναι σε ἔτι, *because truly you had buskins on, you therefore did not expect that I should any longer recognise you.* Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἔγραφεν, ἡνίκα ἐργάσασθαι τι δέοι κακὸν ὑμῶς; οὐ μὲν οὖν ἦν εἰπεῖν ἑτέρῳ: *Demosth. de Cor. p. 333. [p. 274. l. 16. ed. Reisk.]* i. e. οὐ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ἦν εἰπεῖν, μόνῳ οὖν Αἰσχίνῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; ὁ Θρασυκλῆς ὁ φιλόσοφος οὗτός ἐστιν; οὐ μένου ἄλλος: *Lucian. Timon. t. i. p. 169. i. e. ἄλλος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἔστιν οὖν ὁ Θρασυκλῆς.*

The office of μὲν is more apparent when δέ, ἀλλὰ, or a similar particle, following, corresponds to it: thus, Αἰ. Ἐμὲ δεῖ προκεκρίσθαι σου, ὦ Λίβυ' ἀμείνων γάρ εἰμι. Αὐ. Οὐ μένου' ἀλλ' ἐμέ. *Lucian. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 380.* for, οὐ δεῖ μὲν σε προκεκρίσθαι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμέ. Οὖν however in this expression may possibly be confirmative. See οὖν.

VI. As to the use of οὐ μένου, it is corrective, denying somewhat preceding, and substituting somewhat following, as more true: thus, *Car. ἦ τῶν πονηρῶν ἦσθα καὶ τοιχωρύχων. Sycoph. μὰ Δί', οὐ μένου' ἔσθ' ὑγιὲς ὑμῶν οὐδενός: Aristoph. Plut. 871. [nay, but rather; nay, but on the contrary.]*

VII. But when the οὐ pertains to something following, οὐ μένου cannot be rendered by *nay*, without repetition of the negative: ἐγὼ,

says Agatho, ὃ Σώκρατες, σοὶ οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀντιλέγειν· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐχέτω, ὡς σὺ λέγεις : to which Socrates replies, οὐμενοῦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ—δύνασαι ἀντιλέγειν, ἐπεὶ Σωκράτει γ' οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν : Plat. Sympos. p. 201. (p. 226. ed. Bip.) *may rather it is the truth that you cannot contradict, &c.*

VIII. Πως is subjoined to οὐ μὲν, but it qualifies its own verb, and not οὐ μὲν : the particles are rendered, *not certainly by any means* : οὐ μὲν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί : Iliad. β, 203.

IX. Τοι is more frequently subjoined ; which confirms the negation limited by μὲν : ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου, παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα ἁρμονία, ἀναρμωστίᾳ οὐποτ' ἂν μετᾶσχοι. Answ. οὐ μὲν τοι. *indeed it cannot, certainly* : Plat. Phæd. p. 94. (c. 42. ed. Fisch.) So afterwards, p. 82. οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρόποι, ἐφη—. Οὐ μὲν τοι, μὰ Δί, ἥδ' ὅς. (c. 32. ed. Fisch.) See also Aristoph. Vesp. 663. [665. ed. Br.] And in answer to a question, especially to one including a negation : Aristoph. Av. 1667. [1668. Br. 1666. Bekk. There is no interrogation in these editions.]

X. Οὐ μέντοι, by its asseveration of denial, effects an opposition of a succeeding clause or member to a preceding one having μὲν in it ; and is in that case rendered *not however, but not* : ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι παροξυντικοὶ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀτελείας ὑμᾶς ἀφελέσθαι πείσαι· οὐ μέντοι δίκαιοί γε οὐδαμῇ : Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 375.

And this adversative use it may have, even when μὲν is not expressed, provided it may be understood : as, νῦν δὴ—ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν—ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ μένοιτο· χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε : Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 502. (p. 107. ed. Bip.) He might have said, γενέσθαι δὲ χαλεπὰ μὲν, οὐ μέντοι, &c.

XI. Το οὐ μὲν τοι the particle ἀλλὰ also is added, which is followed by γε, the latter affecting not οὐ μὲν τοι ἀλλὰ, but some other word : οὐ denies something not expressed, but to be assumed either from what precedes, or extraneously ; μὲν limits what οὐ negatives ; τοι confirms the limited negation ; and ἀλλὰ introduces something different ; so that οὐ μὲν τοι ἀλλὰ γε is, *certainly not indeed, but at least*. Thus, καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν—οὕτως γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μὲν τοι, ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον : Plat. Phæd. p. 62. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.) After οὐ μέντοι underst. ἀπλῶς ἄλογόν ἐστι. The ellipsis is partly supplied in the Vesp. of Aristoph. χώρει, πρόβαιν' ἐβρωμένως. ὦ Κωμία, βραδύνεις ; μὰ Δί, οὐ μὲν τοι προτοῦ γ', ἀλλ' ἥσθ' ἱμᾶς κύνειος : v. 231. He might have said in the usual order, οὐ μέντοι, ἀλλ' ἥσθα προτοῦ γ' ἱμᾶς κύνειος.

XII. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ qualifies something already said, an addition being made to it by καὶ, which is superadditory : as, τίς σοι διηγείτο ; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης ; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ Φοῖνικι· Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις—. οὐ μέντοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σωκράτη γε ἔνια ἤδη ἀνηρόμην, ὦν ἐκείνου ἤκουσα, καὶ μοι ὠμολόγει, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος διηγείτο : Plat. Sympos. p. 173. (p. 166. ed. Bip.) for οὐ μέντοι Ἀριστόδημος μόνος ἅπαντα διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σ. &c.

ΟΥ ΜΗ.—I. These particles, thus joined and disposed, are

auxiliary to each other in vehement denial or prohibition ; οὐ assisting prohibition by its negative power, and μὴ negation by its prohibitive power. The force of the one or of the other prevails according to the occasion on which they are used : both are referred to the same verb ; from which μὴ always takes away the sense of actuality, reducing it to power or will : what has been said therefore of the construction of ἂν will apply to that of οὐ μὴ. Thus in negation, οὐ prevailing ; οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστε, ἂν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μεγάραδε, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ : Plat. Phædr. p. 227. (p. 281. ed. Bip.)

II. It is seldomer that the prohibitive particle μὴ prevails ; as in οὐ μὴ σκώψης, Aristoph. Nub. 295. [σκώψεις, 296. Br. Bekk.] οὐ μὴ διατρίψης, Id. Ran. 465. [διατρίψεις, Br. 462.] οὐ μὴ φλυαρήσης, ib. 527. [φλυαρήσεις, Br. 524.]

III. The negative power usually prevails. Examples are very frequent in the Holy Scriptures : thus, οἱ πλῶνες αὐτῆς οὐ μὴ κλεισθῶσιν : Revel. xxi, 25.

IV. The prohibitive power is rather more apparent in St. Matth. v, 18. ἰῶτα ἐν, ἣ μία κεραία οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. The sense seems to be the same as if he had said, οὐ παρελεύσεται, καὶ μὴ παρέλθῃ, a degree of assent, and the speaker's approbation being thus added to the negation. So 2 Pet. i, 10. Revel. xviii, 22. 23. St. Mark ix, 1. St. Luke xiii, 35.

V. It is more faint when it follows futures which have not μὴ added to them : as, οὐ λήψεται πρόσωπον ἐπὶ πτωχοῦ, καὶ δέησιν ἡδικημένον εἰσακούσεται. Οὐ μὴ ὑπερίδῃ ἱκετεῖαν ὀρφανοῦ : Jes. Sir. xxxii, 13. See 1 Maccab. ii, 63. St. Matth. xxiv, 2. St. John x, 5. Hebr. viii, 10. 11. St. Luke i, 15.

VI. Sometimes μὴ is entirely void of all sense of prohibition, being put for ἂν in the signification of power or will : as, εἰάν μὴ σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα ἴδητε, οὐ μὴ πιστεύσητε : St. John. iv, 48.

VII. And this is the case when it is construed with the first person singular : τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μὴ μνησθῶ ἔτι : Hebr. viii, 12. x, 17. Here either *will* is signified, or *aversation* : *far be it from me to—*. In the following passage *possibility* is denoted : κάθημαι βασίλισσα, καὶ χήρα οὐκ εἰμι, καὶ πένθος οὐ μὴ ἴδω : Revel. xviii, 7. In this construction οὐ always precedes μὴ : see Thom. Mag. in μὴ.

VIII. Nor is it prohibitive, when used in interrogation ; as, τὸ ποτήριον, ὃ δέδωκέ μοι ὁ πατήρ, οὐ μὴ πίνω αὐτό ; St. John xviii, 11. Here μὴ may be put for ἂν in the sense of *necessity* or *duty*.

IX. Οὐ μὴ is construed with the indicative also, but of the future only ; as, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πονηροὺς οὐ μὴ ποτε βελτίους ποιήσετε : Æschin. c. Ctesiph. οὐ μὴ περιόσομαι, Aristoph. οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν, Plat. See the reason in ἂν and μὴ.

X. With the last mentioned tense it is used in interrogation : ὁ Θεὸς οὐ μὴ ποιήσει ἐκδίκησιν τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν αὐτοῦ ; St. Luke xviii, 7.

XI. The indicative of the future with οὐ appears to be equivalent to the subjunctive of the aorist with οὐ μὴ : ὁ πιστεύων οὐ μὴ κατασχευθῇ, Isai. xxviii, 16. In speaking of the same thing, St. Matth. uses οὐ μὴ with the indicative of the future, St. Mark οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive of the aorist, and St. Luke οὐ alone with the indicative of

the future : οὐ μὴ ἀφεθῇ ὧδε λίθος ἐπὶ λίθον, ὅς οὐ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, St. Matth. xxiv, 2. ὅς οὐ μὴ καταλυθῇ : St. Mark xiii, 2. ὅς οὐ καταλυθήσεται : St. Luke xxi, 6. but the negation is more forcible with μὴ.

XII. What has been said of οὐ followed by μὴ, applies to the compounds also of both ; as, οὐδὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς μήποτε, οὐ μήποτε, &c. οὐ μῆποθ' ἄλλῳ, Aristoph. Ach. 662. See also Aristoph. Vesp. 393. [394. ed. Br.]

XIII. When οὐ and μὴ are separated, οὐ pertaining to a preceding verb, and μὴ to one following in the infinitive mood, μὴ and the infinitive mood are equivalent to an infinitive of an opposite sense, and the two negatives effect an emphatical affirmation : thus, οὐ δυνάμεθα, — ἃ εἶδομεν καὶ ἠκούσαμεν, μὴ λαλεῖν : Acts iv, 20. μὴ λαλεῖν for σιγᾶν. So, οὐ δύναμαι μὴ μνησθῆναι αὐτοῦ, Xen.

XIV. Nor are negative particles redundant, when more than two are joined ; for the Greeks were accustomed to connect negations by a negative : ἔσται γὰρ τότε θλίψις μεγάλη, οἷα οὐ γέγονεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἕως τοῦ νῦν, οὐδ' οὐ μὴ γένηται : St. Matth. xxiv, 21. So xiii, 6.

XV. And when neither of the negatives serves as a copulative, as, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς οὐ μὴ ἀδικήσει : (St. Luke x, 19.) If a transposition be admitted, there will be nothing redundant : οὐ μὴ ἀδικήσει, οὐδὲν, i. e. οὐδὲ ἓν. However this may be, the force of negation is increased by this accumulation of negatives.

XVI. Either a subjunctive of the aorist always follows, or an indicative of the future, with which μὴ, not preceded by οὐ, would be deprecatory ; for οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ πῖω (St. Mark xiv, 25.) is one thing, and οὐκέτι μὴ πῖω another. Οὐκέτι οὐ πῖω is not Greek. Οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ φάγω ἐξ αὐτοῦ, St. Luke xxii, 16. οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ εὐρήσῃς αὐτά : Acts xviii, 14.

XVII. When an optative follows, ἂν is suppressed : τῆς ἀληθείας ὄντως οὐ μήποτε τύχοι : Plat. ep. ii. p. 323.

ΟΥ ΜΗΝ.—I. In οὐ μὴν the latter particle confirms the negation of the former. The combination is used in denying a particular added, on which the main matter spoken of hinges, and it is rendered, *but not, but yet not, not however* : Ἀρχέλαος αἰτηθεὶς παρὰ πότον ποτήριον ὑπό τινος τῶν συνήθων, οὐ μὴν ἐπιεικῶν, ἐκέλευσεν Εὐριπίδην τὸν παῖδα δοῦναι· θαυμάσαντος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, Σὺ μὲν γάρ, εἶπεν, αἰτεῖν, οὗτος δὲ λαμβάνειν ἄξιός ἐστι καὶ μὴ αἰτῶν : Plutarch. Apophth. p. 177. Here ἐπιεικῶν being a word of great weight with regard to the following apophthegm, μὴν is added to the negation of it instead of δέ, which would have been less efficient in the present case, although, if the apophthegm had not followed, it might have been employed, with an ellipsis of μὴν after συνήθων : συνήθων μὴν, οὐκ ἐπιεικῶν δέ.

II. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ is corrective ; οὐ μὴν denying something either before expressed, or to be assumed extraneously, and ἀλλὰ opposing something different : thus, οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Μαρίου σπονδάζοντος ὑφελθῆναι, πολλὰς ἀναβολὰς ποιησάμενος,—ἄφηκεν αὐτόν : Marius how-

ever, &c. Plut. in Mario p. 409. More fully, οὐ μὴν τοῦ Μαρτίου ἀποστάντος, ἀλλὰ σπουδάζοντος. See also Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 217. [p. 382. l. 25. ed. Reisk.] where οὕτως εἰρήνην ποιητέον may be understood after οὐ μὴν.^a

III. Hence it is used in putting off the consideration of something to another time; which is a sort of correction: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον ἀναθώμεθα τοῦ λόγου τόπον: Plut. de Adulat. et Amic. p. 54. The full expression would be, οὐ μὴν πλείω νυνὶ περὶ τούτων, ἀλλὰ, &c. and in pretermission, as, οὐ μὴν, ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ πάντα τὰλλα παραλιπόντα συντόμως εἰπεῖν, &c. Ep. Philipp. ap. Dem. p. 62. for οὐ μὴν μακρολογήσω.

The full expression occurs in Isocrat. χρησιμώτατα μὲν ἅπαντες νομίζουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἥδιστα γε αὐτῶν ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτο πεπόνθασιν, ὅπερ πρὸς τοὺς νοουθετοῦντας: ad Nicocl. p. 45. He might have said, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτο πεπόνθασιν, &c. See also Aristoph. Vesp. 268.

IV. When μὲν precedes, it is not certain that μὴν corresponds to it instead of δέ, for δέ may be understood after μὴν: πάνν μὲν φοβοῦμαι λέγειν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐρῶ: Demosth. Phil. iv. p. 57. i. e. οὐ μὴν σιγήσω, or οὐ μὴν σιγήσω δέ. See also Demosth. de Cherson. p. 56. [p. 92. l. 2. ed. Reisk.] Δέ is expressed in 3 Maccab. v. 50. οὐ μὴν δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ, &c. Μὲν may be latent in what precedes; and Hesych. explains οὐ μὴν δέ by οὐδαμῶς δέ: and in Diog. Laert. l. iii. p. 199. may be read οὐ μὴν δέ ἡσύχασεν ὁ Διονύσιος.

V. In οὐ μὴν γε, γε affects not the other particles, but limits some other word with which it is joined; as, οὐ μὴν τὰ γε ἄλλα οὕτω κρίνεται: Xen. Mem. i. p. 715. οὐ μὴν ἀγροοῦντές γε τούτων οὐδέν—ἡγωνίων: Polyb. i. p. 9. That it does not affect the other particles appears from this, that it occurs sometimes after οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ, some other word, which it limits, being interposed; at other times between οὐ μὴν and ἀλλὰ, other words being then also interposed:—1. ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχον· οὐ μὴν, ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τινα πρόφασιν: Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 56. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἦν οἰμαί σε λέγειν: Plat. Gorg. p. 453. (p. 17. ed. Bip.)—2. *Dionicius*, says Lucian, *was among the guests*; οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γε, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἅπασι παρεγένετο, ἀλλὰ ὀψέ, &c. Laphth. [p. 844. B. ed. Salmur.]

VI. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ adds something of greater moment to something of less, which has preceded; *nay what is more; moreover*: οὐδαμοῦ φανήσονται δίκην εἰληχότες ζῶντι τῷ Δημαρέτῳ· οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἂν τις σκοπῶν αὐτὸ καὶ θεωρῶν, ἴδοι οὐ μόνον οὐχὶ λαβόντα (χρήματα), ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐνὸν αὐτῷ λαβεῖν: Demosth. adv. Nausim. p. 633. For this, οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ, and οὐ μόνον δέ ἀλλὰ καὶ are sometimes used: αὐθις δέ ἀφελέσθαι, ἃ δέδωκεν· οὐ μόνον δέ, (ἀφελέσθαι ἃ δέδωκεν, viz.) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προὑπάρχοντα: Ceb. Tab. p. 216. But most frequently by the later Greek writers: see 2 Corinth. viii. 18. 19. The ellipsis is supplied in vii, 7. This use will account for

^a That an ellipsis of these words is quite inadmissible, will appear upon consideration of the whole passage, beginning at l. 15. of Reiske's ed. The words to be un-

derstood are rather those expressed in l. 16. οὐ μὴν ἀρχὴ γενήσεται τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐχθρας, εἰ τῶν πρεσβευσάντων τὴν εἰρήνην καταψηφείσθε. J. S.

Hesychius's explaining οὐ μὴν by οὐ μόνον. (Οὐ μόνον, *not only*, differs from μόνον οὐ, which is, *all but, almost*.)

VII. What is added, is not always of more moment considered in itself, but with reference only to the person addressed: thus Isocrates, after encouraging Demonicus to the practice of virtue by the examples of Hercules and Theseus, adds, οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς προαιρέσεις, οἰκεῖον καὶ καλὸν ἔξεις παράδειγμα τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένων: p. 7.

VIII. Γε is added here too; *expectation*, says Isocrates, *may perhaps be disappointed*; οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τό γε ἐγχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει: *however the very attempt, &c.*

IX. And here too μὲν precedes, to which οὖν inceptive is subjoined: αἰεὶ μὲν οὖν οἱ τε ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι φιλοτίμως πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶχον· οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ καλλίστων ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἐφιλονείκησαν, οὐκ ἐχθροὺς, ἀλλ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι νομίζοντες: Isocr. Paneg. p. 112.

X. Που is sometimes inserted, to abate the positiveness of assertion: as, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ που καὶ Κλεινία τῷδε ἀρέσκειν δεῖ τὰ νῦν νομοθετούμενα: Plat. de Legg. iv. p. 722. (t. viii. p. 197. ed. Bip.)

XI. Οὐδὲ also is added to οὐ μὴν: Xenophon after mentioning the absence of all ostentation and effeminacy in the dress and mode of life of Socrates, adds, οὐ μὴν, οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει: Mem. i. 2. *nor truly again did he, &c. he was not ostentatious or effeminate; no truly, nor did he, &c.*

XII. When these particles include an adversative sense, they may be rendered, *nevertheless; however*; and both negatives pertain to what follows, but differently, οὐ denying simply and generally, οὐδὲ particularly: as, καὶ μ' ἐκ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ σύνοφρυς κόρα ἐχθρὸς ἰδοῖσα,—καλὸν, καλὸν ἡμεῖς ἔφασκεν. οὐ μὰν, οὐδὲ λόγον ἐκρίθην ἀπο τὸν πικρὸν αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ, &c. Theocr. viii. 74. Οὐ denies ἀπεκρίθην more generally, οὐδὲ more particularly, τὸν λόγον πικρόν. Οὐ μόνον λόγον ἡδὺν, says the scholiast, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγον τὸν πικρόν.

XIII. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ is used in transition to a principal part of a subject: as, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνό γε ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν δεῖ: Demosth. Ol. iii. p. 12. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόγε παραλείψεις: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 486. (p. 74. ed. Bip.)

XIV. Οὐδὲ is sometimes repeated after οὐ μὴν even in one member, when two things are to be more distinctly and particularly stated: οὐ μὴν, οὐδ' εἰ συναγορεύουσι τοῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένοις, οὐδ' ὡς ὀρθῶς περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δυνάμεως γινώσκουσιν: Isocr. Paneg. p. 134. First generally, οὐ μὴν γινώσκουσι, then more particularly, οὐδὲ εἰ συναγορεύουσι.

OYX OTI.—I. Οὐχ ὅτι, *not that*, or *not because*, is an elliptical expression, serving for explication: οὐχ, ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον, ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι· διώκω δὲ, εἰ καὶ καταλάβω: Philipp. iii. 12. i. e. οὐ λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι—. See also iv. 17. The full expression is in v. 11. οὐχ, ὅτι καθ' ὑστέρησιν λέγω. Εἶπε δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὅτι περὶ τῶν πτωχῶν ἔμελεν αὐτῷ· ἀλλ' ὅτι κλέπτῃς ἦν: St. John xii. 5. i. e. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι, &c. *but he said this, not because, &c.*

II. Sometimes λέγω is not understood, but some preceding verb, which is to be repeated : as, οὐκ ἐπαινῶ τοῦτο, ὃ 'Αλέξανδρε' οὐχ ὅτι μὴ καλὸν εἶναι οἶμαι καὶ τιτρώσκεισθαι ποτε τὸν βασιλέα, καὶ προκινδυνεύειν τοῦ στρατοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι σοὶ τοιοῦτο ἡκιστα συνέφερε : Lucian. Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 397. for οὐκ ἐπαινῶ δὲ, ὅτι μὴ, &c. So 2 Corinth. vii, 9.

III. When ἀλλὰ follows, οὐχ ὅτι may be rendered *not only* : δανειζόμενος οὐχ ὅτι παρὰ τῶν ιδιωτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πόλεων : Dio xlii. p. 235. i. e. οὐ μόνον λέγω—ἀλλὰ καὶ, &c. When οὐδὲ, or a negative proposition, follows ἀλλὰ, οὐ appears to be suppressed after οὐχ ὅτι, as in Latin *non modo* is put for *non modo non* : see Cic. in Verr. iii. 78. [§ 182.] οὐχ ὅτι ἡμῶν τινα προσβλέποντες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀλλήλους : *not only not any one of us*, &c. Athen. cited by Budæus, p. 479. When οὐδὲ is put first without ἀλλὰ, and οὐχ ὅτι last, the latter particles may be rendered *much less* : as if Athenæus had said, οὐδὲ ἀλλήλους προσβλέποντες, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμῶν τινα.

IV. Μὴ is added to οὐχ ὅτι, affecting, not those particles, but the word following it, which it negatives : as in the passage above cited from Lucian, μὴ καλὸν is put for αἰσχρὸν or ἄδοξον.

ΟΥΧ ΟΙΟΝ, ΟΥΧ ΟΣΟΝ.—I. Οὐχ οἶον, which also is rendered *not only*, or *not only not*, differs from οὐχ ὅτι in carrying some signification of quality : thus, οὐχ οἶον ἀνθρώπῳ τινι πεισθεῖν καταθέσθαι τὴν ταύτης (τυραννίδος) ἐξουσίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ θεῶν τῷ δυναστεύοντι : Phalaris, cited by Budæus, p. 470. which may be thus explained, καταθέσθαι τὴν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐξουσίαν τοιοῦτό τί ἐστιν, οἶον οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ πεισθεῖν ἂν—. So, μένουσα φύλαγξ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδειοτάτοις αὐτῇ τόποις οὐχ οἶον ὠφελεῖν δύναιτ' ἂν τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτὴν σώζειν : Polyb. cited by Budæus, *ibid*.

II. As some traces of the signification of quality are discoverable in οὐχ οἶον, so of quantity in οὐχ ὅσον, *not only* : πράγματα αἰσχίστα ἔμελλε συμβῆσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὅσον τὸ τῆς δουλείας, ἀλλ' ἀποδράναι πρῶτον, εἶτα δουλεύειν : Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 319. i. e. οὐ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα, ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ, &c. So in Latin, *non tantum. Non tantum dedecus, quantum est servire, sed (quod majus est) primum fugere, deinde servire.*

III. The remark made on οὐχ ὅτι, and which applies to οὐχ οἶον also, is to be made here too, that οὐ sometimes appears to be understood again : αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρῶτον, τὸ πάντας τοὺς ἐν χρεῖα βοηθείας καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ δυοῖν ποδοῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὀρᾶν, μέγα καὶ φανερόν σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ στήλης ἄμεινον, τοῦ προέχειν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὐχ ὅσον λανθάνειν : Aristid. Panathen. p. 202. for οὐχ ὅσον οὐ λανθάνειν. [See Professor Hermann's interpretation in the Abr. of Vig. p. 47. l. 13.] If the last words be transposed, ἀλλὰ, or ἀλλὰ καὶ, must be added, and then the signification of quantity, or of the advance or increase of quantity, will appear ; thus, φανερόν σύμβολόν ἐστιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον λέγω, ὅσον οὐ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον προέχειν. In Thucydides the second negative is expressed : οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἡμύναντο, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐσώθησαν : iv. 62.

ΟΥΧ ΟΠΩΣ, ΟΥΧ ΩΣ.—I. Οὐχ ὅπως is rendered *not only; not only not; much less*: but some traces of the primary and genuine signification of ὅπως may be discovered: οὐδ' ἐστάναι χαμαὶ, οὐχ ὅπως (*much less*) βαδίζειν ἐδύνατο: Lucian. Dial. Mort. c. 27. p. 440. i. e. οὐ λέγω ὅπως, *I do not say how, or in what manner, &c.* [Abr. of Vig. p. 153. l. 20.] οὐδὲ μνημονεύειν εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν ἔτι ᾠμῆν τὸν Δία, οὐχ ὅπως καὶ τηλικαῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀγανακτήσειν: Id. in Prometh. p. 192. i. e. οὐ λέγω ὅπως.

II. Οὐχ ὥς also is used in the same sense; but here too there may be traced some indication of manner: Παρμενίδῃ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς λόγους τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτην, μόλις ἡ ἡλικία συγχωρεῖ, οὐχ ὥς καὶ τοιοῦτους εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους: Athen. xi. p. 505. F. i. e. οὐ λέγω, ὥς (*how or in what manner*) οὐ συγχωρεῖ ἡλικία τοιοῦτους εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους. However it may be rendered, *much less*.

ΟΥΚΟΥΝ, ΟΥΚΟΥΝ.—I. Οὐκοῦν serves to suggest or press a conclusion interrogatively: it is put therefore for ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ; Pyl. μολόντι δ' ἐλπίς ἐστι σωθῆναι κακῶν; Orest. εἰ τύχοι, γένοιτ' ἄν. Pyl. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρεῖσσον ἢ μένειν; Eurip. Orest. 778. [770. Pors. where there is no interrogation.] So Soph. Aj. 79. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 161. l. 34.]

II. Sometimes that from which the conclusion signified by οὐκοῦν is drawn, or the reason for it, follows instead of preceding: as, οὐκοῦν ἡ ἄμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα; Then follows the reason, πεῖθω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ: Plat. Phædr. p. 270. (p. 372. ed. Bip.) So, Merc. ἀπόλλωλας, ὃ κακὸδαιμον. Tryg. οὐκοῦν ἦν λάχων Ἑρμῆς γὰρ ὦν κλήρω ποιήσεις οἶδ' ὃ τι: Aristoph. Pac. 363. See Class. Journ. vol. ii. p. 718. Instead of γὰρ, ἐπεὶδὴ sometimes follows, introducing the reason: οὐκοῦν, ἐπεὶδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν βιάται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὄλω; Plat. de Rep. ii. p. 365. (p. 222. ed. Bip.)

III. The reason is sometimes *implied* in what follows: thus Strepsiades, having been reprehended by Socrates for calling Amynias a woman, answers, οὐκοῦν δικαίως, ὅστις οὐ στρατεύεται; Aristoph. Nub. 692. i. e. ἄρ', ἐπεὶδὴ Ἀμυνίας οὐ στρατεύεται, οὐ καλῶ οὖν δικαίως γυναικα;

IV. The conclusion may depend on a condition following, and marked by εἰ, ἐάν, or ἥν: as, οὐκοῦν, ἐάν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ, γεγενθὼς ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου; Plat. Phædr. p. 258. (p. 346. ed. Bip.) οὐκοῦν ἀσφαλῶς ἂν νέμοιτε, εἰ τὰ ἄκρα ἔχοιτε σύμμαχα; Xen. Cyrop. iii, 2, 20.

V. Like οὖν alone, οὐκοῦν is used in transition to a fresh topic or head of discourse: as, οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάξουσιν οἱ θεοὶ, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις, ὃ Εὐθύφρων,—καὶ τοῦτο εἰρηται; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 7. *further, it has been said too, has it not, that, &c.* οὐκοῦν τὸδε γ' ἐσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι, ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; *but moreover, &c.* Plat. Theæt. p. 187. (p. 146. ed. Bip.)

VI. When οὐ follows οὐκοῦν, οὐκ in οὐκοῦν is not necessarily redundant: e. g. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐπεὶ περ ὠρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 452. (p. 8. ed. Bip.)

must we not therefore not fear, &c. i. e. must we not contemn or disregard? οὐ φοβητέον being equivalent to καταφρονητέον. So, οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτόν τῳ χαίρειν; Id. in Phileb. p. 43. (p. 274. ed. Bip.) *Is it not true therefore that freedom from pain, and pleasure, cannot ever be the same?*

VII. With the imperative mood οὐκοῦν appears to be put for οὖν: οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων περί ικανῶς ἔχέτω: Plat. Phædr. p. 274. (p. 379. ed. Bip.) οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων: Ib. p. 278. (388. Bip.) [See the explanation, from Professor Hermann, in the Abr. of Vig. p. 162. l. 1.]

VIII. In οὐκοῦν the signification of οὖν predominates; in οὔκουν that of οὐ. The use of οὔκουν is to draw from premises a negative conclusion. Thus, in Plato's Phædrus, after mention of certain evils caused by the invention of letters, the following words are addressed to their supposed inventor: οὔκουν μνήμης, ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὔρες, σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις: p. 275. (p. 381. ed. Bip.) *it was not therefore a remedy for memory that you invented, &c.* See Eurip. Phœniss. 1583.

IX. Sometimes, especially in negative answers, its conclusive force is not manifest, but must be elicited from the preceding words of another person, or from something extraneous: thus in the Phædo of Plato, when Socrates has concluded from arguments before adduced, that the soul is immortal, Cebes says, οὔκουν ἔγωγε ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν, οὐδὲ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις: p. 107. (e. 56. ed. Fisch.) Here something extraneous is to be assumed, upon which the conclusion may rest, as, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα δῆλόν ἐστι, or the like. [Hoo-geveen cites Aristoph. Vesp. 309. as an instance of the conclusion being drawn from preceding words of another person; but in Brunck's edition the reading is οὐκ, not οὔκουν, which indeed the metre will not admit.]

X. Sometimes all the collective or conclusive force of οὔκουν disappears, and there remains only that assertion of certainty which arises from conclusion: thus, Sycoph. οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ γὰρ ἐνθάδ' ἐστὸν οὐδενί. Car. μὰ τὸν Δι, οὔκουν τῳ γε σφ', σφ' ἴσθ' ὅτι. no, *not for yours at least, of a certainty*: Aristoph. Plut. 889. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 161. l. 22.]

ΟΥΔΕ, ΟΥΤΕ.—I. There is the same difference between μηδέ, μήτε, and οὐδὲ, οὔτε, as between μη and οὐ, which have been treated of above.

II. When discourse proceeds in the same tenor, οὐδὲ or οὔτε is used; and Eustathius (p. 1813.) observes that these particles connect similar things as well as dissimilar: thus, τῶν οὐδέν τοι ἐγὼ κρύψω ἔπος, οὐδ' ἐπικεύσω: Hom.

III. But when the tenor of discourse is broken by a new division after οὐδὲ, then οὔτε is repeated or reiterated: thus Agamemnon says, that Chryseis was not inferior to Clytæmnestra, οὐ δέμας, οὐδὲ φωνή, οὔτ' ἄρ' φρένας, οὔτε τι ἔργα: Iliad. α, 115. Here οὔτε suits the secondary division, that of φωνήν, into φρένας and ἔργα. Thus again, ἀναλκις ἦν θεὸς, οὐδὲ θεῶν τάων, αἳτ' ἀνδρῶν πόλεμον κατακοιρανέουσιν,

οὐτ' ἄρ' Ἀθηναίη, οὔτε πολίπορθος Ἐννώ : *Iliad*. ε, 333. οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν, οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν : *Xen. Mem.* i, 2.

IV. Οὐδὲ thus preceding οὔτε may be latent in οὐδεῖς, for οὐδὲ εἷς : as, οὐδεῖς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων : *Plat. Euthyphr.* p. 8.

V. Οὔτε is put only once after οὐδὲ in *Gal.* i, 12. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτὸ, οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. But οὔτε is to be understood before παρὰ, that the first of the two opposed members of the sentence may be thus subdivided, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὔτε παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον, οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην.

VI. On the contrary οὐδὲ follows οὔτε repeated ; because it introduces a principal member, contradistinguished from a preceding one subdivided by οὔτε so repeated : οὐκ ἐννύμφη σπέρμα οὔτε ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀρρώστιαις : *Aristot. de Generat. Animal.* xviii. p. 649.

VII. Οὐδὲ differs from οὔτε in being put after a simple negation : when οὔτε appears to follow a simple negation, there may be an ellipsis to which that particle has reference : thus, in οὐπω γὰρ ἡδύνασθε, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἔτι νῦν δύνασθε, 1 *Cor.* iii, 2. οὔτε τὸ πρόσθεν, or the like, may be understood before ἀλλά.

VIII. When οὔτε precedes, οὔτε must again follow, if what comes after be negative ; but not so, if it be affirmative ; for in the latter case οὔτε may be put once only, followed by καὶ or τέ : as, οὔτε ἀντλημα ἔχετε, καὶ τὸ φρέαρ ἐστὶ βαθύ : *St. John* iv, 11. So *neque* is followed by *et* in Latin. See *Sueton.* in *Aug.* c. 66.

IX. Οὐδὲ is used after negation, to exclude all exception negatively ; *not even* : καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκε αὐτῷ κληρονομίαν ἐν αὐτῇ, οὐδὲ βῆμα ποδός : *Acts* vii, 5. οὐδεῖς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι τῶν οὐρανῶν : *St. Matth.* xxiv, 36.

X. The preceding negation is sometimes not expressed : thus in *Iliad*. θ, 234. where Agamemnon tells the Greeks that they had formerly boasted, Τρώων ἀνθ' ἑκατόν τε διηκοσίων τε ἕκαστος στήσεσθ' ἐν πολέμῳ and adds, νῦν δ' οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἄξιόι ἐσμεν Ἐκτορος, the full expression may be, νῦν δ' οὐ μόνον ἕκαστος οὐκ ἰστάμεθ' ἀντὶ ἑκατόν καὶ διηκοσίων, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἄξιόι ἐσμεν. So, λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ περιεβάλετο ὡς ἐν τούτων : *St. Matth.* vi, 29. for, ὅτι οὔτε οἱ δυναστεύοντες, οὔτε βασιλεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Σολομὼν.

XI. In *Iliad* α, 161. αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γέρας αὐτὶκ' ἐτοιμάσατ', ὄφρα μὴ οἷος Ἀργείων ἀγέραςτος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε, the full expression may be, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἔοικε, *since it is not just or allowable*, &c. Ἔστι is expressed in *Odyss.* θ, 358. οὐκ ἔστ', οὐδὲ ἔοικε τεὸν ἔπος ἀρνήσασθαι.

XII. But it is sometimes equivalent to καὶ οὐ, emphatically : οὗτος μὲν οἰεταί τι εἰδέναι, οὐκ εἰδώς· ἐγὼ δὲ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι : *as I do not in reality know anything, so NEITHER do I think that I know anything* : *Plat. Apol. Socr.* p. 21. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.) ἐῷ λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰς τεκούσας ἐμαιοῦτο, παρθένος γε καὶ αὐτὴ οὔσα : *Lucian. Deor. Dial.* xvi. [p. 154. B. ed. Salmur.] *I forbear to observe, that neither would she have acted as a midwife, had she been herself a virgin.*

XIII. Ούτε signifies *not even* less frequently : καὶ οὐτε ἀλύσειν οὐδεὶς ἡδύνατο αὐτὸν δῆσαι : St. Mark v, 3. More fully, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡδύνατο αὐτὸν δῆσαι, οὔτε ἄλλοις δεσμοῖς, οὔτε ἀλύσειν.

XIV. Like οὐ, οὐδὲ, signifying *not even*, is emphatical in interrogation, ἄρα being suppressed : οὐδὲ φοβῇ σὺ τὸν Θεόν ; St. Luke xxiii, 40. i. e. ἄρ' οὐδὲ σὺ φοβῇ ; So vi, 3. St. Mark xii, 10. 1 Corinth. xi, 14.

XV. When οὐδὲ is repeated in the same clause or member, neither of the particles is properly redundant : in οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' οἱ ἀναρχοὶ ἔσαν, Hom. in Bæot. v. 210. [Iliad β, 703.] the first οὐδὲ pertains to ἀναρχοὶ ἦσαν, the second to οἱ : the first denies more generally, the second more particularly, and with exclusion of exception, *not even these*. In the same manner, and with the same sense, the negatives are referred to different things in Aristoph. Vesp. 478. [480. ed. Br.] In οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος ἀνὴρ τάδε φάρμακ' ἀνέτλη, Odys. κ, 327. and οὐδέ γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος, ὅτις, &c. Od. θ, 32. οὐδέ τις may be the same as οὐδὲ εἰς : see Rom. iii, 10. *not even one* : as οὐτις is put for οὐδεὶς, Iliad. α. [88]. In ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ ἔοικεν δῆμον ἔοντα παρὲξ ἀγορευμένον, Iliad. μ, 212. the repetition makes the negation more emphatical and peremptory. See Eustath. ad l. p. 901. So, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἐταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν : Plat. Phædr. (p. 389. ed. Bip.)

XVI. In οὐδ' ἂν, and οὐδ' ἂν εἰς, ἂν does not affect the particle οὐδὲ, but its own verb, from the signification of which it takes away actuality. Besides other uses of ἂν, with οὐδὲ before it, it has a conditional power : οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ : *not even if* : Plat. Phædr. (p. 386. ed. Bip.) ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείψομαί σου, ὦ Κῦρε, οὐδ' ἂν σκευοφόρον με δέῃ σοι συνακολουθεῖν : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1. 42. Οὐδ' εἰ is used in the same manner by Homer, Il. ι, 389. Nor is it necessary that the less emphatical negation should precede ; for it sometimes follows : οὐδ' εἰ μοι τόσα δοίῃ, ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε, οὐδέ κεν ὥς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει Ἀγαμέμνων : Iliad. ι, 385.

XVII. When negation is accompanied with a reason, which the speaker wishes not to insist on too positively and confidently, γάρ που is added to οὐδέ : as, οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὔσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι, κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας : Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 500. (p. 102. ed. Bip.)

XVIII. In poetry μὲν without δὲ following is added to οὐδὲ, the signification of which it renders, by its limitative power, more vehement and emphatical than that of a preceding negative : οὐδέ τί οἱ βουλὰς συμφράσσομαι, οὐδὲ μὲν ἔργον : Iliad. ι, 376. οὐδένα τῶν ἐχθρῶν μωμήσομαι ἐσθλὸν ἔοντα, οὐδὲ μὲν αἰνήσω δειλὸν ἔοντα φίλον : Theogn. 1078. *nor will I either*, &c. but in these passages it may be rendered also, *much less*.

XIX. Μὲν in its confirmative sense also is added to οὐδέ : οὐτ' ἄρ' κακὴ, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὴ, *nor indeed*, or *nor truly*, good : Phocyl.

XX. Socrates, agreeably to his usual simulation of ignorance, uses the conjectural particle που, instead of the limitative γε, after οὐδέ : after censuring those who spoiled the dead, he adds, οὐδὲ μὴν που πρὸς

τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ὕπλα οἶσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων : Plat. de Rep. v. p. 469. (p. 45. ed. Bip.)

XXI. Οὐν also is added, in the affirmative or assertory sense which it acquires from its conclusive or collective power : οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται, οὔτε γέγονεν, οὐδ' οὐν μὴ γένηται : *nor in truth, nor indeed* : Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 492. (p. 87. Bip.) It is added to οὔτε also : ἦτοι νόστος ἀπώλετο πατρὸς ἐμοῖο· οὐτ' οὐν ἀγγελίης ἔτι πείθομαι, εἶποθεν ἔλθοι, οὔτε θεοπροπίης ἐμπάζομαι : Odys. α, 413. But here οὐν retains its conclusive or collective force.

ΟΥΤΙ, with the particles annexed.—I. Τί, when subjoined to οὐ, οὐδέ, or οὔτε, renders the negation total and universal, excluding every kind of exception. Sometimes τι is governed by a verb : ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν, οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν : Iliad. β. 586. and with a genitive case after it : οὐδέ τι κινῆσαι μελέων ἦν : Odys. θ, 298. Sometimes it takes the nature of an adjective, and agrees with a substantive : οὐδέ τί πώ μοι πρόφρων τέτληκας εἰπεῖν ἔπος ὃ τι νοήσεις : Iliad. α, 542. Thus οὔτι is the same as οὐχ ἔν, and οὐδέ τι as οὐδέ ἔν or οὐδέν, or as καὶ οὐδέν. Between οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν and οὔτι or οὐδέ τι this little difference may perhaps be observed, that the latter exclude genus, the former every species also ; that οὔτι and οὐδέ τι, without any other particle, as γε or πον, added, are more common in poetry, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν in prose : ἐμοὶ θανάτου μέλει οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 32. (c. 20. ed. Fisch.) ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον, κακὸν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται : Plut. de Sentent. Stoic.

II. When no word expressed governs or agrees with τί, κατὰ or διὰ is perhaps understood. Thus οὔτι is nearly the same as οὐδαμῶς, *not at all* : τῶν οὔτι μετατρέπη, οὐδ' ἀλεγίζεις : Iliad. α, 160. ἐπεὶ οὔτι μοι αἰτιοὶ εἰσιν : Iliad. α, 153. So, οὐδέ τι : οὐδέ τί πω ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά : Iliad. α, 124. and with little difference, οὔτε τι : οὐ δέμας, οὐδέ φυήν, οὐτ' ἀρ' φρένας, οὔτε τι ἔργα, ib. 115.

The case is different when οὐ and τι are to be regarded as two distinct words ; οὐ then negatives the act of the verb, which τι lessens by its diminuent force : ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλερὸν, οὐ τι γέλωτα ὄφλειν, (παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτό γε) ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεῖς τῆς ἀληθείας—κείσομαι, &c. Plat. de Rep. v. p. 450. (p. 6. ed. Bip.) *non ne utcumque, &c. not lest, in whatever manner, [or in whatever, or some, degree] I should incur ridicule, &c.*

III. Γε is added, but it affects not οὔτι, but some following word, either restrictively or confirmatively : οὔτι γε πρὸς ἐμὲ οὕτω ποιεῖν ἔχρην, *towards me at least* : Lucian. Lapith. l. iii. p. 420.

IV. In οὔτι πον, οὐ denies interrogatively, τι is diminuent, and πον conjectural : thus Ulysses, afraid that Neoptolemus might return the bow to Philoctetes, says, οὔτι πον δοῦναι νοεῖς ; Soph. Philoct. 1226. [1233. ed. Br.] *to be sure you do not think of such a thing as giving it?*

V. Οὔτοι, compounded of οὐ and τοι, denies with asseveration : *not by any means* : οὔτοι σύμφορόν ἐστι γυνὴ νέα ἀνδρὶ γέροντι : Theogn. 437. οὔτοι τὰ χρήματ' ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοί : Eurip. Phœniss. 558.

οὗτοι ποτὲ ζῶν τοῦτον ἀποδυθήσονται : Aristoph. Vesp. 1117. οὗτοι πιστεύει καλῶς ἀγωνιεῖσθαι : Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 227.

VI. The asseveration is sometimes enforced by an oath ; as, οὗτοι, μὰ τὴν γῆν, ἔσσεθ' ὡς οὐκ ἀποθανεῖ : Aristoph. Pac. 187. Or by the confirmative particle δὴ : οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι γε δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν : Plat. Euthyphr. [p. 1. l. 4. ed. Bas. 1.]

VII. The asseveration of a denial with an oath is sometimes enforced by οὐ τοίνυν γε : as in Aristoph. Vesp. 1136. [1141. Br. where γε is not added to τοίνυν.]

OYN.—I. The difference between ἄρα and οὖν is that ἄρα is illative, οὖν conclusive ; ἄρα syllogizes or argues, οὖν applies. Thus in Plato, one draws this inference from something before said, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἄρα δηλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν, εἴτε ὀκνῶντα, χρὴ τὸν φύλακα τηρεῖν ὅτι οὖν : and then, after describing those whom he means by the blind, and bringing the matter to the intended point, concludes in the following manner, interrogatively ; τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα, ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας ; &c. de Rep. vi. (p. 70. ed. Bip.) So St. Paul, in the close of chap. iv. to the Galatians, infers, ἄρα οὐκ ἔσμεν παιδίσκης τέκνα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐλευθέρας : so then we are not, &c. and in the beginning of chap. v. he applies this inference to the duty of the Galatians, τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ οὖν, ἣ Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἡλευθέρωσε, στήκετε, καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε : stand fast therefore in the liberty, &c.

II. As to its use, it peculiarly suits—1. admonition, when duty is urged by conclusion from something before said. To the example just given the following may be added : παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, μιμηταί μου γένησθε, wherefore I beseech you, &c. 1 Cor. iv, 16.—2. entreaty founded on an enumeration of benefits conferred on the person entreated : as, ἀπότισον οὖν μοι ταῦτ', τοῦτ' ἐκεῖ λαβών : Eurip. Orest. 654. [647. Pors.]—3. invitations or challenges to come to the proof of what has been said : as, χρήσδεis δ' ὧν ἐσίδειν ; χρήσδεis καταθεῖναι ἀελθον ; Theocr. viii, 11.—4. explication founded on a previous statement of circumstances : thus Palæphatus, having stated some particulars of the real history of Cottus and Briareus, concludes, ἔλεγον οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, Κόττος, καὶ Βριάρεως, καὶ Γύγης, οἱ ἑκατοντάχειρες, βοηθήσαντες τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοὶ ἐξήλασαν τοὺς Τιτᾶνας ἐκ τοῦ Ὀλύμπου : Incredib. c. 20.—5. narration, in which a person is represented as setting about a thing from a conviction that all things are ready for his enterprise : thus Xenophon of Cyrus, who saw that his soldiers were now strong, bold, expert in the use of their arms, and obedient to their officers, ἐκ τούτων οὖν ἐπεθύμει τι ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πράττειν : Cyrop. iii, 3, 9.

III. It sometimes concludes a very long passage or speech ; as one consisting of forty-four verses in the Medea of Eurip. τοσοῦτον οὖν σου τυγχάνειν βουλήσομαι, &c. v. 259.

IV. The conclusive force of οὖν will scarcely appear in some passages without supposing an ellipsis : thus, Socr. πρόαγε δὴ καὶ σκόπει ἅμα, ὅπου καθιζήσομεθα. Phædr. ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον ; Plat. Phædr. p. 229. (284. ed. Bip.) [196, 15. ed. Bas. 1.]

q. d. *since you will have me for a guide, to select a spot, do you see then, &c.*

V. Sometimes, by an inversion of regular order, the conclusion with *οὖν* is placed first, and that on which the conclusion is founded, last, with *ἐπεὶ*, γάρ, or some other causal particle: as, Merc. οὐδὲν αἰτίων ἀνδρῶν γε τὰς κράδας κατήσθιον. Chor. ἐν δίκῃ μὲν οὖν' ἐπεὶ τοι τὴν κορώνεω γέ μου ἐξέκοψαν, &c. Aristoph. Pac. 627. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ διαλλαχθήσομαι ἐκῶν, ὁμολογῶ γὰρ πατάζει: Id. Vesp. 1412. [1421. ed. Br.]

VI. From the conclusive power of *οὖν*, arises its *inceptive* use. This it has in common with *μὲν δὴ*: but, with the same sense of readiness or preparation, it has not the sense of alacrity expressed by *μὲν δὴ*. This further difference too may perhaps be remarked, that *μὲν οὖν* and *μὲν δὴ* are oftener employed in the beginning of a whole work, *οὖν* alone, either always or most frequently, in the middle of a work, for the commencement of a part of it, after something introductory. Thus Plato, to explain the nature of the soul, compares it to a charioteer, and after prefatory information about the nature and properties of the horses, commences his account of the proceedings of the charioteer in the following manner: ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος, &c. So St. Paul in 1 Cor. viii, 4. thus enters on a subject to which some preceding verses are only prefatory: περὶ τῆς βρώσεως οὖν τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων, οἶδαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ. In Latin *ergo*, or *igitur*, is used in the same manner as *μὲν δὴ* and *μὲν οὖν*. See Cic. de Orat. i. c. vii. [§ 24.]

VII. Closely connected with its inceptive use is that in which it is employed for resuming the tenor of discourse after interruption; such resumption being a fresh commencement. It is so employed—1. after digression;—2. after a parenthesis;—3. after a long hyperbaton.—1. Homer, having said that Achilles, in the battle at the river, met with Lycaon, digresses to inform the reader of what had before happened to Lycaon, and afterwards thus returns to his subject; τὸν δ' ὥς οὖν ἐνόησε ποδάρκης διὸς Ἀχιλλεύς, &c. Iliad. φ, 49.

VIII.—2. Examples of *οὖν* after a parenthesis (which resembles a digression) may be seen in St. John vi, 22—24. xviii, 5. 6. Rom. v. 12—18.

IX.—3. After a long hyperbaton *οὖν* occurs in Plutarch. Thes. [p. 1. l. 12—20. ed. H. St.] Poplicol. [p. 177. l. 25. H. St.] To this use may be added that in which a number of particulars already enumerated are at length comprehended in one more general term, and the scope of the enumeration concludes the period. *Igitur* is thus used by Cicero: ——— *pro his igitur omnibus rebus* (ἀντὶ τούτων οὖν πάντων)—*hujus temporis memoriam postulo*. In Catil. iv. c. 11. [§. 23.]

X. It is used also in mere continuation, when no digression, parenthesis, or hyperbaton, has preceded: but in this case something resembling a new commencement may always be discovered. Thus Socrates, after saying that himself and Glauco were on their return to Athens from a public spectacle, proceeds, κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἵκαδε ὠρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλων, ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν

παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἐ κελεῦσαι, Plat. de Rep. i. [p. 371. l. 5. ed. Bas., i.] and a little afterwards, [l. 10.] ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, &c. So St. John, εἰτα βάλλει ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν νιπτῆρα, καὶ ἤρξατο νίπτειν τοὺς πόδας τῶν μαθητῶν, καὶ ἐκμάσσειν τῷ λεντίῳ, ᾧ ἦν διεζωσμένος. "Ερχεται οὖν πρὸς Σίμωνα Πέτρον, &c. xiii, 6. Here οὖν, though in the middle of a narrative, commences the recital of a remarkable particular. In Latin *ergo* is used in the same manner. See Hor. Serm. ii, 6, 106. Ovid. Metam. iii, 370.

XI. In transition also, which is nothing but the commencement of a new part, οὖν is employed: and when so employed may be termed *transitive*; as in a fresh objection, Rom. ix, 19. ἐρεῖς οὖν μοι, Τί ἐτι μέμφεται;

XII. When besides readiness or preparation to go on in speaking, *alacrity* also is to be expressed, δὴ is added to οὖν, not only when the latter is *inceptive*, but when it is *conclusive* or *continuative* too.—1. when *inceptive*: ἀπὸ Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος ἄνω ἴοντι, ἄναντές ἐστι χωρίον. Ταύτην δὴ τὸ πλοῖον διαδήσαντα ἀμφοτέρωθεν, κατάπερ βοῦν, πορεύεσθαι: Herodot. ii, 29. unless indeed δεῖ should be substituted for δὴ.—2. when *conclusive*: Herodotus, having proved that Egypt from Heliopolis towards the upper parts is narrow, thus concludes, τὸ οὖν δὴ ἀπὸ Ἑλλίου πόλεως οὐκ ἐτι πολλῶν χωρίων, &c. ii, 8. and again, εἰ δὴ ἐβελήσει ἐκτρέψαι τὸ ῥέεθρον ὁ Νεῖλος εἰς τοῦτον τὸν Ἀράβιον κόλπον, &c. ii, 11.—3. when *continuative*: τοὺς δὴ Αἰγυπτίους τρία ἔτεα φρουρήσαντας ἀπέλυε οὐδεὶς τῆς φρουρῆς, &c. Herodot. ii, 30.

XIII. From the conclusive power of οὖν is derived its *affirmative* force; which is exerted principally in answers, wherein what is asserted is moreover supported and confirmed as by a conclusion: thus, Socr. οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσι καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι' ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρήνῃ; Phædr. Γίγνεται οὖν οὕτως, Plat. Phædr. p. 262. (p. 354. ed. Bip.)

XIV. And without any answer, it is affirmative, when opposed to a negative, so as to supply the place of a verb, which must otherwise be repeated: as, εἴτε μὴ γράψει, εἴτε οὖν: thus, εἴτ' οὖν δυνάμεθα, εἴτε μὴ: Plato de Legg. ix. p. 859. (p. 14. ed. Bip.) [this example is certainly not in point, as to οὖν supplying the place of a verb suppressed.] εἴτ' οὖν, εἴτε μὴ γενήσεται: Eurip. Heracl. 150. [In this example there should be another comma after μὴ, to connect γενήσεται with οὖν.] *Etiā* is thus used in Latin. See Cicero pro Rosc. Com. c. 3. [§ 9.]

XV. Οὖν also asserts positively what has before been proposed hypothetically; and it is then subjoined to a relative word: as, εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἐστι, θεὸς, ἢ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἑρως: Plato Phædr. p. 242. (p. 312. ed. Bip.)

XVI. It retains, though somewhat obscurely, its *conclusive* power also after ὥσπερ and other relative words: ὁ δὲ κῶν, ὥσπερ οὖν αὐτῷ παρεκάθενδεν, ἐκ τῆς βοῆς διατεράχθη: Ælian. V. H. i, 13. Had Ælian said only ὥσπερ αὐτῷ παρεκάθενδεν, the reader would of himself have concluded, ὅτι, κῶν οὖν αὐτῷ παρεκάθενδεν: the author therefore inserts the reader's conclusive word οὖν by anticipation.

Its *inceptive* power also is retained after a relative, but with some-
Hoog.

thing prefatory premised : thus, after the words Γλαύκωνος (f. Καύκωνος) τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος, καὶ Ἀριστοδαμείας τῆς Φόρβαντος, γίνεται παῖς Λεπρέας, Ælian begins the narrative, to which those words are introductory, with the following, ὅσπερ οὖν συνεβούλευσε τῷ Ἀγγέῳ, &c. this power of οὖν will appear more plainly, if the relative be changed for a demonstrative, οὗτος οὖν συνεβούλευσε, &c.

After a relative it serves also for explication of some foregoing words ; τίφθ' οὕτως ἔστητε τεθηπότες ἥτε νεβροί ; these words are then explained by the following, with a fresh commencement as it were : αἶ τ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔκαμον πολέος πεδίῳ θένουσαι, ἐστᾶς, οὐδ' ἄρα τίς σφι μετὰ φρεσὶ γίγνεται ἀλκή : Iliad. δ, 243. *which to wit, or these therefore, &c.*

But when οὖν coalesces in one word with a relative, its use, termed ἁοριστολογικὸς, is to render the meaning of the relative indefinite, as *cunque* does in Latin : this use arises from its conclusive power, when from several particulars a general conclusion is drawn ; as, λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν—τῷ ἀδικούντι—ἐπεξίεναι, ἕαντε πατὴρ ὦν τυγχάνῃ, ἕαντε μήτηρ, ἕαντε ἄλλος ὅστις οὖν : Plato Euthyphr. p. 5. if one's father, mother, and (which is understood,) one's brother, sister, relations, friends ; *therefore*, by a general conclusion, *any one whosoever*. Such are ὅποιος οὖν, *of whatever quality or nature ; of what sort soever ;* ὅπως οὖν, *in whatsoever manner ;* ὅπου οὖν, *anything at all ; anything, in whatever way considered ;* ὅπως οὖν, *howsoever, in whatever manner ;* ὅποσα πλάσιος οὖν, *how manifold soever, however multiplied ;* ὅποσος οὖν, *however great ;* ὅποσος οὖν, *among whatever number ; one of whatever number ; &c.* So too ὅπουθεν οὖν, *whencesoever ;* ὅπως οὖν, *in whatever manner ;* περὶ ὅτου οὖν, *about whatsoever ; about any thing whatever.*

When two words of such indefinite meaning occur together, οὖν may be expressed with the last only, and understood with the first : as, οἷε οὖν τίνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὅπως οὖν (for ὅστις οὖν καὶ ὅπως οὖν) δύνους Λυσία, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ; Plato Phædr. p. 258. (p. 346. ed. Bip.)

ΟΦΡΑ.—I. Ὀφρα is a poetical word, the meaning of which, *whilst, as long as*, is expressed in prose by ἕως : but the meaning of ἕως cannot, on the contrary, be always expressed by ὄφρα, for the former limits both *time* and *place*, the latter *time* only. ὄφρ' ἐν νηὶ θοῇ βρῶσις τε πόσις τε, μνησόμεθα βρώμης : Odys. κ, 176.

II. When present duration is spoken of, then, on account of the uncertainty of its termination, ὄφρα is construed with a subjunctive mood ; as, ὄφρα τ' ἐλαφρὰ γούνατα καὶ κεφαλὴν ἀτρομέων προφέρω : Theogn. 971. So 1139.

III. But in speaking of past and terminated duration, with an indicative : ὄφρα μὲν ἐς πόλεμον πωλέσκετο διος Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐδέποτε Τρῶες πρὸ πυλῶν Δαρδανίαν οἴχνεσκον : Iliad. ε, 788. So ι, 352.

IV. Sometimes τόφρα is put as correlative to ὄφρα, as in Iliad. ι, 546.

V. Sometimes it signifies *until*, [when the term of duration is indicated together with the signification of the duration itself,] τόφρα,

either expressed or understood, still corresponding to it : as, τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι τίθει κράτος, ὅφρ' ἂν Ἀχαιοὶ νιδὸν ἐμόν τίσωσιν : Iliad. α, 509. In Iliad. ν, 141. τόφρα is understood. Sometimes ὅφρα follows δηθᾶ instead of τόφρα, as in Iliad. ε, 588.

VI. Ὅφρα signifies the *final cause* also, and is rendered, *that, in order that*. This signification it seems to have acquired from expressing a term of action not yet in act, but only in contemplation or desire ; as when one is said to seek *until* he finds : it may be concluded that the finding is an object of desire, and the final cause of his seeking : and so he seeks *in order that* he may find. In this sense ὅφρα is construed with the subjunctive mood, because something is spoken of which is not actually in existence : ἀλλὰ σοι, ὦ μεγ' ἀναιδὲς, ἅμ' ἐσπόμεθ', ὅφρα σὺ χαίρης : Iliad. α, 158.

VII. When an optative mood follows it, ἂν seems to be understood : ἐγείνατο—οὐρανόν,—ἥφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ : Hesiod. Theog. 328. [See a more accurate account of the construction of ὅφρα in this sense, in the Abr. of Vig. p. 156. l. 20.]

ΠΑΛΙΝ, ΠΑΝΥ.—I. The primary signification of πάλιν is local ; *back, backwards, back again* : καὶ τότε δὴ ρ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν χύτο θεσφατος ἀήρ, Odyss. η, 143. See Galat. iv, 9.

II. Hence with some verbs it has the same sense as ἀνὰ or ἀπὸ in composition with a verb : thus πάλιν διδόναι is not always *to give again*, but sometimes ἀποδιδόναι, *to give back, to restore* ; as, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐθέλω δόμεναι πάλιν, Iliad. α, 116. See Eustath. ad l. p. 62. So πάλιν ἰέναι, ἥκειν, ἔρχεσθαι, for ἀνιέναι, ἐπανέρχεσθαι, as Odyss. ι, 225. Aristoph. Ach. 820.

III. It signifies also *in a contrary or different direction*, without mention of any particular place ; as πάλιν τρέπεν ὅσσε φαεινὸν, Iliad. ν. [3.]

IV. And because he who returns passes *again* over the same ground, πάλιν signifies also *again, a second time, anew* : thus, πάλιν ἐλθέμεν, Odyss. τ, 533. and in the same sense εἰς τὸ πάλιν, 2 Cor. xiii, 2.

V. And because one returning goes in a direction opposite to that in which he went before, πάλιν signifies *contrariwise, oppositely, on the contrary* : οὐδ' ὅγ' ἀληθέα εἶπε, πάλιν δ' ὅγε λάξετο μῦθον : Odyss. ν, 254. i. e. *he said what was contrary to truth*. See Eustath. p. 1740. ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένους ἐπάρδων κηλεῖν : Plat. Phædr. p. 267. (p. 365. ed. Bip.) οἱ μὲν δοκοῦντες χαίρειν—ἀγαθὴν Τύχην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν' οἱ δὲ δοκοῦντες κλαίειν—πάλιν κακὴν Τύχην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν : Ceb. Tab. p. 176. [p. 16. l. 8. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1738.]

VI. The words or things opposed to each other by πάλιν have not always any opposition or contrariety in themselves : thus in St. Matth. iv, 6. to the text cited by Satan, from Ps. xc, 11, 12, "*he shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone,*" Christ thus opposes another text from Deuteron. vi, 16.

πάλιν γέγραπται, (*it is written again*) οὐκ ἐκπειράσεις Κύριον, τὸν Θεόν σου.

VII. Πάλιν is joined with its kindred particle αὖ, but not in the same sense: as, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη, ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνέττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με, θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν: Plat. Apol. p. 27. (c. 15. ed. Fisch.) here πάλιν denotes repetition, αὖ opposition of contraries; ἡγούμενον and *again* ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι, and *on the contrary* θεοὺς εἶναι.

VIII. So πάλιν αὖθις: ὁπόταν ᾗ τὸ μέσον, ὃ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον πρὸς αὐτό, τοῦτο αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον· καὶ πάλιν αὖθις (*and again on the contrary*), ὃ τι τὸ ἔσχατον πρὸς τὸ μέσον, τοῦτο τὸ μέσον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον: Plat. Tim. p. 32. (p. 308. ed. Bip.)

IX. ΠΑΝΥ has a signification of *completeness, totalness, absoluteness*; whence it may be rendered *quite, entirely, altogether*: οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς, αὐτὸ ἀκούσαντας, δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας: Plat. Phædr. p. 64. (c. 9. ed. Fisch.) ἐγὼ δ' ἐπήνον τὸν θεὸν πάνυ σφόδρα, Aristoph. Plut. 745.

X. Hence, when joined with a verb, either by itself or with some other adverb, it is properly rendered *etiam atque etiam, again and again, over and over again*: καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ—τοῦτο ὑμῶν δεόμεναι καὶ παριέμαι, Plat. Apol. p. 17. (c. 1. ed. Fisch.) εὖνους γὰρ ὦν σοι πυνθάνομαι πάνυ σφόδρα, Aristoph. Plut. 25. [In this last example πάνυ σφόδρα is to be construed with εὖνους, not with πυνθάνομαι as Hoogeveen supposed.]

XI. Πάνυ καλῶς is a form by which an invitation is civilly declined: Anc. ἀλλ' εἴσιθ' ἄμ' ἐμοί. Xanth. Πάνυ καλῶς, *excuse me*. Aristoph. Ran. 515. [512. ed. Br.] In this sense *benigne* is used in Latin. See Hor. Ep. i, 7, 62.

XII. In affirmative answers it is sometimes, although rarely, found alone; as in Aristoph. Plut. 393. but it is oftener prefixed to other affirmative particles: thus πάνυ γε occurs very frequently in Plato. So πάνυ μὲν οὖν is found both by itself in affirmative answers, and in construction, where there is no answer. Σ. τίς οὗτος; Εὐ. ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ. Σ. ὁ σὸς, ᾧ βέλτιστε; Εὐ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 4. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὐροιά τίς σε εἶληφε: Plato, [Phædr.] p. 238.

XIII. And it is used in approbation of preceding words of another person, even when no question has been asked: Soc. Δηλόν γε ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ὑπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ' ὡς τεθναυμάκotes. Phædr. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Plato, Phædr. p. 258. (p. 346. ed. Bip.)

XIV. By the subjunction of τι some limitation or emphasis is added: ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία οὐδὲ τριῶν ταλάντων πάνυ τι ἦν, Demosth. p. 518. [In Neær. p. 1347. l. 14. ed. Reisk.] *was not even quite, &c. μὴ πάνυ τι, nearly nothing.*

ΠΕΡ.—I. Περ is a particle used in poetry (for in prose it seldom or never occurs by itself, or unconnected with some other word,) to augment the force of affirmation. It signifies *very, quite, absolutely, altogether*; and affects the predicate of a proposition rather than the

copula; as, σοι αἶσα μίνυνθά περ, Hom. [See Odyss. χ, 473.] νηπύτι, οὐδὲ νῦ πῶ περ ἐπεφράσω, ὅσπον ἀρείων εὐχομ' ἐγὼν ἔμεναι: Iliad. φ, 410. ὡς ἄνυσον κραδίην ἔχεις, οὐδέ νῦ τῶν περ μέμνηται, ὅσα δὴ πάθομεν κακὰ Ἴλιον ἀμφί: ib. 441. *you do not at all remember, &c.* It occurs by itself in Plato, πληρές περ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι, &c. Phædr. p. 235. (p. 296. ed. Bip.) but πληρές περ τὸ στήθος ἔχων will certainly begin an hexameter.

II. Περ retains the same signification when annexed to another word, as ὥσπερ, ἥπερ, *just as*: οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοι δίκη τις οὐσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, ὥσπερ ἐμοί: Plat. Euthyphr. εὐθὺς πορεύεται πρὸς τὸν Κῦρον, ἥπερ εἶχεν, Xen. Cyrop. iii, 1, 7. See Aristoph. Vesp. 1262. [1270. ed. Br.]

III. It affirms too in composition: as in ὅπερ ἐστίν, *which is really the case*: Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. p. 79. [p. 193. l. 25. ed. Reisk.] and in διόπερ. See Demosth. Phil. iii. p. 49. [p. 123. l. 1. ed. Reisk.] Olynth. i. p. 4. [p. 16. l. 2. ed. Reisk.]

IV. Where its assertory power is more faint, it serves at least for explication, as *nempe* in Latin: λησταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης ἥπερ μόνον οἶόν τ' ἦν κακουργεῖσθαι, Thucyd. iv, 53. τὴν κεφαλὴν καταθάψαι, ἵνα περ νῦν τὸ Βακχεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐστι: Lucian. adv. Indoct. p. 110.

V. Περ, like *cunque* in Latin, is used to render the sense of other words more indefinite: thus ἄλλοιπερ is *others whosoever*: Iliad. ι, 301. In this use it is most frequently joined with relative words; ὅς, ὅσος, ἥ, ὅσαχῃ, ὡς, ὅτε, ἐνθα, ὅτι, ὅθεν, and the like: and it denotes—1. an indefinite *person*: καλῶς ποιῶν, ὅστις περ ἦν: Aristoph. Ach. 1049.—2. an indefinite *thing*: συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν, Plat. Phæd. p. 70. See Aristoph. Ach. 559. [560. ed. Br.]—3. an indefinite *manner* or *method*: διαψεθῆναι ταύτη, ἥπερ συνετέθη: Plat. Phæd. p. 78. (c. 25. ed. Fisch.)—4. indefinite *time*: ὅτε περ, *whensoever*: Iliad. δ, 259.—5. indefinite *place*: ἐνθα περ ἦ, *wheresoever*: Theogn. 270. ἀφίκεσθαι ὅθι περ αἱ ἄλλαι, Plat. Phæd. p. 108. So ὅθεν περ, *whencesoever*: Aristoph. Ach. 821. [in this last passage it has the signification of the Latin *fere*.]

VI. Ἄν, or κε, when added, pertains to a verb: ἄλλο πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν δύνηται, Plat. de Rep. v. p. 477. (p. 60. ed. Bip.) [See Abr. of Vig. p. 157. l. 7.]

VII. The *adversative* power of περ is deducible from that by which it renders meaning indefinite: for "*wheresoever* he may have been" is nearly tantamount to "*although* he may have been here or there;" and "*whosoever*," to "*although* he be this or that man." In this sense, which is confined to poetry, περ is very often joined with a participle: μηδ' οὕτως, ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν, — κλέπτε νόψ: Iliad. α, 131. i. e. ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν, μὴ κλέπτε ὅμως νόψ: *how much soever you may excel in courage, yet notwithstanding, &c.* So 275. and ε, 382.

VIII. The participle is often suppressed: γῆ—κατὰ κρατερὸν περ ἐρύκει, Iliad. φ, 63. for κρατερὸν περ ἐόντα. and, οὐδ' ἡμῖν ποταμός περ εὐρύς—ἀρκέσει, φ, 130.

IX. And on the other hand περ itself is suppressed: σὺ δ' ἐνθάδε

πότμον ἐφέψεις, ὦδ' ἑκπαγλος ἑών : Iliad. φ, 589. ἐγὼ δέ μιν οἷη ἀν-
ἐγνων τοῖον ἑόντα, Odys. δ, 250. for ὄντα περ τοῖον.

X. It is sometimes joined with an adverb ; εἰ κ' ὀλίγον περ ἐπαύρη,
Iliad. λ, 391. of an arrow or dart.

ΠΗ, ΠΗ.—I. The interrogative particle Πῆ is by nature an ab-
lative feminine, agreeing with ὁδῶ understood : and therefore it sig-
nifies the place through which motion is effected, either properly or
figuratively : πῆ παρέβην ; τί δ' ἔρεξα ; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη ; Pythag.
42. *in what way have I transgressed?*

II. It is used in poetry for ποῖ, *whither* : πῆ δὴ τόνδε μολοβρόν
ἄγεις ; Odys. ρ, 219. So ο, 578. and Iliad. ζ, 377.

III. Δὴ is often added to πῆ, indicating the eagerness of the in-
quirer : πῆ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι ; Plat. Phædr. p. 82. ἀλλὰ πῆ
δὴ ; *but how, I pray?* Id. Phædr. p. 269. (p. 369. ed. Bip.) The
particles are sometimes separated by another ; as, πῆ γὰρ δὴ ἔξουσιν
ἀμφισβητῆσαι ; Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 501. (105. Bip.) It is sometimes
used relatively, as synonymous with ὅπη : τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς
πέρι, καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῆ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ ὅπη ἀπρεπῶς,
λοιπόν. ἢ γάρ ; *how*. Plat. Phædr. p. 274. (p. 379. ed. Bip.) πῆ δὴ
οὖν θνητὸν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶων ἐκλήθη, πειρατέον εἰπεῖν ; ib. p. 246.
(320. Bip.)

IV. Πῆ, enclitick, signifies, *by any way* : οὐδέ τί πῆ δύνamai
προχέειν ῥόον εἰς ἅλα διαν, Iliad. φ, 219. εἰ μέλλομέν πῆ ἐκφεύξεσθαι,
Plat. de Rep. v. p. 474. εἴ πῆ is also *if any where* : ἀμβάτε ποττὰν
μάδδαν, αἴχ' εὐρητέ πα ; Aristoph. Ach. 732.

V. Like πῆ, it has a figurative sense also ; *in any way ; by any
method* : εἴ πῆ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε : Plat. Crit. p.
48. ὅρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, πείθομέν πῆ ἐκείνους ; Id. de Rep. vi. p. 501.
(p. 104. ed. Bip.)

VI. So it has a diminuent power, by which it detracts from the
full import of an expression : *in some degree ; in some measure ; in
some respects* : κεκοινώνηκε δέ πῆ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ
ψυχῇ, Plat. Phædr. p. 246. (p. 321. Bip.) thus it is used as equi-
valent to κατὰ τι : τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ
ἔστι πῆ : Id. in Sophist. p. 241. (p. 150. ed. Bip.)

VII. As πῆ signifies *whither?* so πῆ *to some place, some whither ;*
as in Iliad. ζ, 377.

Πῆ retains its accent, like other encliticks, when it constitutes a
kind of beginning, so that no word precedes it, on which it can throw
back its accent : τὸ δέ, πῆ μὲν ἴσον, πῆ δ' ἄνισον : *partly, in some
respects* : Plutarch. de Orac. Def. p. 417. if the order of the words
were changed in the following manner, πῆ would throw back its
accent, τὸ δ' ἴσον μὲν πῆ, ἄνισον δέ πῆ. So Alcinous, τῆς μὲν ἐπι-
πλασσομένης, πῆ μὲν λευκῆς, πῆ δέ πελίας. περὶ Πλάτ. δογμ. c. 17.
Secondly, it retains its accent, when the preceding word is of such a
nature as to be unable to sustain it : as, μῶν ὁ γέρων πῆ διαδύεται ;
Aristoph. Vesp. 395. [rather, when the word qualified by πῆ, follows
instead of preceding it.] Thirdly, when it is emphatical ; as it is in

all distinctions : thus, οὐκ ἐπαινετὸν ὁ φθόνος, οὔθ' ὁ ἀπλῶς, οὔτε ὁ πῆ. in the same manner πῶς : οὐ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς : Aristot. Eth. ii. That πῆ is accentuated when taken materially, every one knows ; for it is then also emphatical.

ΠΑΗΝ.—I. The primary signification of πλὴν is *exception* ; and it is construed with a genitive case : πάντες Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι, πλὴν ἐμοῦ, *except me* : Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 25. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.) It excepts from *number* or *multitude* in a twofold manner ;—1. by negation, when that from which the exception is made is affirmed, λέγ' ὅ τι βούλει, πλὴν ἐνός : Aristoph. Vesp. 758. πλὴν γὰρ τέκνων, ἔμοιγε φίλτατον πολὺ : add Dio. xxxvii. p. 57. extr. *except*.—2. by affirmation, when negation is used with regard to that from which the exception is made : οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλος, πλὴν αὐτοῦ : St. Mark xii, 32. μηδένα θεασάμενος, πλὴν τῆς γυναικὸς : St. John viii, 10.

It excepts from *totality* or *entireness* : ἵππων μὲν εἶχον ὅλην τὴν ἰδέαν, πλὴν τῆς κεφαλῆς : Palæphat. c. i.

II. Sometimes, instead of its own proper case, it takes one dependent on foregoing words ; as the nominative ; τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες, πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, Plat. Phæd. p. 68. (c. 13. ed. Fisch.) So in Phædr. p. 249. init. (p. 325. ed. Bip.) [οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλος, πλὴν ἐγώ, viz. εἰμὶ, *but myself*, Aristoph. Plut. 106.]

III. A general or indistinct signification of multitude or totality is latent in the words οὐδὲν, ἄλλο, οὐδεὶς, τί : hence πλὴν is used for exception after them ; κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμην, εἴ τί σ' αἰτήσαιμ' ἔτι, πλὴν ἐν μόνον : Aristoph. Ach. 476. ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο, πλὴν εἶδωλ' : Sophocl. Aj. 125.

IV. It has sometimes a case after it, governed by a preposition, when it signifies *præterquam* : ἐγὼ δὲ τᾶλλα μακάριος πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ, πλὴν εἰς θυγατέρας, *except as to* : Eurip. Orest. 540. hence it is rendered *but only* ; ἀποβολὴ ψυχῆς οὐδεμία ἔσται ἐξ ὑμῶν πλὴν τοῦ πλοίου, Acts xxvii, 22. where if the exceptive force of πλὴν is to be preserved, it must have reference to ἀποβολή, not to ὑμῶν : [after τοῦ πλοίου underst. ἀποβολή ἔσται.]

V. It is still exceptive, when put, without government, and so that the construction of the words following it does not depend on that of those preceding it, for ἀλλά : ἀνταποδώσει αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ἀνταπόδομα αὐτῶν εἰς κεφαλὴν αὐτῶν ἀποδώσει : πλὴν μετανοοῦσιν ἔδωκεν ἐπάνοδον, S. of Sirach, xvii, 24.

VI. It is sometimes corrective : οὐ πάνυ πολλῶν ἰδόντων, πλὴν μόνου, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἔδοξε, τοῦ Ἀρισταίνετου : Lucian, Lapith. p. 429. t. iii. *not many seeing, nay only Aristænetus*.

VII. Sometimes that, from which the exception is made, is understood ; whence πλὴν appears to be used for ὅμως, *nevertheless, but* ; as, ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα· πλὴν οὐαὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ, δι' οὗ τὸ σκάνδαλον ἔρχεται : St. Matth. xviii, 7. the sense here may perhaps be, that offences are necessary for the salvation of the elect ; from the number of whom he is excepted by whom the offence comes.

VIII. Its power of expressing plenitude or totality appears, when a whole is mentioned after specification of some of the parts which help to constitute it: thus Lucian, after mentioning the wounds mutually given and received by the philosophers, adds, *πλήν ταραχῆς γε καὶ δακρύων μεστὰ ἦν πάντα*, Lapith. t. iii. p. 448. καὶ γὰρ ὅστις γυναικὰ ὑβρίζει τὴν σὴν, εἰς σὲ ὑβρίζει, καὶ ὅστις παῖδα, καὶ φίλον, καὶ ὅστις γε οἰκέτην· πλήν γὰρ (or rather πλήν γε) περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ἔχει σοι: Id. Solæcist. t. iii. p. 581.

IX. It is used in pretermission also, when things are mentioned summarily: as, *εἰσιώμεθα οὖν*,—καὶ παρεσκεύαστο ποικίλα· πλήν οὐδέν, οἴμαι, χρὴ καὶ ταῦτα καταριθμείσθαι, χυμούς, καὶ πέμματα, καὶ καρκείας· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἄφθονα: Lucian. Lapith. p. 425.

X. It shows somewhat of the power of supplying deficiency also, when it in some sort performs the office of the conclusive particle οὖν, signifying, *it remains therefore that*: thus Simon, after saying that all his brethren had died for their religion, adds, *πλήν ἐκδικήσω περὶ τοῦ ἔθνους μου*, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀγίων, καὶ περὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τέκνων ἡμῶν: 1 Maccab. xiii. 6. *πλήν καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ καθ' ἕνα, ἕκαστος τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γυναῖκα οὕτως ἀγαπάτω, ὥς ἐαυτόν*: Ephes. v. 33. this admonition may either be a conclusion from what St. Paul had before said of the love of Christ to the church, to which he compares the duty of husbands towards their wives; or *πλήν* may preserve its suppletory power, and signify, *as to what remains; the sum of all is this*—.

XI. Somewhat of the power of completing plenitude appears too, when *πλήν* is used in adding something which surpasses all that has preceded: thus our Saviour, after answering the High Priest, that he was the Son of God, adds, *πλήν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπ' ἄρτι ὄψεσθε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθήμενον ἐκ δεξιῶν τῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ ἐρχόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*: St. Matth. xxvi. 64. thus too, after warning his disciples not to seek things which are of no other use than to sustain life, he adds, *πλήν ζητεῖτε τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ*: *but rather seek, &c.* St. Luke xii. 31. i. e. *it remains therefore that ye seek, &c.*

XII. In *Πλήν Ἀλλὰ*, *πλήν* is suppletory of something to be further said or known, and *ἀλλὰ* demands something different from what has preceded. It is used before a question, when more than has yet been answered is requisite for the full comprehension of the subject of inquiry: thus in Lucian's Timon, Mercury asks Plutus, how he, being blind, could find his way, or distinguish the persons to whom he is sent; and when this question has been answered, Mercury proceeds, *πλήν ἀλλὰ τί πράττετε καταπεμφθεῖς*; [*but further*; or, *but to proceed in my inquiry, what do you do, when sent down by Jupiter?* p. 74. D. ed. Salmur.]

XIII. Sometimes *ἀλλὰ* is to be taken *adversatively*: *μέγα, ὦ Ἥρα, φρονεῖς*,—καὶ ὑβρίζεις· *πλήν ἀλλ' ὄψομαι σε μετ' ὀλίγον αὖθις δακρύουσαν, &c. but I shall soon see you, on the contrary, &c.* Lucian. Dial. Deor. xvi. [p. 154. c. ed. Salmur. *but however; but nevertheless.*]

XIV. *Πλήν ἀλλὰ* sometimes introduces a finishing addition to what has already been said: thus Mercury, after recounting to Plutus some instances of the desperate love of mortals for the latter, adds, *πλήν*

ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἂν, εἴ οἶδα, ὁμολογήσεις, — κορυβαντιῶν αὐτοὺς ἐρωμένων τοιούτῳ ἐπιμερηνότης : *as to what remains; to conclude*: Lucian. Timon. c. 26. [p. 76. A. ed. Salmur. The meaning is rather, *but nevertheless; and yet*: Mercury had before (p. 75. D.) asked Plutus how it came to pass that he, blind, and pale, and lame, as he was, had so many admirers.]

XV. Ἀλλὰ may be thought to have its *impulsive* or *incitative* force in πλὴν ἀλλὰ τί γελᾷς; Lucian. Mort. Dial. xiii. p. 391. for πλὴν ἄγε, *but tell me*. Yet it may have its signification of *diversity*: *as to what remains, or, for the rest, tell me* MOREOVER, or *tell me* ANOTHER THING.

XVI. Πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ signifies *præterquam, except*; ἀλλὰ opposing a foregoing negation: οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἱατρούων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: Aristot. Metaph. c. 1.

XVII. In the same sense πλὴν ἢ is used: ἀδελον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ: Plat. Apol.

XVIII. Πλὴν γε is, *except indeed, except only*: Tryg. ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, γὰρ πεπύσμην οὐδενός. Chor. οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γε νυνί: Aristoph. Pac. 613. [617. ed. Br. where πρὶν is printed for πλὴν by an oversight noticed by Brunck in his note.] καὶ πλὴν γε τῶν θεῶν αἰεὶ σ' ἡγησόμεσθα πρῶτον: ib. 917. See also Vesp. 1305. [1314. ed. Br.] καὶ τίς ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον, οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι, πλὴν γε τὸν θαυμαστόν; Plat. Sophist. p. 225.

XIX. Πλὴν γε performs the office of δέ, following μὲν in another clause or member: καὶ πλουτεῖ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου (Apollo, by his oracles:) πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀνόητοι, καὶ παρέχοντες αὐτοὺς καταγοητεύεσθαι πλὴν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖται γε ὑπὸ τῶν συνετωτέρων τὰ πολλὰ τερατενόμενος: Lucian. Dial. Jun. et Laton. Here γε enforces the negation which it follows: *but the more knowing are far enough from being ignorant, that, &c.*

XX. The confirmative particle δὴ also is sometimes added: πάντα γὰρ πάρεσσι νῶν, ὅσων δεόμεσθα, πλὴν γε δὴ τῆς κλειψύδρας: Aristoph. Vesp. 853. [857. ed. Br.]

XXI. The particles πλὴν εἰ except hypothetically: τί οὖν παθόντες τοῦτο ὀνειδιζομεν ἀλλήλοις; καὶ προφάσει χρώμεθα τοῦ μηδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιεῖν; πλὴν εἰ τῆς τύχης βοηθεία γεγονούγα τοῖς ἀπόροις φθονοῦμεν: *unless perhaps*: Demosth. Phil. iv. p. 57. [p. 141. l. 21. ed. Reisk.] Since nothing remains to be excepted but what no one will allow, the orator by this very hypothetical exception enforces his argument.

Socrates, in his Defence, says, it was not permitted him even to know the names of his accusers, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὢν: Plat. Apol. p. 18. (c. 2. ed. Fisch.) Here there is some expression of indignation. [Wonderful indeed is the variety of significations, which Hoogveen fancies he has discovered in πλὴν, and other particles.]

XXII. The insertion of another word between πλὴν and εἰ by Thucyd. is the cause of some obscurity: Ἀθηναῖοις εὖνοι ἦσαν, πλὴν καθόσον εἰ τὴν Σκελίαν ὥντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι: vi, 88. for πλὴν εἰ κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εὖνοι ἦσαν, καθόσον, &c.

XXIII. Πλὴν εἰ denotes a certain case or condition; but πλὴν ἐάν,

Hoog.

Y

on account of ἂν latent in ἔαν, an uncertain one; for which reason it is construed with a subjunctive mood: πλὴν ἔαν συμφέρῃ: Isocr. πλὴν ἔαν χῆρος ἢ χήρα γένηται: Theophr.

XXIV. Μὴ is added to πλὴν εἰ, without changing the signification: οὐχ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀπολαύεις αὐτοῦ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο φῆς, ὅτι, &c. Lucian. Dial. Diog. et Mausol. [p. 281. A. ed. Salmur.] ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐκ ἐδεήθη, — πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεῦσθαι ἔδει: Diog. Laert. p. 102. So πλὴν ἔαν μὴ and πλὴν ἂν μὴ, but with the difference between πλὴν ἔαν and πλὴν εἰ remarked in xiii.

XXV. Πλὴν is prefixed to relative words for the purpose of excepting or limiting quantities, qualities, modes or manners, parts, times, places: as, πλὴν ὅσον, πλὴν οἷον, πλὴν ὅπως, πλὴν ὅπου, πλὴν ὅταν, πλὴν ὅπου. A few words on πλὴν ὅσον and πλὴν ὅτι will suffice to make all understood. Πλὴν ὅσον then excepts a certain manner or part, in Pausan. ἐπ' ἐμοῦ δὲ οὔτε θεὸς ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, πλὴν ὅσον λόγῳ καὶ κολακείᾳ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερέχον· in Arcad. p. 457. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιφανὲς συμβῆναι παρὰ τὸν βίον φασὶν οὐδέν, πλὴν ὅσον οὐκ ἐν Τεγέᾳ τὴν βασιλείαν κατεστήσατο, ἀλλ' ἐν Τραπεζοῦντι, p. 462.

XXVI. When ὅτι is added to πλὴν, it is only narrative or expositive of that which is to be excepted; and ἔν or ἐνὸς is understood after πλὴν: πλείω δὲ τούτων οὐ κάτοιδα, πλὴν ὅτι πέμπει με κείνῃ τοῦδε τοῦ φόβου χάριν: Sophocle. Electr. 427. [426. ed. Br.] for πλὴν ἐν τοῦθ', ὅτι. See Acts xx, 23. Aristophanes supplies the ellipsis: οὐκ οἶδα, πλὴν ἐν, ὅτι θυνεῖαν ἐσπέρας ὑπερφνῶ τὸ μέγεθος εἰσηνέγκατο: Pac. 227.

XXVII. In πλὴν γ' ὅτι καὶ, πλὴν is exceptive, γε restrictive, and καὶ superadditory: ὥστ' ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ τῆς Τερπάνδρου μάλλον ἂν εἶναι μουσικῆς εἰκάσαι, πλὴν γ' ὅτι καὶ παρελήλυθεν: *except that they even surpass it*; or, *may they even surpass it*: Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 305.

XXVIII. The nervous limitation of the exception by πλὴν γ' ὅτι is further strengthened by the insertion of δὴ: ἂν δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐξηγεῖσθαι θαυμάσω, τί ἄλλο ἢ γραμματικὸς ἀπετελέσθην ἀντὶ φιλοσόφου; πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι ἀντὶ Ὀμήρου Χρύσιππον ἐξηγούμενος: *except indeed this only, that, &c.*

NOTE.—I. Ποτὲ usually signifies time long past; whence it is joined with πάλαι in that adage: πάλαι ποτ' ἦσαν ἄλκιμοι Μιλήσιοι. And after ἥδη it is rendered *long ago, long since*: ἥδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε—ἀπορῶν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξενέχθην, ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει: Plato Cratyl. p. 386. (p. 235. ed. Bip.) [Rather, *before now*.]

II. In some passages however it signifies time but just past, as, οὐ ποτ' ἀπ' Αἰνείαν ἐλόμην, Iliad. θ, 108. See Eustath. p. 702.

III. But subjoined to μὲν and δὲ it signifies time generally and indeterminately; *at one time; at another time*: ποτὲ μὲν συμβολικῶς ἐξαγγέλλων τὰς ἀρρήτους αὐτῶν ιδιότητας, ποτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκόνων ἐπ' αὐτὰς ἀνατρέχων: Procl. in Plat. Theolog. i, 4. In the following passage it is opposed to ἀεί: πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ; Plat. Theæt. p. 170. (p. 108. ed. Bip.)

IV. From this use in signifying time indefinitely, is derived that in which it takes the nature of a particle, and is joined emphatically to relative words, rendering their meaning indeterminate. This it does either—1. simply, like the Latin *cunque*; or—2. if there be an admixture of doubt, it heightens the expression of solicitude in one doubting, or eagerness in one inquiring.—1. *ὅποια ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτῇ, such as it is; be it what it may*: Demosth. de Pace p. 23. [p. 60. l. 15. ed. Reisk.] The English idiom resembles the Greek: *of what ever character this peace I speak of is*.

V.—2. It expresses the solicitude of one doubting: *καῖκείνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἥδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν, ὅπη ποτέ ἐτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον*: Plat. Soph. p. 231. (p. 229. ed. Bip.) *by what possible way; how ever*. So 2 Maccab. xiv, 32. Also the eagerness of an inquirer: *οὔτοι μὰ τὴν γῆν ἔσσεθ' ὡς οὐκ ἀποθανεῖ, εἰ μὴ κατερεῖς μοι τοῦνομ' ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ σοι*: Aristoph. Pac. 188.

VI. Καὶ superadditory is sometimes subjoined: *τὴν θρηνηθεῖσαν ὑπὸ Θεαμένους—ἥτις ποτε καὶ ἔστιν*: Heliodor. ii, 8. or inserted before *ποτέ*: *ἴδωμεν, τίνα καὶ ποτ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν*: Plat. Phædr. p. 368. (p. 366.)

VII. In direct interrogation also *ποτε* denotes the eagerness of the inquirer: *ποίας ποτ' ἀνὴρ λακίδας αἰτεῖται πέπλων*; Aristoph. Ach. 422. [ποθ' ὦνῆρ, 423. Br.] *ποῦ ποτ' ἦν*; Id. Pac. 600. *πῖλον γὰρ ἐστίν, εἰπέ μοι, τίνος ποτέ*; Id. Ach. 588. *πῶς ποτέ*; Plutarch. Quæst. Plat. p. 1004. *τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός; what can it be that the god says?* καὶ *τί ποτε αἰνίττεται*; Plat. Apol. p. 21. Sometimes other words are inserted between *τί* and *ποτέ*: *τί χρή ποτε—εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστὴν*: Plat. Soph. p. 231. (p. 229. ed. Bip.) *τί οὖν ποτε λέγει*; Id. Apol. p. 21. (c. 6. ed. Fisch.) *οὐκ ἐστ' ὅπως σιγήσομαι, ἦν μὴ φράσης, ὃ τι τῷδ' ἀκολουθοῦμέν ποτε*: Aristoph. Plut. 19.

VIII. With a signification of time it is used in figurative questions equivalent to assertions, and denotes a confidence, that no opposition can be offered: *ἦ σὺ οἶε ποτέ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὔσιν εἶναι*; Plat. Theæt. p. 188. (p. 148. ed. Bip.)

IX. "Οστίς δὴ *ποτε* is *quicunque nimirum tandem*: *ἐνιοι τὰ μὲν φιλονεικία, τὰ δ' ἥτινι δὴ ποτ' αἰτία προάγονται λέγειν*: Demosth. de Cherson. [p. 90. l. 7. ed. Reisk. *by whatever motive; by some other motive, whatever forsooth it may be.*]

'Αεὶ *ποτε* comprehends all time: *always without exception*: *τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις αἰεὶ ποτε τὸ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὖνον ὑπῆρχεν*: Thucyd. iv, 78. *αἰεὶ ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὑποπτοι*, ib. c. 103.

In questions *ποτέ* has the same sense, with δὴ subjoined in its hortatory use: see p. 43. *τί δὴ ποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς*; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 15. (c. 18. ed. Fisch.) *what, I pray, or tell me, can be these gifts?* &c. more literally, *what gifts can there ever be?* &c.

ΠΟΥ, ΠΟΥ.—I. Ποῦ is a particle interrogative of place; *where?* Sometimes it is put for ποῦ, *whither?* *ποῦ σου τὸ θεοῦ ἐκεῖνο ἡμίτομον ἀπελήλυθε*; Lucian. Dial. Mortuor. 3. *οὐκ οἶδας, πόθεν ἔρ-*

χεται, καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει : St. John iii, 8. ποῦ οὗτος μέλλει πορεύεσθαι ; ib. vii, 35. So *που* the enclitic signifies motion to a place ; as, σπεύδω *πον*, *I am hastening to some place, somewhither* : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 15.

II. *Που* enclitic signifies place indefinitely ; *anywhere* : οὐ μὲν γάρ τί *που* ἐστὶν οἰζυρώτερον ἀνδρός : Iliad. ρ, 446. ἐλπίς—ἐκεῖ, εἴπερ *πον* ἄλλοθι, κήσασθαι τοῦτο : Plat. Phæd. p. 67. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.)

III. It signifies place definitely with regard to certain limits, but indeterminately with regard to the whole space within those limits : ἀλλὰ *που* ἐν μεγάροισι Λυκάονος ἔνδεκα δῖφοροι : *somewhere* : Iliad. ε, 193.

IV. Hence it is joined with adverbs signifying place definitely : οὐδὲ καλὸν ἐνταῦθά *που* κεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῇ ψάμμῳ αὐτὴν : Lucian. Dial. Nept. et Nereid. ἐκεῖ δέ *που* ὁ Ἄργος βουκολεῖ : Id. Dial. Jov. et Mercur.

V. *Ποῦ* has a circumflex, not only when it interrogates, and when it is taken materially, but also when it signifies place neither definitely nor indefinitely, but considered as the limit of something bounded and included by it : τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐ ποῦ· τὸ γὰρ ποῦ αὐτὸ τε ἐστὶ τι, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλο τι δεῖ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ὁ περιέχει : Aristot. Physic. iv, 5. [See Locke on Hum. Underst. b. ii. ch. 13. § 10.]

VI. The indefiniteness of its signification with regard to place is transferred to other things, and hence arises its conjectural use, in which it is rendered *perhaps* ; *it may be* ; *if I mistake not* ; &c. ἀλλ' ἔτι *που* Τρώων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες εὐρὺ κονίσσουσιν πεδίον : Iliad. ξ, 144. So ο, 48. φ, 83. ω, 488.

VII. It is fitly therefore joined with εικάζειν : Ἀρσάκης, ὡς εικάζειν ἔνεστιν, ἑτερόν *που* καὶ καινότερον τιμωρίας τρόπον τανῦν ἐπινοοῦσιν : Heliodor. Æthiop. viii, 11. And it suits interrogation : καλὸν ποῦ τι ἂν εἴη, ὃ τούτων ἀπολειφθὲν, ὅμως τέχνη λαμβάνεται : Plat. Phædr. p. 226. (p. 363. ed. Bip.) Also ironical jocularly : Ἀπολλων, ὅς *που* Δῆλον ἢ Πυθῶν ἔχεις, says Bacchus in the Ranæ of Aristoph. 772. [659. ed. Br.] but here perhaps it may be taken in the sense explained under iii.

VIII. From its conjectural use proceeds its *diminuent* signification ; which qualifies what might otherwise seem too positive or peremptory : αὐτὰ *που* σχεδὸν φῆς τὰ γινόμενα : Lucian. Timon. c. 42. *what you describe is pretty nearly what really happens*.

IX. This diminuent use suits those peculiarly, who, either distrusting, or feigning to distrust, their own opinion, suspend it on the assent of others, and therefore speak cautiously : thus Socrates, who always dissembled his knowledge : ὁ αὐτός *που* τρόπος τέχνης ῥητορικῆς, ὅσπερ καὶ ἱατρικῆς : Plat. Phædr. p. 270. (p. 370. ed. Bip.)

X. It is elegant when followed by γε : καὶ μάλα *που* συχνά, ὃ Σώκρατες· τὰ γ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις : Plat. Phædr. p. 266. (p. 363. ed. Bip.) Lest the more general assertion should have been too much qualified by *που*, the more particular one, which follows, is urged by the restrictive force of γε.

XI. By this sense *που* is adapted for eliciting, and as it were asking, assent : σύνοισθά *που* καὶ αὐτὸς, ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοι καὶ

σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους—γράφειν, &c. Plat. Phædr. p. 257. (p. 344. ed. Bip.) *You yourself, as well as I, know, if I mistake not, or doubtless, that, &c.* So, ἐννοεῖς πον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, p. 264.

As in this use of πον assent is anticipated, so an expression of it usually follows : ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ ἀδικουμένους ἀδύνατόν πον φίλους εἶναι : Answ. ναί. Plato in Lys. p. 214. (p. 234. ed. Bip.) εἰσὶ δὲ πον οὔτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες. Answ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις : ib.

XII. Sometimes it extorts, rather than elicits, assent, and suits reprehension and rebuke : Ἐκτορ, ποῦ δὴ τοι μένος οἴχεται, ὃ πρὶν ἔχεσκες ; φῆς πον ἄτερ λαῶν πόλιν ἔξεμεν ἢδ' ἐπικούρων : Iliad. ε, 473. *you said, if I am not much mistaken, &c.*

XIII. No one has shown by sufficient examples, that πον is ever redundant : οὐ δὴ πον, e. g. is, *no, indeed, as I think ; not, truly, in my opinion.*

ΠΙΠΙΝ, ΠΙΠΙΝ Η.—I. Πρὶν and πρότερον have the same meaning, *formerly, hertofore* ; but πρὶν is more usual in poetry, πρότερον in prose. It is opposed to νῦν in Iliad. β, 112—114. to δὴ, (now) II. ε, 472. Plato prefixes the article τό : πᾶς ποιητῆς γίγνεται, κᾶν ἄμουςος ἢ τὸ πρὶν, οὗ ἂν Ἐρως ἄψηται : Sympos. p. 196. (p. 216. ed. Bip.)

II. Πρὶν, like πλὴν, is construed with a genitive, after the manner of prepositions, or rather of comparatives ; as, πρὶν θέρους, *before summer* ; πρὶν ὥρας, *before the time* : Pind. Pyth. iv, 76. Like πρότερον, it admits before it words which augment or intend its signification, as πολὺ πρὶν, *long before*, Iliad. λ, 236.

III. It is followed by the particle ἢ more frequently than by a genitive case : μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν (τὴν πόλιν) ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι : Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 501. (p. 104. ed. Bip.) See St. Matth. i, 18.

IV. *H is often suppressed : πρὶν ἀλέκτορα φωνῆσαι, τρὶς ἀπαρνήσῃ με : St. Matth. xxvi, 34. 75. *before the cock crow.* κατὰβαθι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν τὸ παιδίον μου : St. John iv, 49. It appears from the following example, that the act or event, priority to which is signified by πρὶν, needs not actually take place, but may be prevented : ἀλλ' ἐκποδῶν ἄπειμι, πρὶν πληγὰς λαβεῖν : Aristoph. Vesp. 1316. [1325. ed. Br.]

V. From what has been said, it appears that πρὶν requires properly an infinitive mood after it : and this Eustath. observes on Hom. Od. β, 374. (p. 1450. l. 29.) Homer construes it with an indicative in speaking of something future : τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω, πρὶν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν : Iliad. α, 29. An indicative of a past tense is used, when something past is spoken of, and spoken of as past : χρῆν τοίνυν Λεπτίνην μὴ πρότερον τιθέναι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νόμον, πρὶν ἢ τὸν παλαιὸν τοῦτον ἔλυσε : Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 374. [p. 486. l. 13. ed. Reisk. where ἢ does not appear.] In its construction with an optative mood, ἂν is understood, when time is put as past, although the thing spoken of has not actually taken place, but is indeed yet to come : οὐκ ἔστιν ἔθος Ῥωμαίους χαρίζεσθαι τίνα ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀπόλειν, πρὶν

ἢ ὁ κατηγορούμενος κατὰ πρόσωπον ἔχοι τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας, τόπον τε ἀπολογίας λάβοι περὶ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος : Acts xxv, 16.

It is construed with a subjunctive mood in St. Luke's Gospel : ἦν αὐτῷ κεχρηματισμένον, — μὴ ἰδεῖν θάνατον, πρὶν ἢ ἴδῃ τὸν Χριστὸν Κυρίου : ii, 26. But an infinitive might be substituted for either the optative or subjunctive ; as, πρὶν ἰδεῖν for πρὶν ἢ ἴδῃ : see v. 20.

VI. As πρότερον in prose is put before πρὶν in a preceding clause, so in poetry πρὶν is repeated, for the sake of emphasis : see Iliad. β, 348. 354. The last πρὶν requires an infinitive, says Eustathius on Iliad. α, 97. This rule is not however without exception : οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἡμῖν πρὶν δίδόναι, πρὶν καὶ λύκος οἶν ὕμεναιοι : Aristoph. Pac. 1112.

VII. There is sometimes after πρὶν an ellipsis to be supplied from what has preceded ; as, μυθολογία γὰρ, ἀναζητήσις τε τῶν παλαιῶν, μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμ' ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐρχεσθον, ὅταν ἴδητόν τισιν ἤδη τοῦ βίου τὰναγκαῖα κατεσκευασμένα· πρὶν δέ, οὐ : Plat. in Critia p. 110. (p. 41. ed. Bip.) The full expression would be, πρὶν δέ ἴδητόν τισιν ἢ. τ. β. τ. κατεσκευασμένα, οὐ.

VIII. When ἂν is added, the construction is with a subjunctive mood ; as, μήτε δίκην δικάσῃς, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσῃς· πρὶν ἂν μάθω : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 15.

IX. Πρὶν τί ; expresses great eagerness to be informed of something, considered as the term before which some other thing is not to take place : Aj. θανεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτι πω θέλω. Min. πρὶν ἂν τί [δράσῃς,] ἢ τί κερδάνῃς πλέον ; Soph. Aj. 107. *before you do what? or gain what further advantage?* [Abr. of Vig. p. 157.]

ΠΩ.—I. Πω denotes *way* or *manner*, and also *time*. An example of its junction with a negative to exclude way or manner is in the Acharn. of Aristoph. Lam. τί δ' εἶπας ἡμᾶς ; οὐκ ἐρέῃς : Dic. οὐκ οἶδά πω. [ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων ἱλιγγιῶ.] 580. *I do not at all know*, i. e. *in any manner* : [in Brunck's translation, *haud memini amplius*.]

II. But it much more frequently denotes *time*, especially when joined with negatives to exclude it : thus, οὐπω, μήπω, οὐδέπω, μηδέπω, οὔτι πω, &c. So subjoined, it negatively limits past time by the present, without regard to the future ; wherefore with a future tense, as future, it cannot be construed.

It is commonly construed with a past tense ; as, ὅ τι δὲ δν, οὐπω εἶπες : *you have not yet said* : Plat. Euthyphr. p. 11. (c. 9. ed. Fisch.) Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς—κατεστήσαμεν τηλικούτον, ἡλικος οὐδεὶς πω βασιλεὺς γέγονε Μακεδονίας : *hitherto, till the present time* : (nothing is denied of the future :) Demosth. Ol. i. p. 2. [p. 11. l. 26. ed. Reisk.]

Sometimes with the present tense : ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δ' αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων : Plat. Phæd. p. 92.

III. It is sometimes separated from the preceding negative ; as, τουτὶ μὲν, ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἡμῖν πρᾶγμα πω : Aristoph. Pac. 243. The separation is constant in οὔτιπω, wherein the diminuent *τι* excludes all exception whatever : θανεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτιπω θέλω, Soph. Aj. 106.

IV. In the signification of time the difference between *πω* and *ποτε* is this; that with a negative *ποτε* excludes time past, present, and future, *πω* past and present only; and *ποτε* is rendered simply *never*, *πω never yet*, or *never before*. So *πω* and *πρότερον* are joined by Demosthenes: ὅσην οὐδεὶς *πω* πρότερον μέμνηται γεγονῆναι, *pro Cor.* p. 321.

Hence with a negative it may sometimes be properly rendered *not as yet*, with exclusion of all past time up to the present: οὐδέ τί *πω* σάφα ἴδμεν, ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα: *Iliad.* β, 251. Here οὐδέποτε would be inadmissible. So *Iliad.* α, 543.

Πω with a past tense, and *ποτε* with a future, are plainly contradistinguished in the following passage: τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ *πω* τῶν τῆδε ποιητῆς, οὔτε ποθ' ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν: *Plat. Phædr.* p. 247. (p. 322. ed. Bip.)

V. Οὐπω and οὐκέτι differ in this, that οὐπω excludes past and present time, οὐκέτι future: οὐπω ἐστὶ καιρὸς, *is, it is not yet time*; οὐκέτι ἔσται καιρὸς, *there will no longer be time*.

VI. *Πω* cannot stand alone; but in its signification of time is either subjoined to a negative, or, if the sense be affirmative, is supported by *ποτε* following it: ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε: *Plat. Apol.* p. 19. *ever till this time; at any time before now*. See *Iliad.* α, 154.

VII. Μήπωτι *is, not even now, in the least, or, at all*: Ἀργεῖοι, (says Agamemnon) although Menelaus is wounded, yet μήπωτι μεθίετε θούριδος ἀλκῆς: *Iliad.* δ, 235.

ΠΩΣ AND ΠΩΣ.

I.—ON ΠΩΣ AND THE PARTICLES JOINED WITH IT.

I. *Πώς*, *how*, interrogates concerning manner; and that either *properly*, i. e. with a desire of information, as in *Plat. Soph.* p. 239. (249. Bip.) or *figuratively*. In figurative interrogation—1. it expresses wonder: πῶς δυσκόλως οἱ τὰ χρήματα ἔχοντες εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσελεύσονται; *St. Mark* x, 23. for ὡς: *how hardly! with what difficulty!*—2. It is equivalent to negation, by defying one, as it were, to give a satisfactory answer: πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ παρέξοντι γινῶσιν τῶν λυπησόντων γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ λύπη; *Æschin. Socrat. περὶ Θανάτ.* c. 16. [Abr. of Vig. p. 158. notes *h, j.*]—3. It denotes expostulation and reprehension: οὐκ οἶδατε τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην; καὶ πῶς πάσας τὰς παραβολὰς γνώσεσθε; *St. Mark* iv, 13.—4. It is prohibitive: οὔτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἐτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ; *Rom.* vi. 2.—5. It is expressive of doubt: οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ Μακεδόνων πῶς ἔχουσι Φιλίππων, ἐκ τούτων ἂν τις σκέψαιτο οὐ χαλεπῶς: *Demosth. Ol.* ii. p. 8. [p. 22. l. 29. ed. Reisk.]

II. With the article prefixed, *πῶς* is taken materially: ἐξήτουν οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς τὸ πῶς ἀνέλωσιν αὐτόν: *St. Luke* xxii, 2. and afterwards in v. 4. συνελάλησε τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσι καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τὸ πῶς αὐτὸν παραδῶ αὐτοῖς. [The article does not pertain to *πῶς*

alone, but to all the clause *πῶς ἀνέλωσιν αὐτόν*, and in the same manner to *πῶς αὐτόν παραδῶ αὐτοῖς*: *πῶς* therefore is not taken materially.]

III. It is construed with an indicative mood, when actuality in the sense of the verb is not to be taken away: *καθὼς παρελάβετε παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ πῶς δεῖ περιπατεῖν*: 1 Thessal. iv. 1. *Τὸ πῶς* even follows *μηδέν*: *μηδέν εὐρισκόντες τὸ πῶς κολάσσονται αὐτούς*: *finding nothing how they might punish them*: Acts iv, 21.

IV. Sometimes *πῶς* is neither interrogative nor dubitative, but determinative of manner, signifying, *in some certain manner*. It then still retains its accent, because it is emphatical: *δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰς (κτῆσεις), ὅλως δ' ἰδίας*: Aristot. de Rep. ii, 5. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 158. l. 26.]

V. Other particles are subjoined to *πῶς*, as *ἂν*, *γὰρ*, *δὴ*, *οὐ*. *Πῶς ἂν* sometimes signifies *utinam*, *I wish*: as, *πῶς ἂν ὀλοίμαν*: Eurip. Alcest. 864. *πῶς ἂν σύ μοι λέξεις*, Hippol. 345. See Valcken. on Hippol. p. 185. [Abr. of Vig. p. 158. note L.]

VI. *Πῶς γὰρ* interrogatively supports and strengthens, by a reason, a preceding negation: *οὐ γὰρ που τὴν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ*; Plat. de Rep. x. p. 596. (p. 285. ed. Bip.) for *πῶς γὰρ ἂν δημιουργοῖ*;

VII. It has much elegance, when thus used parenthetically: as, *ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἴσον (πῶς γάρ)*; *πρὸς τοὺς πράξαντας διαλυσάμενους τῶν οὐκ εἰδόντων κατηγορεῖν*: Demosth. adv. Nausimach. p. 634. i. e. *πῶς γὰρ ἴσον εἶη*.

VIII. It has a negative power in answers also: *ἡγουμένης δὲ ἀληθείας, οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οἶμαι, φαίμεν, αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσειν*: Answ. *πῶς γάρ*; Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 490. (p. 82. ed. Bip.) i. e. *πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀκολουθήσειεν*;

IX. In this use the negation [of which *γὰρ* represents the reason,] is understood: thus the Eunuch, to the question of Philip, whether he understood what he was reading, replies, *πῶς γὰρ ἂν δυναίμην, ἔαν μή τις ὁδηγήσῃ με*; Acts viii, 31. *οὐ γινώσκω* being understood before *πῶς*.

X. *Πῶς οὐ*; is a question put—1. properly, for the sake of information, and not figuratively; *οὐ* being closely connected with a following word; as, *πῶς οὐχ ὁμοίαν ἔχουσι τὴν μορφήν*; Ceb. Tab. p. 175. [p. 16. l. 1. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1738. where *πῶς οὖν οὐχ*—] i. e. *πῶς πολυειδεῖς ἔχουσι τὰς μορφάς*; See Ælian. V. H. xii, 13. Eurip. Phœniss. 907. Aristoph. Pac. 472. Ceb. Tab. 177. [17, 1. ed. Simps.] —2. *Πῶς οὐ* is sometimes a figurative interrogation equivalent to an affirmation of what is negatively asked, but more emphatical: as, *πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι*; Plat. Phileb. p. 55. (p. 298. ed. Bip.) *πῶς οὐ κάκιστος ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων δικαίως ἂν νομιζοίτο*; Demosth. adv. Timocr. p. 475. *οἱ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγυς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀπῶθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος ἐλθεῖν*; Thucyd. iv, 92. *πῶς οὐχὶ ληρήσει*; Aristid. pro Quatuorv. p. 476. See Plat. Phædr. p. 343. (p. 315. ed. Bip.) Thucyd. iv, 62. Rom. viii, 32. 2 Cor. iii, 8. [Sometimes the question rather expresses surprise with some degree of reproach:] *πῶς οὐ νοεῖτε*; St. Matth. xvi, 11. See Eurip. Phœniss. 907. St. Mark viii, 21. St. Luke xii, 56.

XI. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; asserts and confirms a preceding affirmation interrogatively: τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι, σε φάναι ἂν δεῖν, πάντα λόγον, ὥσπερ ζῶον, συνεστάναι, σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, &c. Answ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Plat. Phædr. p. 264. (p. 359. ed. Bip.) *certainly; for how can it be otherwise?* Γὰρ denotes an ellipsis, which is to be supplied from what precedes: πᾶς λόγος ἔχει σῶμά τι, and then πῶς interrogates negatively.

XII. It is frequently used in answer to questions also; as, ἄρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι; Answ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 477. (p. 60. ed. Bip.) q. d. οὕτως ἔχει· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν τι εἴη ἡ δόξα; See Plat. Euthyphr. p. 7.

XIII. Πῶς δὲ οὐ; is a phrase of similar import in continued speech, and connected with following words, δὲ being transitive, and indicative of fresh commencement: as, πῶς δὲ οὐ κῆκεῖνο αἰσχρόν; Lucian. adv. Indoct. c. 18.

XIV. Πῶς δ' οὐ; also is used elliptically, as an affirmative answer to an affirmation: εἰδότε γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ, ἢ μὴ εἰδότε εἰδέναι, ἀδύνατον. Answ. πῶς δ' οὐ; Plat. Theæt. p. 188. (p. 147. ed. Bip.)

XV. And as an affirmative answer to a question also: Soc. ἡ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἶε τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι; Euth. μὰ Δὲ οὐκ ἔγωγε. Soc. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ; Euth. πῶς δ' οὐ; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 13. (c. 15. ed. Fisch.)

II.—OF THE PARTICLES ΠΩΣ, ΑΛΛΩΣ ΓΕ ΠΩΣ, ΟΥΤΩ ΠΩΣ, ΟΔΕ ΠΩΣ.

I. Πως, the enclitic, *in some manner; in a manner; somehow; somehow or other*; is diminuent; sometimes extenuating or invalidating, sometimes expressive of doubt: οὐχ ἔχω, ὅπως σοι εἶπω, ὃ ροῦ. Περιέρχεται γάρ πως αἰετὴ ἡμῖν, ὃ ἂν ὑποθώμεθα: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 11. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.)

II. Hence this particle suits those who speak circumspectly, and with diffidence of their opinions. Thus to the question of Socrates, whether the art of rhetoric is practised not only in courts of justice, but in all assemblies, public and private, Phædrus replies, μάλιστα μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται καὶ γράφεται τέχνη: Plat. Phædr. p. 261. (p. 352. ed. Bip.)

III. Ἄλλως γέ πως, literally, *in some other way at least*, signifies, with a negative preceding, *absolutely in no manner whatever*: μὴ συνυποθέμενος ἄλλως γέ πως μίαν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπιστήμον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε πτυρείης τὸν θάνατον: Æschin. Socrat. Dial. de Mort. c. 16.

IV. Ἀμῶς γέ πως (usually written in one word ἀμωσγέπως) signifies, *in one, or some, manner at least*: δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν, πρὶν ἂν εἶπω ἀμῶς γέ πως: Plat. Phædr. p. 228. (283. Bip.)

V. Πως preserves its diminuent power in such expressions as μάλα πως, *considerably, pretty much*; μάλα πως με καθίκεο θυμὸν ἐνιπῇ: Iliad. ξ, 104. ἀκριβῶς πως, *with tolerable accuracy; pretty accurately*; οὕτω πως, ὧδέ πως, *nearly thus*.

Hoog.

PA.—I. The particle *ῥα* has been very commonly considered as a mere expletive; but, except in being more appropriate to poetry, it differs not at all from *ἄρα*, either in its origin, or in its power, or in its use.

II. Its primary indication is that of something accomplished and complete in every respect: this indication is discoverable in the signification of order or succession; see p. 20. § iv. Homer, about to describe the complaints of Mars to Jupiter about his wound, first recounts several preceding particulars; his arrival in heaven, his taking a seat by Jupiter, the vexation of his mind, the exposure of his bleeding wound; and things being prepared by this introductory recital, he then proceeds, *καὶ ῥ' ὀλοφυρόμενος ἔπεια πτερόεντα προσήδα, and then; and so, &c.* Iliad. ε, 871. So, *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥ' ἔσσαντο περὶ χροῖ νώροπα χαλκόν, βάν ῥ' ἴμεν*: Iliad. ξ, 383. Here the first *ῥα* may indicate *transition*; the second, *full and fit time*.

III. Hence it is fitly joined with *δὴ* in its signification of time: *ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἐκ τοῖο δυωδεκάτῃ γένερ' ἥως, καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλύμπον ἴσαν*: Iliad. λ, 493. where in like manner it may indicate *transition*.

IV. *Ῥα*, as well as *ἄρα*, has a collective or conclusive power; which however, as in *ἄρα*, is often not very apparent; and especially when *ῥα* is joined with *γάρ*, or other such causal word, is so obscure, that *ῥα* seems to be added to *γάρ* merely for the purpose of augmenting its causal signification: thus, *οὐδ' ἀναθλήσει· περὶ γάρ ῥά ἐ χαλκὸς ἔλεψε φύλλα τε καὶ φλοῖόν*: Iliad. α, 236. *nor will the sceptre bud anew: and no wonder; for, &c.*

Again, Agamemnon says that he was unwilling to receive the ransom of Chryseis, because he chose rather to keep her, and adds, *καὶ γάρ ῥα Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα κουριδίης ἀλόχου, ἐπεὶ οὐ ἔθεν ἔστι χερεῖων*: Iliad. α, 113.

V. But perhaps some may here prefer admitting an inverted form of argumentation, (see p. 17. vii.) in which the inference precedes that from which it is drawn. With such an admission, the collective force of *ῥα* will appear upon a transposition of the words: *καὶ γάρ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι χερεῖων Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα ἄρα αὐτῆς*.

There is a plainer example of this inverted form of argumentation, which indicates commotion of mind, in Iliad. μ, 164. where Asius says, *Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἥ ῥά νυ καὶ σὺ φιλοψενδὴς ἐτέτυξο πάγχυ μάλ'· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἐφάμην ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς σχήσειν ἡμέτερόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους*.

His argument, in a more regular form, runs thus: *I thought the Greeks would not withstand our force; but they do withstand it: therefore Jupiter is false.* *Γὰρ* in the member following *ῥα* is the sign or mark of this inverted form.

VI. From this inverted form of argumentation arises a new sense and use of the particle, which may be of service in explaining the foregoing passages, and in which it is rendered *nempe, scilicet, utique; to wit.* It may be so rendered in the passage last quoted from Homer, if transposition be not approved; and in Iliad. α, 56. *κῆδετο γὰρ*

Δαναῶν, ὅτι ῥα θνήσκοντας ὀράτο. It frequently therefore follows the relative *ὅς* : as, Σελάγον υἱόν, ὅς ῥ' ἐνὶ Παισῶν ναῖε πολυκλήμων : Il. ε, 612. So in numberless places, as in Il. φ, 206. 236. 283. 344. &c.

VII. But after *ὅς* it sometimes manifestly denotes *consequence* or *effect* : thus in the following verses the performances and powers of the dogs are mentioned as the consequence of certain marks or qualities ascribed to them : τὴν δ' ὁ γενειήτης δύο μὲν κύνας ἤμισιν πηγούς, τρεῖς δὲ παρνατίους, ἓνα δ' αἰόλον, οἷ ῥα λέοντας αὐτοὺς αὐτὸν ἐρύοντες, ὅτε δράξαιτο δεράων, εἶλκον ἔτι ζῶοντας ἐπ' αὐλίον· ἐπτα δ' ἔδωκε θάσσοντας αὐράων Κυνοσουρίδας, αἷ ῥα διῶξαι ὥκισται νεβρούς τε καὶ οὐ μύοντα λαγῶν, &c. Callim. h. in Dian. 91—94. *which therefore*.

VIII. When the consequence comprehends an act, then from the syllogistic use of *ῥα* arises another, in which it indicates either effect or event : thus Homer, having said that Briareus excelled his father, adds, ὅς ῥα παρὰ Κρονίῳ καθέζετο, κύδει γαίῳν : Il. α, 405. *whence he sat*, &c. indicating that his valour procured him that honour.

IX. Hence καὶ ῥα may be rendered, *and thus* ; *and so* : ὁ δ' ὀμαρτῇ δούρασιν ἀμφὶς ἦρως Ἀσπεροπαῖος, ἐπεὶ περιδέξιος ἦεν· καὶ ῥ' ἐτέρῳ μὲν δονρὶ σάκος βάλεν—τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ, &c. Iliad. φ, 164.

X. Like ἄρα, *ῥα* denotes the execution of an order ; a sense which is next to the preceding one : after the words of Jupiter to Juno, ἀλλ' ἀέκουσα κάθησο, Homer says of Juno, ἔδδεισεν δέ—, καὶ ῥ' ἀέκουσα κάθηστο : Il. α, 569. And of the Greeks, after the injunction of Neptune to arm and meet the enemy, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥ' ἔσσαντο περὶ χροὶ νῶροπα χαλκόν, βάν ῥ' ἴμεν : Il. ξ, 383.

XI. From this use spontaneously flows that in which it marks *transition* ; which indeed also is signified in the passage last cited. Thus it performs the office of μὲν and δέ : ἡ ῥα, καὶ ἀμπεπαλὼν προΐει δολιχόσκιον ἔγχος : Iliad. ε, 280. equivalent to οὕτω μὲν εἶπε, προΐει δέ.

XII. To the signification of transition, that of *continuation* fitly comes next ; in which *ῥα* has the same effect as μὲν οὖν and μὲν δὴ : that is in resuming narration after interruption or digression : as, ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἐκίχανε, &c. Iliad. ε, 334. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ῥ' ἀφάρμαρτεν &c. Il. φ, 171.

XIII. Hence it may frequently be rendered, *then* ; *afterwards* ; *next* ; &c. ὡς φάτο· τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ· ἔγχος μὲν ῥ' ἀφέηκε· ὁ δ' ἔζητο χεῖρε πετάσσας : Iliad. φ, 115. αὐτὰρ ὁ (Achilles, after slaying Asteropæus) βῆ ῥ' ἰέναι μετὰ Πάριον : Iliad. φ, 205.

ΣΧΟΛΗ.—I. The dative σχολῇ, having first assumed the nature of an adverb, of the same form as δημοσίᾳ, σιγῇ, σπουδῇ, ἡσυχῇ, ὑπερβολῇ, and the Latin *forte*, *sponte*, and the like, became at length, by a gradation of changes, a particle indicating that much is wanting to complete affirmation, and bearing a signification therefore amounting almost to negation. As σχολῇ signifies *leisure*, the genuine meaning of σχολῇ is *leisurably* : thus, οἷγε σχολῇ περὶ τῶν εἰσαγαγελλομένων σκοποῦνται : Andocid. ap. Bud. Comm. l. gr. p. 489.

II. Because what is done at leisure is not done hastily, σχολῇ has

next the sense of *slowly*: ἀλλ' ὑπακούων σχολῇ ὑπήκουσα; Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3, 21. Hence it is opposed to ταχέως, as the comparative is to θάττον in Plato; τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατός θάττον ἢ σχολαίτερον: Theæt. p. 206. (p. 186. ed. Bip.)

III. When an affirmative condition or case precedes it, it signifies *easily*: ὁμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ, τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἃς διὰ γενναιότητα καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποφαίνονται τινες· ἐπειδὴν γοῦν καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξαιμι τὴν παρασιτικὴν πολὺ κρατοῦσαν, σχολῇ δηλονότι τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν δόξει προφερεστάτη: Lucian. Parasit. t. ii. p. 856. [p. 360. B. ed. Salmur. What one has leisure to do, he can do with greater ease; but still, unless the words are to be taken ironically, the true reading perhaps is, πολὺ δηλονότι, &c.]

IV. But when the case or condition preceding is negative, σχολῇ signifies on the contrary, *hardly*, *scarcely*: εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ, μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ γε αἱ ἄλλαι: Plat. Phædr. p. 65. (c. 10. ed. Fisch.) *much less*: an extenuating expression: q. d. *slowly*; i. e. *scarcely at least*; for, *by no means*.

V. So when the condition and negation are implicit: ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἶη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γέ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτο: Plat. Lys. p. 214. (p. 234. ed. Bip.) The negative condition might be made explicit by the following change: εἴ τι αὐτὸ αὐτῷ μὴ ὅμοιον ᾖν εἶη, σχολῇ γέ τῳ ἄλλῳ γένοιτο ὅμοιον.

VI. Sometimes the whole negative condition is to be understood, or at least to be assumed from what has preceded: ἐάν τις ἀνεν τοῦ σίτου καὶ τὸ ὄψον αὐτοῦ ἐσθίη, μὴ ἀσκήσεως ἀλλ' ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, πότερον ὀψοφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἢ οὐ; Σχολῇ γ' ἂν, ἔφη, ἄλλος τις ὀψοφάγος εἶη: Xen. Mem. iii. p. 789. i. e. εἰ οὗτος ὀψοφάγος οὐκ ἔστι, σχολῇ γ' ἂν ἄλλος εἶη.

VII. This mode of reasoning is rendered more formal by the addition of γὰρ, put for γέ ἄρα: thus Ælian, of an effeminate, who complained of having suffered from the hardness of a bed of roses, σχολῇ γὰρ οὗτος ἐπὶ χαμῆνης κατεκλίθη, ἢ στιβάδος, ἢ πίας ἐν προσάντει πεφυκνίας, ἢ ταύρου δορᾶς: ix, 24.

VIII. Thus by degrees it arrived at absolute negation: σχολῇ, οὐδ' ὅλως, οὐδαμῶς, says Suidas: τὰ δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων τί χρηρὴ λέγειν; σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ Ὀμήρου μάθοιεν: Max. Tyr. Dissert. vii.

TAXA.—I. Τάχα first signifies *quickly*: next it is a particle which simply extenuates or diminishes the force of affirmation, *perhaps*; as, τάχ', ὦ γὰρ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 9. (c. 12. ed. Fisch.) τάχα τοίνυν καὶ τριηραρχίας ἐροῦσι: Demosth. adv. Nausim. p. 635. See Rom. v, 7. Philem. 15.

II. In some passages it may have both significations; as, τάχα οἷον ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ᾖν τοῦ γράφειν: Plat. Phædr. p. 257. (p. 344. ed. Bip.) On the repetition of ἂν see p. 16. l. 2. and on its subjunction to τάχα, p. 12. l. 39.

III. Otherwise ἂν subjoined to τάχα pertains to a following verb; as, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν: Plat. Phædr. p. 259. (p. 348. ed. Bip.) So de Legg. iv. p. 708. τάχα δ' ἂν τινος καθίκετο τῇ βακτηρίᾳ: Lucian. Lapith. t. iii. p. 430. See Aristoph. Vesp. 277.

IV. Τάχα and ἴσως are used indifferently as synonymous: ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοὺς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοτε παραφερόμενοι: Plat. Phædr. p. 265. (360. Bip.) So de Rep. v. p. 451. See Hesych. and Suid.

V. To the conjecture indicated by τάχα, a supposition of chance, expressed by εἰ τύχοι, or εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, is very congruously added: thus, τάχα ἂν, εἰ τύχοιεν, σωφρονέστεροι πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χρόνου γένοιντο: Demosth. pro Rhod. Libert. p. 79. ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ πάντα (or πάντας?) ἄδικος, τάχ' ἂν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τοῦτον ἡδίκηει: Id. pro Phorm. p. 607. [p. 961. l. 15. ed. Reisk.]

VI. Τάχ' ἂν ἴσως, is, *it may very probably be perhaps, that*: τάχα δ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἐθέλοι: Aristoph. Vesp. 1147. τοῦτο (ὄνομα) μὲν γὰρ τάχ' ἂν ἴσως καὶ ὁ κατοικισμὸς αὐτῆς, ἢ τις τόπος, ἢ ποταμοῦ τινὸς, ἢ κρήνης, ἢ θεῶν ἐπωνυμία τῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ προσθεῖη τὴν αὐτῶν φήμην καινῇ γενομένη τῇ πόλει: Plat. de Legg. iv. in princip.

VII. The same may be said of τάχα που: τάχα που τὸ σὸν αἰδοῦμενος κάλλος: Aristænet. ep. x. p. 60. where however που may signify place. With ἂν interposed: ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη φορτικωτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρήσωνται, τὰχ' ἂν που ἐν μέθαις, ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ ἀμελείᾳ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίῳ λαβόντε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφροῦρους, &c. Plat. Phædr. p. 256. (p. 342. ed. Bip.) Here τάχα is either *probably*, or rather *quickly*, for ταχέως, and που *perhaps*.

TE.—I. Te has a copulative power, signifying, *and*.

II. When the copulative word is to be repeated with variation, τε is usually put in the preceding clause, and καὶ in the following; as, Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐνκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί: Iliad. α, 17. βούλομαι τε καὶ ἔχομαι: Plat. Phædr. p. 278. See also Plat. Theæt. p. 150. init. (p. 64. ed. Bip.) Parmen. p. 151. init.

III. In poetry there are innumerable passages in which τε is repeated even without καί: e. g. Κίλλάν τε Ζαθέην, Τενέδοιό τε Ἴφι ἀνάσσει: Iliad. α, 38. In prose such a repetition is not very frequent. See an example in Plat. Phædr. p. 248. (p. 324. ed. Bip.)

IV. Sometimes a subdivided member of a sentence is connected with a preceding member by καὶ, and its subdivisions are connected by τε and another καὶ, some other word intervening between the first καὶ and τε: thus, τῶν δὲ ὀπλιτῶν δεξαμένων, ὑπεχώρησαν πάλιν· καὶ ἄνδρες τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι, καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη: Thucyd. iv, 56. Here the former part ὑπεχώρησαν is connected with the latter, as cause with effect, by the first καὶ, and the effect being twofold, its divisions are again connected by τε and the second καί. So, αἰροῦσι τὴν Θυρέαν, καὶ τὴν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν, καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρησαν: Id. iv, 57. In the same manner in Latin *que* is repeated after *et*. See Virg. Æn. v. 619.

V. Te seems to be superadditory in Iliad. α, 218. ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιτείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλνον αὐτοῦ: Iliad. α, 218. *if a man obey the gods, they too in return pay great regard to his prayers.*^a [In Aris-

^a Weiske translates the sentence; *Qui ratas habere solent. Pleonasm. Græc. diis obtemperat, illius preces vel maxime* J.S.

toph. Ach. 598. the true reading is *κόκκυγές γε*, not *τε*, as Hoogeveen quotes.]

VI. When *τε* and *καί* are joined in the same clause or member, *τε* is copulative and *καί* superadditory: *τὸ δὲ τ' ὥκα κατειβόμενον κελαρύζει χώρῳ ἐνὶ προαλεῖ, φθάνει δὲ τε καὶ τὸν ἄγοντα*: Iliad. φ, 262. [See note *u* on p. 191. of the Abr. of Vig.]

VII. *τε* follows the relative *ὅς*, involving an ellipsis: *οὐποτ' ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς σκηπτούχος βασιλεὺς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν*: Iliad. α, 279. *a king; and such a king too as one to whom Jupiter, &c.* So, *κείται ἀνὴρ, ὃν τ' ἴσον ἐτίομεν Ἑκτορι δίῳ*: Il. ε, 467. *and such a man too as, &c.* [See Abr. of Vig. p. 191. l. 29.]

VIII. So *οἷός τε* with another word intervening: *ἰχώρ, οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν*: Iliad. ε, 340.

IX. *Οἷός τε*, signifying *able, ready, willing*, is an elliptical expression, in which *οἷος* is correlative with *τοῖος* or *τοιούτος* expressed or understood: *οὐχ οἷός τέ εἰμι λαλεῖν* is for *οὐκ εἰμὶ τοιούτος, οἷος ὁ μέλλων*, or *δυνάμενος*, or *βουλόμενος*, *λαλεῖν*. The ellipsis is partly supplied by Theophrastus: *ὁ δὲ λάλος τοιούτός τις, οἷος τῷ ἐντυγχάνοντι εἰπεῖν, &c.* Charact. [c. vii. p. 39. l. 3. ed. Simps. Oxon. 1738.] where it signifies *readiness, inclination*: as it does in Plat. Phædr. p. 256. (p. 341. ed. Bip.) The particle *τε*, which is almost always annexed to *οἷος* in this use, [see Abr. of Vig. p. 44.] serves to connect *τοῖος* or *τοιούτος* with *οἷος*, and thus to make the structure of the sentence fuller; for that *καί* may here be employed instead of *τε* appears from the following passage: *ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτά τε* (for *ταῦτα, τοιαῦτα* might have been used) *λεκτέον, καὶ οἷα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι ἦκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδέναι*; Plat. de Rep. iii. init. (p. 261. ed. Bip.) for *ταῦτα*, or *τοιαῦτα*, *καὶ οἷα μέλλοντα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι, &c.* [See Abr. of Vig. p. 44. l. 17.]

X. To *ὅσος* also *τε* is annexed: *βόθρον ὄρυζα ὅσον τε πυγούσιον*: Odys. λ, 25. *a pit, and one too of the measure of, &c.* [Abr. of Vig. p. 47. l. 15.]

XI. *Ἐνθα* too, put for *ὅπου*, is among the relative words which take *τε* after them: *βάλεν Αἰνείας κατ' ἰσχίον, ἔνθα τε μηρὸς ἰσχίῳ ἐνστρέφεται*: Iliad. ε, 305. for *ἔβαλεν, καὶ ἔβαλεν ἐκεῖ, ὅπου, &c.*

XII. And *ἵνα*, in its signification of *place*: *ἵνα τε ξυνέχουσι τένοντες ἀγκῶνος, τῇ τὸν γε φίλης διὰ χειρὸς ἐπειρεν αἰχμὴ χαλκείῃ*: Iliad. υ, 478.

XIII. And *ὅτε*: *ἀνδρῶν λικμώντων, ὅτε τε ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ κρίνει*: Iliad. ε, 500. for *ἀνδρῶν λικμώντων, καὶ τότε λικμώντων, ὅτε, &c.*

XIV. And *ὥσει*: *καί με φίλησ', ὥσει τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ*: Iliad. ι, 477.

XV. And *ἐπεὶ*: *Σκύθας γάρ, — ἐπεὶ τέ σφι Δαρεῖον ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν, μετὰ ταῦτα μεμονέναι μιν τίσασθαι*: Herodot. vi. 84. [On the effect of *τε* subjoined to relative and other words, see Abr. of Vig. p. 191. l. 28.]

XVI. Nor do *relative* words only, properly so called, take *τε* after them, but all words, which in continued construction depend on foregoing ones: thus, *Ἀλέξανδρος γάρ, ἐς τε μὲν φάος ἦν, ἀνὰ κράτος ἐδίωκεν*: Arrian. ii, 11. i. e. *ἐδίωκεν, καὶ ἐς τόσον ἐδίωκεν, ἐς δ φάος ἦν.*

XVII. The effect of *τε* in *γάρ τε* (which answers to the Latin *namque*) may be understood by referring to what has been said under *καὶ γάρ*: *δειδιότες· μάλα γάρ τε κατεσθίει, ὃν κε λάβησιν*: *Iliad. φ, 24.*

XVIII. *Δέ* and *τε* conjoined signify, *but moreover, or, and truly*: *τίς, πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν, ὃ μιν ἔτλης ἀντίος ἐλθεῖν; δυστήνων δέ τε παῖδες ἐμῷ μένει ἀντιώσσι*: *Iliad. φ, 151.* *νωὶ δέ τ' ἄπορροιό κίομεν*: *ib. 456.* *but we returned, and that too instantly.* [See *Abr. of Vig. p. 192. l. 1.*]

XIX. For the case is, that *δέ* explains what is last, or nearest to it, and *τε* connects that explication with what has preceded: *τῷ βάλεν Αἰεΐας κατ' ἰσχίον, ἔνθα τε μηρὸς ἰσχίῳ ἐνστρέφεται· κοτύλην δέ τε μιν καλέουσι*: *Iliad. ε, 306.*

XX. In these and the like passages *μὲν* or *μέν τε* may be understood before *δέ τε*: *μὲν τε* is expressed in *Iliad. ε, 139. φ, 260.*

XXI. In the conclusions of a protasis and apodosis *δέ τε* repeated has a pleasing correspondence: thus in the passage last referred to, the protasis ends with *φθάνει δέ τε καὶ τὸν ἄγοντα*: then follows the apodosis of the simile; *ὡς αἰεὶ Ἀχιλῆα κινήσατο κῦμα ῥόοιο, καὶ λαιψήρὸν ἑόντα· θεοὶ δέ τε φέρτεροι ἀνδρῶν*: *the gods to wit are more mighty than men.*

XXII. *Καὶ τε* is put for *καὶ δέ*, and has a superadditory sense, *and also, and moreover*: *ἐκ κακοῦ ἐσθλὸν ἐγενετο, καὶ κακὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ ἰ τε πενιχρὸς ἀνὴρ αἰψα μάλ' ἐπλούτησε*: *Theogn. 662.* So 138.

TOI.—I. *Τοι* has nearly the same signification as *τούτω*, or *τῷ ὄντι*: *on this account, therefore, wherefore; in reality.* Homer uses *τῷ* where he might have used *τοι*, in the sense of *therefore*; *Il. β, 354.* Its power therefore is confirmative, and founded on something foregoing: thus *τοι* for *τῷ ὄντι*, *in reality, in truth*: *εὖ τοι λέγεις*: *Aristoph. Pac. 933.*

II. *Τοι* agrees with *μήτοι* in being usually accompanied by other particles: it is alone however in *Synes. Epist. 126.* *οἶμοι· τί δ' οἶμοι; θνητά τοι πεπόνθαμεν, truly.*

III. *Τοιγάρ* is to be considered as three distinct particles, *γάρ* consisting of *γε* and *ἄρα*. *ᾧ Ἀχιλεῦ, κέλευαί με, Διὶ φίλε, μνησθῆσθαι μῆνιν Ἀπόλλωνος—· τοιγάρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω*: *Iliad. α, 76.* From the proposal just before made by Achilles to consult a soothsayer, Calchas, whose words these are, infers or collects that he himself is called on to speak: this inference is marked by *ἄρα* latent in *γάρ*. Then *τοι* concludes; *because you order me, therefore I will speak.* Lastly *γε* limits the conclusion, by selecting from the many causes or motives which might prompt him to speak, that one alone, the command of Achilles. *Τοιγάρ* however is usually and rightly rendered *therefore*, simply.

IV. *Τοιγαροῦν* is consequently to be considered as four particles; of which *ἄρα* collects or concludes; *τοι* supplies matter of reasoning or argument, which *γε* limits; and lastly *οὔν* applies the argumentation, so limited, to the point under consideration. *Τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν* (the kings of the Lacedæmonians, because they had a perpetual command of the fleet) *πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες,*

διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς : Aristot. de Rep. ii, 9. *and on this account truly—; or, this being so, it follows therefore that, &c.* Or ἄρα, latent in γὰρ, may denote effect: *therefore, this being so, it thence (or from that cause) came to pass, that, &c.*

V. Effect is manifestly denoted, when the consequence consists of a fact, or when a thing is proved not by argumentation, but by a fact. Thus Lysurgus, after mentioning the severe punishment inflicted by the Athenians on one who had been sent by Xerxes to demand earth and water of them, subjoins, τοιγαροῦν τοιαύταις χρώμενοι γνώμας ἐννεμήκοντα μὲν ἔτη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες κατέστησαν : adv. Leocr. c. 17. *therefore the effect of this was, that, &c.* So in c. 27. οὐ γὰρ λόγῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπετίδευον, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ πᾶσιν ἐπεδείκνυντο. τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἦσαν ἄνδρες σπουδαῖοι—ὥστε, &c.

VI. This particle is used by those who excite themselves to action, urged by some argument or reason : thus Demosthenes, after saying that the Athenians neglected the arrangements and preparations for war, adds, τοιγαροῦν ἅμα ἀκηκόαμέν τι, καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν : Philipp. i. p. 18. [p. 50. l. 18. ed. Reisk.] [This alleged use is another instance of the more than Lyncean faculty of Hoogeveen.]

VII. Hence it is extremely well suited to serious exhortations ; the second person of the imperative mood, or the first person plural of the subjunctive, following it : as, μέμνησο, ὅτι οὐχ ὁ λοιδορῶν ἢ τύπτων ὑβρίζει, ἀλλὰ τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τούτων, ὡς ὑβριζόντων. ὅταν οὖν ἐρεθίσῃ σέ τις, ἴσθι ὅτι ἡ σὴ σε ὑπόληψις ἡρέθισε. τοιγαροῦν ἐν πρώτοις πειρῶ ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας μὴ συναρπασθῆναι : Epict. Ench. c. 27. τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς—τρέχωμεν τὸν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀγῶνα : Hebr. xii, 1.

VIII. Ἄρα and οὖν may sometimes refer to different things : οὐ γὰρ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσία, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁγιασμῷ. τοιγαροῦν ὁ ἀθετῶν, οὐκ ἀνθρωπῶν ἀθετεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν Θεόν. [1 Thessal. iv, 8.] Here ἄρα collects : *if God hath called us not to uncleanness, but to holiness, hence it follows that he that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God* : and as two things are opposed, the one negatively, οὐκ ἀνθρωπῶν, the other affirmatively, ἀλλὰ Θεόν, οὖν adheres to that which is affirmed, and strengthens the affirmation by its confirmative sense ; a sense arising from its conclusive power ; for if he does not despise *man*, who did not call him, then by consequence it is *God*, who did call him, that he despises.

IX. Τοιγαροῦν is usually placed first, but not always : ἐρρωμένος τοιγαροῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πόνων : Lucian. Timon. c. 37. σὲ τοιγαροῦν, ὦ Δύσπαρι, οὐκ ἀφήσω : Id. Dial. Mort. xix.

X. Τοιγάρτοι is used in serious confirmation : ἄρα collects or concludes ; τοι supplies matter for argumentation, which γὰρ restricts ; and the last τοι confirms all. Socrates had refuted an adverse opinion by a ludicrous argument ; and Callicles had said, ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. Socrates answers : τοιγάρτοι, (in truth it is just so, and in consequence) ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα, καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα. σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλάγῃς, οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς : Plat. Gorg. p. 494. (p. 103. ed. Bip.)

XI. Τοῖνον is not placed first, as τοιγαροῦν and τοιγάρτοι are :

τοι retains its signification of *therefore*, and νυν has an obscure signification of time.

XII. The first use of τοίνυν is *inceptive*, in commencement of a subject after something prefatory: thus, οὕτως τοίνυν, ὃ παῖ καλῶ, ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου, &c. *wherefore now*, &c. Plato Phædr. p. 243. (p. 315. ed. Bip.) So, ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν· νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. Then he begins the account thus, ὁ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει ὢν, τό τε εἶδος ὀρθὸς καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχην, &c. ib. p. 253. (336. Bip.) In dialogues also it is inceptive, when one begins a recital at the desire of another: the first passage from Plato is one example; another is in Aristoph. Vesp. 1175. [1185. ed. Br.] where Bdelycleo having said, μὴ μοιγε μύθους. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οἶους λέγομεν μάλιστα τῶν κατ' οἰκίαν: Philocles replies, ἐγὼ δα τοίνυν τῶν γε πάνν κατ' οἰκίαν ἐκείνον, ὡς οὕτω ποτ' ἦν μῦς καὶ γαλῆ.

XIII. Thus τοίνυν, as an inceptive particle, resembles οὖν. Lucian accordingly interchanges them: ὁ τοίνυν Ἴων, Πρῶτος οὖν ἄρχομαι, ἔφη, εἰ δοκεῖ: Lapith. c. 39. Οὖν however has no signification of time, as τοίνυν has.

XIV. Its second use is *continuative*; when, part of a narration having been already despatched, the main point is entered on: thus, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοίνυν ὁ Ἥρατων βαλλόμενος τὸ πᾶν τόλμημα,—ὥρμητο ἐπὶ τὸν τύραννον: Ælian. V. H. ii, 4.

XV. Its third use is *transitive*; in which it concludes a preceding part, to prepare a convenient transition to a following one. In this use it is equivalent to μὲν οὖν. Aristotle de Rep. i. divides the art of gain into two kinds, the natural and the artificial: he concludes his account of the former, and with it the eighth chapter, thus: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις, καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον: and passes to the artificial kind with the following words, which begin the ninth chapter: ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς. It is especially used in transition from thesis to hypothesis, from a general question, or common place, to a particular case: thus Demosthenes applies to Æschines his distinction between accusation and abuse, ταῦτα τοίνυν εἰδὼς Αἰσχίνης οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐμοῦ, πομπεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηγορεῖν εἴλετο: pro Cor. p. 330. [p. 268. l. 24. ed. Reisk.]

XVI. Its fourth use is *conclusive*; and that either simply, or with inference from premises.—1. St. Paul concludes a comparison between the Christian life and a contest for victory in a race and other public games, with these words, ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὕτω τρέχω, ὡς οὐκ ἀδήλων· οὕτω πυκτένω, ὡς οὐκ ἀέρα δέρων: *I therefore so run*, &c. 1 Cor. ix, 26. and Lucian thus concludes his book entitled Adversus Indoctum, &c. καὶ σὺ τοίνυν ἄλλῃ δεηθέντι χρήσεαι ἂν τὰ βιβλία, χρῆσασθαι δ' αὐτὸς οὐκ ἂν δύναιο.—2. With inference from premises, in the same manner as ἄρα: Cario having been informed that one in distress was a very bad man, says, νῆ Δία, καλῶς τοίνυν ἀπόλλυται: Aristoph. Plut. 864.

XVII. Its fifth use is *hortatory*; arising from the signification of time in νῦν. See on δὴ, p. 43. also on νῦν and νῦν οὖν. In this use

it is commonly construed with the imperative mood, as, *τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει*: Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 485. (p. 71. ed. Bip.) *σκόπει τοίνυν, ὡς ἱερὸν χρῆμα συμβουλή*: Lucian. adv. Indoct. c. 25. where there is a sense of eagerness and impatience. It has the same use and force with the first person plural, when one incites himself and others: *τοίνυν ἐξερχώμεθα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξω τῆς παρεμβολῆς*: Hebr. xiii, 13. where the unusualness of the situation of *τοίνυν*, in the first place, adds to the vehemence of the exhortation. When *μὴ* is added, it reverses the signification of the phrase, making it prohibitive: *καὶ σὺ τοίνυν μὴ τὰ θεωρήματα τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἐπιδείκνυε*: Epict. Enchir. c. 69.

To its hortatory use pertains that, in which one, who has been excited by the exhortation of another, is represented as setting about something with alacrity: thus when Socrates has said, *λέγε δὴ, τί φης εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον, καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον*, Euthyphro replies, *λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὄσιον, &c.* Plat. Euthyphr. p. 5. *well then*.

XVIII. The sixth use is in exclamation; when one is struck with something new, strange, atrocious, &c. In this use *τοι* is confirmative, and *νυν* has its signification of time: thus Trygæus, *ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, γὰρ πεπύσμεν οὐδενός*: Aristoph. Pac. 614. [615. Br.] q. d. *now in truth I must confess I have not heard this from any one*.

XIX. Its seventh use is in the *assumption*, or *minor proposition*, of syllogisms. This use is derived from its continuative one; for here it continues the process of argumentation. An example is in the Cyropædia of Xenophon: the major proposition amounts to this, *those who lead the soldiers into bad practices, are to be removed*: then follows the assumption; *καὶ τοίνυν, ἣν μὲν τινες βλακεία καὶ ἀπονοία μόνον κακοὶ ὦσι, τοὺτους ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὥσπερ κηφῆνας, δαπάνη μόνον ζημιοῦν τοὺς κοινωνούς· οἱ δ' αὖ τῶν μὲν πόνων κακοὶ ὦσι κοινωνοὶ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν σφοδροὶ καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι, οὗτοι καὶ ἡγεμονικοὶ εἰσι πρὸς τὰ πονηρά*. Then the conclusion: *ὥστε παντάσιν ἐξαιρετέοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἡμῖν εἰσίν*, ii, 2, 25. In this use it performs the same office as *ἀλλὰ μὲν*. The English word is *but*, or *now*.

XX. Sometimes, *τοι* being confirmative, the signification of time in *νυν* is urged with great emphasis by the restrictive particle *γε*. q. d. *if at any time, now certainly at least*. *τὰ χοιρίδια τοίνυν γ' ἐγὼ φανῶ ταδί*: Aristoph. Ach. 819. for *εἴ ποτε*, *ἀλλὰ τοί νυν γε*. [He does not appear in Brunck's edition.]

ΩΣ.

I.—OF THE PARTICLE ΩΣ WHEN UNCONNECTED WITH OTHERS.

I. Ωs is, with regard to order, prepositive; with regard to power, comparative. It signifies *as* relatively; *in the same manner as*: thus it is correlative with *οὕτως*: *ἡ ἡμέρα Κυρίου, ὡς κλέπτῃς, οὕτως ἔρῃται*: 1 Thessal. v. 2. On the contrary *οὕτω* often precedes: *οὕ-*

δέποτε οὕτως ἐλάλησεν ἄνθρωπος ὥς οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος: St. John vii, 46.

II. Ὡς is put in oblique construction also for πῶς, *how*, in *what manner*: ἐθεάσαντο τὸ μνημεῖον, καὶ ὥς ἐτέθη τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ: St. Luke xxiii, 55. See also xxiv, 35.

III. Ἔστιν ὥς is properly *there is how*: but it is rendered, *in some manner, in a certain manner*. [Abr. of Vig. p. 212. l. 1.] So, ἔστιν ὅτε, *sometimes*; ἔστιν ὅπου, *somewhere*; ἔστιν οἱ, *some men*, which are elliptical expressions, for ἔστι χρόνος ὅτε, ἔστι τόπος ὅπου, εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι οἱ.

IV. When ὥς denotes similitude most fully, it is found without a protasis; which however is understood. This use is twofold:—1. when it denotes *real* conformity, and is rendered *utpote*: thus in the Phœnissæ of Eurip. the attendant of Antigone says to her, *wait while I look out, lest any of the citizens should be in the streets*, κῆμοι μὲν ἔλθου φαῦλος, ὥς δούλω, ψόγος, σοὶ δ', ὥς ἀνάσσει. v. 94. [Absolute identity, not merely conformity or similitude, is here signified: Antigone was actually a princess, and her attendant actually a slave: in those characters or relations they are considered; *to me, as, or as being, a slave*; *to you as a princess*. Hoogveen himself remarks that Hesychius explains it ὁντως.] ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων αὐτοὺς, ὥς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων: Matth. vii, 29. *as one having authority*.—2. when it signifies feigned or unreal conformity: [when resemblance or probability, rather than actuality, is affirmed; or when semblance only is denoted:] thus, Lysias appears, says Socrates, *dis καὶ τρις τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὥς οὐ πᾶν εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*: Plat. Phædr. p. 235. (p. 296. ed. Bip.) *as though*; *as if*. See Acts xxiii, 15. where a feigned motive is held out instead of the real one.

When ὥς in this sense is construed with a verb instead of a participle, the verb is put in the optative mood: ὥς, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι, δώροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρήσειαν: *as if*, &c. Thucyd. iv, 65. When a negative precedes ὥς, a feigned conformity is not affirmed, but a false one denied: ἡναγκάσθην ἐπικαλέσασθαι Καίσαρα, οὐχ ὥς τοῦ ἔθνους μου ἔχων τι κατηγορηῆσαι: Acts xxviii, 19.

V. When a comparison is instituted between two things, of which one exceeds the other, ὥς is used after οὕτως with a negation: οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὢν, ὥς τοῦτο: Plat. Phæd. p. 77. or without οὕτω, the order of the things compared being reversed: ἄθλιός γ' εἶμι', ὥς ἕτερος οὐδεὶς ἀνὴρ: Aristoph. Vesp. 150. χαρίτων ἀφθονίαν εἶχεν (Aspasia) ὥς οὐκ ἄλλη παρθένος τῶν τότε: Ælian. V. H. xii, 1. In the following there is comparison with limitation: τυφλὸς Λυγκεὺς ἐκέινος ὥς πρὸς ἐμέ: Lucian. not simply blind, but blind, *in comparison with me*.

VI. When one is compared with himself, there is limitation either with respect to age, as μικρὸς γε ὥς τοσούτων ἐτῶν, Athenæus: *little; for one so many years old*: or with respect to the ability, genius, &c. of his nation, as, ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἀδύνατος, ὥς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν: Thucyd. iv, 84. *for a Lacedæmonian*; i. e. if compared with the rest of the Lacedæmonians: or with respect to such adjuncts as power and strength, as, ὥς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἐδόκει χρῆναι μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, *as far as, to the utmost of*: Thucyd. viii, 1. i. e. οὕτως μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, ὥς,

&c. or with respect to habit or custom, with which something is contrasted, as, ὁψὲ γούν ἀνεστήκασιν νῦν, ὡς ἀπὸ μέσων νυκτῶν παρακαλοῦντές μ' αἰεῖ : Aristoph. Vesp. 28. [*as being in the constant habit, or, for men who are in the constant habit, of calling on me to come out, in the middle of the night* ; 218. ed. Brunck. where there is a full stop after νῦν, and παρακαλοῦσίν γ' for παρακαλοῦντές μ'. M' indeed, in the mouth of Bdelycleo, is quite inconsistent with the circumstances of the story.]

VII. Ως signifies proportion in, ὥστε οὐ μείον ἢ πεζῶν φόνος ἐν τῇ φυγῇ τῶν ἱππέων ἐγίγνετο, Arrian. Exp. Al. ii, 11. The meaning is, that the slaughter was not less, in proportion to their respective numbers. So with an infinitive mood : τοὺς πολεμίους—ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἰδιώτας ὄντας, ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγωνίσασθαι : Xen. Cyrop. i. 5, 11. *to cope with us ; if opposed to us in battle.*

VIII. Another use of ὡς is *augmentative* or *intensive* ; in which it is usually prefixed to superlatives, as ὡς μάλιστα, *as much as possible* : ὡς τάχιστα (or ὠστάχιστα, Thucyd. vii, 60.) *as quickly as possible* : Eurip. Med. 322. Acts xvii, 15. elliptically for οὕτως ὡς δυνατόν τάχιστα. [See Abr. of Vig. p. 209. l. 1.] The ellipsis is sometimes partly supplied, as, κατέταξεν ὡς ἐδύνατο κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 11. ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν : Plat. Phæd. p. 77. So, ὡς ἐνι μάλιστα, ὡς δυνατόν κάλλιστα.

IX. In ὡς ὅτι, the most ancient authors probably wrote ὅ, τι : οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἐπλάσαν αὐτόν, ὡς ὅτι κάλλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες : Ælian. V. H. ii, 13. i. e. ἐξεικάσαντες οὕτως, ὡς ὅ τι ἐξεικάζεται κάλλιστα.

X. Its augmentative force is less intense, when it is joined with words in the positive degree : εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς : Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 41. *those who are really judges*, for οὕτω δικαστὰς ὄντας, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζοι ἂν τις, or ὡς τις ἂν ὀνομάζων, ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζοι. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστι : Plat. Phædr. p. 228. (p. 283. ed. Bip.) φίλτατος εἶ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῖς : ib. p. 235.^a

XI. From its relation to words having the nature of superlatives, it is naturally suited to exclamation : ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τοὺς γνάθους ἀλγήσετε, *how*, &c. Aristoph. Pac. 236. [237. Br.] See 242. 245. 247. 249. 256. of joy, Aristoph. Ach. 7. grief and lamentation, Eurip. Med. 328, 330. fear, Aristoph. Vesp. 425. [427. ed. Br.] [In Aristoph. Vesp. 434. (436. ed. Br.) ὡς is not used in exclamation, but signifies *for*.] admiration, Aristoph. Vesp. 1266. [1275. ed. Br.]

XII. Allied to this is its use in epiphonema. See Eurip. Phœniss. 526. So Socrates, after asking for assistance against Alcibiades, adds, ὡς ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πάνν ὀρώμω : Plat. Sympos. p. 213. (p. 253. ed. Bip.)

XIII. From the two last uses springs another, in which it is *optative*, or, with negation, *deprecatory* ; and that with emphasis and exclamation. This is especially manifest, when it is joined with ὥφελον, ὥφελε, the poetical form ὥφελλον, or that without the augment ὄφελον : ὡς πρὶν ὥφελλον ὀλέσθαι ! *I wish I had perished before !* Iliad. ω, 764. literally, *how I ought to have perished before !* When ὡς

^a When ὡς is thus joined with the positive degree, Weiske renders it by *prorsus*. J.S.

ὥφеле occurs parenthetically, or at the end of a sentence, an infinitive mood, assumed from the context, is to be understood with it: as, οὐ γάρ που καὶ ἀθανάσιαν (ὥς ὥφеле) ἐπαγγέλλεται: Heliodor. viii, 11.

The absence of ὥφελον is supplied by an optative mood: ὥς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο: Iliad. σ, 107. [but the meaning is very different. See the observations of Professor Hermann in the Abr. of Vig. p. 92.] And on the other hand ὥς is omitted, and ὥφελον or ὅφελον put alone. Perhaps there is no more than one example of ὥφеле construed with an indicative mood; viz. ὥφеле μὴδ' ἐγένοντο θοαὶ νέες: Callim. Epigr. xviii.

XIV. With words signifying number, ὥς may be rendered *nearly*, *about*: ὀπίσται τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὥς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγένοντο: Thucyd. iv, 9. τρεψάμενοι ἐδίωκον ὥς τρία ἢ τέτταρα στάδια: Xen. Hist. Gr. vii. p. 617. This use may be termed *conjectural*.

XV. To its conjectural use, rather than its causal, (which will be hereafter mentioned) is to be referred the phrase ὥς εἰπεῖν, *so to speak*; *as it were*; an expression by which some approximation to truth, rather than the very truth itself, is indicated: διὰ τούτου πάλιν ἀμνδρῶς, ὥς εἰπεῖν, καὶ λανθανόντως ἀνακαλέσασθαι βούλεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν: Chrysost. Homil. xxi. in Genes. v. p. 237. In the same sense ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ (ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) γέροντε ὄντε ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἠρξάσθην: Plat. Euthyd. p. 272. See Hebr. vii, 9.

XVI. Of the same nature is the phrase ὥς ἐπίπαν, and ὥς τοεπίπαν, i. e. ὥς ἐπιτοπλεῖστον, Hesych. *for the most part*: signifying not, *always*, but *almost always*, or *usually*: τῷ δὲ εὖ βουλευθέντι πρήγματι τελευτῇ ὥς τοεπίπαν χρηστῇ ἐθέλει ἐπιγίνεσθαι: Herodot. vii. c. 157. For this Aristotle says ὥς ἐπιτοπολὺ εἰπεῖν: Hist. Anim. vi, 14.

XVII. Another signification of ὥς is that of the *final cause*; *that, in order that, to the end that*;—1. With the aor. 1. subjunctive, λέξον, γέροντα τυφλὸν ὥς κατὰ στέγας ἐλθοῦσα τέρψω: Eurip. Phœniss. 1095.—2. With the 2 aor. subj. πάντων πρὸς ἀσπῶν (εἰλίσσόμεθα), ὥς θάνω: Eurip. Orest. 446. [440. ed. Pors.] But the 2 aor. is for the most part used only when there is no first, as after ὅπως. (See ὅπως, § ii.) In its construction with the optative mood, ἂν in its potential sense seems to be usually suppressed: thus, παρὰ τὸν Ταῦρον ἐπέμπετο, ὥς ὁ Ταῦρος τιμωρήσαιο: Palæph. c. 7.—3. With the future of the indicative, as ὅπως, the future taking away so much from the act of the verb as there is time between the cause and its effect, οὕτως being commonly understood in the preceding clause or member, but sometimes added: as, ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω νουθέτει, ὥς, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται, οὔτε ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς: Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (p. 328. ed. Bip.)

XVIII. Μὴ following it with an infinitive mood brings a great accession of emphasis: thus, οἶψ δὲ σοὶ—οὐδὲ ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι πότ' ἂν—κατηξίωσαν (αἱ Μοῦσαι), ἀλλ' ἀντὶ δάφνης μυρρίνη ἂν, ἥ καὶ μαλάχης φύλλοις μαστιγοῦσαι, ἀπήλλαξαν ἂν τῶν τοιούτων, ὥς μὴ μιᾶν αἰ μήτε τὸν ὀλμειὸν, μήτε τὴν τοῦ ἵππου κρήνην: Lucian. adv. Indoct. c. 3. [p. 538. D. ed. Salmur.] *to prevent your polluting; that you might not pollute, &c.*

XIX. 'Ως τί, *why*, is an expression resembling ἵνα τί and ὅπως τί; [See Abr. of Vig. p. 206. l. 24. and Weiske, Pleonasm. Gr. in "Ἰνα, § 3.] ὡς τί μ' ἰστορεῖς τόδε; Eurip. Phœniss. 624. for ὡς τί ὠφελήθης, μ' ἰστορεῖς τόδε; It is never construed with an indicative, except of the future.

XX. Δὴ is sometimes added, in the sense treated of, p. 43. ii, 1. and iii, 1. to denote eagerness for information: Orest. καί με πρὸς τὸ μύθον πόρευσον πατρός. Pyl. ὡς τί δὴ τόδε; Or. ὡς νῦν ἰκετεύσω με σῶσαι: Eurip. Orest. 794. [786. ed. Pors.]

XXI. 'Ως signifies *effect* also, having an infinitive mood after it, and before it, in the protasis, either οὕτω, as, οὕτω δὴ κατέστρεψεν ἡ τύχη ταῦτα, ὡς τάναντία γενέσθαι τοῖς προσδοκωμένοις: Dinarch. adv. Dem. p. 96. or τοσοῦτο, or the like; as, τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκει τῶν ζῶων τοσαύτην τροφήν, ὡς ἱκανὴν εἶναι: Aristot. de Rep. i, 8. ἐς τοσοῦτον ἄμφοιν ἡ φιλία προῆλθεν, ὡς ἐγγὺς ἰστοιμίας εἶναι: Ælian. V. H. xii, 1.

XXII. Sometimes no such word precedes in the protasis; which however contains the cause from which the effect arises: οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως βραδὺς εἰμι, καὶ χωλὸς ἀμφοτέροις, ὡς μόλις τελεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα: *so that; so as*: Lucian. Timon. c. 20. μελωδεῖ πάνν γλαφυρὸν—καὶ ἐναρμόνιον, ὡς κἀμὲ αὐτῷ φθονεῖν: Id. Dial. Apoll. et Vule.

XXIII. 'Ως, like ὥστε, is, in its signification of effect, put before the imperative mood: οὐκ ἂν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὑπ' ἱατροῦ θεραπευθῆναι δύναιτο· ὡς, εἴγε ἄλλος τις ἀπαλλάξειε, μίσει τότε ὡς ἀδικοῦντα ἐμέ: Lucian. Abdic. c. 31. *So, or wherefore*.

XXIV. When what precedes contains matter for argument, rather than a cause, ὡς assumes a collective or conclusive power: thus Ælian, after naming four Sibyls, says, *to these, others add six*, and then concludes, ὡς εἶναι τὰς πάσας δέκα. V. H. xii, 35. for εἰσὶν οὖν αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα.

XXV. 'Ως has also a *causal* signification. This is derived from its similitudinary power; for there is a constant congruity and similitude between things and their causes: thus, νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οὕτως, ὅπως δύναμαι, λέγειν· ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν, πρὶν ἂν εἶπω ἀμωσγέπως: Plat. Phædr. p. 228. *for*.

The similitudinary power of ὡς may perhaps even here be retained: for it will discover itself in the following arrangement: ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν, *as you seem to me*, &c. This is the protasis: then the apodosis, οὕτω νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστι λέγειν: *so*, &c.

XXVI. So, ἐρήνυστον τέκνα δεινῆς ἀμίλλης, ὡς ὁ κίνδυνος μέγας: Eurip. Phœniss. 1267. An inversion of the order will show how the *causal* power arose out of the *similitudinary*: ὡς ὁ κίνδυνος μέγας, οὕτω σὺ ἐρήνυσον, &c.

XXVII. The case is the same with prohibitive sentences: μηδὲν τρέψης τάσδ', ὡς πάρεισ' ἡμῖν φίλαι: Eurip. Orest. 1104.

XXVIII. 'Ως has a causal signification with a genitive case absolute also: καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ πρῶτος ἑαυτὸν ἐν μέσῳ κατετίθετο τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ὡς ταύτης τῆς χώρας ἐχυρωτάτης οὐσης: Xenoph. Cyrop. viii, 5, 8. *because this place was the most secure*.

XXIX. The transition from its comparative or similitudinary sig-

nification to that of *time* is next to be treated of. This transition is not peculiar to the Greek language; for in most others the words of similitude and time are of kindred origin: thus, *similis, simul, simulac*, in Latin. Thus the Italians use *come* in both significations, the French *comme*, the Germans *wie*, [the English *as*.] In this sense *ὥς* originally and properly connected two events happening at the same time, and in that particular resembling each other. See St. John ii, 9. *as soon as*.

XXX. This signification of contemporariness is especially to be noted when *ὥς* is repeated: *ὥς εἶδ', ὥς ἀνέπαλτο*: Hom. II. ν, 424. in reference probably to which, Hesychius explains *ὥς, εὐθέως*: *ὥς εἶδ', ὥς μιν μᾶλλον ἔδν χόλος*: Iliad. τ, 16. *ὥς ἴδον, ὥς ἐμάνην, ὥς μοι περὶ θυμὸς ἰάφθη*: Theocrit. ii, 82. So, iii, 42. So, *ut vidi, ut perii, ut me malus abstulit error*: Virg. Ecl. viii, 41. [It is impossible to preserve the idiom of these elegant morsels in any English translation.]

XXXI. *Ὡς*, having once acquired a signification of time, began to mean simply, *when*: *ὥς δὲ ἦλθε τὸ πρῶτον πρὸς Κύρον ἡ Ἀσπασία, ἔτυχε μὲν ἀπὸ δείπνου ὦν*: Ælian. V. H. xii, 1. or *after that*: *ὥς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίπη, &c.* Plat. Phædr. p. 60. or the point of time at which any thing commenced; *since*: *πόσος χρόνος ἐστίν, ὥς τοῦτο γέγονεν αὐτῷ; ὁ δὲ εἶπε, Παιδιόθεν*: St. Mark ix, 21. or the progress or duration of time; *whilst*: *ὥς δὲ ἦν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἐν τῷ πάσχα, ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, πολλοὶ ἐπίστευσαν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*: St. John ii, 32. So St. Luke xii, 58.

XXXII. *Ὡς* appears to be sometimes put, especially by Attic writers, instead of a preposition: it has been observed however that *ἐς* or *ἐπὶ*, or *πρὸς*, is suppressed, and that *ὥς* is either redundant, or has an obscure signification: thus, *καὶ μοι βαδιστέον ἐστίν ὥς Εὐριπίδην, and I must go to Euripides*: Aristoph. Ach. 393. *ὥς αὐτὸν παρίεναι αὐτήν*, Ælian. V. H. xii, 1. See Aristoph. Plut. 89. Demosth. Philipp. i. [p. 54. l. 6. ed. Reisk.] [Abr. of Vig. p. 210. l. 16.]

XXXIII. The ellipsis of the preposition *ἐπὶ* is sometimes supplied: *ἐπῆγεν Ἀλέξανδρος—τοὺς τοξότας δρόμῳ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν*: Arrian. i. p. 15. *προσῆγεν ὥς ἐπὶ Δαρεῖόν τε καὶ Πέρσας*, Id. ii. c. 6. See Acts xvii, 14. [Abr. of Vig. p. 210. l. 29. and Weiske, Pleonasm. Gr. in *ὥς*, § 6.]

XXXIV. Its last use is *narrative*; in which it may be rendered *that*. This use appears to be derived from its similitudinary or comparative use: for in those words of Demosthenes, e. g. *λέγοντες, ὥς ἐκεῖνός γε οὐ πολεμεῖ τῇ πόλει*. (Phil. iii. p. 45.) *ὥς* may perhaps bear the sense of *in what manner, how*.

XXXV. Sometimes it is so used narratively, that it may at the same time be rendered, *how*, i. e. *to what a degree*: *κατανοῶν δὲ Κύρος, ὥς εὖ μὲν αὐτῷ εἶχον τὰ σώματα οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι στρατιωτικούς πόνοὺς φέρειν· εὖ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς, &c.* Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 9.

XXXVI. But the traces of the significations above mentioned are often so dubious, that they appear to be lost in the mere narrative sense; especially after *νομίζω, ὁμολογῶ*, and the like verbs: *as, πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὥς αἱ μάχαι κρίνονται μᾶλλον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ῥώμας*: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 3, 19.

XXXVII. 'Ως is put for ὅτι also, when one speaks in the person of another, reciting his very words, just as they were spoken, in direct phraseology, and not in oblique: as, ὅθ' οὗτος, ὡς ἀπήλλαγμαi, περιῶν ἐλογοποιεi, ἐνδηλοί τινες ἦσαν ἀχθόμενοι: Demosth. in Mid. p. 412. where ὡς ἀπήλλαγμαi is said as in the person of Midias, the rest in that of Demosthenes himself. [Abr. of Vig. p. 209. r. x.]

XXXVIII. 'Ως takes an acute accent—1. when it follows the word with which it is construed, and is pronounced emphatically: as, μόλιβος ὡς, ἐράπετ' αἰχμή, *like lead*: Iliad. λ, 237.—2. when it is put for οὕτως, *thus*: ὡς ὅγε κοιμανέων διέπε στρατόν.—ὡς οἱ μὲν πονέοντο. Hom. fully, *they so labored as I have related*. Οὐδὲ ὡς, *not even so*, is common even in prose. Thus ὡς and ὥς are correlative, like ὡς and οὕτως: Θέτις δ', ὡς ἤψατο γούνων, ὡς ἔχετ' ἐμπεφυῖα: Iliad. α, 512. and in the same manner τὼς and ὡς: μὴ μ' ἔρεθε σχετλίη, μὴ χωσαμένῃ σε μεθείω, τὼς δέ σ' ἀπεχθήρω, ὡς νῦν ἐκπαγλ' ἐφίλησα: Iliad. γ, 415.

XXXIX. Theocritus, inverting the usual order, has placed the apodosis first, with ὡς oxytoned, followed by οὕτως and an optative mood; so that there is an appearance of a double apodosis, without any protasis: ὡς μὲν ὁ παῖς ἐχάρη, καὶ ἀνήλατο, καὶ πλατάγησε νικήσας, οὕτως ἐπὶ ματέρα νεβρὸς ἄλοιτο. ὡς δὲ κατεσμύχθη καὶ ἀνετράπετο φρένα λῦπα ὥτερος, οὕτω καὶ νύμφα γαμεθεῖσ' ἀκάχοιτο: viii, 88. for ὡς νεβρὸς ἄλοιτ' ἂν, ὡς ὁ παῖς ἐχάρη καὶ ἀνήλατο, ὡς δὲ νύμφη ἀκάχοιτ' ἂν, ὡς ὁ ἕτερος κατεσμύχθη.

II.—OF THE PARTICLES USUALLY JOINED WITH ΩΣ.

I. *Αν subjoined to ὡς affects, in some cases, only a following verb; but in other cases it appears to affect ὡς by rendering its signification indefinite; especially when that signification is of manner or time. Thus, ὡς ἂν signifies, *in whatever manner*, with a subjunctive mood: βοηθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα, ὡς ἂν ἕκαστος δύνηται: Xen. Cyrop. iii, 2, 1.

II. Sometimes it denotes proportion; being put for καθὰ, *accordingly as*; *in proportion as*: ὡς ἂν ποιήσης, πανταχοῦ χρηστός γ' ἔσῃ: Soph. Aj. 1387. [1639. ed. Br.] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεῖα συναναγκάσῃ: Aristot. de Rep. i, 8.

III. *Αν very manifestly affects ὡς, and not a following verb, when, in recital of something past, it is construed with the imperfect: οἶδατε, ὅτι ἔθνη ἦτε, πρὸς τὰ εἰδῶλα τὰ ἄφωνα, ὡς ἂν ἤγεσθε, ἀπαγόμενοι: 1 Cor. xii, 2. *even as ye were led*.

IV. As ὡς is used for ὅτε or ἐπεὶ, of *certain* time, so ὡς ἂν, for ὅταν or ἐπὰν, of *uncertain*: προστάττει δὲ τοῖς εἰσπορευομένοις, τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, ὡς ἂν εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς τὸν βίον: *whenever, as soon as*: Ceb. Tab. p. 168.

V. *Ως γε is, *as at least*; *as far at least as*, &c. ἡ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ρεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὡς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι: Plat. Phædr. p. 230. (p. 286. ed. Bip.) When γε is separated from ὡς, it appears to restrict the word which it immediately follows, and

hoi *ὡς* : thus to the question of Gobryas, whether he may speak the truth, the answer is, *νῆ Δί', ὡς ψεύδους γε οὐδεμία ἐρώτησις δέεται* : Xen. *Cyrop.* viii, 4, 13. q. d. οὕτως ἂν μὴ δεομένη, ψεύδους γ' οὐ δέεται.

VI. Ὡς signifies *just as ; precisely as* : ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ σκολύθρια τῶν μελλόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες, χαίρουσι καὶ γελῶσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἴδωσιν ὑπτίον ἀνατετραμμένον : Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 278. (p. 18. ed. Bip.) And because *περ* signifies all the parts of a whole, whereas *πάνν* denotes the whole simply, the meaning of ὥσπερ, if considered with more nicety and exactness, will be found to be, *in whatever manner you consider the things compared, they will be found alike in every part, in every particular.* [But see Professor Hermann's account of *περ* in the *Abr. of Vig.* p. 157. l. 7.] As *ὡς* and οὕτως, so ὥσπερ and οὕτως are correlative. See Rom. v. 19.

When the apodosis with οὕτω follows at a great distance from the protasis with ὥσπερ, the latter particle, or ὡς uncompounded, is repeated, with οὖν, for the purpose of obviating obscurity. Thus in Rom. v. the protasis in v. 12. ὥσπερ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, is separated from the apodosis by more than five verses : it is introduced therefore in v. 18. by a repetition of the kind above mentioned : ἄρα οὖν ὡς δι' ἐνὸς παραπτώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, εἰς κατὰκριμα· οὕτω καὶ δι' ἐνὸς δικαιώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς.

Sometimes the whole apodosis is to be assumed extraneously : ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀποδημῶν ἐκάλεσε τοὺς ἰδίους δούλους : St. Matth. xxv, 14. This protasis is followed by no apodosis ; one must therefore be understood ; such as, οὕτως ἐστὶ τὰ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν. Often οὕτως only is understood : ὥσπερ θανάτῳ, τῷ κακῷ βεβλημένῃν, καὶ ὥσπερ ψυχῆς, τοῦ Θεαγένοῦς ἀφηρημένην : Heliodor. i, 29. And often, when οὕτω is suppressed, καὶ follows ὥσπερ or ὡς : as, εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν : Aristot. *de Rep.* i, 2. for the οὕτω here expressed has no reference to ὥσπερ.

VII. It is peculiar to poetry to disjoin, by interposition of some other word, such particles as are commonly combined : as, ἔπεισιν μὲν ὀνειδίσον, ὡς ἔσεται περ : *Iliad.* α, 211. *in whatever manner you please.*

VIII. In ὥσπερ ἂν, ἂν pertains to a verb, not to ὥσπερ : ὥσπερ ἂν εἶποι : Plat. *Apol.* p. 23. Ὡσπερὰν εἰ also is said : ὑμᾶς δὲ δέδοικα, μὴ παρεληλυθότων τῶν καιρῶν ὥσπερὰν εἰ κατακλυσμὸν γεγενῆσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγούμενοι, μάταιον ὄχλον τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους νομίσητε : Demosth. *pro Cor.* p. 244. [p. 299. l. 21. ed. Reisk. where ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.] Ὡς compares ; περ signifies that the similitude is perfect in all points ; ἂν denotes indefiniteness of manner ; q. d. on whatever side, in whatever view, the things compared are contemplated, they will be found to tally in every respect ; εἰ indicates a condition, which however is latent, on account of the change made by the speaker, as he goes on, in the construction of the sentence. The construction may be thus restored : ἡγούμενοι γεγενῆσθαι κατακλυσμὸν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ γένοιτο κατακλυσμός τῶν ὑδάτων. When the construction

is preserved entire and regular, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ is written separately: ὅμοιον γε φαίνεται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις Ὀλυμπίᾳσι νικήσας πολλάκις, ὕστερον γέρων ὧν ἀπογράφουτο ἔτι: Æschin. Ep. xi. [p. 690. l. 8. ed. Reisk.]

IX. Τοῦ ὥς also εἰ is subjoined, with some subindication of condition, notwithstanding a change of construction: τίς νύ σε τοιάδ' ἔρεξε, φίλον τέκος, οὐραنیωνων μαψιδίως, ὥς εἴ τι κακὸν ῥέζουσιν ἐνωπῇ; Iliad. ε, 374. for ὥς εἰ ῥέζουσιν. The condition is more manifest, when the construction is preserved: as, καὶ ὅμοιον ὥς εἰ περὶ τῆς Σκύλλης ἢ τοῦ Κενταύρου τίς οἰδύροιο: Æschin. Socrat. Dial. de Morte. Ὡς is seldom suppressed before εἰ, as in Aristoph. Ach. 558. Καί, συκοφάντης εἴ τις ἦν, ὠνείδισας; for ὥς εἰ συκοφάντης τίς ἦν.

X. When ὥσει is written conjointly, the condition is latent; and a verb is to be assumed either from the preceding words, or extraneously: as, τὸ ἐνδύμα αὐτοῦ λευκὸν ὥσει χιῶν, and ἐγένοντο ὥσει νεκροί: St. Matth. xxviii, 3. 4. for ὥς εἰ ἦν χιῶν, and ὥς εἰ ἦσαν νεκροί. Though ὥς and ὥσει are very often used indifferently, (for ἦν δὲ ἰδέα αὐτοῦ ὥς ἀστραπῇ) precedes the words just before cited,) yet there is this difference, that ὥσει signifies not the very thing itself, but the nearest approximation only to it, and that hypothetically. Hence it is used conjecturally in speaking of number, and signifies *about*: ὥρα ὥσει ἔκτῃ: St. John xix, 14. Ψυχὰς ὥσει τρισχίλια: Acts ii, 41. Sometimes, but rarely, an accusative follows it: εἶδεν ἐν ὁράματι φανερώς ὥσει ὥραν ἐννάτην ἡμέρας ἄγγελον τοῦ Θεοῦ: ib. x. 3.

XI. The construction of ὥσπερ εἰ is the same as that of ὥσει. The similitude signified by ὥσπερ εἰ however is more perfect than that by ὥσει, on account of the force of περ. The condition indicated by εἰ is latent, because a verb is suppressed; for when the verb is expressed, ὥσπερ εἰ is the more proper form. In the following verse the verb is to be assumed from the apodosis: ὥσπερ εἰ πόλις πρὸς ἐχθρῶν, σῶμα πυργηρούμεθα: Eurip. Orest. 760. i. e. πυργηρούμεθα σῶμα, ὥσπερ εἰ πόλις πυργηρεῖται ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν. So a verb is to be assumed, when a participle follows: χῶ κολοῖς οὐτοσὶ ἄνω κέχνηεν, ὥσπερ εἰ δεικνύς τί μοι: Aristoph. Av. 51. for ὥσπερ εἰ χαίνοι ἂν, or ὥσπερ ανεῖ χαίνοι.

The verb is sometimes to be assumed extraneously: τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν (Ἑρμῆν), ὥσπερ εἰ ἐπιτάττει ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης· ὃ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἶρην ἐμήσατο, δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Εἰρέμης· νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὡς οἴομεθα καλλωπίζοντες τὸ ὄνομα, Ἑρμῆν καλοῦμεν: Plat. Cratyl. p. 408. (p. 279. ed. Bip.) Here προτίθῃσι, or συνίστησι, or the like, appears to be understood before ὥσπερ εἰ. An ellipsis is to be supplied also, when one of the things compared is suppressed: ἀρετὴς ὥσπερ εἰ πηγὰς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐμηχανήσατο: Aristid. in Hercul. p. 63. for ἀρετὴς γένεσιν or ἀρχὴν ἐμηχανήσατο, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰς πηγὰς ἂν τις μηχανήσαιτο.

XII. In Ὡσπεροῦν, (which circumstances similar to those mentioned under ὥσπερ ανεῖ may cause to be written ὥσπερ οὖν,) οὖν has sometimes its conclusive power: as, ἀφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ χώρου αἱ περιστεραὶ γίνονται, (when Venus leaves the place,) ὥσπεροῦν τῇ θεῇ συναποδημοῦσαι: Ælian. V. H. i, 15. From their disappearance it might be concluded that they accompanied the goddess. Its affirmative sense

also may here be assigned to it: *as if in reality they went away together with the goddess*. Athenæus certainly, in relating the same circumstance, uses *ὥς δὴ* for *ὥσπερ οὖν*: *τότ' οὖν αἱ περὶ τὸν τόπον περιστρεφαὶ ἀφανεῖς γίνονται, ὥς δὴ τῇ θεῷ συναποδημοῦσαι*: ix. 2. p. 394. Its affirmative sense is very apparent in the following: *εἰ δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἐστι, θεὸς—ὁ Ἔρως*: Plat. Phædr. p. 242. (p. 312. ed. Bip.) So Apol. p. 21. [p. 8. l. 49. ed. Basil. 1.] *Εἰ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἀληθές ἐστίν*: Cosmas. de magnitud. Solis. l. vi. *εἰ τις ἔχει πεπαιδευμένα ὦτα, ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ χειρουργοὶ τεχνικὰ ὄμματα*: Ælian. V. H. xiv. 47.

XIII. Καὶ also is added: *τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει*: Plat. quoted by Budæus: i. e. *ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ μόνον κινδυνεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔχει*.

XIV. In *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, οὖν*, in its affirmative sense, is sometimes inserted between *ὥσπερ* and *ἂν*: *ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσελθὼν ἂν τις ἔψεγε*: Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (p. 327. ed. Bip.) *exactly as if in reality, &c.*

XV. It is unnecessary to treat of the particles *ὥς* and *τε* not united, each retaining its proper and usual sense; and *as*; and *how*: see Apoll. Rhod. i. 505.

XVI. When they are conjoined in *ὥστε, as, like*, before *ὥς* there is something understood, which *τε* connects with what follows: thus, *ἂν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων ἴστατο δακρυχέων, ὥστε κρήνη μελάνυδρος*: Iliad. ι. 14. for *δακρυχέων, καὶ οὕτω δακρυχέων, ὥς κρήνη*. *Ὡς* alone would have simply compared: by *ὥστε* amplification is added to comparison: q. d. *shedding tears, and in an abundance as great too as that of the waters of a deep fountain*. See also Iliad. φ. 493. ε. 136.

XVII. In the same manner *τε* is conjoined with *ὥς* when the latter signifies *utpote, as being*; and *ὥστε* then exactly resembles *ἅτε*: *τὸν δ' ἐξήραξ' Ἀφροδίτῃ ῥεῖα μάλ', ὥστε θεά*: Iliad. γ. 381. where if *ῥεῖα* had not been expressed, it must have been understood, or at least something similar.

XVIII. *Τε* is annexed to *ὥς* also, when oxytoned, and put for *οὕτως*: *τε* in this case entirely loses its accent, and does not merely throw it back on *ὥς*, as it does when *ὥς* has no accent. In Rom. vii. St. Paul compares the law of Moses to a husband, who has dominion over his wife as long as he lives: then follows the apodosis in v. 4. *ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ: and so; and in the same manner*. In the same sense it is to be taken in Aristot. de Rep. i. 2. *Ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον*.

XIX. It has a collective or conclusive use also; which is easily derived from its similitudinary power, since there must necessarily be some congruity between conclusion and premises: thus in St. Matth. xii. 12. our Saviour concludes [*a fortiori*], *ὥστε ἔξεστι τοῖς σαββάτοις καλῶς ποιεῖν: wherefore it is lawful to do well on the sabbath days*. So Plato: *ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους, ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει*: Phædr. p. 233. (p. 292. ed. Bip.) *so that, or wherefore*.

XX. In drawing conclusions it requires the indicative mood, and is most frequently construed with the present tense: thus, *ἀλλὰ πέ-*

παισται μετρίως ἡμῖν' ὥσθ' ὦρα δὴ' στί βαδίξειν : Aristoph. Thesmophila [1228. ed. Br.] See also Epict. Ench. c. 64.

Sometimes with the imperfect of the indicative : ὥστ' ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ τάφῳ τότε κείρασθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι, &c. Lysias Or. Fun. p. 514.

With the perfect of the indicative : ὥστε καὶ προσοφείλοντές σοι ἄλλας χάριτας ἀναπεφνήναμεν : Xen. Cyrop. iii, 2, 16. So Galat. iii, 24.

With the 1 aor. of the indicative : κατέλιπε τοῦτο μόνον αὐτοῖς, τὸ σὺν μαχαίρᾳ καὶ γέβρῳ καὶ θώρακι μάχεσθαι· ὥστε εὐθὺς αὐτῶν παρεσκεύασε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς ὁμόσε ἰτέον εἶη ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις, &c. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1, 21.

With the future of the indicative : ὥστ' οὐχὶ μὴ παύσει ποτ' ὦν Ζηλωτὸς ἅπασιν : Aristoph. Pac. 1034. ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημήσαι βούλονται ἰδίᾳ, ἐξέσται αὐτοὺς, &c. Plat. de Rep. iv. p. 420. (p. 327. ed. Bip.)

XXI. Construed with the imperative mood, it concludes either with adhortation or dehortation : with adhortation, as, οὐ φέρομεν, ὦ Πλούτων, Μένιππον τουτονὶ τὸν κύνα παροικούντα· ὥστε ἡ ἐκείνόν ποι κατὰστησον, ἡ ἡμεῖς μετοικήσομεν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον : Lucian. Dial. Mort. 2. See 1 Corinth. x, 12.

XXII. And in this use with the imperative, it sometimes concludes a prolix demonstration by exhortation or dehortation : as, ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, ἐδραῖοι γίνεσθε, &c. after a long argument by which the certainty of the resurrection is proved : 1 Corinth. xv, 58. So in xiv, 39. ὥστε, ἀδελφοί, Ζηλοῦτε τὸ προφητεύειν.

XXIII. When a subjunctive mood follows, it depends on μὴ preceding, or some word compounded with μὴ, as μήποτε, &c. ὥστε τοῦτ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα : Plat. Phædr. p. 245. (p. 317. ed. Bip.) So p. 238. (p. 303. Bip.)

XXIV. Before interrogation it has something of indignation : ὥστε ἐχθρὸς ὑμῖν γέγονα, ἀληθεύων ὑμῖν ; Gal. iv, 16. or at least of eviction of absurdity. *So it seems I am become your enemy because I tell you truth.*

XXV. Πῶς is often added : ὥστε πῶς οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀποκτείνας ; *so that how can it be otherwise but that,* &c. Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 226. So Plat. Phædr. p. 231. (p. 289. ed. Bip.)

XXVI. Lucian has ὥστε τί : σχολὴν ἄγομεν· ὥστε τί οὐκ ἄμμεν εὐθὺς τῆς καθόδου περιπατήσοντες ; Dial. Mort. t. i. p. 437.

XXVII. From its collective or conclusive use proceeds that in which it denotes *effect* or *event* : e. g. οὕτω γὰρ ἡγάπησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον, ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν : St. John iii, 16. Πιθανοὶ δ' οὕτως εἰσὶ τινες, ὥστε, πρὶν εἰδέναι τὸ προσταττόμενον, πρότερον πείθονται : Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 10. So ii, 2, 5. Plat. Euthyphr. p. 5. (c. 4. ed. Fisch.) Euthyd. p. 287. In all these passages ὥστε, preceded by οὕτω, *to such a degree—that*, is construed with the indicative mood.

XXVIII. But when ὥστε has reference to τοιοῦτο or τοσοῦτο preceding, either the indicative or infinitive mood is used indifferently : τὸ δὲ νῦν ὑπάρχον περὶ σε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τοὺς ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς

οἰκουμένης εἰς ἓνα τόπον ἀποβλέπειν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα πρὸς σε : Plat. Ep. iii. p. 230. Κολοφώνιοι καὶ ἱππικὴν (ἐκτῆσαντο), ἐν ᾗ τοσοῦτον διέφερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ', ὅπου ποτὲ—ἐπικουρήσεις, λύεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον : Strab. xix. p. 643. Τοσοῦτον γὰρ δέω τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσθ' ἕτεροι μὲν—πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν· ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲ τὴν διδομένην μοι χώραν ἡξίωσα λαβεῖν : Isocr. in Nicoel. p. 65.

XXIX. The signification of *event* or *effect* is especially remarkable in the close of a long narration : thus Triton in Lucian concludes the whole story of Andromeda with a sort of epiphonema : ὥστε ἀντὶ θανάτου γάμον οὐ τὸν τυχόντα εὔρετο : *and so* : Dial. Triton, et Nereid.

XXX. An optative mood following depends not on ὥστε, but on ἂν intervening : ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίσαιμ' ἂν εἰσιδὼν : Eurip. Or. 379. ὥστε καὶ ἄλλους εἰκότως ἂν διδάσκοιτε τάδε : Xen. Cyrop. iii. p. 82. So Aristoph. Ach. 941. [943. ed. Br.]

XXXI. A subjunctive mood following depends on something else, as when μὴ intervenes : οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμῃκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστε οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ : Plat. Phædr. p. 227. (p. 281. ed. Bip.) See Aristoph. Vesp. 112. [ὥς ἂν μὴ ἔξη, in Brunck's edition v. 113.]

XXXII. Ὡστε with an infinitive mood has the same signification of proportion as ὥς : see I. vii. Νεώτεροί εἰσιν, ἢ ὥστε εἰδέναι, οἷων πατέρων ἐστέρνῃται· πρεσβύτεροι, ἢ ὥστε ἐπιλαθέσθαι τῆς δυστυχίας : Lysias Or. Fun. p. 520. The use of the particle τε is to be explained here upon the same principle as when it follows οἷος. See on τε, ix. *too young to know,—too old to forget.*

XXXIII. When ὥστε is construed with an infinitive mood in speaking of something not yet effected, it may be interpreted by ἵνα, and may perhaps indicate the final cause, since there is a close affinity between effect and final cause : ἐγὼ, ὥστε ἀπελάσαι Χαλδαίους ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ἄκρων, πολλαπλάσια ἂν ἔδωκα χρήματα : Xen. Cyrop. iii, p. 73. Σκοποῦντες καιρὸν, εἴ τις παραπέσοι, ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι : Thucyd. iv, 23.

XXXIV. Examples which might justify the attribution of a *narrative* use to ὥστε as well as to ὥς, are rare : εἰ δὲ πολλάκις γέγονεν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς μείζω δύναμιν ἔχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων κρατηθῆναι : Isocr. in Archidam. p. 245. ἐλπίδα δὲ δὴ τιν' ἔχομεν, ὥστε μὴ θανεῖν : Eurip. Or. 52. But even these passages may be referred to its sense of *event* or *effect* ; for in the first a verb significative of event, γέγονεν, is expressed ; in the second, one may be understood, ἐλπίδα ἔχομεν συμβῆσεσθαι ὥστε, &c.

XXXV. In a passage of Plato ὥστε γὰρ seems to be equivalent to καὶ γὰρ οὕτως, ὥς being put for οὕτως. Socrates asks whether one, who is eager for any kind of learning or knowledge whatever, can be properly called a philosopher : to this question Glauco replies, πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσονται σοι τοιοῦτοι, and adds as a reason, ὥστε γὰρ φιλοθέαμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες, τοιοῦτοι εἶναι : *for so ; for in that case, &c.*

[For further information on ὥς and ὥστε, see the Abr. of Vig. p. 205—212. and the notes.]

SUPPLEMENT.

OBSERVATIONS ON ARTICLES, NOUNS, VERBS, AND PREPOSITIONS, WHICH ASSUME THE NATURE OF PARTICLES.

I. Τῷ for *τούτῳ*, which is for *διὰ τοῦτο*, for *this reason, therefore*, is far more common in poetry than in prose: *Thy delight is still in contention, and wars, and battles, and thou inheritest the headstrong and ungovernable disposition of thy mother*, says Jupiter to Mars, who has been wounded; and then adds, τῷ σ' ὅτω κείνης τάδε πάσχειν ἐννεσίησιν: *Iliad. ε*, 894. So τῷ νῦν: *the event of the expedition of the Greeks is as yet uncertain*, τῷ νῦν Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι λαῶν ἦσαι ὀνειδίειν: the words of Ulysses to Thersites, in *Iliad. β*, 254.

When a wish precedes, it denotes *effect* or *consequence*, and has αἶν or κε following it: it may then be rendered, *so*, or *in that case*: αἶ γάρ—τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶεν Ἀχαιῶν τῷ κε τάχ' ἡμῦσε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἀνακτος: *Iliad. β*, 373.

II. The dative feminine ᾗ of the subjunctive article assumes the nature first of an adverb, and afterwards of a particle. As an adverb it signifies—1. rest in a place, μερίδι being understood.—2. motion through a place, with ὁδῷ understood: [rather it signifies either the place in which something is, or the place or way through which it passes.]—1. πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα, ᾗ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ: *Plat. Phædr. p. 246. (p. 321. ed. Bip.) i. e. ὅπου οἰκεῖ, where.*

For ᾗ Homer uses ᾗχι, *Iliad. α*, 607. Περ is added to ᾗ, either rendering the sense less determinate, so that ᾗπερ may signify *where-soever*, or retaining its primary force, and meaning *absolutely, altogether, entirely*: καὶ λησταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ᾗσσαν ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ᾗ περ μόνον οἶόν τ' ᾗν κακουργεῖσθαι: *Thucyd. iv*, 53.

2. In signifying passage through a place, when ὁδός, or ἐξόδος, or διεξόδος [or some similar word,] is either not expressed, or so expressed that ᾗ cannot agree with it; then the latter drops the nature of the subjunctive article, and assumes that of a particle: thus, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ᾗ τὸ πτερόν ὀρμαῖ: *Plat. Phædr. p. 251. (p. 331. ed. Bip.) by which way or passage.*

From *place* its signification is transferred to immaterial things; and hence it limits *manner* or *respect*, and perhaps *quantity* or *degree* also: συνεπισκέψασθε δὲ, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν: *Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 72. in what respect.* Καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμη, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ᾗ ἐστὶ πον ἐτέρα ἐν ἐτέρῳ οὕσα: *Id. Phædr. p. 247. (p. 323. ed. Bip.) not in that respect, in which, &c. not in respect of its having, nor in respect of its being, &c.*

III. As ᾗ limits manner relatively, so τῇ limits it demonstratively: and in this use τῇ μὲν and τῇ δὲ are frequently correlative; *partly*,

partly; in one respect, in another respect: ὃ δῶμα, τῇ μὲν σ' ἡδέως προσδέρκομαι Τροίαθεν ἐλθών· τῇ δ' ἰδὼν καταστένω: Eurip. Orest. 356. Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζητεῖ, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν: Aristot. Ethic. vi.

IV. On all these occasions ταύτη must be understood before or after the particle: it is sometimes expressed; as, ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συνθέτῃ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, ταύτη, ἥπερ συνετέθη; Plat. Phæd. p. 78. When oblique interrogation is involved, ταύτη cannot be understood, but τῇ is used for πῇ: πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις, ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ἕτερα; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 10. and in what respect, &c.

V. Of ἄλλο discrepative, τι indefinite, and ἡ comparative, is composed the formula ἄλλο τι ἡ, which is used in figurative questions, ἄρα, μὴ, or some other interrogative word being understood: [see Abr. of Vig. p. 53. viii. and the notes.] Thus, εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάξεις τε, καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα, ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων; Plat. Gorg. p. 481. *would not all the affairs of human life be subverted? would the consequence be any thing else but the subversion of all human affairs?* More closely, *would the life of us men be any thing else but subverted?* ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι ἡ οὐκ εἰκὴ ἐρεῖ; ib. p. 503. *will not such a one avoid speaking rashly?* more literally, *will he say anything else but what may be not rashly said?* When there is no interrogation, no vestige of the nature of a particle remains: thus, εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῶν, ἡ ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη: Plat. Phædr. p. 245. (p. 319. ed. Bip.) *that what moves itself is nothing else but the soul.* But when τί of itself interrogates, it is oxytoned, and put before ἄλλο, as, ἂν δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐξηγεῖσθαι θανμάσω, τί ἄλλο ἡ γραμματικὸς ἀπετελέσθην ἀντὶ φιλοσόφου; Epict. c. 73.

VI. Ἄλλο τι, without ἡ following, approaches more nearly to the nature of a particle, and appears to be used elliptically for εἰ μὴ ἄλλο τι δοκεῖ σοι. Ἄλλοτι is put in the beginning, as well as in the middle, of sentences: as, φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; Ἄλλοτι, γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς· ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος· ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης. ἡ καὶ σκυτοτόμον αὐτοῖς προσθήσομεν, ἡ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτὴν; (θεραπευτῶν, ed. Bas. 1.) Plat. de Rep. ii. p. 369. *unless you are of a different opinion, unless you have anything different to propose, let one be a husbandman, &c.* The answer is φαίνεται. These words however might be taken interrogatively.

VII. Οἶον and οἶα are properly adjectives, but they are often used as particles, and signify as; in the same manner as: χέρσον περάσας οὐχὶ ναυβάτη στόλῳ, ἀλλ' ἀστίβητον οἶμον, οἶα τις σιφνεὺς κευθμῶνος ἐν σήραγγι τετρήνας μυχοῦς: Lycophr. 121. He might have said οἶός τις.

Many of the uses of οἶον are the same as those of ὥς. Thus it signifies similitude both full and perfect, when it occurs without a protasis, and also feigned or unreal. [See Ως I. iv.]—1. αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν μέσῳ νῆσον, οἶα δὲ θεός, εὐμαρῶς διεκόσμησεν: *as a god; as being a god:* Plato in Critia p. 113. θαρρεῖν, οἶα ὑπατον, ἐκέλευον,

App. Alex. i.—2. μετὰ δέησεως οἶον ἐξωθούντων με : Plat. Ep. vii. p. 339. *as it were*.

It is put for ὥς in its limitative use also : κἀγὼ μετέσχον, οἷα δὴ γυνή, φόρου : Eurip. Orest. 32. i. e. *as far as a woman could*.

Conjecturally also : [see ὥς I, xiv.] τὸ στρατόπεδον προαπεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἶον δέκα σταδίου : Thucyd. iv, 90. *about*.

Also in its augmentative or intensive use, to express wonder : [see ὥς I, xi.] οἶον ἅπαντες ἦσθ' ἄνεψ : Odyss. β, 239. *how you all sit mute !*

VIII. When it is used in exemplification, and signifies *for example, for instance*, it may sometimes, by the help of an ellipsis, be easily made appear syntactical : thus, ἄρ' οὕτως γίγνεται ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι ; οἶον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που, καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ.—ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου οἶον, ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνεται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττους ὄντος πρότερον, ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι ; Plat. Phæd. p. 70. Here οἶον may be rendered syntactical in the following manner : οἶον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον,—and οἶον τοῦτ' ἐστὶν, ὅταν μεῖζόν τι, &c. but sometimes it cannot be made appear so : e. g. ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων οἶον (*as for instance*) Χάρητι δὴ τῷ Παρίῳ, καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Αἰνιῳ : Aristot. de Rep. i. p. 11. Here τοιοῦτο or ἐστὶν cannot be understood.

IX. As οἶον denotes *quality*, so ὅσον *quantity* : it is referred to τόσον or τοσοῦτο : e. g. εἴ τις ἐπαιέσσει σε τόσον χρόνον, ὅσον ὀρώη : Theogn. 93.

It limits either *bulk*, as ὅσον ὀβολόν, ὅσον κόγχην, *as much as, or about, an obolus ; about a spoonful : or length or space* ;—1. of *place* ; as, ὅσον δὴ ἢ τρία στάδια : Plat. Phædr. p. 229. (p. 284. ed. Bip.) *about three stadia*.—2. of *time* ; as, ἐπειδὴν ἀποκοιμηθῆς, ὅσον μέτριον : Xen. Cyrop. ii. p. 60. i. e. ἀποκοιμηθῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ἐφ' ὅσον μέτριον ἂν ᾖ : *moderately ; in moderation* : fully, ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον : 1 Corinth. vii, 39. Nor does it lose this elliptical use, when subjoined to superlatives, or words having the nature of superlatives, as θαυμαστόν ὅσον, μέγιστον ὅσον. Even in the plural number : χρήματα ἔλαβε θαυμαστά ὅσα : Plat. Hipp. maj. p. 282. (p. 7. ed. Bip.) It is put *before* μάλιστα : ὅσον μάλιστα.

X. After these observations, other syntactical forms will be more easily understood : e. g. ὕπνος ἐφ' ὅσον ἡδιστος, for ὕπνος ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προβεβηκώς, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἡδιστος. Ἐν κύκλῳ περιφράσσουσιν ἐς ὅσον μακρότατον, for περιφράσσουσιν ἐς τόσον ἐς ὅσον δύναται, or δυνατόν, περιφράσσειν. This ellipsis is partly supplied by Plato, τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα : Phædr. p. 277. (p. 385. ed. Bip.) Ἀφαιρεῖται ἡμᾶς χρήματα, ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ, for ἂ. ἢ. τοσοῦτον τρόπον, ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Ἐλοιδορεῖ ὅσον γε ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, i. e. τοσοῦτο ὅσον γε ἀπὸ, or ἐκ, τοῦ λόγου εἰκάσαι ἔξεστιν. There is a similar ellipsis whenever an infinitive mood follows : καρποφορήσω ὅσον ἐπισπείσαι σοι. Epigr. for καρποφορήσω τοσοῦτο, ὅσον ἐξαρκεῖ ἐπισπείσαι, or εἰς τὸ or ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπισπείσαι. Like ὥς, in its conjectural use, it is construed in the plural with an infinitive mood,

when neither *ἐξαρκεῖ*, nor *δυνατόν*, nor *δεῖ*, can be properly understood: as, *ὅσα γε κἀμέ, Σύρον ὄντα, εἰδέναι*: as far as I, who am a Syrian, can know: Lucian. adv. Indoct. t. iii. *Εἰκὸς*, or the like, is probably understood. So, *οὐχ, ὅσα γε κἀμέ ὄραν*: Id. in Jove Tragedo.

XI. *Ὅσον οὐ* is *almost; very nearly; all but*: as, *ὅσον οὐκ ἀπολωλάμεν*: that is properly, *τοσοῦτο τοῦ ἀπολωλέναι ἀπείχομεν*, *ὅσον ἐξαρκεῖ εἰς τὸ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι*. So Thucydides, *τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσονοῦ παρόντα πόλεμον*, i, 36.

XII. *Ὅσον οὐπώ* is, *forthwith; almost immediately; only not yet*: *ὀλέθρου τοιοῦτον τοῖς μὲν αἴτιον ἤδη γεγονότα, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐσόμενον ὅσον οὐδέπω*: Herodian. i, 13. *ὅσον οὐδέπω τεθνηξομένης οἰκας*: Lucian. de Merc. Cond. c. 31. With *δὲ* intervening: *νομίσαντες, πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἢ ἦλθον ἐπιεῖναι, ὅσον δὲ οὐδέπω παρῆναι*: Thucyd. iv, 125.

It is elegantly placed between an article and the substantive with which the article agrees: *τὴν ὅσον οὐδέπω σφαγὴν ἀναμένων*: Heliodor. x, 28.

XIII. *Ὅσον μὴ* and *ὅσον μήποτε*, from the nature of the particle *μὴ*, do not deny, but forbid; or, if they deny, they deny a part only of the whole: as, *ὅσον γ' ἂν αὐτὸς μὴ ποτε ψαύω χερσίν*: Sophocl. Trachin. 1221. [1216. ed. Br. *μὴ ποτιψαύων*] as far as I can without using my own hands to do it; only not touching it myself. *Φυλάσσειν δὲ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μὴδὲν ἤσσαν, ὅσα μὴ ἀποβαίνοντας*: Thucyd. iv, 16. but without landing: as far as it could be done without going ashore.

XIV. *Τι* the enclitic has often a diminuent force, and signifies, *in some measure; in a manner; somewhat*: *εἰ μὴ τι ἀδόκιμοί ἐστε*: 2 Corinth. xiii, 5. And with the comparative degree: *εἰ τι ἐκείνους φοβερωτέρους ποιήσομεν*: Xenoph. Cyrop. iii, p. 79. Joined with a verb, it detracts something from the force of the latter: *μενῶ, τὸν ἐχθρὸν εἴ τι τιμωρήσομαι*: Eurip. Or. 1102. Thucydides places it before the word qualified by it: *ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων τινι μᾶλλον σπονδῶν*: iv, 21. for *μᾶλλον τι*, rather more than usual.

XV. On the contrary, when *τι* is negated by another particle, it augments the force of the verb: [rather, it makes the negation more absolute and total:] *οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω*: Iliad. α, 243. So, *οὐδέν τι θαυμαστόν*, Xen. Cyrop. viii, p. 208. *Τι* augments even without negation; but with an ellipsis of *μέγα*, *σεμνόν*, *μεγαλοπρεπές*, or the like: *σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε*: Plat. Phædr. p. 242. for *μέγα τι*.

XVI. *Τί* oxytoned is interrogative. With an ellipsis it inquires into causes.—1. into the ratiocinative cause, or *reason*: *τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο*; Plat. Phædr. p. 86. *why*, for *διὰ τί*; The ellipsis is supplied by St. Matth. ix, 11.—2. the *efficient* cause: *τί δειλοί ἐστε*; *what is it that makes you fearful?* St. Matth. viii, 27. for *τί ὅτι*.—3. the *suasive* or *impulsive* cause, or *motive*: *τί ἐξήλθετε εἰς τὴν ἔρημον θεάσασθαι*; St. Matth. xi, 7. or, with a negative, the *dissuasive* or *detering* cause: *τί δ' οὐχὶ θυγατὶς Ἑρμιόνης πέμπεις δέμας*; Eurip. Or. 107. The ellipsis of *ὅτι* is supplied in Acts v, 4.—4. the *final* cause, or *purpose*: *τί οὖν πρεσβεύετε*; Demosth. de Cherson. p. 39. Here *βουλόμενοι* is

understood, *τί οὖν βουλόμενοι*. It is expressed by Demosthenes, *pro Cor.* p. 336. *τί βουλόμενοι μετεπέμψασθε*;

XVII. *Τί γάρ*; signifies *why not? to be sure*. This it does in consequence of an ellipsis:—1. Tynd. *Μενέλαε, προσφθέγγη νιν, ἀνόσιον κᾶρα*; Menel. *τί γάρ*; Eurip. *Orest.* 481. [476. ed. Pors.] The full expression would be *προσφθέγγομαι τί γάρ κωλύει*;—2. And to a question not figurative, as that just quoted, but plain and direct, it gives, by a figurative question, what amounts to a vehemently affirmative answer. Thus to the question, whether Sophists could impart to their disciples a faculty of denying such things as are manifest in the heavens and the earth, the reply is *τί γάρ*; *most undoubtedly*: Plat. *Soph.* p. 232. *underst. δύναται ἀντιλογικοὺς ποιεῖν. τί γάρ κωλύει*;—3. It is used in anticipation of objections: thus, *τί γάρ εἰ ἡπίστησάν τινες*; *μη ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Θεοῦ καταργήσει*; Rom. iii. 3. *for what if some did not believe?*—4. In affirmative answers in which *γάρ* demands a reason why what is said should not be so, and *τι* denies by interrogation the possibility of the thing being otherwise: e. g., Socr. *τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους*. Phædr. *τί γάρ*; Plat. Phædr. p. 258. (p. 349. ed. Bip.) *for, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τὸ γράφειν τί γάρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο αἰσχρόν*;—5. In continuation of discourse, when, something having been rejected or denied, something else is proposed anew for consideration: thus, *ἔχομεν ἂν, ἔφη, ὧ ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ ποίῳ ποτὲ ἔργῳ ἄνθρωπος ὀψοφάγος καλεῖται*; *ἐσθίουσι μὲν γάρ δὴ πάντες ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ ὄψον, ὅταν παρῇ· ἀλλ' οἶμαι, οὐπῶ ἐπὶ γε τούτῳ ὀψοφάγοι καλοῦνται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη τις τῶν παρόντων. τί γάρ*; *ἔφη, ἔάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ σίτου τὸ ὄψον αὐτοῦ ἐσθίῃ, μὴ ἄσκήσεως ἀλλ' ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, πότερον ὀψοφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἢ οὐ*; Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. p. 789. [c. xiv. § 3.] *q. d. that case being set aside then, what say you to this? Again then*.—6. With *ἀλλ'* *ἢ* added; and occurring either in the beginning of a sentence, as, *τί γάρ ἀλλ' ἢ ἄνοιά ἐστιν*; *for what is it else but folly?* or in the middle; as, *καταλαβοῦσα τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ἐν ὀδυρμοῖς καὶ δάκρυσι, καὶ τί γάρ ἀλλ' ἢ πενθοῦσαν*; Heliod. *Æthiop.* viii. 7. *and what but mourning? and mourning*; *for what else (could she do? viz.)* *Τί* denies interrogatively, that any thing else could be done.

In the first use the particle *δὴ*, either confirmative or hortative, is sometimes added: *τί οὖν*; *οἰόμεθά τινα τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ὀρθὴν εἶναι*; *Answ. τί γάρ δὴ καὶ κωλύει*; Plat. *Politic.* p. 292. (p. 77. ed. Bip.) This answer virtually denies that any thing hinders; and the negation is strengthened both by the interrogative form, and by the exhortation signified by *δὴ* to discover if possible anything that can hinder it: *q. d. say you yourself, if you can discover any reason why it should not be so*.

XVIII. In *τί δέ*; *τί* gives expectation of something worthy of attention, and *δὲ* serves for transition. After an enumeration of instances of the power of wealth, Chremylus says to Plutus, *τί δέ*; *τὰς τριήρεις οὐ σὺ πληροῖς*; *εἰπέ μοι*: Aristoph. *Plut.* 172. *and again, what say you to this? is it not you that man the triremes pray?* The most common use of *τί δέ*; is in introduction of a fresh topic, when a preceding one has been already despatched. Thus Socrates,

after showing that Lysias had neglected definition in a composition which he criticizes, passes on to another fault: *τί δέ; τᾶλλα οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλησθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου*; Plat. Phædr. p. 264. (p. 358. ed. Bip.) Sometimes *τί δέ* is understood: *εἰ νυκτὸς αὐτοῖς προσβάλομεν ἐκ λόγου*; Eurip. Phœniss. 731. for, *τί δ' εἰ*.

Δὴ too is added; either in its signification of time, *now*; or in its hortatory use: as, *τί δὲ δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῖόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι—ἄρ' οὐ καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι*; Plat. Protag. p. 358. (p. 185. ed. Bip.) q. d. *but come, answer me this*. And again presently afterwards, *τί δὲ δὴ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοῖόνδε λέγετε—*;

And as exhortation is used only on occasions of importance, hence *τί δὲ δὴ* is employed when interrogation arrives at length where it exults and triumphs as it were: thus, *τί δὲ δὴ; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἀπεργασίας*; Plat. Euthyphr. p. 14.

Sometimes the emphasis and hortatory signification of *δὴ* are less apparent; and it then probably signifies merely *now*. Thus in a frequent repetition of *τί δέ*; intervenes *τί δὲ δὴ; τί δὲ δὴ; ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν κεκτῆσθαι*, &c. Plat. Hipp. maj. p. 575.

But the addition of *δὴ* is peculiarly proper and necessary, when by a gradation of propositions one has at length arrived at the main point, at the scope to which everything preceding has tended. Thus after a series of questions, tending indirectly to establish the principle that civil war was to be avoided in his imaginary republic, Socrates at last interrogates as follows: *τί δὲ δὴ; ἢν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται; Δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ ἡμεροὶ ἔσονται*; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 469. (p. 44. ed. Bip.)

XIX. *Τί δ' οὐ* differs from *πῶς δ' οὐ* in this, that the latter excludes every *mode* by which a thing may not be; the former every *reason* why it may not be: *ἢ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίῳσις διαλύει—*. Answ. *τί δ' οὐ; why not?* i. e. *certainly*. Plat. de Rep. v. p. 462. (p. 19. ed. Bip.)

XX. *Τί δ' οὐ* sometimes replies to a part only, not the whole, of a preceding sentence or proposition: e. g. *τό γε μεμερισμένον, πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὄν καὶ ὄλον, ἐν εἶναι*. To this the answer is, *τί δ' οὐ; not τί δ' οὐ κωλύει*, &c. for so *τί γὰρ* (κωλύει viz.) would be more suitable: but *τί δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔν*; Plat. Sophist. p. 245. (p. 257. ed. Bip.)

XXI. *Τί μὴν*; is used as an affirmative answer; *τι* signifying, by figurative interrogation, that nothing imaginable can be opposed to what precedes, and *μὴν* confirming what is so signified: *οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρω προσήκει προστάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν*; Answ. *τί μὴν*; Plat. de Rep. v. p. 453. (p. 11. ed. Bip.) But *τί μὴν*; is customarily used in merely expressing assent: *ὁρᾷς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον*; Answ. *τί μὴν*; Plat. Phædr. p. 229. (p. 284. ed. Bip.) So p. 272. (375. Bip.)

XXII. *Τί οὖν* is used—1. when it is inquired which of two or more things is necessarily true. After observing that to the mind of man some things are plain and evident, others doubtful,

Socrates proceeds to ask, τί οὖν; τὸν ἔρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων, ἢ τῶν μὴ; Plat. Phædr. p. 263. (357. Bip.) *tell me therefore.* Οὖν denotes the conclusion that love must be in one or other of those classes of things, and τί inquires in which.—2. in the protasis or introduction of an objection which one supposes to be made to himself against a conclusion, for the most part a false one, which he has drawn from what precedes. Thus Socrates, having proved that love is a blind and mad desire, recants, as it were, and feigns himself amazed, as if he had uttered something absurd and profane: τί οὖν; *what? what then?* τὸν ἔρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἡγῇ; and afterwards adds, *if love be a divinity, as it is, it cannot be anything evil.*

XXIII. Τί ποτε is used in interrogation significative of ardent desire of information. (See ποτὲ vi.) In poetry the two particles are contracted into τίπτε, and, before an aspirated vowel, into τίφθ': ἦρη, τίπτε σὸς υἱὸς ἐμὸν ῥόον ἔχραε κήδειν; Iliad. φ, 369. [Hoogeveen quotes Demosth. de Cherson. p. 42. for an example of τίπτε used in prose; but in the passage cited, τί ποτε is the reading of Reiske's edition p. 105. l. 17.] In Aristoph. Pac. 61. [62. Br.] τί and ποτε are separated by another intervening word.

XXIV. The verbs which assume the nature of particles are ἄγε, ἴθι, φέρε, εἰπέ.

Ἄγε retains the nature of a verb, whenever it is construed with the second person of the imperative mood; as, ἄγε, λέγε, τίς ἐλαβέ σε μόρος—; Diog. Laert. in Diog. p. 415. ἄγε, φράζε: Aristoph. Pac. 357. *come tell me.* But it truly and properly takes the nature of a particle, when construed with a different person or number. Thus the first person singular follows it in Iliad. α, 542. εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι κεφαλῇ κατανεύσομαι: the third person singular in Odys. θ, 542. ἀλλ' ἄγ', ὁ μὲν σχεθέτω. The first person plural of the subjunctive mood more frequently follows; as, ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ χαζώμεθ' ἐφ' ἵππων: Iliad. ε, 249. *but come, &c.*

XXV. And if it be true, as Hesychius says, that ἄγειν is ἵεναι, and it thence derives its hortatory force, the conversion of ἄγε into a mere particle is indubitable, especially when it is put before ἴωμεν, as, ἄγε νῦν ἴωμεν, Aristoph. Vesp. 1256. [1264. ed. Br.] Pac. 851. For not only the disagreement of persons, but the tautology also, must in that case prevent its being considered as a verb.

It is construed with the first person of the future indicative also: εἰ δ' ἄγε, τοὺς ἂν ἐγὼ ἐπιόψομαι: Iliad. ι, 167. ἀλλ' ἄγε, νῆα μέλαιναν ἐρύσσομεν: Odys. π, 348.

XXVI. It is frequently construed with the second person plural, although it retains the form of the singular. e. g. ἀλλ' ἄγε, Φαιήκων βητάρμονες, ὅσσοι ἄριστοι, παῖσατε: Odys. θ, 250. Even with the plural δεῦτε: δεῦτ' ἄγε, Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες: Odys. θ, 11.

XXVII. It does not always keep the termination of the singular number: e. g. ἀλλ' ἄγετ', ὅφρ' ἂν ἐγὼ πολεμῖα τεύχεα δύνω, τόφρ' ὑμεῖς εὐχέσθε: Iliad. η, 194. where it may possibly retain the nature of a verb, if ἄγετε, εὐχέσθε be taken for ἴτε καὶ εὐχέσθε. But it is manifestly a particle, when the first person plural follows, as,

ἀλλ' ἄγε', ὡς ἂν ἐγὼν εἴπω, πειθόμεθα πάντες: Iliad. ι, 26. 700. ξ, 74.

XXVIII. The particle *φέρε* has the same use and force as *ἄγε*, but it does not occur in the plural number. It is employed—1. for self-excitement, with the first person singular of the subjunctive mood; as, *φέρε νῦν ἅμα τήνδ' ἐγχεάμενος κῆγ' ῥοφῶ*: Aristoph. Vesp. 901. [906. ed. Br.] In this use it is most frequently followed by the first aorist of the subjunctive; by the second, only when there is no first, or when the first is not in use: *φέρε δὴ, κατίδω, ποῖ τοὺς λίθους ἀφέλωμεν*: Id. in Pac. 360. [361. ed. Br.] It constantly retains the form of the singular number, even when more than one are excited or instigated: e. g. it is construed with the first pers. plur. *φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέγομεν*: Plat. Euthyphr. p. 7. *φέρε δὴ, κῆκεῖνο ἐξετάσωμεν*: Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 369. With the second pers. plur. *φέρε γάρ, πρὸς θεῶν σκοπεῖτε*: Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. p. 81.

It is to be observed that *καὶ* often follows *φέρε*, as, *φέρε καὶ περὶ τούτων διαλάβωμεν*: Diog. Laert. iii. p. 217.

XXIX. *ἴθι* also, originally the imperative mood of a verb, has become a hortatory particle, even when construed with the second person singular: as, *βάσκι, ἴθι, οὐλε ὄνειρε, θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν*: Iliad. β, 8.

It is construed by Plato with the first person of the 1 aor. subjunctive: *ἴθι δὴ, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε*: Phileb. *ἴθι δὴ, καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα*: Id. in Gorg. cited by Thom. Mag.

XXX. The imperative *εἰπέ* retains the form of the singular number, even when more than one are addressed. It has then the force both of a verb and of a particle, and expresses both command and instigation, being put for *ἄγε, εἰπάτε*: e. g. *εἰπέ μοι, τί φειδόμεσθα τῶν λίθων, ᾧ δημόται*: Aristoph. Acharn. 318. [319. ed. Br.] *pray tell me; tell me now.*

XXXI. Of the *prepositions* with their cases, which assume the nature of particles, the first to be mentioned is *ἀνθ' ὧν*. This becomes a particle, only when nothing precedes to which the relative *ὧν* can be referred; or rather, only when the mention of something to be required either follows, (which is the most common case) or precedes: e. g. *παραχρῆμα δὲ ἐπάταξεν αὐτὸν ἄγγελος Κυρίου, ἀνθ' ὧν οὐκ ἔδωκε τὴν δόξαν τῷ Θεῷ*: Acts xii, 23. *because he gave not God the glory*; or, more suitably to the nature of the phrase, *in requital for this, that he gave not*, &c. for the causal sense which *ἀνθ' ὧν* has acquired from this use is not a general one, but only one arising out of deserts, good or bad. This proper and primary sense of the phrase, however, being kept in mind, it may be rendered *because*, when it precedes the matter for requital, and *for which reason*, or *wherefore*, when it follows it: thus, *εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμώμοκεν, εὐθὺς δηλὸς ἔστι παρεσκευασμένος οὐδὲν (f. μηδὲν) ποιήσειν τῶν δεόντων ἀνθ' ὧν δικαίως ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρήσῃσθε*: Lycurg. adv. Leocrat. c. 18. *wherefore*, &c. So our Saviour, after saying, *there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, neither hid, that shall not be known*, concludes, *ἀνθ' ὧν ὅσα ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ εἶπατε, ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ἀκου-*

σθήσονται· καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὸ οὗς ἐλαλήσατε ἐν τοῖς ταμελοῖς, κηρυχθήσεται ἐπὶ τῶν δωμαίων : St. Luke xii, 3. *therefore, &c.* [I cannot perceive any signification of *requital* here.]

XXXII. Ἐφ' ᾧ, when it assumes the nature of a particle, signifies, *on condition that*. It is construed with a future tense ; as, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιῶνται : Thucyd. With an infinitive mood ; as, ἐψηφίσαντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέχεσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς τε ἄρμους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐξάγειν, τὰ τε στρατόπεδα διαλύειν : Xen. Hist. Gr. vi. p. 593. πῶς ἂν οὗτος ἐθέλοι τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποστρεφεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ κακόδοξος εἶναι ; Id. Agesil. p. 665. So ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ : οἱ δ' ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ καίειν τὰς κώμας : Id. Anab. iv. p. 321. With a first aorist : διώκω δέ, εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφ' ᾧ κατελήφθην ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ : Philipp. iii, 12. *if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus* : q. d. Christ apprehended or took me on that condition, that I should pursue, &c. With a future of the indicative, and (what is not very usual) in narrating something past : εἰ βούλοιντο ἄνευ κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τὰ τε ὕπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ' ᾧ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ τηρήσονται : Thucyd. iv, 30. But possibly ᾧ may here retain its nature as a relative, the condition preceding instead of following it : in that case it must be rendered *on which condition*, i. e. on the condition of surrendering. With a subjunctive mood accompanied by ἂν : τοῖς μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦτο, ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν μισθὸν λαμβάνωσιν : Xen. Mem. i. p. 730. [Here ἐφ' ᾧ has certainly no resemblance to a particle, but ᾧ retains the nature of a relative pronoun, and agrees with the antecedent τοῦτο.]

XXXIII. Ἐφ' ᾧτε requires an infinitive mood : Δέξιππον δὲ αἰρεθέντα οἶδα ὑπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἄρχειν τῆς πεντηκοντόρου, ἧς ἡγησάμεθα παρὰ Τραπεζοντιῶν, ἐφ' ᾧτε πλοῖα συλλέγειν, οἷς σωζοίμεθα : Xen. Anab. vi. p. 390. It is construed with a future of the infinitive : thus Tithraustes directs gold to be given to the governors of the cities, ἐφ' ᾧτε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους : Xen. Hist. Gr. iii, p. 502. With the aor. 1. of the same mood : αἰρεθέντες ἐφ' ᾧτε ἐγγράψαι νόμους : ib. ii. p. 462.

XXXIV. Καθὼ, compounded of κατὰ and ὁ, signifies literally, *according to which*. It is a limitative or restrictive particle, and may be rendered *as, as being, considered as, so far forth as, &c.* It limits variously : e. g. a species ; as, καθὼ ἄνθρωπος, *in respect of being a man* ; so far forth as he is a man. A manner ; as, τὸ γὰρ, τί προσενώμεθα, καθὼ δεῖ, οὐκ οἶδμεν : Rom. viii, 26. *as we ought*.

XXXV. When ἂν is added, that particle, by its power of rendering expressions less definite, relaxes the restriction. In the New Testament ἐάν is often substituted for ἂν, as in ὁ ἐάν, ὅπου ἐάν : e. g. καθὼ ἐάν ἕχῃ τις, εὐπρόσδεκτος· οὐ καθὼ οὐκ ἔχει : 2 Corinth. viii, 12. *according to whatsoever a man hath*.

XXXVI. The addition of τι also renders the limitation less strict. Καθότι is peculiarly appropriate, when things, which have not yet come to an issue, are spoken of : ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθότι ἐσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου : Thucyd. iv, 118. *how ; by what method*.

XXXVII. Like καθὼ, καθότι may signify *cause*, in respect of that

sense of *κατά*, according to, by which it may denote congruity between cause and effect : e. g. *καὶ οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῖς τέκνον, καθότι ἡ Ἑλισαβὲς ἦν στεῖρα, καὶ ἀμφοτέροι προβεβηκότες ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις αὐτῶν ἦσαν* : St. Luke i, 7. *because that Elizabeth was barren, &c.* The following change in the form of expression will make the congruity signified more apparent : *κατὰ τὸ τὴν Ἑλισαβὲς στεῖραν εἶναι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρους προβεβηκότας εἶναι.*

XXXVIII. As *καθὸ* limits quality, so *καθόσον* limits quantity ; the force of limitation being in *κατά*, the signification of quantity in *ὅσον*. Thus, *οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία, οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ, καθόσον δύναται, ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι* ; Plat. Phæd. p. 64. *as much as, as far as, he can ; for κατὰ τοσούτον ἀφεστάναι, καθόσον δύναται.* Lysias, cited by Budæus, p. 130. has the full expression : *καθόσον ἕκαστος οἶός τ' ἦν, κατὰ τοσούτον ἐβοήθει.*

XXXIX. In *καθάπερ*, for *κατά ταῦτα ἅπερ*, *κατά* limits, *ἃ* constitutes relatively the matter for limitation, and *περ* heightens and amplifies the similitude. Thus, *καὶ μοι ὡμολόγει καθάπερ ἐκείνος διηγείτο* : Plat. Sympos. p. 173. (p. 166. ed. Bip.) *exactly as he related ; i. e. agreeably to all particulars whatsoever that he had related.* So, *Εὐφραίῳ μὲν συνεβούλευσα, καθάπερ ἐπέστελλες, τῶν σῶν ἐπιμελουμένων, περὶ ταῦτα διατρίβειν* : Plat. Ep. v.

XL. *Καθάπερ*, as well as *ὡς*, may be rendered *utpote, as being* : a use which arises from the signification of limitation included in *καθάπερ* : *βασιλέα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων δικῶν μὴ ἐξεῖναι δικαστὴν γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἱερέα, καθαρεύοντα καὶ δεσμοῦ καὶ φυγῆς* : Plat. Ep. viii. p. 356. *properly, according to this, that he is a priest.*

XLI. *Εἰ* is added to *καθάπερ* with some signification of condition, and elliptically : e. g. *ἔστι γὰρ δὴ τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης, καταπερεὶ τινων ζῶων* : Plato (or Dio) Ep. v. p. 321. If *φωνή ἐστι*, taken from the preceding words, be understood after *καταπερεὶ*, the expression will be, more fully, *κατὰ ταῦτα, καθ' ἃ φωνή ἐστι ζῶων τιῶν*, or *καθ' ἃ ἂν εἴη.*

XLII. *Καθὼς* occurs in the New Testament^a for *καθὸ* or *καθάπερ*. For *καθό* : *ταχινὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόθεσις τοῦ σκηνώματός μου, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐδήλωσέ μοι* : 2 Pet. i, 14. *καθὼς γέγραπται*, 2 Corinth. viii, 15. It limits manner in 2 Timoth. [Thessal.] iii, 1. *ἵνα ὁ λόγος τοῦ Κυρίου τρέχῃ καὶ δοξάζηται, καθὼς καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς.*

^a Hoogveen was of opinion that *καθὼς* is not to be found in ancient Greek Authors, because they did not compound prepositions with adverbs, although Mæris says *καθότι*, 'Αττικῶς' *καθὼς* δὲ

Ἑλληνες. H. Stephens in the Index of his Thesaurus cites *καθὼς ἔγω λέλεκται*, from Aristot. de Mundo. See the references given in the new Edition, printed by Mr. Valpy, 10993. d. J.S.

THE END.





2095
Hoogveen, Hendrik
Greek particles; ed. & tr. by Seager.

LaGr.Gr
H779d
.Es

**University of Toronto
Library**

**DO NOT
REMOVE
THE
CARD
FROM
THIS
POCKET**

Acme Library Card Pocket
LOWE-MARTIN CO. LIMITED

